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DEPARTMENT OF CIVICS AND ETHICAL STUDIES**



**CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF ETHICS LIAISON UNITS IN COMBATING  
CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF LEMO WOREDA, HADIYA ZONE, SNNPRS,  
ETHIOPIA**

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BY  
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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART IN CIVICS AND ETHICAL STUDIES**

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**Declaration**


I, the undersigned, hereby declare that this thesis “*Challenges and Prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in Combating Corruption: The case of Lemo Woreda, Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS, Ethiopia.*” is my original work and has not been submitted partially or fully by me or any other person for award of any degree in any other University and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

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MEKELLE UNIVERSITY  
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CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF ETHICS LIAISON UNITS IN COMBATING  
CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF LEMO WOREDRA, HADIYA ZONE, SNNPRS,  
ETHIOPIA.

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**APPROVAL SHEET OF BOARDS**

We, the undersigned, members of the Board of Examiners of the final open defence by Gizaw Bekele Botoro have read and evaluated his thesis entitled “*CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF ETHICS LIAISON UNITS IN COMBATING CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF LEMO WOREDA, HADIYA ZONE, SNNPRS, ETHIOPIA*”, and examined the candidate. This is, therefore, to certify that the thesis has been accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of masters of Art in Civics and Ethical Studies.

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## Abbreviation



<b>ACA</b>	Anti-Corruption Agency
<b>ACRC</b>	Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
<b>AUCPCC</b>	African Union Convention on Preventing & Combating Corruption
<b>CGG</b>	Campaign for Good Governance
<b>CIPE</b>	Centre for International Private Enterprise
<b>CPIB</b>	Corrupt Practice Investigation Bureau
<b>CPI</b>	Corruption Perception Index
<b>CS</b>	Civil Servants
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>CSR</b>	Civil Service Reform Program
<b>EACC</b>	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
<b>FEACC</b>	Federal Ethics and Anti - Corruption Commission
<b>ELUs</b>	Ethics Liaison Units
<b>FDRE</b>	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
<b>EPRDF</b>	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
<b>FHI</b>	Family Health International
<b>FGDs</b>	Focused Group Discussions
<b>GOPAC</b>	Global organization program against corruption
<b>HoPR</b>	House of People Representative
<b>IACA</b>	Independent Anti-Corruption Authority
<b>IER</b>	Institution of Educational Research

<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>SNNPR</b>	South Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PSCBP</b>	Public Sector Capacity Building Program
<b>SPC</b>	Special Penal Code
<b>TI</b>	Transparency International
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCAC</b>	United Nations Convention against Corruption
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>WB</b>	World Bank

## Abstract

*Corruption fosters an anti-democratic environment characterized by insecurity, declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and is biggest obstacles to economic and human development. There has been global, continental, regional and national campaigns against corruption. Ethiopia has been making her efforts against corruption by organizing institutions from federal to lower administration levels. This thesis explores the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in Lemo woreda, SNNPRS. The researcher employed qualitative methodology which involves the qualitative data and analysis. To gather data primary and secondary sources were used. The researcher identified the qualitative evidence that the ELUs are established to strive to create an aware society, to prevent corruption offences and to receive and investigate any suspected cases of corruption offences. Principal-Agent and Collective-Action Theories of corruption were used as theoretical framework of the study. Establishment by formal proclamations, and clear duties, higher salary payment for officers, having religious society, having access to FM radio by local language (Hadiyyisa), and the increasing capacity of the government to allocate budge were seen as prospects to ELUs in combating corruption. Despite this, institutional structure, implementation of employment criteria, dependency of officers, lack of full power to prosecution of suspects, shortage of budget, lack of public trust and their reluctance to cooperate, attitude of society towards corruption and ethnic or race based thinking towards corrupters and absence of strong political commitments were seen as challenges to ELUs. Based on the findings the researcher recommend that the structure to be rearranged, the placement of the officers to be based on*

*strongly set criteria, officers to be accountable to the Sub-branch of commission in woreda, to be given full power or independence, and be empowered to accomplish tasks, sufficient budget, and strong political leaders commitment are important things for ELUs' works to be real.*

*Key Words: corruption, ELUs, combating corruption, challenges, prospects, Lemo Woreda*

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## Chapter One

### Introduction

This chapter consists of background of the study, statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives, significance of the study, delimitation on of the study, limitation of the study, organization of the study, and operational definition of key words.

#### **1.1. Background of the Study**

Corruption according to World Bank (2007), is the abuse of public office for private gain. According to Mbah (2010), corruption exists in every nation of the world and what is different is its degree, mode, and dimension.

The negative impact of corruption on development is no longer questioned. Evidence from across the globe confirms that corruption impacts the poor disproportionately. Corruption hinders economic development, reduces social services, and diverts investments in infrastructure, institutions and social services. Moreover, it fosters an anti-democratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. Corruption therefore reflects a democracy, human rights and governance deficit that negatively impacts on poverty and human security (UNDP, 2004). Again, according to Estan(2006), across the world Corruption is the major societal problem. It is one of the biggest obstacles to economic and human development and it is still a growing cancer worldwide.

In Ethiopia, according to corruption survey of public perceptions carried out by Addis Ababa University in 2001, fraud, trickery, cheating, embezzlement, extraction, nepotism, bribery and theft were found to be the major features by which corruption manifested itself.

Accordingly, various international, continental and regional anti-corruption instruments adopted and came in to force with the intention of preventing and combating corruption in a coordinated manner such like the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, 2003), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC, 2003), and East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA, 2007).

At the same time, domestic anti-corruption institutions with the mandate to prevent and combat corruption have increased rapidly in many countries. According to UNDP(2011), most of the domestic anti-corruption institutions were established as part of a broader good governance reform program in late 1990s. During this time, there was a widespread belief that establishing anti-corruption institutions could play a key role in the fight against corruption.

Ethiopia is a state party to those conventions and has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) by United Nations Convention against Corruption Ratification Proclamation No.544/2007, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) by the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption Ratification Proclamation No.545/2007 and East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA, 2007) that FEACC of the FDRE became member in 2013. These instruments cover a range of measures from corruption prevention to criminalization of corruption offences, international cooperation and asset recovery to be implemented by contracting parties.

According to Tamyalew (2010), more and more international and governmental actors are creating specialized entities to combat corruption. In line with this, the FDRE constitution article 12, the Revised SNNPRS constitution article 12 sets out the principles determining the conduct and accountability of government, setting out the requirement of government to be transparent and Accountable. Based on this, as a part of a series of wide ranging reforms Ethiopian government established the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) on May 24, 2001 under proclamation 235/2001 adopted by House of People Representative (HoPR) and set out its powers in the revised Proclamation 433/2005. The Commission has adapted Hong Kong's three-pronged approach to fighting corruption, which incorporates prevention /ethics education, investigation, and prosecution (FEACC web site, [www.feac.gov.et](http://www.feac.gov.et)). According to the corruption prevention policy of Ethiopia, the main strategies are awareness creation through face to face education (Proclamation No. 433/2005).

In view of that, the major powers and duties given to the FEACC are mandates to combat corruption and other improprieties (with other institutions and partners) by creating awareness through educating the public about the effects of corruption, and by the promotion of ethics in public service and in society; Prevent corruption through the study of practices and procedures in public offices and public enterprises; Strive to create and promote integrity in public service by

detecting, investigating and prosecuting alleged or suspected cases of corruption or breaches of the public office and public enterprise code of ethics and other improprieties in public offices and public enterprises; Prepare and monitor the implementation of codes of ethics for public offices and public enterprises (outside of the legislature and judiciary); and Conduct research both into the nature and extent of corruption in Ethiopia, but also into particular current practices and procedures in the public service and public bodies ( Proclamation No. 433 of 2005).

To combat corruption in a decentralized ways in accordance with the FEACC Establishment Proclamation No. 235/2001 article 20 the regional states in Ethiopia are given authority to establish their own regional anti-corruption commissions. Accordingly, in SNNPRSEthics and Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2002 (SNNPRS EACC Proclamation No, 48/1994).These institution has been making an effort in fighting corruption and improprieties which impede the development, democracy and good governance in the region. To strengthen the anti-corruption struggle the SNNPR Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission has been establishingELUs in different sectors or offices in regional bureaus,Zonal departments, especial woreda, woreda and town administration offices. Ethics Liaison Units (ELUs) is the major ethics infrastructure which was launched in public office and government enterprises by establishment code No. 84/2003 of SNNPRS Council of Administration whereby mandated to prevent Corruption in lower decentralizations. Therefore, this research was mainly focused on exploring the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in Lemo Woreda.

### **1.2.Statement of the problem**

According to the World Bank (2007), corruption is an important aspect of poor governance, and often defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. Corruption if left unattended could spread like wild fire and it is like HIV/AIDS in that it may spread and affect a much larger population if left unchecked (Ibid). Corruption also undermines the achievement of a constant feature of democratic societies with good governance, namely predictable and reliable institutional performance particularly in the executive and State organizations (Matlhare, 2006).

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries where the prevalence of corruption has been uncontrolled (Selamu, 2010). In Ethiopia in order to combat corruption effectively, the government established the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (FEACC) at the federal government level. Following that, there has been wide spread establishment of regional

ethics and anti-corruption commissions to fight, prevent and prosecute corruption crimes in their respective jurisdictions.

Accordingly, in SNNPR Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2002 with the aim of preventing and fighting corruption (SNNPRS EACC Proclamation No, 48/1994). As like the federal government, the SNNPR in general, and lower administrative areas like Lemo Woreda in particular, have on tendency to be free from the socio-economic development discourages because of the corruption. For that reason, SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission has been scaling up its effort to combat corruption in its jurisdiction by establishing different ethics infrastructures in lower levels of the government. The main body established in lower level public offices and public enterprises is said to be Ethics Liaison Unit with the aim to prevent corruption and bad working habits.

Here, bad working habits or unethical behaviors can be understood as IER, AAU (2001), stated actions like bribery, nepotism, patronage, conflict of interest, misuse or stealing of government property, selling of favors, receiving kickbacks, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, misappropriation. Therefore, Ethics Liaison Units are responsible to prevent such behaviors and other evils of corruption. However, Ethics Liaison Units are given afore mentioned responsibilities by Ethics and Anti-corruption commission of SNNPRS, it is obvious to perceive that such institutions might have different prospects that support their achievements and challenges that create obstacles for their achievements. But to the best of this researcher's knowledge the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in lower administrative areas have not been explored particularly in this study area. Researches in Ethiopia conducted mostly tend to focus on national and regional levels and there has been little attention to study the lower anti-corruption agencies. For example researches by, Tamyalew (2010), a Review of the Effectiveness of the Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Commission of Ethiopia, Gigiso (2015), Human Rights Approach to Combating Corruption in Ethiopia: The Case Of SNNPR'S' Ethics and Anticorruption Commission, Negash (2016), the Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Institutions in Implementing International Anti-corruption Instruments: The Case of the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of Ethiopia and Dr. Minhaj (PhD) & Daniel (2017), Assessing the Effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units in Combating Corruption: The Case of Hadiya Zone. These researches have criticized the anti-corruption bodies to be ineffective but they have not given due attention to explore the

challenges and prospects of the ELUs in fighting corruption particularly in lower administrative areas. So, this study in order to fill that gap tray to explore or investigate the practically existingprospectsfor Ethics Liaison Units to achieve their goals and challenges that prohibit Ethics Liaison Units from achieving their goals at Lemo woreda. Based on these, the specific questions that guided the research in this study are:

1. What are the objectives that the Ethics Liaison Units are founded in the lower administrative areas?
2. What are the prospects for the Ethics Liaison Units to achieve their goals in combating corruption in the study area?
3. What are the challenges that prohibit Ethics Liaison Units from achieving their goals in combating corruption in the study area?

### **1.3.Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.3.1. General Objective: -**

The main objective of this research is to explore the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in Lemo woreda, Hadiya zone.

#### **1.3.2. Specific Objectives: -**

The specific objectives of this study are:

1. To recognize the objective that the Ethics Liaison Units are founded in the lower administrative areas?
2. To explore the prospects that the Ethics Liaison Units have to achieve their goals in combating corruption in the study area?
3. To explore the challenges that prohibits Ethics Liaison Units from achieving their goals in combating corruption in the study area?

### **1.4.Significances of the Study**

The government in Ethiopia has been working to fight against corruption at all levels of administration from the federal to the lower administrative areas. Lemo Woreda is one of the lower administrative areas. Therefore, the finding of this research will have the following importance or purpose for Lemo woreda in particular and Hadiya zone, as well as for SNNPR government in general. The main significances are first, for the public of the study area to be aware of the objectives of Ethics Liaison Units, second, for the Ethics Liaison Units in order to be motivated to use different existing prospects in combating corruption, third, for rules and

regulation makers of the region concerning the ELUs to take in to consideration the existing prospects and hindering challenges of ELUs in combating corruption and put mechanisms to solve such problems, and finally, for researchers who have an interest in the related issues that they can use this study as an additional reference material.

### **1.5. Delimitations of the Study**

It is advisable to limit the study size and scope of the problem to a manageable size (Leithwood, 2008). The scope of this study was delimited only on the challenges and prospects of the ELUs in Lemo woreda, Hadiya zone. Accordingly, Lemo woreda was chosen purposively having the reason that the researcher has pre-information or close information about the study area and due the rationality for proper usage of time and resource because of the proximity of the researcher's work place to the study area. For the purpose of selection of the respondents, 7 Ethics Liaison Units officers were taken by purposive sampling method based on the sectors where ELUs were available in the woreda of the study, and in addition to that 14 Ethics Focal Persons were selected through purposive method from all the sectors where ELUs were not available. Therefore, findings, conclusions, and recommendations which were drawn in this research were limited to the context of this study area.

### **1.6. Limitation of the Study**

Limitations are restrictions in a study that may decrease the credibility and generalize ability of the findings (Burns and Grove, 2003). No research project is carried out without limitations (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). The researcher in conducting this study faced the following major limitations such as the absence of local researches in the area so as to compare their results against the results of the present research, prolonged time to get respondents and reluctance and lack of confidence to cooperate and give needed information. Moreover, the researcher in his way to accomplish the study, challenged with the time due to work responsibility and resources constrain such as camera and other recording material. However, in order to overcome these limitations the researcher made all the possible efforts.

### **1.7. Organization of the Study**

This study was categorized into five chapters. Chapter one introduction which consists background of the study, statement of the problem, basic research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study, delimitation of the study, limitation of the study, and organization of the study. Chapter two consists of conceptualization of corruption which includes



meaning and concept of corruption, types of corruption, forms of corruption, causes of corruption, consequence of corruption, approaches and strategies of anti-corruption, factors affecting anti-corruption initiatives, contextual theories of corruption, exemplary domestic anti-corruption Institutions in the world and empirical review of anti-corruption in FDRE. Chapter three consists the research methodology specifically which includes description of the study area, research design, research method, study population, sample size and sampling techniques, data collecting tools, data analysis. Chapter four deals analyses and interpretation of the data and finally chapter five provides summary, conclusions and recommendations based on the finding of the study.

### **1.8. Operational definition of key terms**

**Corruption:** means the abuse of entrusted authority (public or private) for illegitimate (private or group gain) (World Bank, 2007).

**Ethics liaison units:** means the office led by ethics officer to maintain ethics and to prevent corruption and bad working habit in public office or public enterprise of the studying area. SNNPR State council regulation code No. 84/2003.

**Combating corruption:** means first understanding what corruption is and second how to go about it (World Bank, 2007).

**Challenges:** means actions or situations that cause, interfere or prevent and deprive the ELUs from achieving their goals or hinder them from being successful in combatting corruption in Lemo Woreda.

**Prospects:** means possibilities, enabling environments, occasions or situations that are available for the ELUs to achieve their goals or access to be successful in combatting corruption in Lemo Woreda.

## Chapter Two

### Review of Literature

This chapter consists of conceptualization of corruption which includes meaning and concept of corruption, types of corruption, forms of corruption, causes of corruption, consequence of corruption, approaches and strategies of anti-corruption, factors affecting anti-corruption initiatives, contextual theories of corruption, exemplary domestic anti-corruption Institutions in the world and empirical review of anti-corruption in FDRE.

#### **2.1. Conceptualization of Corruption**

##### **2.1.1. Meaning and concepts:**

Corruption is a difficult concept to define. It defies/challenges universal definition or interpretation because "it is not a discrete phenomenon, separate and distinct from all other forms of political and administrative behavior" (Williamson, 1994). No one definition of corruption has received universal acceptance yet. Here under some definitions by different scholars and institutions are stated.

The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines corruption as: "dishonest or illegal behavior, especially of people in authority". It further states that it is, "the act or effect of making somebody changes from moral to immoral standards of behavior".

Corruption is the behavior of private individuals or public officials who deviate from set responsibilities and use their position of power in order to serve private ends and secure private gains (Petter, 1999). The World Bank (2007), settled on a straightforward definition—the abuse of public office for private gain. This definition is concise and broad enough to include most forms of corruption that the Bank encounters, as well as being widely used in the literature. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if bribery does not occur, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the

diversion of state revenues. Like most other definitions, it places the public sector at the center of the phenomenon.

Corruption also defined as encompassing all forms of irregular, unethical, immoral and/ or illegal practices and transactions dealing and activities in the process of handling commercial or public transactions or in the performance of official duties (Bevier, 2007).

Regarding to meaning of corruption and the place where corruption has become rampant problem, different scholars and writers agreed upon the following theme. Corruption is using public resources for private purpose or abuse of public power for private gain that hampers the public interests. This gain may be direct or indirect. It is generally practiced by public officials who have direct responsibility to deliver the service to the public, apply or enforce specific regulations. Here, identified actors for this problem were policy makers, basically politicians, experts (the bureaucracy) at different level in public sector. The above concept indicates corruption as borderless disease of this globe. Corruption is found in every corner of the world like public sector, private sector, nongovernmental organization and etc. (Dr. Vinay, 2005)

Corruption can be placed into five groups. These are public-interest-centered, market-centered, public-office-centered, public-opinion-centered and legalistic. According to public office-center definition, corruption is a behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, who improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by misusing public power entrusted to them while the public interest-centered definition is described in terms of the subversion of the public interest for private ends. Corruption, here, is understood as harmful to or destructive of public interest. Public Opinion-Centered Definition of corruption becomes a political and social process. Unlike the earlier definitions, which are primarily behavior-based definitions, the public opinion-centered definition emphasizes the perspective of public opinion about the conduct of politicians, government and probity of public servants. Market-centered definitions are expressed by exchange relationship between those who hold public power that enables them to decide on scarce resources of the state on the one hand and those individuals and firms who are willing to pay in order to acquire that scarce resource against the law, on the other. The exchange mechanism, here, is the free-market model, thereby considerably changing the nature of corruption. Legal definition takes place when corruption is defined by statute. In other words, definition given for corruption by law of a given country is known as legal definition (Ayallew, 2005).

The five approaches, as discussed above, have concentrated on the nature of corruption. Though the approaches throw some light they do not clarify the meaning of corruption to any satisfaction. Now there are four divergent views on the definition of corruption. The definitions have come from moralists, functionalists, social censurists and social constructionist realists.

**The moralists view** —corruption as an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority (Gould, 2001). One of the well-known proponents of this view, Nye, portrays corruption as —a behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. But this way of defining corruption suffers from a number of limitations. It tends to individualize a societal phenomenon and attempts to dichotomize as to what is good and what is bad. In the process societal contexts are ignored and the gap between formal norms and the underlying practice-girded norms are not analyzed (Caiden, 1991).

**The functionalists** usually look at corruption in terms of the actual function that it plays in socioeconomic development. Claims are made by functionalists that corruption flourishes as a substitute for the market system; offers an acceptable alternative to violence; increases public participation in public policy (Leff, 1979). Some functionalists believe that political and bureaucratic leaders may see a national interest in actively pursuing or tolerating a certain degree of administrative corruption (Klitgaard, 1988). The major criticisms against functionalists are that they ignore the political significance of deviance and lack any consideration of power, interest and social structure in their analyses and at the same time the whole question of the origins of corruption is not considered.

The two comparatively recent perspectives, such as social censure and social construction reality, view corruption radically differently from the other two approaches, i.e. moralists and functionalists. Both the approaches tend to look at corruption from a broad societal perspective. The proponents of social censure believe that in understanding corruption one should take into consideration the capacity of the state to produce a particular form of social relations and shift the theoretical emphasis to the interplay of law, ideologies and political economy (Lo, 1993). In view of the multitude of approaches and views on corruption it is not easy to agree on a unanimous definition of the term. Two definitions of corruption can prove handy. The shorter

definition of corruption includes —abuse of authority, bribery, favoritism, extortion, fraud, patronage, theft, deceit, malfeasance and illegality (Caiden, 1991).

The broader definition of corruption refers to "use of one's official position for personal and group gain and that includes unethical actions like bribery, nepotism, patronage, conflict of interest, divided loyalty, influence-peddling, moonlighting, misuse or stealing of government property, selling of favors, receiving kickbacks, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, under- or over-invoicing, court tempering, phony travel and administrative documents and use of regulation as bureaucratic capital (AAPAM, 1991).

## **2.2. Types of corruption**

Regarding the typology of corruption, it is difficult to restrict its boundary and its types, but. Corruption is often described as either grand or petty.

Petty corruption has also been called low level and street level corruption or bureaucratic or administrative corruption. It involves mid-and lower-level officials such as agency bureaucrats, immigration officials, customs clerks, police officers, etc. (Amundsen, 1999). Examples of petty corruption include:

- Revenue officials practicing extortion by threatening to levy surcharges on taxpayers and importers unless bribes are paid, in which case unjustifiably low tax assessments are made or goods are passed for importation without payment of any duty at all
- Law enforcement officials extorting money for their own benefit by threatening to impose penalties unless bribes are paid—which are frequently less than the penalty the offense would attract if it goes to court
- Providers of public services (i.e., drivers licenses, market stall permits, passport control) insisting on payments to speed up service or prevent delays.
  - Superiors in the public service charging their subordinates, requiring them to raise set sums each week or month and to pass these upwards

Grand corruption typically takes place at the top levels of the public sphere and the senior management levels of business, where policies and rules are formulated and executive decisions are made. Grand corruption is high-level government (political) corruption that unlike petty corruption takes place by greed motives. It is practiced by those public officials who have power to decide on significant economic and political issues. It involves senior agency officials,

military and police commanders, senior judges, legislators, cabinet ministers, and even heads of government and state.

Grand corruption practices include (Kindra and Stapenhurst 1998).

- Ministers 'selling' their discretionary powers
- Officials taking percentages on government contract, which are often then paid into foreign bank accounts
- Officials receiving excessive hospitality from government contractors and benefits in kind, such as scholarships for the education of children at foreign universities
- Officials contracting government business to themselves, either through front companies and partners or even openly to themselves as consultants
  - Political parties using the prospect of power, or its continuation, to levy large 'fees' on international businesses in return for government contracts

### 2.3. Forms of Corruption

Some examples of forms of corruption are bribery, collusion, embezzlement of public funds and theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism, clientelism, nepotism, the sale of government property by public officials, patronage, etc. Some explanations of forms of corruption are stated as the follows.

**Bribery:** -Bribery refers to the bestowing of a benefit, usually a monetary payment, to improperly influence the outcome of an action or decision. The practice can be initiated by those seeking to solicit bribes or those offering one, and is probably the most common form of corruption to occur (Ayallew, 2005).

**Extortion:** -This is a form of corruption as extraction of money or other resources either from the society to the state or from the state to the society as a form of either 'redistributive' extraction 'from below' or 'from above' through the use of coercion, violence or the threats to use force. Corruption as extraction from below is said to occur when individuals or firms compel individual state officials (Ayallew, 2005).

**Embezzlement, Theft and Fraud:** -Embezzlement, theft and fraud involve the taking or conversion of money, property or valuable items by those who are not entitled to them but, by virtue of their position or employment, have access to them. The terms embezzlement and theft refer to cases in which property is taken by those to whom it was entrusted. According to Amundsen (1999) fraud is an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit. It is fraud when state agencies and state representatives are engaged in illegal trade networks, counterfeit, racketing and other organized economic crimes. Fraud, on the other hand,

involves the use of false or misleading information to induce the owner of the property to relinquish it voluntarily which is actually practiced in both private and public sector.

**Abuse of Discretion:** -Some cases of corruption involve an abuse of discretion, vested in an individual, for personal gain. For example, a government employee involved in contracting may exercise the discretion to purchase goods or services from a company in which he or she holds a personal interest (Ayallew, 2005).

**Favoritism:** -This is a form of corruption in which state resource, are distributed in a highly biased manner. It is a way through which state officials grant offices or some kind of benefits to their friends, relatives, and, in most societies, to family, clan, tribe, ethnic, religious or regional group regardless of merit by abusing their public power. —Favoritism is the penchant of state officials and politicians, who have access to state resources and the power to decide upon the distribution of these, to give preferential treatment to certain people when distributing resources (Ayallew, 2005).

#### **2.4. Causes of Corruption**

The causes of corruption are usually complex and rooted in a country's policies, bureaucratic traditions, political and economic development, and social history (Bottelier, 1998). In general, the driving forces that propel corruption can be seen from two perspectives: need and greed. Need, as discussed earlier, may cause petty corruption where wages of civil servants and petty officials cannot sustain a modest level of living.

Corruption occurs at high levels of government in awarding of contracts, privatization, allocation of import quotas, and the regulation of natural monopolies. This is what is referred to as grand corruption. Grand corruption involves not the poor but those who have power, both political and economic. What causes grand corruption, therefore, is not need but sheer greed; greed of both government officials and suppliers from within and out. In other words, there are both internal and external causes for occurrence of corruption. Rent seeking behaviors triggered by faulty economic policies, poor public service leadership and pay, weak detection and penal mechanisms, and absence of transparency, and societal tolerance are considered as internal causes while corrupting incentives and procedures from foreign contractors and donor agencies are regarded external causes (World Bank, 1997).

Culture and moral values are also determinants of actual occurrence of corruption. According to Bottelier, the motivation to remain honest may be weakened by poor salaries, absence of

merit based promotion, dysfunctional government budgets, loss of organizational purpose, bad example by organizational purpose, bad example by senior government officials or political leaders and long established patron-client relationships in which corruption has been nurtured. Moreover, private parties may be willing to pay bribes to government officials in seeking rent from the existing several regulations and wide discretion of government officials (Bottelier, 1998).

According to Amundsen (1999) causes of corruption in developing and transition economies can be explained from three perspectives: institutional, economic, and political

**Institutional Factors:** - refers to established systems which display weaknesses. These structures fail as a result of wide authority, little accountability, little or no attempt to control the work of junior staff and lax working practices. According to the symbolic formula of (Klitgaard, 1998),  $C$  (corruption) =  $M$  (monopoly) +  $D$  (discretion) -  $A$  (accountability). In very simple terms, this means what constitutes corruption is the existence of monopoly and discretion coupled with the absence of accountability. Therefore, irrespective of the nature of the activity (public, private, or non-profit) and spatial difference one may find corruption when an organization or person has monopoly power over goods or services, has the discretion to decide who will receive it and how much that person will get, and is not accountable.

**Economic Factors:** - In all CPIs of TI that have been done at different times, countries with high level of economic prosperity are found at the top of the indexes while the poor countries are found at the bottom. Level of corruption, according to the indexes varies negatively with level of development showing strong correlation between the two. The higher income level a country has the lower is the level of corruption and conversely the lower income level of a country is the higher is the level of corruption. However, the causal relationship between the two variables is not timely established. Whether the income increases because of decreasing corruption or whether corruption decreases because of increasing income is not clear yet (Amundsen, 1999).

**Political Factors:** - Levels and forms of corruption vary with type of the political system within which it occurs. The more public power is legitimate the more the involvement of the people and transparency in the system and the less corruption could take place. The degree of corruption varies inversely to the degree that power is consensual. Hence, corruption is negatively related to democratization. In countries in transition, however, with incomplete political legitimacy



and poor operational capacity, democratization and liberalization imply a broader distribution of powers as well as opportunities that may have the effect of decentralizing corruption from the central to the local level. Political corruption is the manipulation of the political institutions and the rules of procedure, and therefore it influences the institutions of government and the political system, and it frequently leads to institutional decay. Political corruption is therefore something *more* than a deviation from formal and written legal norms, from professional codes of ethics and court rulings. Political corruption is when laws and regulations are more or less systematically abused by the rulers, side-stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests. Political corruption is a deviation from the rational-legal values and principles of the modern state, and the basic problem is the weak accountability between the governors and the governed (Amundsen, 1999).

**Societal Attitudes** – refers to public perception and acceptance of corruption; a belief that a behavior is not corrupt, a laissez faire attitude because no action will be taken if a matter is reported or that the behavior is justified in the circumstances. These stem from personal loyalties, inequality or an illegitimate government in power (Berlin, 1997).

## **2.5. Consequences or Cost of Corruption**

The consequences of corruption for economic and social development are detrimental. Corruption deters investment and hinders growth. It spurs inequality and erodes macroeconomic and fiscal stability. It reduces the impact of development assistance and provides an incentive to exploit natural resources, further depleting our environmental assets. It reduces the effectiveness of public administration and distorts public expenditure decisions, channeling urgently needed resources away from sectors such as health and education to corruption-prone sectors or personal enrichment. It erodes the rule of law and harms the reputation of and trust in the state. Corruption is not a problem exclusive to the public sector. Private sector corruption also damages developing and developed countries economy. It may involve businesses corrupting public officials but can also take place between private sector actors only. Discover how economic development spurs initiatives to improve integrity and stamp out corruption in this sector that is crucial to lifting countries out of poverty. Corruption in both the public and private sectors poses important socio-economic, governance and values and ethics challenges in contemporary world. Corruption is detrimental or harmful to the soul of the nation, the institutions of democracy and the values and ethos of a young democracy like ours. The impact

of corruption on socio-economic rights is immeasurable. Corruption denies development and quality of life to the most vulnerable members of society. It is especially harmful in developing countries, which have fewer resources and thus are more vulnerable if those resources are wasted or not used effectively and equitably. Soaring or high levels of corruption have the potential to lead to high poverty for two reasons. Such as, first, evidence suggests that a higher growth rate is associated with a higher rate of poverty reduction and that corruption slows the rate of poverty reduction by reducing growth. Second, income inequality has been shown to be harmful to growth and if corruption increases income inequality,

Economically corruption lowers investment and retards economic growth. It will also reduce growth and thereby limit poverty reduction. Generally, cost or consequences of corruption are seen as follows. destroys investors' confidence by making decisions on the basis of corrupt manipulation rather than according to defined and transparent rules. Corrupt government officials usually ask entrepreneurs for bribes before enterprises can be started or at a later stage to share proceeds of their investments, which lower incentives for both domestic and foreign investment. Entrepreneurs, therefore, interpret corruption as a species of tax that diminishes their incentive to invest (Mauro 1998). Corruption lowers the quality of public infrastructure and services. Corruption decreases tax revenue when it takes the form of tax evasion or claiming improper tax exemptions and through the growth of the unofficial economy. Moreover, corruption induces in talented people to engage in rent seeking practices when rent seeking proves more lucrative than productive work (Mauro 1998).

Politically corruption undermines democracy and good governance. It erodes the institutional capacity of government and hence results in political instability, bureaucratic red tape, and weak legislative and judicial systems, which are intrinsically linked in the sense that they feed on each other (ibid). Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and representation in policy making. It can weaken democracy and make the state a tool for rewarding supporters, and repressing political opponents. As a result, citizens see the institutions of democracy and government as being for sale to the highest bidder, not open to all by right. Moreover, politicians and civil servants see society as serving them, not vice versa, which can lead to a profound eroding of moral standards both in government and in civil society. Corruption weakens the state's legitimacy and, in extreme cases, may lead to political instability or even war (Bottelier, 1998).

Socially corrupt governments spend less on education and health, and more on public investment where they can easily collect rent. Corruption, therefore, may distort the composition of government expenditure by spending more public resources on those items on which it is easier to extract large bribes and keep them secret. In such cases, government officials benefit from large infrastructure projects or high technology defense system whose exact value is difficult to monitor than on 'textbooks' or 'teacher's salaries'. Corruption, therefore, has an immense effect on poverty because it makes the poor to receive fewer social services like education and health (Mauro 1998).

## **2.6. Approaches and strategies of anti-Corruption**

Although corruption tends to get the most attention, it is a symptom of a more general problem of perverse underlying incentives in public service. Corruption flourishes where distortions in the policy and regulatory regime provide scope for it and where institutions of restraint are weak (World Development Report 1997).

The above reading attests that effective anti-corruption strategy has to focus on systems and institutional capacity rather than individual cases.

It is of little use to chase down individual bribe-givers or bribe takers. Yes, we should fry some big fish, some of those who went far too far, because we want to send a signal that the rules have changed, that impunity is over. But corruption is a problem of bad systems more than one of bad individuals. We need to change those systems (Klitgaard, 1998)

Corruption cannot be effectively attacked in isolation from other problems. It needs to be combated through a multi-pronged strategy. Indeed, this does not mean all size fit solution prevails. There is no single model or practice which suits all countries, and each jurisdiction needs to explore practices drawn from a variety of options (UN, 2001 as cited in Ayallew, 2005). As the nature, magnitude and forms of corruption vary from place to place, measures for curbing it also differ. Therefore, strategy to curb corruption should start from a clear understanding of the scope of the problem and its causes.

In this vein, there are different approaches and mechanisms or tools that have been used to combat corruption in different countries, in international organizations. Different countries adopt diverse methods to combat corruptions. These include working with universities (e.g. Colombia), Ethics education for primary pupils (Madagascar), physical education for citizenship(Brazil), making Anti-corruption heroes in to school( Italy), good governance in school(Zambia), Ethics at

school a model program of America(US), youth against corruption a national essay contest(Georgia), then power of information training young journalist( Uganda), integrating Anti-corruption in to school curriculum(Cambodia) (Selamu, 2010)

The institutional arrangements governing ACAs greatly varies across countries including with regard to their level of specialization and centralization based on the local governance context and the specific circumstances that brought them into existence (Chene, 2009). In this vein, approaches to combat corruption may categorize as preventive and curative approaches. Preventive approach is a long term strategy whereas curative or law enforcement approach is a short term strategy to fight against corruption.

Generally, to combat corruption, different international organizations like TI and different countries have been commonly agreed upon most of issues such as promoting the notion of good governance, collective actions among different stakeholders, particularly among NGOs, Civil society organizations, and private sectors. The commitment of top leaders' role was taken as a cornerstone to combat corruption and also most of them recommend that giving high attention to preventive action and to create informed society. The other critical issue is the present of vibrant watchdog institutions and full authority and independency.

When we see the way that we fight corruption effectively; a useful approach to corruption control has been to link the reform agenda to that of promoting good governance. Understanding the effectiveness of democratic mechanisms in preventing abuses of power and promoting public interest provides a way forward for anti-corruption activists. Regaining public trust in responsive democratic institutions should be the driving force behind anti-corruption reforms (Claasen, 2010).

### **2.6.1. A Five-Pronged Anti-Corruption Reform Strategy by UNDP**

A successful campaign against corruption demands a complex set of interventions applied strategically over the short, medium and long term. It requires a highly political balancing act and coordination among various pressing (sometimes conflicting) priorities and stakeholders.

When corruption is endemic, piecemeal reform efforts are not likely to make a difference.

Partial solutions can offer some help to countries with strong and clean government traditions. Other countries need more comprehensive reforms since they are in a “corruption trap” where corruption feeds on itself to produce only more corruption. The history of anti-corruption efforts

is filled with programs that succeeded at first only to be undermined by subsequent governments (UNDP, 2004).

Since fighting corruption is politically sensitive and extremely complex, the five-pronged strategy suggested here attempts to provide a simplified menu of options to help a CO in assisting partner countries in systematically initiating, developing reform programs, prioritizing action, implementation and monitoring. The five prongs of the strategy are classified in terms of interrelated elements: (1) prevention, (2) enforcement, (3) public participation and coalition building, (4) strengthening national integrity institutions, and (5) working with the international community. A country's reform effort may contain all of the five prongs or a combination of some, depending on the established needs, agreed upon priorities, available resources and timing of the A-C program. Again there is no one solution or model, the key will lie in strong political commitment and public participation in a coherent, comprehensive strategy that attacks on several fronts and involve the widest possible range of stakeholders.

#### **2.6.1.1 Prevent Corruption**

Improving efficiency, accountability and transparency in the delivery and administration of public services often close the loopholes for corruption. It is also the best mechanism to achieve MDGs: minimizing corruption to improve public service delivery. Preventive measures entail reform of administrative procedures, accounting and procurement practices, and record keeping, among others. Anti-corruption reform efforts, which focus on prevention should take into consideration and be integrated with other reform programs, such as those in financial management and civil service reform. Further detail about many of these preventive measures highlighted below

- Decrease opportunities for corruption through simplification of procedures and regulations, as well as use of ICT to transform delivery of public services.
- Minimize discretionary powers of decision-makers. Publish clear written guidelines for exercising discretion, publication of staff manuals, manuals of procedures etc.
- Demystify and de-personalize government. Transparency of public affairs and the right of access to information on rights of citizens and government functions is an integral part of an anti-corruption campaign. Minimizing unnecessary face-to-face contact and rotation of staff also decreases the chances for corruption by reducing the predictability with whom the public may be dealing.

- Promote meritocracy. Compensating public servants with a decent living wage is critical in any effort to prevent corruption. This is where civil service reform and anti-corruption initiatives link with fiscal policies and economic policies to stimulate equitable growth. Other measures include performance management, publicizing roles and responsibilities, ensuring effective appeal mechanisms against contentious decisions, and instilling a sense of purpose and mission in civil servants. For example, developing a campaign of respect for government and civil servants, as well as a common understanding for their mission and a sense of pride in pursuing it can help reduce tolerance for corruption.

#### **2.6.1.2. Strengthening National Integrity Institutions and contact guidelines**

- Support legislation. If designed with the broad participation of all stakeholders involved, laws can contribute positively to the establishment of a value system that would support a culture of zero-tolerance for corrupt practices. This also requires strong independent oversight and enforcement actors
- Educate the younger generations towards a responsible citizenry: sensitizing future generations to key principles of democratic governance and the negative consequences of corrupt behavior. It is also important to instil in young people a culture of positive engagement and respect and skills for constructive and investigative debate on the quality of governance and its impact on people's lives.

#### **2.6.1.3. Enforce Accountability**

Vigilance is necessary in the implementation of anti-corruption legislation and in the enforcement of accountability mechanisms that have been initiated. Often, this role will be assigned to an independent anti-corruption agency. No matter what the options are, reform within public programs and procedures cannot occur in isolation and different types of reforms need to be considered to strengthen the enforcement of anti-corruption incentives.

- Establish independent investigators, prosecutors, and adjudicators that ensure “equal” enforcement of the laws and regulations.
- Strengthen capacity and integrity of the police as the frontline investigator agency for criminal infractions.
- Strengthen and ensure independence and accountability of the judicial system.
- Provide adequate powers of investigation and prosecution, consistent with international human rights norms.

- Integrate transparent mechanisms, which eliminate privileges that have no relations with the needs of the public, and which high public officials enjoy by reason of their office, into the reform of enforcement measures.
- Develop effective complaints mechanisms and procedures for appeals, whether internally by a public servant or by a member of the public. The potential application of an online complaints system should be explored to widen reach of feedback mechanism.
- Develop mechanisms to protect whistleblowers: encourage the development of institutions, laws and practices, which ensure that responsible citizens can report corrupt practices without fear of reprisals, and to ensure that the media is empowered to play its pivotal role in holding relevant individuals and institutions accountable
- Consider procedures for punishing those involved in corruption within the state but who are outside the jurisdiction of the state in the anti-corruption reform effort.
- Impose powerful disincentives for the would-be corrupt, such as civil penalties, blacklisting of corrupt firms, extradition arrangements, and other legal provisions, which enable the profits of the corrupt to be seized and forfeited, inside or outside the country.

#### **2.6.1.4. Increase Public Participation and Build Coalitions**

A common factor to all successful anti-corruption efforts, whether these efforts involve reforming public programs, reorganizing government, or strengthening enforcement, is that they enjoy broad public support and are strongly championed by the highest level of political leadership.

Anti-corruption campaigns cannot succeed unless the public is behind them. Therefore, public awareness and coalition building is the glue that holds the campaign together. It is also where the campaign starts, with the public review of the legal and institutional framework and the assessment of the nature and extent of corruption in society.

People generally understand the seriousness of the corruption problem; they only need to be convinced that something can be done about it. Various civil society groups (religious leaders, business organizations, professional associations and ad hoc groups) have roles to perform in assessing, monitoring and public awareness raising, thus enabling active public participation and oversight.

Several steps can be taken to pursue public awareness and coalition building campaigns:

- Ascertain what the public perception is regarding existing levels of corruption and where corruption takes place in order to provide a baseline against which the progress of anti-corruption reform can be measured.
- Provide an enabling environment for a free press: pass Freedom of Information laws; repeal or revise anti-defamation laws and "insult" laws to ensure that these cannot be used to threaten the press; and removing press and media censorship; raise the professional standards of journalists; end government discrimination against certain media; and ensure that state-owned media employees can maintain professional standards of independence and responsibility.
- Build capacity of civil society to perform watchdog functions. Besides well-functioning governing institutions, it is also necessary to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society, including the media, as independent watchdog bodies that need to raise public awareness about the seriousness of the corruption problem. The fight against corruption in developing countries requires an engaged and informed public and an increased demand for good governance.

#### **2.6.1.5. Strengthen National Integrity Institutions**

A nation that is serious about fighting corruption needs to establish or strengthen institutions and ensure that they are adequately staffed and funded to carry out some specific functions in the anti-corruption mandate. The options include:

- An Independent Commission against Corruption, which has broad investigative and prosecutorial powers (operating closely with the judiciary), as well as a public education mandate. Such a Commission must be genuinely independent of the country's rulers but subject to the rule of law, or it risks becoming a force for repression in its own right. To operate successfully, any independent agency tasked to investigate and prosecute corruption must possess: committed political backing at the highest levels of government; political and operational independence to investigate even the highest levels of government; organizational capacity<sup>1</sup> and a coherent strategy, significant human, technical and financial resources and adequate powers to access documentation and to question witnesses, and leadership, which must be of highest integrity.
- A Transparent Public Procurement Body would provide independent oversight of government procurement, contracting and performance. The Electoral Management



Board which ensures an independent and impartial review that does not favor any political party or group. Countries must be able to contain the corrupt influence that money has over many of its democratic processes. In order to build confidence, public participation in the monitoring process is required. So is the need for training of political party officials to ensure their familiarity with the system and enable them to monitor it professionally. More details are found in the Elections Practice Note.

- Strong legislative mechanisms for accountability such as a Public Accounts Committee are required to ensure public access to oversight proceedings, which needs to include oversight of state-owned corporations, financial and budgetary processes, public expenditure and revenues. (Refer to UNDP Policy Note on Parliamentary Strengthening)
- The Judiciary enforces the rule of law and thus a powerful player in addressing corruption, details discussed in the Access to Justice Practice Note.

## **2.7. Factors affecting anti-Corruption initiatives**

Before analyzing the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units (ELUs) in combating corruption in Lomo Woreda, it is appropriate to refer the literatures highlighting the challenges and failure of the Anti-corruption initiatives across the world. Accordingly, key factors that affect the effectiveness of Anti-corruption initiatives based on a review of the literature can be broadly classified into two categories: exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenous factors are external issues that affect the agency's Institutional effectiveness, while endogenous factors are internal conditions that affect ACAs ability to fight corruption successfully (A Review of the Effectiveness of the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of Ethiopia <https://www.acauthorities.org> accessed on 02/02 2017: 11:39 PM). These factors are discussed here below as follows.

### **2.7.1. Exogenous factors**

Exogenous factors include external factors that impede the performance of ACIs. These challenges broadly include lack of political will, economic conditions, donor initiations, public confidence and trust in the ACAS and relationship with civil society actors. These factors are discussed in greater detail below.

**Political Will:** – In order for ACAs to be fully effective, high-level political backing and commitment is critical. This is called political will (Kpundeh and Johnston 1998). If there is

political will, an incumbent government can, through legislation, empower ACAs and implement anti-corruption laws. Furthermore, the government can also provide ACAs with consistent funding, assist them by working closely through various agencies, grant them access to government data, and continuously give political support to achieve concrete results. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that besides political will demonstrated at the highest levels of government, there are bottom-up sources of political will as well. In some cases, these sources may include street level bureaucrats who are public officials that deliver final services to the general public and who are strongly committed to controlling, preventing waste, fraud, and abuse (Brinkerhoff, 2010). The role of these groups in whistle-blowing, voicing concerns and demands, and putting pressure on public officials is an important factor in strengthening political will.

**Economic Conditions** – This factor has to do with macroeconomic stability and poverty, which can undermine the effectiveness of ACAs. An example of the impact of unfavorable economic conditions on an ACA is the Argentine experience. While the institution began with very good prospects for success, the deep economic crisis in the country caused shortfalls in funding, which resulted in underpaid staff and diminished morale (Meagher, 2004). This situation made it difficult for the Argentine ACA to continue to be effective. The effectiveness of the ACAs of African countries such as Tanzania and Uganda has also been affected by poverty and economic shocks that have contributed to the lack of necessary funding for those ACAs to perform their day- to-day operations (Meagher, 2004).

**Donor Initiatives** – A lack of donor coordination or duplication of efforts can negatively impact ACAs. Given that most ACAs suffer from a lack of funding, donors determine which ACA components to finance mostly based on donors' choices rather than ACAs' needs assessments. In order to enhance the effectiveness of ACAs, donors should work in partnership with ACAs rather than solely focusing on their own initiatives (Doig et al., 2007).

**Public Confidence and Trust in ACAs** – Because they operate on behalf of citizens, ACAs must command public respect and credibility (De Beke, 2002). In this regard, the public confidence in ACAs is a key indicator in their success.

**Relationship with Civil Society Actors** – An important factor impacting the effectiveness of ACAs is building cross sectional-sectoral support to create a significant mass of public official, civil society groups, and private firms (Schedler, 2009).

Free media and nongovernmental watchdogs play a vital role through their capacity to build public awareness and monitor ACA activities. As gaining the public trust is crucial to ACAs' effectiveness, collaboration between ACAs and non-governmental groups is an important factor in their success.

### **2.7.2. Endogenous factors**

Endogenous factors are the internal conditions that affect ACAs ability to fight corruption effectively. Among others, these factors include the ACAs independence in performing its functions, the specificity of its objectives in terms of the context of the country, permanence, sufficiency of financial resources, and staff capacity (human capital). These factors will be discussed in depth below.

Independence – Independence basically refers to the ability of an ACA to carry out its mission without political interference. However, it does not mean the absence of reporting to external control. Rather, it refers to an ACA's degree of independence to freely investigate corruption wherever it suspects that it may occur without the punishment being cancelled or modified because of the interests of powerful individuals or groups (Schedler, 1999). In order to function efficiently, the ACA should have a broad mandate without restrictions on its investigation of suspected corruption. However, at the same time, the ACA should also be held accountable for its actions, investigations, and general comportment as a government agency. In this regard, an independent anti-corruption institution needs to integrate a system of checks and balances in order to maintain transparency and accountability. In addition, the independence of an ACA may be evaluated based on the following considerations (OECD, 2008):

Institutional placement- A permanent agency, unit, or commission that exists separately and outside of government agencies has greater independence than an ACA established as a unit or department within an institutional structure of a selected ministry, (e.g., Ministry of the Interior, Finance, or Justice).

Appointment and removal of the head of the ACA- The selection process of the head of the ACA should be transparent and based on consensus among different high-level decision-makers, such as the president and parliament. If the head of the institution is nominated by the president and subsequently approved by the parliament, then the president is not authorized to appoint the head, while the parliament is not authorized to nominate. This creates a system of checks and

balances given that there is a separation of the authority to nominate and appoint. The head of an ACA should also be protected by law against dismissal.

**Budget and fiscal autonomy-** In the case of ACAs, complete financial independence is not possible given that in general, the budget for these entities is set by the parliament and in many cases, the government. Nevertheless, there needs to be a law in place that prohibits a decrease in the current year's budget from that of the previous year. In addition, an ACA's budget should be reflected separately in the governments overall budget.

**Permanence-** An essential factor in the effectiveness of ACAs is long-term durability. In particular, regular funding and continuous political and popular support is critical (De Sousa, 2009). Permanence is also an important factor in reducing corruption over time and creating an institution that learns from its mistakes and generates advanced technical capacity to combat corruption. Furthermore, it is also important to take into account that time is needed to select and train personnel and establish both operational and functional systems (Schedler, 1999).

**Country-specific Objectives –** Most ACAs are created by copying successful models without taking into account a particular country's unique political environment, social and economic conditions and available resources in the context where the ACA will carry out its functions (De Sousa, 2009). This practice does not always result in success and efficiency and can result in a gap between expected results and achievements. Consequently, when replicating a model, it is vital to assess the aforementioned factors and establish a country-specific model with realistic and achievable objectives.

**Sufficient Resources –** Most ACAs operate with limited financial resources. Without sufficient resources, it is difficult to attract qualified personnel, especially in developing countries, which often results in low-quality outputs. In addition, inadequate budgetary resources can also mean disconnected and inefficient outputs (for instance, partial investigations or the inability to implement planned prevention programs due to a lack of funding). Thus, a key factor in budgetary consistency is solid political support and an efficient budgetary process.

**Appropriate Staffing –** Deficiencies in recruitment and training procedures are the major causes for a lack of specialization among personnel (De Sousa, 2009). Lack of skill full human power can be one obstacle to fight corruption, even if the recruiting of candidates is problematic.

**Well-defined Strategy –** A failure to understand the underlying causes of corrupt practices may lead to misguided strategies in the fight against corruption. For instance, corruption should not be

dealt with by law enforcement alone. However, most countries try to deal with corruption entirely through investigating, prosecuting and sentencing ((Schedler, 1999), ACAs should pursue a strategy that fits the specific cultural context of the country. Moreover, if there is a lack of a clear strategy regarding how to fight corruption within an ACA, the impact of its operation may be minimal.

**Sufficient Internal Coordination** – As previously mentioned, most ACAs integrate different anti-corruption functions. Such an integration of functions must be well coordinated in order for ACAs to operate effectively. For instance, the Prevention and Education Department should work closely with the Investigation Department to create techniques to reduce corruption.

**Adequate Leadership and Management** – Weak leadership or an inadequate or lack of a management strategy affects the performance and efficiency of ACAs (De Sousa, 2009). In this regard, ACAs need to have a management team in place to lead day-to-day operations and a technical team to carry out specialized aspects of operations.

In line of this, strong political commitment, Rule of Law, Public confidence and Trust ELUs, Participation of civil society and media, independence, sufficient resource both human and materials, capacity and training, well-defined strategy, sufficient internal and external coordination and adequate leadership and management are certain pre-conditions that need to be in place for ELUs to function effectively. Therefore, assessing challenges and prospects of ELUs in combating corruption gave consideration on them in the study area.

## **2.8. A Contextual theory of corruption**

### **2.8.1. Principal-Agent Model Theory of Corruption**

The predominant theory of corruption within both political science and economics today is the principal-agent model (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) and (Klitgaard, 1988). According to theory, a principal-agent problem stems from two assumptions: that the principal and agent have diverging interests and that the agent has more information than the principal (information asymmetry). Due to asymmetric information, the principal is unable to perfectly monitor the actions of the agent, and so the agent has some discretion to pursue their own interests. Moral hazard occurs when the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned, and the agent pursues their own interests at the expense of the interests of the principal (hence the ‘problem’) (Ross, 1973).

Corruption is often described to exist in society as a double principal-agent problem. In the first instance, a political leader is cast as the ‘principal’; they are tasked with monitoring the actions of bureaucrats (agents) in order to keep them accountable. Without the ability to perfectly monitor their actions, however, rationally minded bureaucrats use their discretion over resources to extract rents when the opportunity arises. The second principal-agent problem occurs when public officials (bureaucrats or politicians) are conceptualized to be the ‘agents’ and the public, more generally, as the ‘principal.’ As the agent the public official is able to abuse their office and discretion over public services to secure private rents from members of the public, and the public is unable to perfectly monitor or hold public officials accountable (Bardhan, 1997).

Thus, in short, from the perspective of the principal-agent framework, corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interest in the pursuit of his or her own self-interest. This betrayal is in turn made possible by the information asymmetry between the two groups of actors.

The principal-agent relationship in order to reduce corruption, the principal should aim at negatively affecting the agent’s motivations to engage in corrupt behavior. This could most effectively be done through control instruments that decrease the level of discretion among agents; limit the monopoly of agents, and; increase the level of accountability in the system (Klitgaard, 1988). The principal-agent perspective, analysts assume that the problem of corruption lies exclusively with the agent. As such, the principal-agent model always rests on the assumption that the principal will take on the role of controlling corruption (Rauch & Evans, 2000). By implication, if the supposed principal(s) are also corrupt and do, as such, not act in the interest of the public good, the principal-agent framework becomes useless as an analytical tool since there will simply be no actors willing to monitor and punish corrupt behavior (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2000).

Since the successful implementation of the principal-agent anti-corruption framework ultimately relies on the existence of actors willing to act as “principals” by holding corrupt officials accountable, the failure of anti-corruption reforms should not come as a surprise because only if one understands the incentives for taking part in corrupt activities – and for not acting honestly – can one arrive at promising strategies to bring about change (Karklins, 2005).

The anticorruption efforts in most developing countries have commonly followed the logic of principal-agent theory (Johnston, 2005 & Ivanov, 2007). As such, the policy instruments used

have primarily been designed to influence the number of transactions over which public officials at various levels have discretion, the value of the bribes offered (i.e. the scope of gains from each transaction), the probability of being detected, as well as the loss incurred by being detected (i.e. the penalty for corrupt activities) (Klitgaard, 1988 & Shah, 2007). In particular, reforms are targeted to reduce discretion of public officials through privatization and deregulation; reduce monopoly by promoting political and economic competition, increase accountability by supporting democratization (for political accountability) and bureaucratization (for administrative accountability); improving salaries of public officials, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of corruption if detected; improving the rule of law so that corrupt bureaucrats and politicians can be prosecuted and punished, and; encouraging greater transparency of government decision-making through deepening democratization, decentralization, as well as through the creation and encouragement of civil society watchdogs (Ivanov, 2007 & Lawson, 2009).

Finally, the principal-agent theory, is the following. If only formal institutions that negatively influence the “agent’s” expected gross gain of being corrupt, increase the probability of getting caught, as well as increase the size of the penalty if detected are established, the corruption problem will be solved. However, as the overall failure of anti-corruption reforms in Africa should give an indication of, this formula seems to work considerably better in theory than in practice.

### **2.8.2. The collective action problem Theory of Corruption**

Collective action theory becomes relevant as a potential alternative analytical tool to principal-agent theory.

In a context in which corruption is the expected behavior, the successful implementation of any anti-corruption reform turns into a collective action problem of the second order (Ostrom, 1998).

This phenomenon is a second-order collective action problem: in environments where corruption is endemic, individual actors face little incentive to engage in anti-corruption efforts because they do not expect others to behave likewise (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). Nobody acts to stop corruption because everyone assumes that others will not act, making individual action irrational – i.e., costly to the individual who foregoes the immediate benefits of the corrupt transaction, and with little chance of success in curbing corruption. Moreover, since reduced corruption is a collective good, actors might choose to free-ride on the actions of others rather

than participate themselves in fighting corruption; again, theory suggests that this will lead to an equilibrium outcome in which nobody acts to curb corruption (Olson, 2002).

The collective action problem of corruption is not as one sided as it may look. Even actors higher up in the hierarchy – such as low-level public officials and political elites – seem to feel a pressure to passively support the corrupt game rather than actively taking part in it for their own private, absolute gain.

To the extent that collective action theories of corruption hold true, we should expect people to engage in corrupt practices not because they morally approve of them or do not understand the negative consequences for society at large, but because most other people are expected to be corrupt, making the short-term benefits of engaging in corrupt behavior greater than the costs. In this context, important to take into consideration is that, to properly understand what ultimately motivates people to act corruptly rather than honestly in a corrupt environment, you ultimately need to understand the pay-off structures for both behaviors in a particular context. As such, we need to explore both the pay-off for behaving honestly and pay-off for playing along with the corrupt game. As we shall see, there are great negative pay-offs involved for all actors when it comes to acting honestly, whereas the positive payoffs for acting corruptly are likely to vary considerably across groups.

### **The interaction between the theories and this thesis**

The main aim of this thesis is to identify the challenges and prospects of ELUs in combatting corruption in Lemo Woreda, SNNPRS, Ethiopia.

The first theory framed corruption as a principal-agent problem that occurs when the agent misuses the trust granted from the principal and it suggests that solving the problem requires looking into the relation between agent and principal through transparency, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanisms. For ELUs to achieve their goals or be effective in their works willingness among both rulers and citizens to effectively monitor and punish corrupt behavior is necessary. This help them to create an enabling environment (prospects) and avoid constraints that hider the works of the ELUs (challenges) together rather than expecting the principal will take on the role of controlling corruption.

According to the second Theory, corruption is a collective action problem that requires collective effort to prevent and combat it. The theory purports that the collective or group action influences an individual's decision in way that makes him/her choose to act corruptly if they expect other



people to be corrupt. So to create an enabling environment (prospects) and avoid constraints that hinder the works of the ELUs (challenges) in collective way rather than expecting single institution, because fighting corruption need not rely on the action of one or a few individual elites or disparate and small citizen groups speaking out against corruption but an effective response to fight corruption requires coordinated actions.

Both the principal-agent and the collective action theories are not contradictory. They are rather complementary in many respects (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). Above all, both recognize corruption as a problem with economic, social and political consequences. They do not differ on the potential relevance of effective monitoring and punishment regimes as means to curb corruption. So this thesis is to identify the challenges and prospects of ELUs in combatting corruption in Lemo Woreda is founded on these two theories based on the belief that this institution alone can do or can walk no step to tackle corruption without cooperation of all stake holders as the theories suggests.

## **2.9. Exemplary Domestic Anti-corruption Institutions in the world And Empirical Review of Anti- corruption in FDRE.**

### **2.9.1. Exemplary Domestic Anti-corruption Institutions in the world**

The domestic context of the creation of anti-corruption institutions is intertwined with the international level as several international organizations have recommended the creation of such institutions as an important strategy against corruption (Sousa, 2009).

The development of international anti-corruption instruments has given motivation to the creation of domestic anti-corruption institutions as most of these instruments require states parties to establish such institutions. However, it should be noted that the specific drivers for the creation of domestic anti-corruption institutions are diverse. They range from real political commitment to fighting corruption to response to external pressure and attempts to window dressing (USAID, 2006b).

Although the surge in domestic anti-corruption institutions has been witnessed since the late 1990s, the first creation of such institutions dates back to the 1950s. Anti-corruption institutions were established in Singapore and Hong Kong in 1952 and 1974 respectively. These two anti-corruption institutions are not only the oldest but also the most successful in the world. They

registered remarkable achievements in combating and preventing corruption in their respective countries.

The Singapore anti-corruption institution, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), has been successful in its fight against corruption. Corruption was rampant in Singapore throughout its colonial history. However, after the establishment of CPIB the country significantly reduced corruption and succeeded in attracting huge foreign investments. The success is mainly ascribed to the existence of three factors namely, strong political will from the government, adequate legal framework and operational independence (Quah, 2001). Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was also successful due to similar factors in curbing the widespread corruption hitherto in the territory (Maria, 2008). The ICAC has built an impressive record of investigations that have resulted in numerous convictions (Heilbrunn, 2004). According to Transparency International's latest corruption perception index, Hong Kong is ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world. In general Hong Kong and Singapore are the two commonly cited best practices of anti-corruption undertakings.

Next to Hong Kong and Singapore, Indonesia is mentioned as a success story in anti-corruption moves. The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) which was established in 2002 is being praised for reaching near 100 % conviction rate against corrupt senior government officials (Transparency International, 2013). Latvia is another success story in Europe. As De Jaegere (2012) indicated Latvia's Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) which was established in mid 1990s is now considered as Europe's most efficient anti-corruption commission. It has been admired for its determination to investigate corruption at high level political leaders. Coming to Africa, Botswana's record of anti-corruption undertakings is highly commendable. The country established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 1994 in an attempt to curb corruption and other related crimes. The DCEC is widely perceived as successful. Botswana is now seen as the least corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2014). Although anti-corruption institutions in Indonesia, Latvia and Botswana may have their own peculiar features that has led them to success, they somehow have been enjoying common favorable conditions as that of the Hong Kong and Singapore anti-corruption bodies.

The Singapore and Hong Kong anti-corruption institutions have been modelled by many anti-corruption institutions that have come afterwards. Those institutions which are organized based

on the Singapore model are mandated with investigation activity while those on Hong Kong's model are entrusted with the tasks of ethics education, corruption prevention and law enforcement. The Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Commission mimicked/ imitated the Hong Kong model of three pronged approaches of education, prevention and investigation.

Anti-corruption institutions are generally referred as a separate, permanent government agency whose primary function is to provide centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity (USAID, 2006b). There are also some common standards that governments have to maintain for the effective functioning of domestic anti-corruption institutions despite differences in approach. These include ensuring political will, adequate legal framework, independence and allocation of enough resource for the effective functioning of such institutions. Both the UN and AU Conventions against Corruption require states parties to establish anticorruption bodies and to ensure the effective operations of those bodies by facilitating necessary conditions including granting their independence and allotting enough resources.

With regard to the effectiveness of domestic anti-corruption institutions, most literatures agree on the crucial role such institutions could play in tackling corruption. They also acknowledge that most anticorruption institutions are entangled with a number of problems that undermine their effectiveness. Although anti-corruption institutions are established with great expectation and of great importance in anti-corruption endeavor, most of them have often been criticized for being ineffective. As Speville (2008) indicated there are actually very few examples of successful independent anticorruptioncommissions/agencies.

Some literatures express the flaws in anticorruption institutions in the strongest terms possible while others inclined to emphasize on how to fix the problem. For instance, Maria (2008) described anticorruption institutions as "serious program failure". Heilbrunn (2014) argued that anti-corruption commissions fail to reduce public sector venality in all but a few special circumstances. Speville (2008) asserted that many anticorruption agencies fail dismally to have any impact. These literatures mentioned, among others, defectiveness in institutional design or planning/management and implementation, weak political will, lack of independence from the executive and insufficient budgetary support from the legislature and unrealistic aim and expectations for the failures.

On the other hand, UNDP recognizes that while many anticorruption institutions still have considerable works to do, they can, and should, play an important role in a country's national

accountability (UNDP, 2011). Thus, anti-corruption institutions need to be provided with appropriate assistance and enabling environment in light of international standards to discharge their responsibilities effectively.

### **2.9.2. Empirical Review of Anti- corruption in FDRE.**

Ethiopia had been both under imperial and military rules for a long time. Under these times the peoples' quest of democracy, human rights and good governance had been compromised. These regimes brought maladministration, corruption, poverty and socio-economic and political crisis to the people at large. All these lead to various revolutions which brought the end of both the imperial and the military regimes and the coming of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in to power in 1991. This also resulted the coming into effect of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's constitution (FDRE constitution, 1995).

To practice of democracy, human rights, good governance and development in Ethiopia, the government believed that preventing and combating corruption will be of a great help. In line with this the government has expressed its commitment to fight corruption by the ratification of UNCAC and AU anti-corruption convention, by establishing the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Regional Anti-corruption Commissions and Ethics Liaison Units in different sectors from the federal to woreda levels.

The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia stipulates that the conduct of the affairs of government shall be public and transparent and public officials are accountable for any dereliction of the duties of office (FDRE Constitution Article 12, 1995). The conduct of government in transparent and accountable manner is in fact beneficial in reducing, among others, the vulnerability to corruption in the civil service. This constitutional base paved the way for the launching of Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in March 1996. The rationales for the launching of CSRP was to pull the civil service out of rampant unethical practices and ensure transparency and accountability or with the overall objective of providing fair, transparent, efficient, effective and ethical civil service for the Government and people of Ethiopia.

The CSRP through its Ethics sub-program culminated in the enactment in May 2001 of the proclamation establishing the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Ethiopia (FEACC). This legal framework gave birth to FEACC with objectives namely:

- In cooperation with relevant bodies, to strive to create an aware society where corruption will not be condoned or tolerated by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education;

- In cooperation with relevant bodies, to prevent corruption offences and other Improprieties;
- To expose, investigate and prosecute corruption offences and impropriety.

Among the above mentioned three objectives of FEACC the first two objectives are directly relevant to corruption prevention measures while the last one focuses on law enforcement activities.

As part of its preventive works, the FEACC is mandated to not only work on the promotion of ethics but also to study the practices and working procedures in various institutions to secure the revisions of methods of work which may be conducive to corruption. This also includes follow up of implementation of system review. The FEACC has also been given the power to conduct the registration of assets and other financial interests of public officials and other selected public employees as part of its corruption prevention activities. The Disclosure and Registration of Assets Proclamation No. 668/2010 is the legal base that can be cited in this respect. The law enforcement activity of the FEACC mainly includes investigating and prosecuting alleged corruption offences as well as freezing and forfeiting of assets obtained by corruption. In order to enhance these investigation and prosecutorial activities of the FEACC a Proclamation to Amend the Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence and a Proclamation for Corruption Crime were adopted in 2015.

These newly adopted proclamations and the 2015 Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment (Amendment) Proclamation No. 883/2015 have enabled the FEACC, among others, to widen its mandate to the private sector. The FEACC's jurisdiction had long been limited to public offices and public enterprises until very recently. The FEACC was mandated to investigate and prosecute alleged corruption offences where they are committed only in public offices or public enterprises, or in regional offices relating to subsidies granted by the Federal Government to the regions (Article 7 of the Revised Establishment Proclamation, 2005).

The Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Commission (FEACC) is entrusted with a crucial role to play in these areas. It is mandated to conduct several wide ranging preventive and law enforcement activities. In view of that there have been different proclamations relevant in one way or another in the fight against corruption and help enhance the works of FEACC.

- Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission establishment proclamation,

Proclamation No. 235/2001

- The Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation, Proclamation No. 236/2001
- Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation, Proclamation No. 433/2005
- Revised Anti-corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation, Proclamation No. 434/2005
- The Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Proclamation No. 414/2004
- The Federal Civil Servants Proclamation of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 515/2007
- The Council of Ministers Regulation to Provide for the Functioning of Ethics Liaison Units, Regulation No. 144/2008,
- A Proclamation to Provide for the Disclosure and Registration of Assets, Proclamation No. 668/2010
- Protection of Witnesses and Whistle blowers of Criminal Offences Proclamation, Proclamation No. 699/2010
- Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation (Amendment), Proclamation No. 833/2015

In addition to that Ethiopia has ratified other international and continental conventions against corruption which can support her domestic works in fighting corruption.

- FDRE Proclamation to provide for the Ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: Proclamation NO. 544/2007
- FDRE Proclamation to provide for the Ratification of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: Proclamation NO. 545/2007
- East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (EAAACA, 2007) the FEACC became member in 2013.

The FEACC is also mandated to coordinate ethical infrastructures and to establish various anti-corruption groups so as to make them play their part in preventing corruption. Accordingly, after 2002 in Ethiopia there has been wide spread establishment of regional ethics and anti-corruption commissions to fight, prevent and prosecute corruption crimes in their respective jurisdictions. Each regional anti-corruption office has autonomy in managing its own operations and budgets.

The SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission is one of regional EACC which was established in 2002 as an autonomous regional government organ to prevent and fight Corruption (SNNPR proclamation No. 48/1994). SNNPRS Ethics and Anticorruption Commission is scaling up its effort to combat corruption in its jurisdiction by establishing Ethics Liaison Units in different Government departments/offices and enterprises (SNNPRS, proclamation No 84/2003). Like the trend in the federal states, the SNNPRS anti-corruption fight has been founded its base on the following regional proclamations.

- SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission establishment Proclamation No. 48/1994
- SNNPRS Council of Administration Ethics Liaison Units (ELUs) Establishment Code No. 84/2003
- SNNPRS Disclosure and Registration of Assets Proclamation No, 138/2003
- SNNPRS Amended Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission establishment Proclamation No. 142/2004

SNNPRS has brought the anti-corruption institution near to the society to confront corruption in a decentralized way. This practices is one other step forward rather than only depending on the Regional EACC. But having such institutions established merely is not guaranty for them to work to achieve their goals and not to fail. According to Speville (2008) many anticorruption agencies fail dismally to have any impact. For this as a reason mentioned defectiveness in institutional design or planning/management and implementation, weak political will, lack of independence from the executive and insufficient budgetary support from the legislature and unrealistic aim and expectations for the failures. The institutions in lower administrative areas like the study area of this research to achieve their goals need to have suitable field or enabling environment. Therefore, this research is aimed to explore the practically existing challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in Lemo Woreda to achieve their goals.

## Chapter Three

### Research Methodology

This chapter consists of description of the study area, study design, source of the data, study population, sample size and sampling techniques, data gathering tools, methods of data analysis, validity and reliability and ethical consideration.

#### 3.1. Description of the study area

This study was carried out in Lemo Woreda, Hadiya Zone; SNNPRs. Lemo Woreda is one of the ten woredas and two town administrations of Hadiya Zone. The administrative center of Lemo Woreda is Hossana, which is 230 km away from Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. It is also 168 km and 200 km from the capital city of the SNNPR Hawassa through Angecha and Durame, respectively. Lemo Woreda is structured in to 33 kebeles and two town administrations.

The absolute location of Lemo Woreda is between 10°17'-10°45'N latitude and 37°00'-37°10'E' longitude. Relative location of Lemo woreda is Silte Zone in the North, Kembate Zone in the South, Soro Woreda in the South West, Mish Woreda in the North West, Anlemo Woreda in the North East, Shashogo in the South East, and Gonbera Woreda in the West.

The woreda has total area of 34973 hectares. From this area of the woreda most of the territory or 45% is plateau, 35% is flat plain and 20% is mountain. There are two ecological zones in Lemo woreda. These are mid latitude known as Woine Dega /*Hansaww Qalla'a* accounts about 83.3% and high lands called Dega/ *Hansawwa* accounts about 16.7%.

The mean annual temperature of Lemo woreda with elevation ranges from 15-20 C° and 1950-2500 masl. The mean annual rainfall of Lemo woreda is 700-1226mm. (Lemo Woreda Finance and Economic Development office, 2009E.C.)

Total population of the woreda is male 81500, female 88675 total 165265. The population of the woreda is composed of different ethnic groups such as Hadiya, Gurage, Silte, Kembata and others. Mother tongue language in the study area is Hadiyyisa and office language is Amharic. Again the population is composed of different religions such as protestant, orthodox Christian, Muslim and others.

Ethics Liaison Unit (ELU) are one of watchdog institutions network in the study area which was found with establishment code No 84/2003 of SNNPRS house of people Council. It is an office lead by Ethics Officer to maintain Ethics, to prevent corruption and bad working habits in public



offices and public enterprises. Currently, there are about 7(seven) ELUs in Lemo Woreda which were established in different public office like Administration Office, Revenue and Custom Office, Finance and Developmental Office, Justice Office, Police Office, Agriculture and Natural Resource Development Office, Education Office. For each Ethics Liaison Units there is one officer who coordinates Ethics and anti-corruption affairs. The Units are directly accountable to the concerned head of the office. Accordingly, this study was conducted to assess its effectiveness in combating corruption since its inception in Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS.

**Figure.**  
**3.1.**  
**Administ**  
**rative**  
**Map of**  
**Lemo**  
**Woreda**



Source: - Lemo Woreda Finance and Economic Development office, 2009 E.C.

### **3.2. The study Design**

The research approach to select depends on the kind of studies that are to be conducted. This study was explorative qualitative research conduct and it involves a descriptive design in the qualitative data collection and analysis. According to Dawson (2002), exploratory research attempts to clarify why and how there is a relationship between two or more aspects of a situation or phenomenon. Again according to him exploratory research is undertaken to explore an area where little is known or to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research study.

The rationality behind using qualitative research design to conduct this study is based on the assumption that Langkos (2014) said it offers a complete description and analysis of a research subject, without limiting the nature of participant's responses. Again according to Yin (2009), qualitative research is concerned with understanding the processes that bring about patterns, and measures information based on opinions, perceptions, beliefs, ideas and values and the benefit of applying this method in a research is that the method takes into consideration the overall picture in a way that the quantified method cannot.

Lastly, what makes a qualitative design more suitable in order to fulfill the purpose of this research in exploring the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in Lemo woreda is the assumption by FHI (2005) that qualitative methods are effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue may not be readily apparent.

Thus, qualitative data was required to analysis of the challenges and prospects of ELUs in combating Corruption in Lemo woreda, Hadiya zone, SNNPR. In line with this, interview, FGDs and document analysis were employed to collect the qualitative data.

### **3.3. Source of Data**

When using a special technique for collecting data, the collecting data can be either primary or secondary. According to Grimshom(2010), primary data is information that the researcher gathers on his own, for instance by using interviews and on the other hand, secondary data refers to the data such as literature, documents and articles.

In this study both primary and secondary data were generated through both primary and secondary sources. Regarding to primary source, data were gathered from study population by using the tools such as interview and FGDs, while secondary data were collected from published and unpublished materials such as researches, performance report, proclamations, regulations, guidelines, and journals.

### **3.4. Target Groups (Study Population)**

According to Dawson & Catherine (2002), study population means People: individuals, organizations, groups, or communities provide the researcher with the information or the researcher collect information about them. Again in the view, study population is the entire group of the people to which a researcher intends the results of a study to apply. Accordingly, population of this research included Ethics Liaison Units officers, and Ethics Focal Persons from Lemo Woreda as explained following in the sample size determination part.

### **3.5. Sample size determination**

One of the most important elements in any study is how samples are drawn from the study population. According to Tuckett (2004), sampling in qualitative research usually relies on small numbers with the aim of studying in depth and detail. Therefore, in this study the researcher used purposive sampling which is commonly used sampling technique in a qualitative research.

Accordingly, Lemo woreda was chosen purposively having the reason that the researcher has pre-information or close information about the study area and due the rationality for proper usage of time and resource because of the proximity of the researcher's work place to the study area. Then from the woreda 7 (seven) Ethics Liaison Units were selected in purposive techniques based on the sectors where the Ethics Liaison Units were available and their proximity to the issue under this investigation in selected woreda. In addition to that 14 (fourteen) Ethics Focal Persons were selected through purposive method from all the sectors where ELUs were not available. Based on this respondents' selection, the total sample size of this study were 21 people.

### **3.6. Tools of Data Gathering**

According to Beverley (2002), the benefits of using different approaches include richness of data and deeper insight into the phenomena under study. Accordingly, in this study interview, FGDs and document analysis were used as instrument of data collection in order to gather required data.

### **3.6.1. Interview**

According to Hancock (2007), qualitative researcher usually employ semi-structured interview which involve a number of open ended questions based on the topic areas that the researcher wants to cover. And in his view, the open ended nature of the questions provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to discuss some topics in more detail. If the interviewee has difficulty answering a question or provides only a brief response, the interviewer can use cues or prompts to encourage the interviewee to consider the question further. Accordingly, in this study to properly conduct interview the following procedure were employed. First, open ended interview questions were prepared in English and translated in to Amharic. Second, 7(seven) Ethics Liaison Units officers were selected and asked their voluntariness. Third, programs to conduct interview were set with the officers at their suitable time and appropriate place. Lastly, interview conducted and the researcher took detailed note on the questions raised.

### **3.6.2. Focus Group Discussions**

According to Kothari (2004), FGDs tends to the production of opinions expressed and exchanged in everyday life and tools for reconstructing individuals' opinions more appropriately. According to Hancock (2007), the members of each focus group should usually have something in common: characteristics which are important to the topic of investigation. Based on this assumption in this study, all the 14(fourteen) Ethics Focal Persons available in the woreda were purposively selected. Again according to Hancock (2007), a study using FGDs to collect data should include several groups, not just one, because any individual group is subject to internal or external factors of which the investigator may be unaware. Having this view, in this study the respondents were divided in to two groups each consisted 7 members.

For this open-ended questions were prepared in English and translated to Amharic. Then one moderator was assigned and orientation was given to both moderator and participants on the questions and study purpose. Then, FGDs were conducted within a given time after preparation of the logistics such as hall, stationary and refreshment. Lastly, while the discussion was running detailed note of the discussions were taken by the both the moderator and the researcher and each discussion took one and half an hour.

### **3.6.3. Document Analysis**

Documents are valuable source of information in qualitative research. Documents consists of public and private records that qualitative researchers obtain about a site or participants in a study. These sources provides valuable information in helps researchers understand central phenomena in qualitative studies and they represent public and private documents (Creswell, 2012).

For this study, it was collected from published and unpublished materials such as Proclamations, ELUs codes and guidelines, published and unpublished researches, performance reports, and journals and analyzed by linking related ideas found from interview and FGDs.

### **3.7. Data Analysis**

According to Creswell (2012) qualitative data analysis is conducted concurrently with gathering data, making interpretation and writing reports. In this study data found through interview and FGDS taken during interview and discussion were analyzed by transcribing the respondents' idea through expanding the notes into descriptions and elaborating on the researcher's initial observations as soon as after each interview and discussion. According to Hancock (2007) transcribing is the procedure for producing a written version of an interview or it is a full "script" of the interview or conversation. And information taken from the documents were analyzed by linking the related ideas found from interview and FGDs and by acknowledging the sources. Finally, data interpretation, summary and conclusions, and recommendations were drawn accordingly.

### **3.8. Validity and reliability**

Validity and reliability are two factors which any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analyzing results and judging the quality of the study (Patton, 2002). Checking the validity and reliability of data collecting instruments before providing for the actual study subject is the core to assure the quality of the data.

#### **Validity**

To accomplish validity of this thesis, the researcher used interview questions which were developed by directly related to specific research questions. In order to address the specific research questions of the study, appropriate respondents from ELUs were purposively selected and approached, which was important to achieve the validity of the study.

## **Reliability**

Although the term reliability is a concept used for testing or evaluating quantitative research, the idea is most often used in all kinds of research (Golafshani, 2003). This can be used to examine both the process and the product of the research for consistency in qualitative research. (Hoepfl, 1997). After the processes and procedures of data collection and following their interpretations the researcher sufficiently discussed and documented data in this study, it helped to ensure the trustworthiness of the findings.

## **3.9. Ethical Consideration**

Ethical consideration plays an important role in the process of conducting research. According to Georgia (2011) research ethics involve requirements on daily work, the protection of dignity of subjects and the publication of the information in the research. Again according to Bulme (1982) informed consent is one of the most important tools for ensuring respect for persons during research. Hence, researcher was aware and followed the ethical consideration related to this study. The researcher first explained the aim of the study and requested the respondents consent and ensured their deliberate participation. The researcher took strict care not to manipulate the respondents to his own intention and to keep the confidentiality of the respondents no name of them is mentioned in the research.

Furthermore, the first page of the in-depth interview and FGDs were displayed the opening introductory letter by requesting the respondents' cooperation to provide required information for the completion of the research. After transcribing the data the researcher shown that the interviewee to check whether it is their own view or no and then interviewee gave the researcher consent letter by putting their sign and their office stamp. Again in the case of secondary data, all the materials used in this study were acknowledged.

## Chapter Four

### Findings and Discussions

This chapter consists of Research presentation and analysis focusing on the objectives of the ELUs, challenges of the ELUs and prospects of the ELUs in combating corruption in Lemo Woreda, Hadiya Zone, and SNNPR. In general, the chapter starts with the background characteristics of the respondents and then analysis on the further deals with the analysis of objectives of the ELUs, analysis of challenges and analysis of prospects of ELUs in combating corruption in the study area.

#### 4.1. Background of the respondents

**Table 4.1:- Background characteristics of the respondents.**

Variables	Category	Frequency
Sex of respondent	Male	16
	Female	5
Nationality	Ethiopian	21
	Other	---
Age of respondent	25 and below	----
	26-35	13
	36-45	6
	46-55	2
	Above 55	---
	Certificate	---
	Diploma	1
	Degree	20
	Master degree	---
Marital status	Married	13
	Unmarried	8
Religion	Muslim	1
	Protestant	17
	Orthodox	3
	Other	---

Ethnicity	Hadiya	21
	Other	---
Experience	Below 5	---
	6-10	5
	11-15	4
	16-20	4
	21-25	2
	26-30	2
	Above 30	2

Source: - Gathered during data collection, 2017.

#### **4.2. The objective of the Foundation of Ethics Liaison Units in the study area**

According to UNCAC (2003) each state party shall endeavor to establish and promote effective practice aimed at the prevention of corruption. In line with this Council of Minister Regulation No. 144/2008 part two, article 4 states that Ethics Liaison Units shall have the objectives to endeavor to create public employees who do not condone corruption by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education, work discipline, professional ethics, consciousness of serving the public and sense of duty among employees, prevent corruption and impropriety in public offices and public enterprises and endeavor to cause acts of corruption and impropriety be exposed and investigated and appropriate actions are taken against the perpetrators.

Accordingly, SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission ELUs establishment code 84/2003, article 117 and revised ELUs guideline 16/2005 revealed that the primary objectives behind the establishment of ELUs are;

- to strive to create an aware society where corruption will not be tolerated by promoting Ethics and Anti-Corruption education,
- to prevent corruption offenses and other improprieties by proposing new work systems which narrow the prevalence of corruption,
- to receive and investigate any suspected cases of corruption offenses and other improprieties, and then to report the result of serious ethical violation or corruption cases to Commission as well as they are mandated to present the cases of any ethical violation to concerned head of the office with their own decisional suggestion.

Concerning the objectives of the establishment ELUs officers respond that:



*The major aim in establishment of ELUs is to minimize the prevalence levels of corruption by doing the preventive activities such as awareness creation on the threat of corruption and improprieties, counseling, following the proper implementation of rules and regulations in cooperation and collaboration with others ethical infrastructures and other stakeholders*

In line with that, the FGDs respondents said that:

*The main objectives behind the establishment of ELUs in the study area are to prevent corruption before it happens through the promotion of ethical values in the society and by raising awareness of the dangers or risks of corruption and improprieties.*

Based on the above information, it is possible to recognize that most of the officers and ethics focal persons have understood the basic establishment objectives or have information in fundamental objectives behind the establishment of ELUs in the study area. This is quite good to give responses on challenges and prospects of ELUs in the study area which are the main focuses of this study.

#### **4.3. The three basic objectives of ELUs and their implementation activities in the study area.**

The Revised Establishment Proclamation No 433/2005, part two, Article 6 sub articles 1-3 of Federal EACC, states three-pronged approaches to fighting against corruption such as awareness raising (anti-corruption education), prevention, investigation, and prosecution. Again as clearly stated in the above sub topic 4.3 the establishment objectives of ELUs in SNNPRS lower administrative levels are mainly to create aware society, to prevent corruption and improprieties before it happens, as well as receiving complains of corruption and investigation are major responsibilities of ELUs in the study area. Here, below attempts are made to see the activities being done in the study area on the three major objectives of the ELUs.

##### **4.3.1. Awareness creation**

According to J. Chan (2005), educating citizens is often considered a critical part of addressing corruption and education has proved to be an enduring answer to the problem of corruption in developing nations and has come to dominate many anti-corruption policies. In his view, in one of the few successful anti-corruption initiatives, the Hong Kong Independent Commission against Corruption, it was the changing perceptions and responses of citizens that helped to significantly reduce the incidence of corruption in that country. According Marquette (2007),

suggestion there are three assumptions in the belief that education helps reduce corruption. First, it is assumed that a more educated population will be more inclined to play an effective watchdog role. Second, educated citizens are assumed to be less likely to engage in corruption. Third, better-educated citizens can end up as politicians and civil servants, who, if properly educated, are assumed to be more likely to say no to corruption.

Education also appears to have an impact on reporting. Those with higher levels of education were significantly less likely to fail to act against corruption and more likely to report some types of corruption (Gorta & Forrell, 1995). As a result, a number of academics have called for education campaigns to bolster citizens' awareness about the impacts of corruption. Improving access to education in developing countries may reduce the presence of corruption norms and ultimately corruption itself' (Truex, 2011).

The main target of ELUs in the study area is to create awareness in society in general and to impart ethical values by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education through different mechanisms.

Concerning awareness creation, the ELUs officers during interview responded that:

*Beginning with the establishment of the ELUs and since we took this responsibility more or less we have been giving awareness raising trainings in concept of ethics and anti-corruption, strategies base on the regional anti- corruptions strategies and proclamations, the code of conducts, and criminal law of corruption through different mechanisms for civil servants and other citizens in different ways with integration to others trainings and sometime separately. Weobserve awareness problem with in the ordinary society, civil servants as well as the government officials of the worda. However,with the establishment of these , works being done on the awareness creation have been showing good change in the level of awareness of the society recently. In order not to work a lot or to broaden our awareness creation activities, financial and man power shortage have been becoming challenges. We have not been given necessary capacity building training from the regional commission or other concerning body and this is another challenge for our works.*

From the above response what can be understood is that, awareness creation activities have been running in the society, civil servants and the officials. Again, the above evidence shows us that awareness level on the corruption in the society has been gradually increasing from time to

time. This shows a good progress in expanding of ethics and anti-corruption education in the study area. But against that, the officers raised that their awareness creation plans have not been fully achieved and it has low outreach when it is compared with the total population in the study area.

The ELU officer from the police office of the woreda to strengthen respondents the awareness problem on the side of the political leaders said that:

*There are a great gap and reluctance even among political leaders concerning the wise understanding of what they do and try to lead others to anti-corruption strategies and lack of commitment to strongly support our works.*

From the officers' responses, it is clear to reveal that however there have been changes observed, awareness gap or reluctance of political leaders, shortage of man power as an employee or officer is only one in each ELU, and an insufficient budget are raised as the constraints to broaden awareness raising activities. This in turn could result challenge on a population of the study area to have the information on where and how they go to report the case of corruption and weakens the works of the ELUs.

Concerning awareness creation, the respondents of FGDs indicated that:

*We have been giving awareness raising training in concept of ethics and anti-corruption, strategies, bad effects of corruption, the code of conducts, criminal law of corruption and others through different mechanisms for civil servants and other citizens who have relation with our office works in different ways with integration to others trainings and out of our sectors we have been working in cooperation with the ELUs officers.*

FGDs respondents supporting the responses of the ELUs officers again said:

*The participants' number in awareness raising training and their awareness level has been gradually increasing from time to time. But it has not walked on the intended level to reach the broader society in the woreda.*

FGDs respondents raised different reasons for the awareness creation not being broadened at the intended level by saying that:

*There are inabilities of some ethics officers to alert the awareness creation in the society due to lack of sufficient knowledge, skills, techniques and commitment to initiate*

*different stakeholders for cooperation rather than expecting only suitable conditions and blaming others.*

From the above responses of FGDs, what can be inferred is that, it is not financial, human resource and political reluctance only challenging awareness creation works of ELUs in Lemo Woreda, but also commitment and skill of the officers' have matter with the reality of the ELUs objective concerning awareness creation in the study area. In another means responses of FGDs seem raising question on the commitment of the sectors heads about putting good recruitment criteria into consideration during the employment of the officers for getting professional officers and the absence of regularly planned capacity building training for officers from the regional commission or the heads of the sectors that challenging effective awareness creation works of the ELUs.

Finally, what can be concluded from the above information is that however according to J. Chan (2005), education has proved to be an enduring answer to the problem of corruption in developing nations, and has come to dominate many anti-corruption policies, in this study area awareness creation education has not been done at a satisfactory level and its outreach is lower. For that low achievement as respondents' views shortage of financial and human resource, the reluctance of political leaders, lack of commitment and skill of the officers are the main once. According to the Principal-Agent theory as stated in the literature part, the failure to be successful in awareness creation is that the Principals (Leaders) have not been playing the expected role in strengthening the ELUs. Again in view of Collective-Action theory as awareness creation needs collective effort but is left only for the Units while the units alone are not able to work without an enabling environment due to the mentioned challenges.

#### **4.3.2. Prevention**

According to AUCPCC, Article 12 and UNCAC, Article 13, state parties have to give due attention to prevention of corruption with the active participation of society in the fight against corruption. Again according to UNDP (2004) the provisions with regard to participation of society stipulate the involvement of civil society, non-governmental organizations, the media and community-based organizations in the prevention of and the fight against corruption.

As mentioned in revised Establishment Proclamation No 142/2004 of SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, examining the practices and working procedures in government departments and public enterprises are believed to close the conducive environments or

situations for corrupt practices is at the heart of the country's corruption prevention program. So far, according to ELUs establishment code 84/2003 and its revised guideline 16/2005 article 3 the units attempt to examine the practices and working procedures in different government departments and public enterprises, and put forward corrective measures and follow up the implementation of the recommendations. Also, they have the responsibility to follow up other rule and regulations of the work and new proposed work system by the commission.

Concerning prevention, the ELUs officers responded that:

*There is good progress in the prevention of corruption, and it has been increasing time to time. We receive any sorts of hints of corruption or misappropriation of government properties in advance from any whistle blower, we have been taking the immediate actions by following or visiting the area of corruption suspect. We have prevented many public assets and budgets for example like vehicles maintenance and engine usage. In our works, there is a problem of different stakeholders cooperation especially civil servants to cooperate and expose corrupt actions and involuntariness of government officials to provide necessary information on the suspected case and even some times giving cover for improprieties are some of the constraints.*

The above information tells us that, prevention of corruption in the study area has good progress. Again the information reveals that, however, the ELUs have been trying their best to prevent corruption, and still they are not free from different constraints in their works to walk more. And this shows that, they are in problem in their ways to achieve their goals due to the aforementioned obstacles because without the cooperation of all concerning bodies preventing corruption is a dream that cannot be tackled.

Concerning the prevention of corruption, the FGDs respondents said that:

*We have been working to prevent corruption in our offices and as much as possible in cooperation with the ELUs officers at the woreda level. We have been preventing different suspects in different places like in kebeles public resources like forest sells, gathering community support money to schools without receipts, level promotion of civil servants and others. But there is a problem of coordinating our scattered efforts to strengthen us in the works of prevention and cooperation problem from the public to inform suspects.*

Generally, it is possible to assume that like the first objective, there is a progress on prevention of corruption in the study area. But in their works, there has been a problem of cooperation from different stake holders. This is against the Collective-Action theory that corruption is collective action problem and it needs a collective effort. Again in view of Principal-Agent theory there has been a problem that both the principal and the agent have not developed consensus to expose corrupt acts by blaming or suspecting each other to commit corruption and on another hand it is possible to say that the principal has weakness in convincing the agent and playing an exemplary role by showing commitment of the government against corruption.

#### **4.3.3. Receiving and investigating corruption suspects**

According to Yap (2013), the best way to control corruption is to increase the risk of being caught and resulting punishment and if punishment is exerted, citizens are less likely to support or engage in corruption. According to Klitgaard (1988), addressing corruption requires functioning formal institution that citizens can expect to investigate and prosecute corruption.

According to Ethiopian anti-corruption policy, law enforcement is the last stage of the three pronged approach to combating corruption. Accordingly, it is expected that citizens may present any complaints of corruption for ELUs in the study area and investigation will be taken by the employee of ELUs before taking disciplinary or criminal sanctions.

According to the ELUs establishment code 84/2003 article 7 and 8 of the SNNPRS, the units have the responsibility to obtain complaints about alleged corruption from whistleblowers anonymously or not anonymously through different channels such as telephone, in-person statements, in text and etc.

Concerning Receiving and investigating corruption suspects the ELUs respondents said that:

*Our responsibility in this concern is to obtain complaints about suspected corruption from whistleblowers secretly through different channels such as telephone, physical contact, and suggestion box in the door of our offices. The next step we do after receiving and registering incoming cases, is investigation. Then if the cases are serious breaches of the codes of ethics or offenses of corruption our only responsibility is reporting to Commission whereas if the cases are simple breaches of the codes of ethics we submit the cases to concerned public office head and enterprises with decisional suggestions for the disciplinary measure. But there has been no case beyond our capacity and reported to the regional commission and there has been no case that legal sanction has been taken in*

*the woreda level rather than only administrative measures like shifting work position and giving warning orally or in written means. We are not practically given full power to investigate and prosecute the offences of corruption. But, we have been endeavoring to provide the public and civil servants including others stakeholders with clear information on the mechanisms of reporting or presenting complaints of corruption and improprieties in the study area.*

From the preceding evidence what can be inferred is that, the ELUs have been receiving complains of corruption through different mechanisms but the information clues us that due to lack of full power, the units' work in investigation has been weak in the study area. Again the information shows that having no case reported to the EACC of the region and absence of legal measure taken on corrupt acts are very weak works of the ELUs in the study woreda and very low commitment from the political leaders in the woreda to take strong legal measures in cooperation with other justice institutions in a way that others get lesson from the punishments of corrupt acts.

Again the ELUs officers during the interview said that:

*In our works too much delay and less attention of concerned head of a given public office to take disciplinary punishment in presented cases of simple breaches of the code of ethics and lack of power for the units to prosecute corrupters have been minimizing the trust of society or civil servants in our performance and due to that we are seen as simply a titular persons and the ELUs have been considered by the society as a non-functional institution.*

These information tells us that absence of power for the ELUs to prosecute corrupters and low commitment of the heads of the sectors have weakened the works of the ELUs by reducing public trust and reducing their cooperation in their works in the study area.

Concerning receiving and investigating corruption suspects the FGDs respondents said that:

*Investigation and taking measures or punishment has been very weak in our woreda because of lack of full power for the ELUs to investigate and persecute the suspects. The organizational structure of the ELUs itself has a great gap. It made ELUs too much powerless and more dependent on concerned heads of the office as well as in the Commission. This made the officers to wait for the permission of the heads for each and every activity. So, having this status it is difficult to think the ELUs are truly established*

*to work against corruption and in another way is decreasing public trust and cooperation in fighting against corruption.*

From the above information it can be understood that however, situation of fighting against corruption to some extent is good in the study area, lack of power for the ELUs to prosecute and take any disciplinary or criminal sanctions on corrupters, long time wait to take action on the corrupters on informed cases of corruption from the sectors heads and due to these reasons decreasing of public trust and cooperation have become constraints in the activities of the ELUs in the study area. These conditions in the views of the two theories of corruption explained in literature part can be viewed as follows. In sense of Principal-Agent theory, we see that the principals have commitment problem to take necessary measures on suspected cases and work to build trust in the mind of agent and agent loss trust rather than strongly lobbying the principal. In addition to that, we can see this in view of Collective-Action theory that there is weakness of all concerning bodies like commission of the region, concerned heads of sectors, the officers of ELUs themselves and other stake holders to exert their efforts to practically inform, investigate and take necessary measure and even to structure the ELUs in a manner that they can work with full power.

#### **4.4. Prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in the study area**

In this part, the researcher attempted to discuss both the internal and external prospects which are available or which facilitate the achievement of ELUs' objectives in combating corruption in the study area. Factors which can affect the achievement of ELUs were analyzed in two categories like exogenous and endogenous as were described earlier in chapter two. Here to explore the existing prospects for practical work of ELUs in the study area different questions from the perspective of different prospects like political, social-cultural, and economic were prepared. In addition to that, document analysis were made. Based on the information found from the respondents and related document, analysis on the prospects of ELUs in combating corruption in the study area are presented and analyzed as follows.

##### **4.4.1. Political prospects or prospects from the side of the government.**

Political will or political commitment is one of the external factors that need to exist for the achievement of the goals of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

The UNCAC obliges states parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption measures affecting their laws, institutions, and practices. According to the UNCAC (2003), each



state party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prevent corruption. Again the AUACC (2003), requires states parties to adopt legislative measures for the search, seizure, freeze, confiscation, and repatriation of corruption.

Based on the above facts the Government in Ethiopia has established anti-corruption institutions at the federal level and the regional states have formulated institutions in their jurisdictions accordingly.

Concerning political prospect, the ELUs officers responded that:

*The government in Ethiopia has consistently recognized corruption as a critical issue and has been taking different actions in terms of including the issue of corruption in different policies as well as some degree of institutional development from the federal to lower administrative levels. In different sectors, ELUs have been established turn by turn in different sectors and they are supported with formal proclamations and given detailed responsibilities.*

From the above information, it is possible to suppose that political commitment or the government stand in establishing the ELUs as an instrument to fight against corruption in the lower administrative area is a good travel. The units have been founded by clear proclamations and given clear objectives and specified or detailed responsibilities.

Concerning political prospects on the interview that the ELUs offices asked to rate the practical existence of political suitability for the ELUs to combat corruption in the study area, they responded that:

*"Good" the heads of our sectors more or less have been allocating budget, however, is insufficient too, and facilitating some suitable situations for awareness creation in combination with another program. Sometimes they allow us to observe when they make some decisions.*

From this response what can be taken is that the practical existence of political suitability for the ELUs to combat corruption in the study area is not bad. But that does not mean that the political leaders are going all the possible journey to facilitate condition for effective struggle against corruption in cooperation with the ELUs in the study area.

Again concerning political prospect, the FGDs respondents said that:

*The attention in the country recently given to fight corruption including lower administrative levels is good. The ELUs establishment with proclamation and regulation*

*procedure which clearly states the duties of the ELUs, and rule and regulations to protect the whistleblowers from being a victim of the corrupters are prepared. In our case, however, the ELUs officers and ethics focal persons have not been capacitated and motivated to work strongly and in some corruption sensitive sectors, ELUs are not established like the municipality, trade, and industry, health where works are beyond the capacity of ethics focal persons.*

The above information like the response of the ELUs officers rated "good" the practical political prospect on the establishment basis and support. What another thing can be seen in the existence of those prospects is that there are different remaining things to make sure the practical political prospects.

To finish, what can be inferred from the above information is that that the ELUs have legal ground to perform their duties and there are regulations which support their works by giving guaranty to the whistleblowers as previously explained in empirical review part of the literature such like SNNPRGS Proclamation No. 48/1994, 84/2003, 138/2003 and 142/2004. This idea is supported by, for example, Mauro (1998) since fighting corruption will involve taking difficult decisions, and the leadership must also display firmness, political will and commitment to carry out the required reforms. For this, honest and dedicated leaders are a necessity. In this view we also can see that the government more or less has assigned officers for the ELUs because before this there were no targeted concerning bodies in the lower administration levels to objectively perform the issue of combating corruption and allocated budget for the officers even in a better amount than other civil servants or government employees and more or less in some sectors has facilitated separate offices for ELUs, however, the shortage and absence of facilities like chair, table, computer, phone, and vehicle is visible. The existing political prospect can be viewed in sense of Principal-Agent theory that the principal more or less has been playing its role to facilitate for the ELUs in fighting corruption but still problems left to play the role at the intended level.

#### **4.4.2. Sociocultural prospects or prospects from the side of the society**

Sociocultural prospects or prospects from the side of the society are one of the external prospects that need to exist for the achievement of the goals of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

Concerning the Socio-cultural prospects in fighting against corruption in the study area the ELUs officers responded that:

*The cultures of the society have their own positive support in different ways. First of all in the society there is an attitude which pressure people not to take something for themselves which is not belong to them and a person who commits such crimes is exposed to outcast from the society. Again the society is tied with religion and each religion teaches its members that theft and corruption are sin and committing such crimes or evils are against the law of God. However, there are some opinions that corruption is misunderstood that like gift giving for some who did something and the thinking that the officials are required to accept that. It need our effort to promote and bring the positive societal attitude towards fighting against corruption and develop cooperation with the ELUs.*

From the earlier information what we can assume that there is some societal culture that can help the ELUs to work in cooperation. That shows that if the officers are able to coordinate the public there are supportive thinking in the society.

Again during FGDs the respondents on the Sociocultural prospects in fighting against corruption in the study area revealed that:

*In the society there are traditional conflict resolution mechanisms with elders which support the works of ELUs in combating corruption. For example in the community there are different community based self-help organizations like (Iddir, Ikub and others). The community assigns leaders for coordinating their affairs in those organizations. When the cases of illegal usage of properties happen with the leaders, people take the cases to the elders and elders use different mechanisms to bring back the lost property and even give proper punishment either in cash or removing from the position. Elders even work not only in the community affairs but also they involve in the governmental issues in lower administrative levels like kebele until they remove the administrative from power in cooperation with the Kebele council.*

The preceding information tells us that in addition to cultural thinking of not using some one's property for self and religious teachings informed by ELUs officers, there are different society-based institutions in the community that have their own rule of administration that if possible to bring to the struggle of corruption can support the works of the ELUs.

To end, the earlier information remind us that there are different encouraging outlooks in the society that can initiate the society if works done to coordinate in fighting corruption to work with the ELUs. These activities in the community support their works of ELUs in two ways. First, by fighting or avoiding corruption in the community where the government's involvement is not directly accessible and second by reducing the work burden of the ELUs by making cases not to come to ELUs. The Collective-Action theory of corruption support that the positive attitudes in the society help or facilitate suitable environment to motivate collective effort of the society in fighting corruption.

#### **4.4.3. Economic prospects or prospects from the side of the financial support.**

Economic prospects or prospects from the side of the financial support are one of the external prospects that need to exist for the achievement of the goals of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

For the ELUs to achieve their goals and effectively and efficiently in combating corruption necessary financial support need to be facilitated. Concerning to that the SNNPR state has clearly stated the source of finance for ELUs in the proclamation that the government covers the finance.

During interviews with ELUs officers, economic prospects or prospects from the side of the financial support, they responded that:

*The government economic power in Ethiopia has been growing in fast rate recently. This opportunity can strengthen the power of the government to struggle against corruption in one way and can support the government to allocate a better amount of budget for the ELUs to combat corruption in another way. In our context, the units have been very insufficiently budgeted and there are no uniform means of allocation. The budget allocation of the year varies from sector to sector and there is increase and decrease from year to year.*

The prior information tells us that the government increasing economic power has an important role to play in fighting corruption at country level at large and in the study area particularly. Against the increasing budget its allocation to the ELUs

*The FGDs respondents concerning the economic prospects or prospects from the side of the financial support they responded that:*

*The improving economic potential in Ethiopia enables the sectors to allocate the optimum amount of budget for the ELUs. In another way that helps the government to allocate better or higher salary for ELUs officers than other civil servants which can*

*motivate the officers in their works. The economic potential of the country also can help the government reduce corrupt acts by improving the civil servant's salary scales.*

From the above views of the respondents what can be understood is that in the country at large and in the study area particularly there is economic potential to support the works of the ELUs and to allocate better salary for officers to strengthen their works and initiate civil servants to fight corruption by increasing salary scale and improving the life conditions.

To conclude, the preceding information tells again us that there is economic potential in the study area to support the works of the ELUs. On this, the Principal-Agent theory of corruption direct the issue to the role of the principals (leaders) to in allocating necessary budget in the existing financial prospect.

#### **4.4.4. Prospects from the side of access to channels to expand ethics and anti-corruption education.**

Concerning prospects from the side of access to channels to expand ethics and anti-corruption education in the study area the respondents from the ELUs officers' interview and FGDs responded that:

*The ELUs have different opportunities to expand ethics and anti-corruption education there are different opportunities or channels in the study area. In our works, we can cooperate various governmental and non-governmental institutions to promote ethics and enhance the participation of the public in corruption prevention. For Example, civics and ethics education clubs in schools, youth associations, women associations, youth and women forum, farmers training centers, development group(Limat Budin), one to five (1 to 5) groups in kebeles, religious organizations, professional associations, civil society organizations and justice sector bodies in order to enhance public awareness about the evils of corruption and promote other preventive measures. Currently, there is FM radio program in our town (Hossana) with our local language (Hadiyissa). These opportunities if supported by financial suitability can strongly strengthen our works of fighting corruption by creating an aware society in the woreda.*

The preceding information tells us that in the study woreda the ELUs have different supportive establishments that they have to work in coordination from the woreda to kebele levels. What another thing can be seen from the prior views is that for the ELUs in the study area to use the opportunities to the desired level is financial availability. Lastly, it can be concluded that the

ELUs in the study woreda can engage different local partners in their works of combating corruption if situation is facilitated.

#### **4.5. Challenges of ELUs in combating corruption in the study area**

The deep rooted causes and the natures of corruption by itself are a big challenge in the field of fighting corruption (Durand-Laser 1998, as cited in Melese, 2012). There are certain pre-conditions which were reviewed earlier in chapter two and that needs to be in the place for ACA more effectively in their duties. These include strong political commitment, public confidence and trust, independence, sufficient human resources and budget, and participation or cooperation of civil society. Concerning this the ELUs officer's interview responses indicate that ELUs have been facing many challenges and complaints such as the issue of political commitment, institutional issues like structure, human resource, financial and material factors, cooperation problem of different stakeholders, cultural attitude towards corruption, are the most challenges for the achievement of the intended goals of the ELUs in combating corruption in the study area.

##### **4.5.1. Political challenges or challenges from the side of the government**

Political will or political commitment is one of the external factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

According to Mauro, the top leadership must set a good example with respect to honesty, integrity, and capacity for hard work. Since fighting corruption will involve taking difficult decisions, the leadership must also display firmness, political will and commitment to carry out the required reforms. For this, honest and dedicated leaders are a necessary (Mauro, 1998)

On the Political challenges, the interview respondents of the ELUs said that:

*The fight against corruption should be the daily task of each and every government official. There are great reluctance and lack of commitment from the leaders of government offices and public enterprises showing not to produce supportive information to ELUs and cooperate in their works. The ELUs are not given due attention and support by the officials of their respective institutions and even sometimes they are considered as fault finders and have been pushed indirectly to leave or quit their job in some cases. Also there is a commitment problem from the government officials to integrate joint efforts of different concerning bodies and convince employees of public institutions as well as*

*ordinary citizens that the problem of curbing corruption need to be treated seriously by the government strong commitment and in cooperation with different stakeholders but not with in an opportunistic ways and weakness to promote their cooperation in combating corruption in the study area.*

Based on the above information it is clear that for the ELUs to work effectively in the study area there are strong political constraints. The leaders seem to ignore the issue of corruption and have not been practically accepted the ELUs an institution to work against corruption. Again it tells that if the political leaders are not open on their works and not willing to provide information the works of the units have no means from being left nil.

In line with Political challenges, the FGDs respondents said that:

*The ELUs in the woreda sometime seen as challenges for the works of the government officials. Some leaders point their finger at them when they see coming from in front by saying "Look at there the commissioner coming". The government officials are not really working for the functionality of the objectives of the ELUs in combatting corruption. The reluctance of the political leaders has made their supports to develop the same attitude towards the ELUs. This in another hand can make others those who want to fight corruption lose trust on the ELUs and keep quite from informing the suspected cases to the units.*

From the above responses, we can bear in mind that the ELUs have been challenged by different attitudes that demoralize them from implementing the given tasks. They are ashamed of their works due to lack of strong political support which can motivate them and convince civil servants and other society that ELUs is working as an institution and need their cooperation. This develops mistrust in the mind of the whole society that the government of the word and its ELUs are not truly committed to struggle against corruption.

For anti-corruption agents or bodies to be effective, they have to be created in a political atmosphere where leaders are honest, civil servants are insulated from political interference, and better incentives are provided to discourage corruption. Otherwise, the oversight bodies will be rendered useless or worse, misused for political gain (Gary et al, 1998).

To finalize, the prior evidence shows that however the political leadership that is credible in terms of its engagement in the fight against corruption, and genuine support and engagement in implementation of the strategies against corruption in cooperation with the ELUs some leaders

seem to either deafen their ears to act that they have no idea on those issues or ignore the works of the ELUs as having no role. Again while political will need to be expressed by empowering ELUs implementing anti-corruption laws, providing ELUs with regular funding, assist them by working closely together, creating them access to different data of offices, and continuously give political support to achieve concrete results but their works are seen as simply supplementary work than they have their own goals.

This according to the officers' response made fitting corruption seems to be left only as the responsibility of the ELUs. The Principal-Agent theory of corruption that talks that there needs to be trust between the principal and the agent and the principal to play the greater role to mobilize anti-corruption struggle criticize that political challenge is highly due to the weak role of the principal in this context the political leaders. According to the Collective Action theory of the corruption both the principal, agent and the broader weakness to cooperate the works of the ELUs because this theory accepts that corruption is collective action problem and it needs collective effort.

#### **4.5.2. Challenges from the institutional structure of the ELUs.**

The institutional structure of the ELUs is one of the internal factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.


Concerning the institutional structure of the ELUs, the officers responded that:

*The existing institutional structure of the ELUs in woreda level is not suitable for the effective work of the ELUs. Giving all the power for the heads of the specific sector or office makes the ELUs dependent on the head of the concerned office or sector for budget and other facilities. The absence of some responsible body to coordinate the ELUs scattered in different sectors of the woreda is another challenge due to the structure of the units that prolong the chain of the work and scatter our capacity to strongly fight against corruption with a joint effort.*

Again they rose that having established the units in each sector in the absence of concerning body like branch or sub-branch of Regional Anti-Corruption Commission near to officers in the woreda level to integrate efforts of ELUs officers which are organized in different sectors has prolonged the chain of work and scattered their capacity to strongly fight against corruption with a joint efforts or it weakened the integrity of the units. So the responses indicate that the institutional structure of the ELUs needs to be re-arranged.




**Figure 4.1. The Existing Vertical Structure of ELUs**



**KEY: -**

- Top to bottom relationships
- Bottom to top accountability
- Top to bottom or Bottom to top Cooperation



Source: - Developed by researcher, 2017

Concerning the institutional structure of the ELUs, the FGDs respondents said that:

*In practice, the present structure of the ELUs has made it very dependent on the concerned head of the sector or office. However, the units were established in accordance with proclamation, codes and with quantified guidelines, and however, ELUs have great aims in their establishment to combat corruption, there is structural adequacy*

*problem. Being scattered in each sector without having a responsible body to coordinate their works at the woreda level.*

The above information revealed that like the ELUs officers in the woreda the ethics focal persons are not happy with the structure of the units that made them very dependent and scattered their effort.

So, this condition can hinder the ELUs from achieving their goals in the study area.

Lastly, from the preceding views, we can conclude that the current structure of the ELUs which has made the units accountable to the head of the respective public office or public enterprise in woreda level is not suitable for the practical achievement of what units are expected to do. Again this way of the institutional structure of the ELUs has not satisfied most of the informants and this is obvious to conclude that situation can reduce public trust at the institution and push them from cooperation with to combat corruption.

#### **4.5.3. Challenges from the perspective of the placement of the ELUs officers**

The placement of the ELUs officers or human capital/staff capacity is one of the internal factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

Corruption is a phenomenon the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of which need to be approached on numerous levels, using specific knowledge and skills from a variety of fields. Each State should, therefore, have experts specialized in the fight against corruption (OECD, 2008).

According to Council of Ministers Regulation to Provide for the Functioning of Ethics Liaison Units Regulation No. 144/2008 article 11, the head of the concerned public office or public enterprise shall assign the ethics officer and staff of the Ethics Liaison Unit through employment, promotion or transfer.

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the placement of the ELUs officers the respondents of the ELUs officers during interview responded that:

*Giving power to the head of the concerned public office or public enterprise to assign the officer may have a tendency of not being free of subjectivity. Even if the heads of the concerned public offices or public enterprises assign the officer in a proper way it is not easy to get trust from other staff members. During our assignment for this position, there were grievances in each office in some offices even until the commission of the region*

*interfere in the case and warn the heads of the sectors. In the assignment of the officers, we do not believe all the sectors or offices of the woreda be free from the breaking the set rules in favor of someone to benefit from the better salary of that position.*

From the earlier evidence what we can recognize is that giving power to the concerned head of sectors has a problem or is a challenge for the ELUs to be accepted as an institution to combat corruption but rather may be seen that the concerned head has selected a person who supports and cover his/her corrupt acts. This, in turn, can make the servants not to inform suspects due to fear of not keeping secret because of the expectation of close relation to the officer and the head of the employment and fear of losing their benefits and less expectation the officers can do to prevent that case.

In line with the Challenges from the perspective of the placement of the ELUs officers the respondents of the FGDs responded that:

*Giving power to the head of the concerned public office or public enterprise to assign the officer cannot be free from the problem during the assignment. The assignment of the officers is not free from either close friendship or relativity or blood relation with the head of the concerned public office or public enterprise. The assignment of the officers for not being merit based but rather it sometimes seems to be the place for those who work in government positions for a long time to benefit from the better salary of the ELUs officer position.*

The preceding information informs us that the way how ELUs officers come to that position is problematic. If the cases informed really happen in the assignment of the officers in the woreda it is against for example from OCED (2008), that says each state should have experts specialized in the fight against corruption.

Finally, what can be concluded from the above information is that there are problems related to giving power to the concerned heads of the sectors to assign officers for the ELUs. That also shows that there is weak practical political will and commitment to establish the units in necessary condition or in right ways, support and encourage attaining its target aims in the study area. Without having right persons for right place corruption is unthinkable to reduce because as mentioned in the endogenous factors that affect in the absence of skilled man power the achievement of the anti-corruption institutions will fail.

#### **4.5.4. Challenges from the perspective of the independence of the ELUs.**

The independence of the ELUs is one of the internal factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

The UNCAC and AU anti-corruption convention urge that independence of the ACAs be ensured. There is a directly proportional relationship between the independence of ACAs and their success. Thus, the sovereignty of these bodies must be promoted and protected as far as possible and they must be given the opportunity to perform their mandates free of political interference (UNCAC, article 36 and AU, article 20).

Concerning the challenges from the perspective of the independence of the ELUs the officers responded that:

*The ELUs have independence problem. It is the power of the heads of each sector to appoint the ELUs officers. It is again the heads' power to allocate budget for the units. In our work, it is if the heads allow us that we participate to observe their decisions. Again when some cases or complaints of corruption come to our offices first we have to inform and get permission from the head of the concerned sector to conduct the investigation. Again when we receive cases which are higher in amount or level we have to report that to the regional commission because we are not given the power to persecute such cases and even to report such cases to the commission the report has to pass the audit of the head of the concerned office and get signed. In our office in the suspected cases if there is involvement of the heads it is too difficult to make investigation and interfere in the issue because when we consult the heads for that case they deliberately are reluctant to the issues and when time goes that informs us that they are indirectly telling us not to go longer on the case.*

From the preceding evidence what we can assume is that the ELUs in the study area have been challenged to achieve their goals due to lack of independence because of their being under the strict control of the heads of the concerned sectors of offices. Again the above evidence clues us that the ELUs seems to be seen to be established only for the sake of having it in the woreda level but not to practically perform. Lack of power for the units to persecute corrupters and to take necessary measures in the study area is also another challenge that weakens their works and makes the units to be seen as only a subordinate institution to the regional anti-corruption

commission but not an institution by itself in the study woreda to perform activities independently.

Concerning the challenges from the perspective of the independence of the ELUs the FGDs respondents said that:

*The independence of ELUs is uncertain. The ELU as an institution seems to have created to serve the will of the officials rather than fighting corruption, and their works are not free of the intervention of the concerned heads and are not independent. Even if the proclamation of the region has established ELUs, officers cannot refuse to accept orders of the head of the concerned sector or office as they can influence them by allocating insufficient budget, or even fear of removing from that position. This condition of the ELUs strongly make nil the works of the ELUs and ethics focal persons by reducing public confidence and trust at the institution in the study area by pushing the people/society away from informing corrupt cases.*

Lastly, the prior views inform us that the ELUs in the study area are not situated in a manner that they can perform practically works of fighting corruption. In the proclamation one of the duties of the ELUs is to consult the heads of the concerned sectors in their works and decisions but the above information tells us that the units are missing their goals and are criticized rather for serving the will of their heads due to the reason of being dependent on them for each and every activity. To the extreme, the ELUs dependence is up to asking permission from their heads to give the interview that the researcher of this study observed during data gathering. Thus, we can conclude that the ELUs have not been protected adequately from excessive influence and interference and this can create a negative image in the public and harm its effectiveness. This condition is one of the internal factors that affect the effectiveness of the ACAs as stated in literature part and against the ideas of UNCAC and AU on the institutional dependence of ACAs that says there is a directly proportional relationship between the independence of ACAs and their success. So here this idea can be concluded by raising what the Principal-Agent theory of the corruption says that weak role of the principal can cause such weak institutions deliberately or with reluctance.

#### 4.5.5. Challenges from the perspective of the financial and another source of the ELUs.

The financial sources of the ELUs or sufficiency of the financial resource are one of the internal factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the financial sources of the ELUs in the study area the officers during the interview said that:

*The ELUs are suffering from the shortage of budget and necessary materials. The units have not been obtaining enough budget and materials. The units have not been in a suitable condition to achieve the goals set by proclamation due to budget shortage and we are below our plans each year in our activities of outreach of the ethics and anti-corruption education is low. We also are not clearly allowed to search another alternative source of the budget like donors, non-governmental organizations and others. There is no formal way of budget allocation for the units and it sometimes seems to be based on the level of intimacy of the officer and the head of the concerned office rather than making it on the basis of the basic aims of combating corruption.*

To cross-check the above responses the following annual budget information of the two consecutive years was gathered during the interview.

**Table 4.2:- ELUs Budget Information**

The sectors where the ELUs are available in Lemo Woreda	Years	
	2016	2017
Lemo Woreda Administration Office	50000	10000
Lemo Woreda Education Office	8000	4000
Lemo Woreda Justice Office	4000	2500
Lemo Woreda Agriculture and Natural Resource Development Office	4000	4080
Lemo Woreda Police Office	3000	3000
Lemo Woreda Finance and Economic Development Office	4000	4000
Lemo Woreda Revenue and Custom Office	4000	4000

Source: Gathered during data collection, 2017

From the above interview responses and annual budget information, it is clear to conclude that the ELUs in the study woreda has been under budget. Again the above information tells us that

the budget allocation for the ELUs has no formal and regular system. The evidence in the above table shows that due to the absence of regular budgeting system it is subject to the will of the heads of the concerned sectors of offices. Because of that the table shows that budget variation from sector to sector with in one woreda and increase and decrease fluctuation from year to year and stagnation or absence of necessary increase relative to the increase in the annual budget of the study woreda as well as the country at large.

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the financial sources of the ELUs in the study area, the officers during the interview again said that:

*We have the shortage of different necessary resources and facilities which support our works in fighting corruption. Some of the ELUs in our woreda have no separate office, for example, the Police office and the Justices office. That is a challenge for those who what to inform cases of corruption in a secret way by physical contact with the officers. Again other materials commonly we face as the challenge in all offices are lack of computer and printer which made our information holding system manual, the absence of phone in offices to receive complaints, and lack of vehicles and others facilities.*

From the foregoing information what we can infer is that the ELUs in the study area again have been challenged in their works by the shortage of material facilities. The information shows that most units have no office phone to receive complaints and no computer for proper handling of information that the researcher during interview practically witnessed. Budget shortage so has again cussed the shortage of the basic materials for the works of the ELUs in the study area

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the financial sources of the ELUs in the study area, the FGDs participants said that:

*We have no knowledge on the exact amount of the annual budget of the ELUs in each sector but we repeatedly hear rumors from the officers on the shortage of budget. As we observe the units have been suffering from the shortage of the material and other facilities. Being the power to allocate budget for the ELUs in the hands of the heads of the concerned sectors has challenged the units. This way of budget allocation without formal allocation mechanism without fixed amount determined by the government of the region has made it be under the will of the heads of the concerned sector or office.*

The preceding evidence informs us that in the view of the focal persons budget shortage still challenging the works of the ELUs and lack of formal uniform budgeting system and giving the power to the heads of the specific sector to assign budget has caused the problem the works of the ELUs in the study area.

To finalize, in the study woreda the works of the ELUs have been discharged by the shortage of the budget. Again leaving the budget case to heads of the specific sectors has created the condition to be dependent on their will. As the respondents claimed and the gathered budget information shows it even seems to be not free of corruption and base on the intimacy of the allocator and the officer. Thus, what here can be concluded is that for effective achievement of the objectives of the ELUs in the study shortage of budget and other necessary materials has become the prominent constraint.

#### **4.5.6. Challenges from the perspective of the cooperation of the concerning bodies to the works of the ELUs.**

Cooperation of the concerning bodies to the works of the ELUs or getting regular public support is part of both internal and external factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part

Fighting corruption need not rely on the action of one or a few individual elites or disparate and small citizen groups speaking out against corruption; an effective response to fight corruption requires coordinated actions (Marquette, 2015). For anti-corruption agents or bodies to be effective, they have to be created in a political atmosphere where leaders are honest, civil servants are insulated from political interference, and better incentives are provided to discourage corruption. Otherwise, the oversight bodies will be rendered useless or worse, misused for political gain (Gary et al, 1998).

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the cooperation of the concerning bodies to the works of the ELUs during the interview, the officers responded that:

*Combating corruption is not something to be only left for us (ELUs). It needs cooperation among different stake holders. We (ELUs) available in the woreda have been trying to work together through cooperation with each other but here are certain problems from different directions. There are regularity problems in our works which we perform incorporation due to lack of single responsible or concerning body to coordinate the units in the woreda level because of each unit being accountable to*



*concerned sector's head. We face challenges in our ways to support the sectors of the woreda where the ELUs are not available like commitment problem from ethics focal persons assigned for work of combating corruption in those sectors and again leaders of those sectors to cooperate. The reason for ethics focal persons not to be committed to cooperation is may be lack of better salary just like ELUs officers and lack of other incentives. Not establishing ELUs in some corruption sensitive sectors like municipality, trade and industry, health, and road and transport and water supply office is another challenge to work in the woreda in cooperation. There is cooperation problem from civil servants in different sectors to inform the corrupt actions or other improprieties to the ELUs.*

Based on the foregoing views we can consider that there is cooperation from different stakeholders' for the works of the ELUs in the study area. The problem of cooperation included those who are assigned to perform the anti-corruption activities, political leaders, civil servants and ordinary citizens. Again the above information informs us that absence of the ELUs in different sectors of the woreda and lack of incentive for the ethics focal persons are part of the challenge for the ELUs in the study area.

Again concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the cooperation of the civil servants in different sectors to the works of the ELUs during interview the officers responded that

*In the civil servants in different sectors of the study area, we sometimes observe negative names given or stigma attached to honest behavior in contrary to those who commit corruption. People shame those who talk against corrupt behaviors for example by saying "It is because you have not that position but if you get there you that be first". Again you hear a everywhere or every road that people saying that "If you have money, you have a road on the sky" and it seems in every person's mind there is thinking that you go to offices with some amount of money or pay some money to get service better than others and in short time that thinking that getting services is their rights.*

The above information shortly tells us that the supportive attitude of some civil servants towards corrupt behavior is another challenge. Again the information reminds us that some civil servants seem to be supporting today's corrupters and waiting for their turn to hold that position and to commit corruption instead of fighting against corruption in cooperation with

the ELUs. It seems that the notion that fighting corruption should not be left to a single institution has not been well taken by various civil servants in the study area.

Concerning the Challenges from the perspective of the cooperation of the concerning bodies to the works of the ELUs the FGDs respondents said that:

*The ELUs in the woreda have to work with different stakeholders but conditions are not facilitated in a suitable way. The units have not been able to set discussion programs to initiate concerning stakeholders due to the shortage of budget and other facilities. There is not any encouragement or incentives which motivate us (ethics focal persons) to work in our sectors effectively and to cooperate with the officers in other activities. Civil servants and other ordinary citizens have no trust and are not voluntary to participate in the works of the ELUs rather than shaming their works by giving different names for the officers.*

From the preceding information, we can infer that the ELUs have no suitable condition to initiate different stakeholders in their works due to financial shortage and other facilities. Again prior information tells us that different stakeholders lack trust on the works of the ELUs. This situation so can create a difficult condition for the ELUs to get supportive cooperation from stakeholders at the required level and if this situation happens there is no guaranty for this institution to fail from achieving its goals in the study area.

To conclude, the ELUs in the study area have been challenged in their works due to lack of cooperation of the concerned bodies. Without the involvement of the hands of each and every concerned body, the fight against corruption or the achievement of the ELUs goals have no way to come into reality. This idea can be strengthened by the statement, the effectiveness of ACIs requires a systemic and strategic partnership with other government agencies, civil society organizations, the private sector, donors, the media, and other relevant actors (Doig et al, 2007).

As mentioned earlier by the respondents if there is no trust in the society on the works of the ELUs it is an obstacle to combat corruption even it can create suitable condition for its prevalence.

Literature support this idea that mistrust in public institutions increases levels of permissiveness of corruption (Lavena, 2013). And Marquette (2007), says trusting that the government and its institutions will address corruption may be a key determinant of reporting

corruption. Both the theories of corruption the Principal-Agent and Collective-Action have ideas to say here. The Principal-Agent theory says lack of cooperation is the weakness of both the principal and the agent to develop common consensus on the struggle against corruption and their failure to play their own role. Collective -Action theory says the challenge from lack of stakeholders' cooperation is the result of each and every stakeholders' misunderstanding of their own role in exerting collective effort in the fight against corruption.

**4.5.7. Socio-Cultural Challenges or Challenges from the perspective of the society to ELUs**  
Relationships with the society or socio-cultural condition of the society are one of the external factors that can affect the works of the ELUs as it was indicated previously in the literature part.

Corruption is often seen as deep-rooted, common and permanent; it is in all social systems, organizations, and age and gender groups. Values in society are assumed to determine behavior. Because of a clash of values connected to one's private and one's public role, choices have to be made. And certain values lead to corruption. Out of obligations to friends or family (which can be very important in certain cultures), officials take bribes. Thus it is not so much selfish personal gain the corrupt official is after, but rather the agent feels a need to be corrupt to fulfill important personal (moral) duties, like ensuring loyalty to friends and family (Petter, 1999). The way we recognize corruption varies from culture to culture, the boundaries between corrupt practices and other actions are often difficult to define. In some cultures, certain aspects of corruption is not a social deviation, but it is a tradition (Treisman, 1998)

Concerning the Socio-Cultural Challenges or Challenges from the perspective of the society to the works of the ELUs in the study area the officers during interview responded that:

*There has been a long history of the tendency of corruption in a form of thanks giving for someone who did something. In the society, there has been challenging attitudes that are difficult to easily avoid from the society that supports that demanding and paying bribes becomes the tradition and this also had been considered as a right action to do for those who are in power. Even if the society believe that corruption is destructive and using something that does not belong to oneself is sin, even if they are victimized by corrupters, they have the attitude of fear or fell fear that attempts to deal with corruption will lead to further victimization because of their little hope of corrupt actors will be brought to justice. In the society, there is one another challenging attitude related with the prior*

*idea with the societal saying that "An eye and a nose" to express their fear that a person who they inform to have corrupt behavior and a person who receive complain are both related to their works. The thinking of the society that leaders in the government positions are beyond accusation because of their elevated status in society seems a very deep seated idea in the minds of younger to elder people and due to this, there are the deeply rooted reluctances in society to report to the ELUs the people who commit corruption.*

The preceding evidence shows us that the attitude in the society towards corruption is challenging issue in the works of the ELUs in the study area that not giving thanks for someone who has done something that seems like supporting because of his/her position or other has been considered reducing the honor of that person and that benefit will not be found next time. Again the above information informs that there is the expectation that officials who are in power are to commit corruption and the bodies like the ELUs and others are not far from cooperating and covering that action.

Again concerning the Socio-Cultural Challenges or Challenges from the perspective of the society to the works of the ELUs in the study area, the officers during interview responded that:

*In the society of the study area if you are a person who supports the community, help in the times of funeral and wedding, lend money, help to build churches that the members could not do you have great honor/ admiration from them. The society does not question where the money actually came from and do not punish corrupt behavior but even they pray to them in the religious institutions and bless them raising as exemplary persons.*

From the above evidence and respondents argument what we see is that some people see officials or servants as stupid for not taking advantage of their position to enrich themselves or laugh at them sometimes when they find them at a certain level and when they do not have as much money as they would expect them to have. This shows sometimes it is not corrupters that the society is punishing but those who attempt to show good behavior instead or corrupters.

Concerning the Socio-Cultural Challenges or Challenges from the perspective of the society to the works of the ELUs in the study area the FGDs respondents said that:

*There is race based thinking or ethnicity that make the society not to blow the whistle on corruption or not to expose corrupt persons and the condition that members of ethnic groups feel that getting favors through the ethnic bond in offices is the effective way to*

*obtain government services. In some places some members of the society to save the corrupt persons say “our son or our man” and some other says “As other people are eating let our man eat”. By this sense some elders and members of the society try to protect the corrupt persons from legal procedure of correcting from the corrupt acts and facilitate to hide information. In addition to that if the official does not want to commit corruption to support his family, relatives or friends they curse or see him as a cruel person for the family and the relatives by saying "When do you use your position?, You will leave there tomorrow and you will hesitate".*

From the prior indication what can be taken is that again the perception of the society towards corruption, corrupt persons and the confidence of some members of the society in their relatives to get favor when they come to the government positions are very challenging thinking that has power to push the society away from participating in anti-corruption activities supporting the works of the ELUs in the study area.

To sum up, the earlier facts displays that in the works of the ELUs in fighting corruption in the study area the cultural thoughts of the society towards corruption are very challenging external factors. It is difficult to think that the society easily come stand beside the anti-corruption institutions like the ELUs to struggle against corruption having in its mind that all supportive thinking towards corrupters and corruption. This according to the Collective-Action theory of corruption weakens the collective effort to tackle corruption. Again the Principal-Agent theory of corruption for these challenges directs to the necessity of the strong principals' role to coordinate the ELUs in a strong way to work on awareness of the society of the study area.

## Chapter five

### Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

This chapter consists of summary and conclusion of the main findings and recommendations forwarded in accordance with the main findings.

#### **5.1. Summary and Conclusion**

This study was categorized into five chapters. Chapter one introduction consisted background of the study, statement of the problem, basic research questions, objectives of the study,

significance of the study, delimitation of the study, limitation of the study, and organization of the study and definition of key terms. Chapter two provided concepts of corruption, approaches to anti-corruption, a theoretical background, empirical review and other related literatures. Chapter three consisted the research methodology specifically which included description of the study area, research design, research method, study population, sample size and sampling techniques, data collecting instruments, data analysis approach. Chapter four dealt with analyses and interpretation of the data. Finally, chapter five provided summary and conclusions, and recommendations based on the finding of the study as follows.

The main objective of this research is to identify the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption the case of Lemo woreda, Hadiya Zone and is aimed to answer the research questions such as first, what are the objectives that the Ethics Liaison Units are founded? Second, what are the prospects for the Ethics Liaison Units to achieve their goals in combating corruption? And third, what are the challenges that prohibit Ethics Liaison Units from achieving their goals?

In order to achieve the above main objective and answer the research questions the study used a descriptive research conduct based on explorative qualitative research design which involves the qualitative data collection and analysis. Qualitative research is concerned with understanding the processes that bring about patterns, and measures information based on opinions and values, not on statistical data. The benefit of applying a qualitative method in this research is that the method takes into consideration the overall picture in a way that the quantified method cannot.

To this effect the study was conducted in Lemo Woreda which is purposefully selected. The sources of information were both primary and secondary data. Primary data were gathered and analyzed from 7 ELUs officers and 14 Ethics focal persons and secondary data were gathered from different conventions, EACC proclamations, ELUs establishment code, guideline and annual reports. Accordingly interview, FGD and document analysis were used as major data gathering instruments.

The data collected from the respondents through interview and FGDs were analyzed by transcribing respondent's ideas and views in through descriptions and discussions. And information taken from the documents were analyzed by linking the related ideas found from interview and FGDs and by sighting the sources.

Based on the analysis made on the data gathered through the above tools, the major findings of the study are summarized as follows:

The negative impact of corruption on development is no longer questioned. Evidence from across the globe confirms that corruption impacts the poor excessively. Corruption hinders economic development, reduces social services, and diverts investments infrastructure, institutions and social services. Moreover, it fosters an anti-democratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. Corruption therefore reflects a democracy, human rights and governance deficit that negatively impacts poverty and human security.

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries that is not free from the above mentioned negative effects of the prevalence of corruption from the federal to the lower administrative levels. Fraud, trickery, cheating, embezzlement, extraction, nepotism, bribery and theft were found to be the major features by which corruption manifests itself in the country.

The Government in Ethiopia has consistently recognized corruption as a critical issue and has been taking meaningful actions in terms of including in different policies as well as some degree of institutional development from the federal to the lower administrative levels. Accordingly, the government has been working by establishing anti-corruption bodies at different levels of government. In federal level it is Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) that the government has organized to work against corruption. And to broaden its outreach regional governments have been given authority to establish Anti-Corruption Commissions in their jurisdictions. Based on this, SNNPRS established its own Ethics and Anti-corruption commission in 2002. To strengthen and decentralize the anti-corruption struggle, the SNNPR Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission established different ethics infrastructures in regional bureau, Zones, especial woredas, woredas and town administrations. Ethics Liaison Unit (ELU) is the major ethics infrastructures which was launched in public office and public enterprises by establishment code No 84/2003 of SNNPRS Council of Administration whereby mandated to prevent Corruption in regional bureau, Zones, especial woredas, woredas and town administrations.

This research was mainly focused on exploring the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in Lemo Woreda, Hadiya Zone. As clearly understood in the background of this study the main anti-corruption strategy of the Ethiopia includes ethics and

anti-corruption education under prevention, investigation and prosecution. Based the main establishing objectives of Ethics Liaison Units in the study area. First, endeavor to create public employees who do not condone corruption by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education, work discipline, professional ethics, conscious of serving the public, and sense of duty among employees. Second, prevent corruption and impropriety in public office or public enterprises. And third, endeavor to cause acts of corruption and impropriety be exposed and investigated and appropriate actions are taken against the perpetrators.

In addition to the objectives the units are founded, they also are given different functions to make sure the implementation of the objectives. The main functions are first, raise awareness of the officers or staff of the public offices or enterprises on corruption policies, laws, regulations, directives, good conduct and harmful effects of corruption. Second, follow up the observance of anti-corruption policies, anti-corruption laws and rules and procedures of public office or public enterprise; and advise head of public offices or public enterprises to the implementation and others explained in the above chapter and the units are accountable to the head of the respective public office or public enterprise.

Concerning the achievement of the objectives for instance in awareness raising, however the ELUs have shown important progress and have been working in awareness raising in the mentioned concepts of ethics and anti-corruption, the responses from interview showed no year since their establishment successfully achieved their yearly plans and the outreach of awareness raising training was very low in the study area. According to the respondents the same is true that the ELUs have good progress in prevention and receiving corruption complaints and making investigation however lack of power to ELUs to persecution of corrupt persons and lack of power to take necessary measures on corrupt persons have become obstacle for the units in order not to run longer.

From the side of the prospects which support the ELUs to achieve their goals in the study area the government's consistent recognition of corruption as a critical issue and beginning to take meaningful actions in terms of including it in different policies as well as some degree of institutional development from the federal to lower administrative levels. Again concerning the political commitment or the government stand in establishing the ELUs as an instrument to fight against corruption in the lower administrative area, the government has traveled good ways. As a result, the ELUs was founded by clear proclamation and given clear objectives and specified or



detailed responsibilities in the lower administrative area. Other prospects were having the religious society in the study area, economically the growing economy in the country which can strengthen the government's power to stand against corruption, pre-employ training and presence of clear work manuals, and higher salaries scale of ethics officers compared to other government employees. In addition to that the existence of different channels like different community-based organizations, and FM radio with local language were seen as positive factors which support the achievement of ELUs in combating corruption in the study area.

In contrary of the above-explained beginning achievements and prospecting factors, ELUs had not been free from both internal and external factors in their fight against corruption in the study area. The following main challenges were identified in this particular study area.

The institutional dependency of ELUs was seen as constraints in order not to achieve their goals. The units have been dependent both internally and externally. Internally, the units are accountable to the head of assigned sector which made them too much dependent in their established sectors heads to investigate, follow up cases whistle blown, to get the budget, to the extreme up to asking permission from the heads to give the interview during this research. Externally, the ELUs have no power to persecute corrupt persons because this is the power of the Commission of the Region and this lack of power or mandate to take necessary measures like disciplinary measure and criminal punishment over corrupters have become obstacle to give immediate responses in the study area and exposed for a very long wait from the Commission in taking criminal sanction in substantiated cases of serious breaches of the code of conduct or corruption crime in the study area.

The absence of strong and regular political leaders commitment concerning cooperation and taking the disciplinary measurement in substantiated cases of simple breaches of the code of conduct was considered as great challenges in combating corruption in the study area. In practice, the absence of political leaders' commitment concerning to cooperation and support of ELUs were manifested in less voluntariness to participate and facilitate awareness raising programs, low support or less than an expected budgetary allocation and no quick measurement response in presented cases of breach of the code of the conducts.

The organizational structure of the ELUs is another challenge for the units to achieve their goals according to respondents. However organizing the ELUs in each sector near to the society is a suitable condition for the effective work of anti-corruption struggle to do in

cooperation with the society, absence of branch office of Anti-Corruption Commission of the region in woreda level prolonged the chain of work. Again according to the respondents the existing structure of ELUs scatter their capacity to strongly fight against corruption in joint efforts or it weakens the integrity of the units in the absence of target concerned body in the woreda level to make regular follow-up and promote and coordinate the works of the units.

Placement or employment of the ELUs has another challenge in the work of the units according to the respondents. It is the head of the concerned public office or public enterprise is given power to assign the ethics officer and staff of the Ethics Liaison Unit through employment, promotion or transfer. This way of employment is not free from the tendency of the subjectivity of the specific head. As the sayings of the respondents even if the heads of the concerned public office or public enterprise assign the officer in a proper way it is not easy to get thrust from other staff members and for this as an indication the respondents raised that during their assignment for this position there were grievances in each office and even in some offices until the Commission of the Region get interference and take measure. The respondents claimed that the assignment of the officers again is not free from relativity or blood relation with the heads of the concerned public offices or public enterprises and some times that position seems to be a position for those who worked in government positions for a long time to benefit from the better salary payment of the ELUs officer's position. Lastly, this is a constraint for the Units to be held with skillful manpower who properly can perform given tasks.

The cultural attitude towards corruption in the society of the study area is another challenge for the ELUs to achieve their goals in cooperation with the society. According to the respondents in the society of the study area, there has been a long history of the tendency of corruption in a form of thanks giving for someone who does something. Again the attitude of the society that is demanding and paying bribes becomes the tradition and this also had been considered as a right action to do that for those who are in power. Another socio-cultural challenge they raised is that there is race based thinking or ethnicity based thinking that make the society not to blow whistle on corruption or no to expose corrupt persons and the thinking of the society that leaders in the government positions are beyond accusation because of their elevated status in society is seem a very deep-seated idea in the minds of younger to elder people and due to this there is the deeply rooted reluctance in society to report to the ELUs the people who commit corruption and this has

become obstacle for the ELUs to easily convince and get public cooperation in their works of combating corruption and improprieties in the study area.

Shortage of budget is another most strong challenge for the ELUs in the study area. According to the respondents, the units are suffering from the shortage of budget and necessary materials. As their responses, the units have not been in a suitable condition to achieve the goals set by proclamation due to the budget shortage. Again according to the sayings of most officers budget allocation has no formal or organized way and it depends on the will or commitment level of the head of concerned office or sector and even sometimes it seems to be based on the level of intimacy of the officer and the head of the concerned office rather than the basic aim of combating corruption. For this, as evidence, they raise the fluctuation and stagnation of budget year to year as shown in Table 4.2. Also, the units in the establishment proclamation are not allowed to search another alternative source of the budget like from donors, non-governmental organizations and others.

Finally, concerning major findings of the study, ELUs were established to strive to create an aware society, to prevent corruption offenses and other improprieties and to receive and investigate any suspected cases of corruption offenses. The main prospects or suitable conditions for the units were being established by formal proclamations, being given clear duties, higher salary payment, and positive cultures of the society or having the religious society, having access to electronic media like FM radio by local language, and the increasing capacity of the government to allocate budget. The main challenges of ELUs were institutional structure problem, absence of strong commitment in the implementation of placement criteria or making it by blood relation, dependency of officers or being under the influences of the heads of the concerned sector, and lack of full power to prosecution of suspects, shortage of budget due to lack of formal budget allocation system, lack of voluntariness of concerning bodies to cooperate and lack of public trust due to the units weak power, attitude of society towards corruption and ethnic or race based thinking of the society towards corrupters and reluctance or absence of political commitments to stand strongly against those challenges.

## **5.2. Recommendations**

Based on the findings stated in conclusion part the following recommendations are forwarded.

- ❖ Lack of independence is one of the major challenges in the works of the ELUs in the study woreda. In their independence problem the researcher recommends in two sides. First, dependence of the ELUs on the heads of the concerned sectors for budget or other necessary materials which has made the officers serve the interests of their heads rather than working their tasks need to be solved by formal budgeting way as recommended in budget part. Second, the power of the units need not be limited only to prevention but also the authority to prosecute and punish corrupters which is given only to EACC of the region is better to be given to the ELUs in the lower administrative areas or woreda level because equipping the units to enforce laws and giving this authority helps them to take immediate measures over corrupters in the study area without long wait from the commission for response. This in turn, will build public trust in ELUs and in government and help to trigger public interest to cooperate with the ELUs in fighting corruption in the study area.
- ❖ Financial shortage is one of the most prominent challenge for the works of the ELUs in the study woreda. The reason for this is that, allocation of budget is the power of the head in each sector and it has been subject or limited on the will or commitment level of the head of the concerned office. So, what the researcher recommends here is that, the budget allocation need to be through a formal way. For this, either of these two alternative ways can take place. First, fixed amount or percent of the budget from the yearly budget of the concerned office or sector need to be decided for the units or second, it should be directly allocated from the regional government through the regional EACC for all ELUs. In addition to that, it is better to include other alternative means of searching budget in the proclamations to enable them to search from non-governmental organizations and the like.
- ❖ Absence of strong follow up from the EACC of the region and the regional government is also one factor for the weak work of the ELUs in the study woreda. In order to have effective the endeavor the EACC of the region to widen its corruption prevention through ELUs, the EACC of the region and the regional government should undertake appropriate follow up and assessment of ELUs with uniform and appropriate measurements in woreda level to evaluate their plans and reports and to give feed backs and to identify the


needed resources for the good work of ELUs rather than expecting only the officials of the woreda to facilitate the works of the ELUs.


- ❖ Employment or placement of the Ethics Liaison Units officers at the woreda level is one another problem that has been raising grievance among each sectors' civil servants and again blamed for having ineffective officers this lastly resulting the EULs lose trust. So, assigning the officers must not only be the authority of the heads of the concerned offices. The researcher here recommend the regional EACC either to appoint officers in formal and uniform ways by itself or reshape the institutional structure as recommended following and give power to sub-branch commission. Again in their appointment there need to have a the system of gathering comments from the society on the background profile of the persons who are going to be assigned to the position of the ELUs officer besides considering their educational level and work experiences required by the job.
- ❖ Absence of strong commitment from the political leader at the desired level in the woreda against corruption is another challenge for the ELUs to effectively perform their tasks. So, works need to be done by the concerning bodies to aware the political leaders to clearly understand the anti-corruption strategies of the country or the region, to enable them recognize their responsibilities in their level of jurisdictions, to initiate them make the issue of anti-corruption in their regular tasks or day to day activities and to facilitate the necessary resource for the ELUs and cooperate them rather than making its agenda one time or seasonal campaign, continuous awareness raising for the existing and the new appointees in the political leadership positions need to be undertaken with strong follow up of the regional government, regional EACC, woreda government or concerning bodies.
- ❖ The attitude and thoughts of the society towards corruption are other challenges that have been hindering the works of the ELUs. These have challenged their works by reducing the cooperation or active participation of the public in reporting fighting corrupt behaviors. So, in order to bring change on the larger societal and the civil servants attitude towards corruption, strong and continuous awareness raising activities need to be set for all the concerning bodies. For example, to rich larger local society including the contents on the concept of corruption in Farmer Training Canters and Adult Educations as civics and ethical education to youth in primary and secondary schools. In addition to

that, not only awareness creation but also strong legal punishments need to be taken on corrupt persons that enable others to learn lessons from that.

- ❖ Lack of capacity building training for ELU officers since their appointment is one of the challenges in their works. ELUs officers who are supposed to serve as a driving force of the anti-corruption movement in their respective institutions are criticized for their lack of commitment and skills of work. So, necessary and up to date trainings to help or strengthen the officers' capacity to make their own adequate efforts to carry out their functions, to make them be committed to struggle the complex and challenging nature of the crime of corruption, to enable them to prepare necessary trainings materials for awareness creation activities, to enable them to be tactful in receiving, and holding or documenting information properly and secretly, regular capacity building training programs need to be undertaken by the regional EACC, the woreda government or other concerning bodies.
- ❖ Establishing the ELUs in each sector at woreda level is a good step forward to close nearby to the larger society. But, the organizational structure of the ELUs in woreda level is another challenge for the ELUs to achieve their goals. So, to reduce the prolonged chain of work of the ELUs to report serious corruption cases for prosecution by giving immediate measure at the woreda level, to integrate and coordinate a joint efforts of the ELUs which is scattered in each sector separately, and to make regular follow-up and promote the works of the ELUs, the researcher recommend the regional state and EACC to organize sub-branch office of regional EACC at woreda level. In this view the structure of ELUs is recommended as follows

**Figure 5.1. New Recommended Vertical Structure of ELUs**






**KEY:** - Top to bottom relationship

Bottom to top accountability

Source: - Developed by researcher, 2017



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# Appendix

**Interview**

**Questions**

**English version**

## **Interview Questions for Ethics Liaison Units officers**

### **Purpose of the Interview**

**Dear Respondent;**

I am a student of Post-Graduate Program in civics and ethics in College of Law and Governance, Department of Civics and Ethics at Mekelle University. As part of the requirement to successfully complete the Master's Program, I am conducting this research on the topic entitled: "Prospects and Challenges of Ethics Liaison Units in Combating Corruption in Lemo Woreda", Hadiya Zone, and SNNPRS. Therefore, the main aim of this interview is to get relevant information regarding to the mentioned research topic. So ethical principle of privacy, secrecy etc. will be maintained and at any cost these will not be revealed to anyone. I kindly request you to please provide the accurate information to complete the interview to the best of your knowledge.

**Thank you in advance!**

**Gizaw Bekele**

**Part one**

### **Personal profile of Interviewee**

- Name of respondent (optional) -----
- Sex----- age -----
- Name of organization -----
- Position holding -----
- Academic back ground -----

## Certificate

College diploma

Major-----

Minor-----

Bachelor degree

Major-----

Minor-----

Master degree -----

- Working experience-----
- Religion -----
- Ethnicity? -----

## Part two

### Questions

1. Why were the Ethics Liaison Units established?
2. What are the main ways the units use to achieve their goals?
3. Have you been successful in combating corruption since the establishment of ELUs? In what extent are you successful?
  - A, in awareness rising (where, for whom and in which topics and how?)
  - B, prevention, (what done
  - C, Investigation and prosecution (how much corruption complaints you received and reported to EACC and how much of them were resolved, and not resolved?)
4. Fighting corruptions require co-operation and co-ordination among other agencies. Do you have any evidence shows as you are working with them in collaboration?
5. Are there any existing positive factors you think which prospect the realization of works of the ELUs in your area? How do you see the prospects from the perspective of:-
  - Culture of the society
  - Economic condition of the society and government
  - Political commitment
  - Up-to-date capacity building trainings
6. Do you think that your works or units have the support of political leaders in your office? How do you rate their support? Argue your answer in the above question with sound reasons.



7. What do you think the main factors or challenges undermining the current curbing-corruption efforts of the ELUS in your area? How do you see the challenges from the prospective of :-
  - Budget availability
  - Independent power of the units
  - Cooperation of concerning bodies
  - Public trust and support
  - Culture and attitude of the society
  - Institutional structure of the ELUs
  - Up-to-date capacity building trainings
8. Do you think that the ethics liaison units are adequately founded? Where is there regular Budget and materials source for Ethics Liaisons Units to perform its?
9. In your opinion what do you think the main weakness of the existing institutional arrangement or structure of ELUs?
10. How do you see appointment or placement of ethics officers? How do you see having given the power to the head of the concerned sector or office to nominate and appointment officer?
11. To what extent you are working in cooperation with the ethics focal persons to combat corruption and to overcome the challenges and strive to achieve the common goals regarding to combat corruption?
12. Do you have any measure you recommend to overcome those hindrances which negatively affecting the realization or achievement of Ethics Liaisons Units?

## **Focus Group Discussion Questions English version**

### **Focus Group Discussion Questions for Ethics Focal Persons**

#### **Part one**

Purpose and Key steps

Dear participants and moderator;

The main aim of this FGD is to get relevant information regarding to the challenges and prospects of Ethics Liaison Units in Combating Corruption in Lemo Woreda and the data will be used as input to get insight on the topic. The data will only be used for the partial fulfillment of M.A Thesis at the Department of Civics and Ethical studies, College of Law and Governance in

Mekelle University. So ethical principle of privacy, secrecy etc., will be maintained and at any cost these will not be revealed to anyone.

Part two

Questions

As you have mutual aims with ELUs regarding to fostering Ethical values and combating corruption, the units have responsibility to coordinate and collaborate with you. Accordingly, make discussion deeply on the following questions.

1. What do you think that the main objectives behind establishing ELUs?
2. What are the main ways the units use to achieve their goals?
3. Have you been successful in combating corruption since the establishment of ELUs?  
In what extent are you successful?  
A, in awareness rising (where, for whom and in which topics and how?)  
B, prevention, (what done  
C, Investigation and prosecution (how much corruption complaints you received and reported to EACC and how much of them were resolved, and not resolved?)
4. Fighting corruptions require co-operation and co-ordination among other agencies. Do you have any evidence shows as you are working with them in collaboration?
5. Are there any existing positive factors you think which prospect the realization of works of the ELUs in your area? How do you see the prospects from the perspective of:-
  - Culture of the society
  - Economic condition of the society and government
  - Political commitment
  - Up-to-date capacity building trainings
6. Do you think that your works or units have the support of political leaders in your office? How do you rate their support? Argue your answer in the above question with sound reasons.
7. What do you think the main factors or challenges undermining the current curbing-corruption efforts of the ELUS in your area? How do you see the challenges from the prospective of :-
  - Budget availability
  - Independent power of the units
  - Cooperation of concerning bodies
  - Public trust and support
  - Culture and attitude of the society
  - Institutional structure of the ELUs
  - Up-to-date capacity building trainings
8. Do you think that the ethics liaison units are adequately founded? Where is there regular Budget and materials source for Ethics Liaisons Units to perform its?









