



**DEFUNCT HEGEMONIC EXCHANGE IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018:
THE CASE OF OROMO LIBERATION FRONT AND
PROSPERITY PARTY**

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with rationale of defunct of power sharing between OLF and PP in Ethiopia since 2018. The reason is that despite three years attempt of military operation, the conflict has continued hitherto. As the result, the empirical lesson we had had so far vindicated that power sharing is the only option left to realize peace in Ethiopia. This is because the modus vivendi of hegemonic exchange is to grant rebellion group fair representation and decision making in governance sphere so that everlasting peace can be envisaged since it guarantee rebellion group to have moderate position. Alternative approaches used to ensure prevalence of power sharing elsewhere such as consociation democracy, deliberate democracy, and incentive based inclusion have all failed in Ethiopia. Dysfunctional and pitfalls to approaches of power sharing in Ethiopia emanated from interwoven of historical legacy with the juxtaposition of status quo such as pressure from unitary pro power, lack of consensus on forms of government, suspicious political culture, non-compliance with popular sovereignty, denial of adopting experience, adverse effect of first past the post electoral system and hate speech. Because of these pitfalls, although it is the only way to solve current crisis of OLF and PP, the role of power sharing has awfully underestimated in Ethiopia. The attempt of power sharing had been orchestrated by different fakes. Despite underestimation of power sharing, experience denotes that such conflict is not only continued for such a long time but also helm to prompt to genocide. To this effect, the recommendation shall be re arranging negotiation for power sharing undertaken via supervision of impartial third party umpiring. Unfortunately, despite the claim, military response and the national dialogue underway are not believed to be effective to solve current turmoil in Ethiopia. The reason is that the former is devastating while the latter is not realistic due to its exclusion among not only rebellion group but also other political elite. Thus, power sharing is the only alternative left if everlasting peace is reckoned to be realized.

Key words: power sharing, defunct, Oromo Liberation Front, Prosperity party

1. Introduction

The current conflict between OLF and PP is the result of defunct hegemonic exchange attempted in 2018. The *sun quo non* hegemonic exchange was periled from the beginning as it was subjected to debate. The debate was stemmed from whether the agreement was made under umpire of impartial third party watch dog or not. At the end even if third party was absent, OLF had opted to come back to the country. Subsequently, the conflict broken between OLF and PP due to suspicious political legacy Ethiopia had had before.

The best method to solve the current conflict between OLF and PP must be power sharing alone. This is because it granted the insurgent group to have representation that enables them to participate in decision making. This argument is posed because the three years military operation corroborated that it is not the right option. Moreover, despite the operation, no sign of break though. Rather the insurgent group has getting stronger than ever.

The lesson learned from some countries proved that power sharing is the only alternative to realize peace in such cases. Comparatively, the case of OLF and PP is a little bit easier than the country with same experience. This is because the conflict is going on intra ethnic group. Being from the same ethnic group-Oromo can contribute to some extent to move extra mile in process of power sharing.

2. Conceptualizing power sharing

Notion of hegemonic exchange(power-sharing) emerged in the late 1960s as a normative proposal that aimed to provide democratic stability in divided societies through the accommodation and inclusion of political elites along with incentives for the promotion of moderation and restraint (Carvalho, 2016). Since then, it has defined differently by different people. Despite the variation, power sharing is defined better as:

A set of principles which, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide each significant group in a society with representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to their group" (Lijphart cited in Carvalho, 2016).

The focus of power-sharing studies is on structuring options of political systems that can manage and combat the destructive potential of inter-communitarian divisions (or its manipulation for political purposes). In this regard, definition by Timothy (cited in Carvalho, 2016) encapsulates theory of power-sharing as:

A set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group.

The central point of this definition is all about providing segment of group representation and decision making. This definition connotes necessity providing the insurgent group (OLF) representation in governance and in decision-making so that sustainable peace can be ensured through power sharing process.

Power sharing has been believed to be a tool to mitigate or prevent conflict in ethnic, plural, or divided societies. Indeed, it includes power and resource-sharing as part of what (Gurr, 2000) terms an emerging “doctrine” in the international practice of managing conflicts. Power-sharing arrangements are commonly built into peace agreements to provide critical assurances to negotiating parties and induce them to sign and implement them. Such arrangements seek to provide incentives for warring parties to remain committed to the peace process and to assuage their security concerns (Sriram, and Zahar, 2009). Such political arrangements are expected to ensure that grievances that could promote conflict are addressed through nonviolent means (Gurr, 200; Fayemi 2006). While power-sharing solutions and theories emerge from work on ethnically divided societies (McGarry and O’Leary 1998), in this paper power-sharing has examined in intra ethnic. Before analyzing causes of defunct power sharing between PP and OLF, let us discuss the alternatives approach to power sharing and their relevance to current Ethiopian cases.

3. Approaches to hegemonic exchange (power sharing)

3.1. The Consociation Approach

Consociation democracy is most readily associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, who has consistently maintained that this particular form of power sharing is not simply the best

option for divided societies, but the only realistic option (Lijphart, 2004). As he describes it, consociation democracy is a form of democracy in which the leaders of all the main ethnic groups in society share power within a governing grand coalition, in which major political decisions about matters of mutual concern are made on the basis of consensus, in which elections are conducted by proportional representation (PR) in order to ensure a broadly representative legislature, and in which groups are granted a high level of autonomy with respect to their own internal affairs, especially in areas like education and culture (Lijphart, 2004).

According to (O'flynn, 2007), consociation democracy is preferred to majoritarian democracy in at least three crucial respects. First, a party with a majority of seats can form a government on its own, or, if it falls short of a majority, where it is free to enter into a minimum-winning coalition with as little as one other party. Secondly, assuming that ethnic-group leaders actually do take up their place in government, then the grand coalition that results will be highly representative. Thirdly, because all major decisions are made by consensus, it follows that group leaders can veto those decisions should they see fit. Veto-powers can be formally enshrined or can operate by convention. But decision making by consensus marks a clear departure from the more usual practices of government by majority rule (O'flynn, 2007).

One way of ensuring consociation is through PR electoral system. This is because PR systems tend to reduce disproportionate vote-to-seat ratios. But a further key attraction of such systems is their ability to facilitate minority group representation: as long as the threshold for election is not set too high and district magnitude is not set too low, political parties with even a few percentage points of electoral support should gain some seats in the legislature. Knowing this, there is a strong incentive for new political parties or independent candidates to stand for election, which, in turn, broadens the political spectrum and increases electoral choice (Gary, 1990). For instance, new parties may offer social and economic policies that cut across ethnic divisions, whereas independent candidates may focus instead on local issues such as a hospital closure, neighborhood renewal and so forth. However, a PR system might just as easily encourage political parties that aim to represent the more extreme ends of the political spectrum, perhaps by offering policies that are, for example, blatantly

chauvinist or xenophobic in their intent and whose rationale (or lack thereof) is premised on little more than naked hatred and blind intolerance (O'flynn, 2007).

3.2.The Incentives-based Approach

Incentive based approach can be defined 'as an electoral system that makes a party's chances at the polls depend, at least in part, on the support of groups other than those it principally represents. In order to gain those votes, parties will first have to soften their stance on issues of society-wide concern; but having gained those votes, the hope is that they may then be able to form an inter-ethnic coalition of the moderate middle that is strong enough to fend off the extremists on its flanks (Horowitz, 1991).

The Incentive based approach stumbled between OLF and PP for two major reasons. The first is the very nature FPTP electoral systems that exclude and waste vote of minority parties. The problem in Ethiopia, however, is fall on the second problem that unfair and fraud election. For example, Both OLF and Oromo Federalist congress didn't participate on the 2021 Ethiopian election.

The adverse effect of FPTP electoral system is very great to thwart hegemonic exchange. FPTP by its very nature exclude minority party from election so that their constituent vote wasted altogether. As the result, their supporter remained defenseless. Ethiopia is currently using FPTP electoral system. Due this fact law maker are the collections of the same part-PP. They always pass law in favor of their interest than worrying for accommodating others.

Failure of power sharing failed when government offered wrong incentive. It has occurred when member of OLF had poisoned and others denied what they promised by government. Nonetheless, offering wrong incentive stumble progress of power exchange. For example, in Sudan, some groups value territorial autonomy and governance of resources, but have no particular interest in governing at the national level. These groups might not be interested in signing an agreement that offers them, say, participation in national security forces or in parliament. In Sudan, the SPLM/A (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army) had the most clearly articulated demands for power- and resource-sharing, and territorial autonomy. It had less apparent interest in inclusion in security forces, which is at odds with future autonomy, so perhaps it should be no surprise that the creation of joint integrated units has

been halting, at best. Where the nature, capacities, and interests of the group are not fully taken into account, negotiations will clearly be hampered (Sriram and Zahar, 2009).

3.3.A deliberative approach

It has suggested that deliberative democratic theory can enable us to rethink the relation between inclusion and moderation and, correspondingly, to reframe the debate over which kinds of institutions are most appropriate for divided societies. It has further suggested that the richer notion of political equality that deliberative democracy provides may lead to a form of political stability that is more robust and durable than that which can be secured through either the consociation or the incentives-based approach (O'flynn, 2007).

Dryzek (2005) noted that the scope for deliberation within power-sharing institutions, since at that level decision making will often become enmeshed in seemingly intractable issues of identity. His solution 'involves partially decoupling the deliberative and decisional moments of democracy, locating deliberation in engagement of discourses in the public sphere at a distance from the sovereign state'. In the public sphere, deliberation is not directly tied to decision making, and so it is possible for ordinary citizens to debate policy issues without ending up in a deadly contest for the state. Of course, those debates might, in some instances, serve to deepen the sense of animosity that the members of competing ethnic groups feel towards one another. But, 'from the point of view of promoting dialogue in divided societies', the fact that the 'engagement of discourses in the public sphere' is not directly linked to decision making 'may be positive because it provides a space for exploratory interchange across difference.

As enumerated by Dryzek (2005) deliberation in the public sphere can result in 'social learning' and hence may help groups in conflict to soften or moderate their positions. But while democratic legitimacy can 'be secured through responsiveness of public policy to the relative weight of discourses in the public sphere', it can only be so under the right sorts of institutional conditions.

If it had been for deliberation democracy propagated by advocates, innocent people have to be heard. Conversely, many Oromo and other people have been debilitating by diverse effect

of the conflict they do not want. No justice is underway to relief the community. Rather it is being continued at expense of them

4. Cost of power sharing

Power sharing is not without drawback. Power sharing put countries in risk of disintegration if it is not kept vigilantly. In conflict-affected countries, the new grievances and perverse incentives often associated with power-sharing further decrease the state's ability to effectively deter and assure (Sriram and Zahar, 2009). States whose institutions cannot easily accommodate the grievances of new players (assurance) will often fall back on (more or less violent) methods of exclusion which, in turn, increase the potential for the emergence of violent challenges. And states that cannot effectively wield the threat of legitimate violence (deterrence) are ill-equipped to address these challenges. In other terms, in such conditions, power-sharing arrangements might in fact speed the decline of the state. In this article, we elaborate on these challenges with illustrative lessons from a number of African states that have been the sites of power-sharing arrangements, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. The same thing had replicated in Bosnia, Nepal, Colombia, Lebanon, and elsewhere (Ibid).

Despite its decisiveness to solve current crisis in Ethiopia, power sharing has remained defunct in Ethiopia to particular. In case of Ethiopia, history of Ethiopian has to be blamed for failure of hegemonic exchange between OLF and PP. This is because Ethiopian power transmission has imbedded its root in suspicious manner. It had been written so far at expense of Oromo despite prominent contribution of Oromo elite. In this regard, it was enunciated that Ethiopian state formation was exactly colonial thesis in which Oromo incorporated into Ethiopian empire through forceful subjugation (Merera, 2016).

5. Factors peril power sharing in Ethiopia

The alternative approach suggested by commentator of hegemonic exchange has failed in Ethiopia due to different factors. Factors that thwart the relevance of power sharing approaches in Ethiopia are highly complicated and inter woven. However, for the sake of this paper, the following are discussed.

5.1. Pressure from unitary pro power

Unitary form of government has been propagated by Amhara elites. The propagators of this form of government favor Amhara hegemony in terms of one flag, one language, one religion and Amhara dominated culture. In this regard, (Kymlicka, 2007) stipulated that nation-state in Ethiopia quite differ from Western Europeans based on individual liberty and were able to ensure economic development, in most parts of Africa, including Ethiopia, these favorable conditions were missing. The nation-state in Ethiopia based on the Orthodox Christian religion and Amharic language with the slogan one country, one flag, one language, one religion, then became a mask for the majority's culture, language, religion to become the national culture, language or religion. In other words, the group, however narrowly founded its base may be, which controls the state uses it not only to marginalize others from power and resources but also uses state institutions and policies to promote, consolidate and create a privileged position with respect to its identity and its manifestations (Kymlicka, 2007). If so, I shall call better process of Ethiopian nation-building as assimilation. It had been carried out at expense of different nation, nationalities and people of Ethiopia.

According to nation-building thesis Massacres of innocent people in Ethiopia had been enunciated as struggle for nation-building while the same thing is colonialism for Oromo elite. For commentator of this notion crisis people has been suffering from so far has consider as all a normal process of 'nation building' and, hence, consider the ethno-nationalist-based 'liberation struggle' as a form of tribalism. Next are the instrumentalists, who focus on the concentration of political and economic resources at the Centre as a core source of tension and who emphasize the proliferation of ethnicity as an erroneous comprehension of political and economic deprivation. Whereas as nation-building for some a few political elites even went further to state that it must be seen as a form of 'internal colonialism' (Assefa, 2012).

Nonetheless, 'nation-building' process and the instrumentalists fail to grasp some of the central issues of the debate in diverse societies such as Ethiopia (Clapham, 1994). In many African states, including Ethiopia, there remained many ethno-nationalist groups instead of one. Thus, the context under which nation building was meant to apply was entirely different from western European countries (Kymlicka, 2007).

In Ethiopia, Amhara hegemony has truncated with downfall of Derg regime in 1991. Since then, ethnic federalism has been used as system of government. Under EPRDF, no matter how the under laid federalism has been subjected to criticism, it is allowed different nation, nationalities and people to use their language, promote their culture and use religious freedom.¹

After demise of EPRDF government in 2018, the unitary propagators begun to resuscitated. They began to denounce ethnic federalism as if it is grave danger for Ethiopian unity. They assumed Prime Minister- Dr Abiy Ahmad as the God sent leader to exalt their project. Indeed, some people argue that Prime Minister Dr Abiy Ahmed is pro-unitary. They corroborate this notion by recalling the opening speech he made during beginning of his work. In addition, some unitary propagators had been publicly explained as his election would exalt their projects.

In contrary, federalist proponents do not share the ideology of unitary. Currently, member of Oromia PP are among other who do not want the unitary under Amhara hegemony. Such politicians do not share the idea of unitary; however, have been highly influenced by the people from unitarist wing. They collaborate with them to defend OLF in virtue PP. Put this in another words, even if they do not share idea of unitary, they oppose the OLF because of the panacea ideology underpinned by PP.

Secessionist on their part, are quit opposite with the both Unitarist and Federalists power. They base their foundation in ethnic line so that stick to promote their ethnicity first than the whole. They place their ethnic first and others next to it. Hence, it is bizarre for secessionist to be mutually concomitant with unitarists and other federalists. Fortunately, as OLF base their foundation in secession they do never agree with unitarist or quasi-federalist view point of pp. It is this contrary that stumble the hegemonic exchange between PP and OLF.

In short, there is mismatch between the theory to acknowledge ethnic based federalism lead by PP and its practical aspects. As the result OLF did not acknowledge the democratizing the existing government as other Oromo elite had been done so far. OLF was not optimist

¹ See article 11 and art 29 of FDRE constitution.

towards ethnic equality within PP government. There has been polarization among PP and OLF.

5.2. Suspicious Political culture

Despite Ethiopia's rich tradition of dispute-resolution mechanisms and culture of tolerance in society (Assefa, 2012), the political elites on both sides of the political spectrum manifested a militant political culture that seems to be the product of a deep-rooted hierarchical and authoritarian notion of governance, with its emphasis on obedience, inherited from the previous regimes. With many of the political parties being products of the Ethiopian Student Movement of the 1960s and the liberation movements of the 1970s, this culture is further reinforced by Marxist Leninist organizational principles, such as 'democratic centralism', 'revolutionary democracy' and 'one party dominated political process'. This culture stands in sharp contrast to a federal political culture (Assefa, 2012).

Our political culture is suspicious political legacy. Political elite had been assassinated merely because of their political difference they had with regime. For example, Menelik II had assassinated Gobana Danche-who had played great role to subjugate people the southern people mainly Oromia. Similarly, Derg had assassinated known political elite due to suspecting the each other's. Likely, EPRDF used carrot and stick approach to eliminate members OLF and other parties after the election of 1992.

Moreover, some scholars argue that culture of suspicious extends to identity. In this line, Abbink, 2006) stipulated absence of an overarching identity and trust in Ethiopia. The reason is that The EPRDF succeeded to promote ethnic and cultural expression, but it has failed to simultaneously foster a voluntary pan-Ethiopian identity. It has thus neglected the claim for unity made by many Ethiopian. For example, the CUD, a party that promotes Ethiopian unity, was banned by Meles Zenawi in the competition with the EPRDF during the 2005 elections.

After era of EPRDF, suspicious political culture has been continued. Because of such suspicious political culture PP government had stick to jeopardize the OLF. Such decision had worsen when government had become panic by number of people marched Finfinnee to welcome OLF. Many people believe that point of departure began there. This is because

government was so panic and shocked by such wide support so that started to search for how to weaken it.

In this regard, because of the past suspicious political outlook the leader of OLF- *Jaal* Dawud Ibsa had asked the third engagement before come to Ethiopia. Nonetheless, his claim had ignored by government. The importance of third party in power sharing has succinctly stated as Power-sharing incentives are but one set of tools through which the international community and third-party mediators may facilitate negotiations. Power-sharing arrangements are commonly built into peace agreements to provide critical assurances to negotiating parties and induce them to sign and implement them. Such arrangements seek to provide incentives for warring parties to remain committed to the peace process and to assuage their security concerns ((Sriram and Zahar, 2009).

Because of such suspicion government had resort to thwart OLF and its member than welcoming in government. OLF on their side had experience of 1991 when they had forced to evict from parliament so that they didn't fully fledge with power sharing started at the time. Hence, for nearly three decades, TPL used OPDO to dismantle the Oromo. Several evidences attested that OPDO were individual who were succumbed to the TPLF because of the economic business than political purpose. They subjugate themselves to TPLF in order to ensure their economy.

Regardless of reason why OPDO affiliated with TPLF, one thing is clear that they contributed a lot to subjugate not only Oromo people but also OLF. They were created for two reasons. For one thing they were drawn out of Oromo people so that they were gained acceptance. Next, unless they dismantle the Oromo by themselves they couldn't. They were allied to the enemy of the time because of their personal benefit than being loyal their respective beloved people.

5.3.Non-compliance with popular sovereignty

Hegemonic exchange had being failed in Ethiopia due to lack of popular sovereignty. Due to *de jure* democratic government people are not equipped with power to ensure their sovereignty. Despite decisiveness of popular sovereignty in Ethiopia, it had been hijacked by government. What government said tantamount than the people.

If we ask every Oromo other than puppet of government and the OLF members all deserve reconciliation of the two: OLF and PP. such expectation, however, remains useless as government hinged to run its business than listening to the people.

If it had been for the passion of the people, both party never last overnight to reconcile. The reality is the fact that there is no room to listen to the people. This is corroborated by the speech made by people everywhere other than the incumbents. Such approach was denounced by Merera as The mother of all problems is the hegemonic aspiration of the ruling party, which not only blurred the vision of the EPRDF leaders but also made them think that “we know what is good for the people” and the thinking of others is anti-people (Merera, 2007).

Absence of popular sovereignty paves way for failures of power sharing. People couldn't lobby the government to act accordingly. In short, we do not have political community such like of Western country who lobby the government along the already flourished political system. There have never been political communities that run by the system. Rather locus of political pivot has been not a system but the personality of who lead the party. The flip side of such system is its demise with that individual leader.

5.4.Negligence of adopting experience

Experience of different countries corroborated that power sharing the safest way of resolve conflict. A power-sharing agreement between Kenya's two main political parties was reached in March 2008 was the best example. The accord called for the creation of a grand coalition government in which both parties would share power on an equal basis. It is otherwise a minimalist and purely inclusionary power-sharing agreement. The agreement had the immediate effect of restoring peace and stability in Kenya. Yet, the accord's long-term durability is far from certain. The fundamental causes of the conflict – inequalities in access to power and resources – have not been addressed. These issues remain latent sources of conflict that have the potential to derail the current grand coalition government and lead to renewed conflict. In Burundi n 2004, an advanced power-sharing accord was reached. This led to democratic elections and the installment of a new government in 2005.

Despite its effectiveness, experience of hegemonic exchange had ignored by concerned body because of their political interest at expense of the people. Even the government failed to ponder the very recent experience in countries like South Sudan let alone others. This is because it the governed who have favorable condition than insurgence group to arrange the process of power sharing.

I personally believe that government has to take responsibility in arranging hegemonic exchange than insurgent group. This is because government play role on international arena while role of insurgent group is rare to paly such role. Similarly, government has access than those groups. Due to this reason, for failures of hegemonic exchange government has to be criticized than the insurgent as they lack necessary condition that government has at hand.

5.5.Absence of good neighborhood

Implementation of power-sharing may be difficult if not impossible in “bad neighborhoods”. Neighboring states may foster or destabilise power-sharing in multiple ways. Neutrality has often been invoked to explain the success of the Swiss experiment; likewise, the intrusions of Syria and Israel into the internal politics of Lebanon have been partially blamed for the instability of its power-sharing experiment. When geostrategic interests or ethnic kinship considerations draw neighboring states into the politics of a power-sharing state, they might destabilise the internal pacts. Thus scholars have pointed to the destabilizing role of neighboring states and refugee flows in Rwanda, on power-sharing arrange that matters; some external actors may actively undermine it (Sriram and Zahar, 2009).

Externally, the interest of Eritrea on Ethiopia ruined the process of power sharing. Eritrea had continued to fuel the oil of conflict than stabilizing. It did this by sending its troops to fight in virtue of government against other opponents. Internally, the collaboration of freedom fighter in Gambella regional state and Benishangul regional state aggravated the failures of power sharing between OLF and PP.

5.6.Impact of electoral system

The impact FPTP electoral system is great on hegemonic exchange. This is because it is not conducive for minority party to have seat in parliament. In doing, so supporter of minority

party remained voiceless and defenseless as their vote is wasted. Under first-past-the-post, a voter gets a single vote for a single list or a single candidate. But under preferential systems like the single transferable vote (STV) or the alternative vote (AV), a voter is allowed to rank the candidates on the ballot in order of their preference (Reilly, 2001). Thus, while it is reasonable to assume that voters will continue to give their first preference to a party representing their own ethnic group, they may be willing to exchange lower-order preferences with voters from another ethnic group. According to Horowitz, this means that lower-order preferences can become extremely valuable to those parties willing to pool votes across ethnic lines, and, correspondingly, that moderation can be extremely rewarding, electorally-speaking, to all those who practice it (O'flynn, 2007).

Ethiopia is currently using FPTP electoral system. Due this fact law maker is the collection of the same part-PP. They always pass law in favor of their interest than worrying for accommodating others. The worst in Ethiopia, however, is FPTP electoral system accompanied by strong party system that altogether juxtaposes the series function of fair representation thereby stumble hegemonic exchange.

5.7. Impact of hate speech

Government media and other politicians had been defaming the OLF from the beginning. They had been calling pejoratively to demoralize them. This includes change of the name and defaming the opponents. Such hate speech has been prohibited by Proclamation No. 1185 /2020 sub article 4 on Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation which read as:

Any person disseminating hate speech by means of broadcasting, print or social media using text, image, audio or video is prohibited.

Moreover, the issue of 'water and fish' has been echoing throughout 2021/2022. Even if figurative speech 'water and fish' is not something new it add fuel to the already ignited fire in Oromia. The speech has made by one of the higher Oromia officials in 2022. Since then it has been deemed to be the campaign opened against Oromo people at large and OLF in particular.

The speech 'dry the water to catch the fish' connotes Oromo people and OLF respectively. It indicates that eradicating the Oromo people will pave ways to delicate OLF. Their assumption is stemmed from the fact that logistics are provided by people. Oromo people and OLF have been served to connote the two sides of the same coin.

In my verdict, regardless of what the speech conveys and intention behind, it contributes its role in defunct power sharing process. It has juxtaposed the least possible left to have negotiation with ruling party.

6. Was the 2018 power sharing is fake?

Before answering to this question, I shall precursor the process of OLF invitation to Ethiopia. This is because the process has been accompanied by bewildering events. One of such confusion was emanated from whether umpiring third party was necessary or not.

As far as I know, Ethiopia government had invited OLF to come to Ethiopia after the so called transformation in 2018. Based on this request the leader of OLF responded them to have impartial third party umpiring. Nonetheless, government refused to admit this claim.

After vigorous and vigilant discussion with Obbo Lemma Megersa- president of the Oromia at the time, OLF agreed to come home after more than two decades of fled. However, not all military come back officially nor did they disarm. Thereby number of fakes had made both by government and OLF side in fear historical paradoxes.

Fake number one:

Fake number one was made by government. This fake was intentionally made refusing engagement of third party. After they had entered despite the third party denial, government continued to treat the military of OLF cynically. Government had infringed publically the deal between them. According to the deal, political leader and other concerned body were surmised to visit training camp without any prerequisite. However, government had breached this deal immediately. Even people were vehemently denied from visiting them even when they had poisoned.

The fake was continued after the training. Government had failed to implement what was pledged to do so in the deal. One of the deal says that the trainee have right prefer job based on their experience of profession. Accordingly, a few of them were included in the Oromia police force. Worst, however, was some of them were not only denied job but also incarcerated for their claim. Thus, power sharing has paralyzed because of these fakes.

Fake number two:

Fake two was made by OLF *per se*. When they entered into Ethiopia, we have seen a few disarmed military. Subsequently, many OLF military have been seen everywhere in Oromia with their arm. This was perplex of the time because people realized that OLF had reserve power who were entered with their weapon either earlier or meanwhile.

In short, in my personal point of view, both entities prefer to use fakes because of the political culture based on suspicious. One of such suspect was stemmed from hesitation of the government to invite impartial third party umpiring. OLF refrain from fully-fledged entrance because of the fear of the 1992 political legacy in which they had pushed not only out of parliament but also out of the country.

Moreover, the welcoming ceremony enforced government to change their mind. It was reported that more than 2,000,000 Oromo gathered at Finfinne from every corner of that region to welcome OLF. Government was so panic to this much number so that started to instigate counter attack. One of such counter attack was ceremony of Ginbot 7 and others. Since then, government adheres to deceive the OLF at international arena. Paradoxically, OLF had getting stronger from time to time despite government vowed to eradicate once and for all.

7. The three years balance sheet

The three years balance sheet of military operation is not succeeded. This argument can be corroborated by the ongoing war between OLF and PP currently in different part of Oromia. Despite government report enunciating the demise of OLF, they are continued in fighting in way that is not known before. The June 14, 2022 attempt made by OLF to seize Western Wallaggaa Zone is typical example.

The June 14, 2022 attempt vindicated two important things. For one thing, it disproved the propaganda of government that has been allegedly reporting the eradication of OLF. Secondly, guerilla fighters shift their operation from rural to urban. Few days before the attempt of June 14, 2022, government endorsed campaign to repel OLF. Accordingly, urban resident had forced to search OLF in campaign by closing their shops and stopping their daily routines. Urban resident were wandering through the forest in search of OLF militaries. They had forced to search the well -armed OLF by stick. The campaign has brought nothing than amplification by government media.

In after math of the campaign government media had reported that the OLF had dismantled for one and for all. Ironically, soon after the report, OLF had controlled Rural and sub-urban of Western Wallagga zone on June 14, 2022.

In nut shell, from the three years campaign, it is plausible to conclude that military operation was never succeeded nor will likely to succeed in near future. For this matter, government has to stop to see the only left alternatives to bring peace in Ethiopia that is power sharing and power sharing alone.

8. Prospect

The conflict between OLF and PP has continued in vicious manner. The last three years lesson proved that none of the two can gain victory over the other. Paradoxically, the opponent has being intensifying their seizure all over Oromia than before. What has been observed so far vindicated the fact that no sign of solving the problem democratically.

Thus, from experience of other country point of view, continuity of such war fro such a long time can be envisaged. For instance, the conflict between rebellion and government in Mali has been lasting for more than ten years. It has been continued hitherto. At its worst, the conflict between OLF and PP might lead to genocide. The reason is that there are many interested group who want Oromia to be place of proxy war which enable them to rob the resources.

9. Conclusion

The defunct of power sharing between OLF and PP continued to be conspiracy since 2018. The worst is the fact that bloody guerilla fighting underway had brought nothing than devastating the life and resources of the future. Surprising, however, is both parties are striving with war which both cannot win. To this effect, the three year war balance sheet vindicated that OLF had getting stronger than before despite government vows to repel once and for all.

Although it is the only way to solve current crisis of OLF and PP, the role of power sharing has awfully underestimated. It has attempted wrongly within wrong perception. The process made to implement power sharing is childish approach which cannot convince any ordinary man. The attempt of power sharing between OLF and PP had failed from the beginning. The reason is that its deliberation has accompanied by full of deceive. The incentive for power sharing has debilitated during the negotiation has underway. In nut shell, it is a kind of treating political with wrong medicine.

In nut shell, military response and national dialogue is not the best solution to bring everlasting peace in Ethiopia in general and in Oromia to particular. This is because the former is very devastating in which both group lose. The latter is neither welcomed nor invited the rebellion group. The rebellion group has isolated from the discussion. Though rebellions are being cause of crisis, they are not represented nor has the attempt never made to include them as far as I know.

10. Recommendation

Re arranging negotiation of power sharing which undertake by thorough watching dog of third impartial party. This is because the only alternative left to bring everlasting stability in Ethiopia in general and in Oromia to particular is merely power sharing and power sharing alone. The reason is that the crisis of the last three years corroborated that eradicating OLF through military operation doesn't work despite government has been vowing day and night. Realistically speaking both endorsing OLF as terrorist group by defaming it as *shanee* and deployment of military operation has nothing did than media orchestration. In contrary, OLF had becoming stronger than ever.

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