

Exploring the Genesis and Effects of Insecurity in Northeast of Nigeria: A view from Taraba and Adamawa States.

by

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Abstract

Origins and Consequences of Insecurity in Northeast Nigeria is a topic that focuses on understanding the underlying reasons of insecurity in the region as well as its influence on the local population. Political instability, economic disparity, ethnic and religious tensions, and the presence of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen may all have a role. In order to address insecurity in Nigeria, a comprehensive approach that addresses core causes, promotes inclusive governance, and expands economic possibilities is required. It entails promoting inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue, strengthening security forces, improving socioeconomic conditions, and establishing accountable institutions. For nearly two decades, the Northeast Nigeria have been exposed to the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram's insurgency and Fulani herdsmen. This region is also recognized for its severe environmental conditions, which mostly appear as land desertification and paucity of water. We investigated the origin and the effect created amongst rural dwellers in Adamawa and Taraba States. It has influence instability and violence which resulted to migration from rural areas to Yola and Jalingo the Urban cities. We also investigated the role that water scarcity and desertification have in local people's migration decisions. Between April and July 2022, 2000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were interviewed at the Taraba and Adamawa IDP camps. Experts were also interviewed at various governmental, non-governmental, and international institutions. Exploring the Respondents at the IDP camps came from Jalingo, Takum, USSA, Yola and Mubi. Though insecurity created by the conflict between Boko Haram insurgents, Fulani herdsmen and government forces was mentioned by all respondents as the main factor that triggered migration, this study shows that the decision to migrate was also a function of other factors that differ between communities. These factors include the geographical location of the community, land ownership, the socioeconomic status of the migrants, access to water and land, and wealth. This study reveals that in some communities, it was possible for people to live with conflict if they were still able to practice farming or if they had additional sources of income such as small businesses. The decision to migrate was only taken when the practice of such activities was no longer possible and they had nothing to hold on to.

Keywords: Terrorism; conflict; migration; insecurity; resource scarcity; herdsmen, banditry.

1. Introduction

Since the return of democracy in 1999, Nigeria has faced a range of complex security challenges and suffered huge social, economic, infrastructural and human losses mainly due to arm-banditry, increased kidnapping, terrorisms, trafficking in both human and materials, cattle rustling etc. This study provides an empirical conclusion as regards the relationship between corruption, poverty and insecurity in Nigeria. The specific areas of coverage are Taraba and Adamawa States in the Northeast region of Nigeria, while the former provides the platform for analysis, the latter considers the possible cumulative effects of the results of such interplay as an element strong enough to affect aggregate appearance of the States' economy in the long run. Guided by existing literature, this work strengthens its conclusions by adopting survey methods through questionnaire administration to generate useful information the analysis of which will provide basis for academic interpretation and reconstruction on one hand and a source of policy input capable of turning security service around in Nigeria. At the end, recommendations to emerge are expected to also affect multiple segments of the economy of the States as well as a source of striking a balance between where we are and where we want to be as a polity, a society and an economy.

The Northeast region of Nigeria has been plagued by insecurity for over a decade, with the Boko Haram insurgency being the most prominent cause. The insurgency started in 2009 and has led to the loss of thousands of lives, displacement of millions of people, and destruction of property worth billions of naira. The insecurity in the region has also led to the emergence of other criminal activities such as banditry, kidnapping, and communal clashes [1].

The states of Taraba and Adamawa have been particularly affected by the insecurity in the Northeast. In Taraba State, the Jukun-Tiv crisis has led to the displacement of thousands of people and the loss of lives and property. The crisis, which started in 2019, is a result of a long-standing land dispute between the Jukun and Tiv ethnic groups. The crisis has led to the closure of schools and markets in affected areas, making life difficult for the people [2].

In Adamawa State, the Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of over 1.5 million people, with many living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. The insurgency has also led to the destruction of infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and markets, making it difficult for people to access basic services. The insecurity in the state has also led to the emergence of banditry and kidnapping, with criminal gangs taking advantage of the situation to carry out their nefarious activities [3].

The insecurity in Taraba and Adamawa States has had a significant impact on the economy of the region. Farmers have been unable to cultivate their crops due to the insecurity, leading to food shortages and high prices. The closure of markets has also affected trade, making it difficult for people to access basic goods and services. The insecurity has also led to the withdrawal of investors from the region, further worsening the economic situation.

The insecurity in the Northeast has also had a significant impact on the social fabric of the region. The displacement of people has led to the breakdown of families and communities, with many people losing their loved ones and property. The insecurity has also led to the emergence of hate speech and ethnic tensions, with people blaming each other for the crisis [4].

The Lake Chad Basin (LCB) spans eight countries and covers 2,434,000 km² in the Sahel. Lake Chad, a shallow, freshwater lake shared by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, is located in the basin's middle [5]. The LCB's water resources support a population of more than 45 million people, 60% of whom rely on agriculture [6]. While Lake Chad's whole surface area is particularly sensitive to short and long-term climate variations, as well as anthropogenic interventions, the northern pool of the lake has demonstrated greater vulnerability, with surface water falling quicker than in the southern pool. This can be explained by a decrease in Komadugu Yobe River discharge and an increase in permanent plant cover inside Lake Chad [7]. Lake Chad, one of Africa's largest freshwater lakes, lost roughly 90% of its size between 1963 and 2018 as a result of such external disruptions [5]. Over the last few decades, the LCB has been subjected to a number of security challenges [6]. Water scarcity and land desertification are two of the causes of livelihood insecurity in the region [7,8].

Nigeria has the most people in the LCB, with a population of 201 million people [9]. Because of their location within the Sudano-Sahelian belt, the northern states of Nigeria are particularly affected by desertification, and more than half of the country's geographical area is at risk of desertification. Aside from the environmental difficulties found in the LCB, which could be a source of conflict in the region, Islamic terrorism is also present. Boko Haram, an Islamist group, has been responsible for human rights violations in the region since 2009. Boko Haram benefits from the socioeconomic aspirations of the majority of ordinary inhabitants in Nigeria's northeast, who feel excluded from socioeconomic chances that could help them climb the social ladder [10] (p. 21). Around 2002, the first Islamic insurgency appeared in northeast Nigeria. The group increasingly turned violent, and Voll [11] contends that, while most Nigerians regard this tendency

of violence as outside of acceptable Islamic norms, it follows a long record of violence by militant jihad in West and Central Africa.

The principal cause of forced displacement in Nigeria is the Boko Haram insurgency and counter-insurgency by Nigerian security forces [12]. Since 2009, the instability generated by this conflict has pushed over two million people to travel to Nigeria for safety. Others crossed the border into Nigeria's nearby Lake Chad region and became refugees. The Boko Haram insurgency has not only forced residents to evacuate for safety, but it has also made agriculture, the region's main source of income, impossible. Terrorism's impact on agriculture is mostly predicated on farmers' subjective fear of being assaulted by militants [13]. Fear is increased further by the fact that farmlands have become a safe haven for rebels, who subsequently target the agriculture sector for daily supplies. Environmental change has also been widely cited as a driver of migration, particularly in climate-vulnerable areas such as northeast Nigeria [14,15,16]. Environmental change can cause migration or conflict in a variety of ways [17]. Thus, when attempting to study the probable causal ties between environmental change and migration or conflict, social, political, economic, and cultural aspects have been taken into account.

However, data suggests that climate change causes environmental disruptions such as intermittent droughts, desertification, and deforestation [18]. Other implications include low water tables and the construction of dams upstream across the primary water supply routes to Lake Chad, resulting in reduced agricultural production, particularly when rain-fed. Many people in northeast Nigeria are forced to relocate to Cameroon, to adjacent water sites inside Nigeria, or even to southwest Nigeria.

The LCB views migration as a response to the carnage inflicted by the Boko Haram insurgency and counter-insurgency by state military forces. Although internal forced migration is not a new occurrence in Nigeria, an increase in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) and their concentration in refugee camps and host communities was only noted after the rebel group Boko Haram emerged [19]. Other factors, such as environmental factors, have been identified as reasons of migration in the LCB. Environmental issues related to drylands and paucity of water supplies may function as conflict causes, but also as environmental push factors causing migration [20].

As a result of the continuous conflict in the region, many local residents of northeast Nigeria who rely on farming are anticipated to flee their homes in search of safety [21]. Such migrations are

additionally exacerbated by the region's poor environmental circumstances [22]. Little is known, however, about the reasons that genuinely determine migration from the most impacted rural areas to metropolitan centers and IDP camps.

The following questions will be addressed in this paper: What influence does the instability caused by Boko Haram's insurgency, Fulani herdsmen and banditry play in people's decision to migrate from their homes to IDP camps in Taraba and Adamawa? Does lack of water resources and fertility of land have effect on such decisions? To answer these questions, we gathered information from residents of the Taraba and Adamawa IDP camps in northeast Nigeria.

2. Method

2.1. Conceptual Framework

The push-pull conceptual framework of this study aims to discover factors that either anticipate migration from the sending location or create resistance to conflict. The push-pull theory of migration, articulated by Ravenstein [23], holds that unfavorable rural conditions 'push' people away from their original domicile, while favorable conditions 'pull' them into other areas where they can live in better conditions.

The neoclassical theory of migration [24] (p. 3) gave rise to this theory, which has been a recurring analytical framework in migration research. The current analysis suggests that push variables that affect migration patterns could include war, water scarcity, and land degradation. Safety and the availability of humanitarian help at the recipient site may act as draw factors. These factors might be exacerbated by the fact that civilian populations are more vulnerable in violent conflict scenarios and that their susceptibility is increased in the face of challenging environmental conditions [25]. The primary emphasis of this study is the push factors at the origin and their influence on the decision to move within the various groups at the sending location. As such, the push-pull methodology used in this study is supplemented with theories related to a human security framework. This will make it possible to properly arrange human interactions related to resource management and assess the risk that the insurgency of Boko Haram poses to locals in the transmitting area. A proper definition of the fundamental ideas is necessary for this kind of research.

In this research, migration is mostly associated with forced displacements rather than any other type of migration. The movement of individuals who are displaced due to conflict, natural or man-made calamities, or the aftermath of earlier circumstances like famine is known as forced migration

[16]. Since 2015, non-state armed groups have increased their attacks in northeastern Nigeria, which has led to protracted insecurity, made the situation of vulnerable populations worse, and caused waves of forced displacement and human rights violations [26]. The primary driver of relocation in the region appears to be conflict and the ensuing instability, either directly due to the threat to human life and the documented death toll, or indirectly due to the forced secession of economic operations [27].

The term "conflict" has many definitions, and they differ greatly. Conflict is defined as the interaction of interdependent individuals who believe their aims are conflicting and that one another is interfering with their efforts to achieve those goals [26]. Comparably, a situation is seen to be in conflict when two or more social groups act according to the perception that their interests are incompatible with one another [28]. Determining the threshold for violence in the interaction proposed by Lewicki et al. [29] remains a challenge. The definition of conflict that follows focuses more on the factors that contribute to violent conflict. Jeong [30] states that conflicts arise when two or more groups fight one other for ideals and claims to resources, position, and power with the opponents' goals being to neutralize, harm, or destroy the rivals. The study's definition of conflict as a driving force behind migration may not directly relate to the state military forces' counterinsurgency efforts or the violent actions of the terrorist group Boko Haram, but rather to the anxiety these actions instill in the communities where they occur. People may migrate because they fear for their lives, but not necessarily because they were caught in the crossfires.

Additionally, the term "desertification" refers to the degradation of land caused by a variety of factors, such as weather fluctuations and human activity, in dry sub-humid, semi-arid, and arid places. The current study similarly views this degradation as a push factor in the case of northeast Nigeria, where agriculture is the primary source of income for the majority of rural community members [31]. Fertile soil and water supplies, which are essential for agricultural techniques, rapidly run out. Moreover, land degradation in dry sub-humid, semi-arid, and arid regions brought on by a variety of circumstances, such as climatic fluctuations and human activity, is known as desertification. The majority of rural community members in northeast Nigeria depend solely on agriculture for their income, hence this kind of degradation is taken into account as a push element in the current study [31]. Fertile ground quickly becomes limited, as does the water supplies required for agricultural techniques.

2.2. Study Area and Data Collection

Interviews were carried out at the IDP camps in Taraba and Adamawa States, Nigeria, at Jalingo, Takum, USSA, Yola, and Mubi. A significant number of IDPs were sent to these areas in 2009. At the time of our visit in 2022, the IDP camps built up by the State government to house IDPs could hold about 3,000 IDPs. The Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herdsmen, and banditry had a significant impact on these communities, forcing locals to migrate to state capitals.

Respondents in the several IDP camps were asked to fill out a questionnaire. The IDP camps served as a host for respondents from the study region. In this study, the research team questioned 500 respondents from Jalingo, 300 from Takum, 250 from USSA, 525 from Yola, and 425 from Mubi. Of the respondents, 41% were men and 59% were women, with ages ranging from 18 to 65. Interviews took place between April and June of 2022.

2.3. Data Analysis

The relationship between the length of time people spent in conflict and other factors, such as gender, occupation, income, land ownership, access to water, water scarcity, and migration, was tested through the analysis of data gathered at the IDP camps using the SPSS software package. In contrast to subsurface water sources, which were typically reached by shallow wells or boreholes, "access to water" refers to surface water sources.

Using the SPSS software program, data gathered from the IDP camps was examined to determine the correlation between the length of time individuals spent in conflict and various characteristics such as gender, occupation, income, land ownership, water availability, water shortage, and migration. While subsurface water sources were typically accessible through shallow wells or boreholes, surface water sources are referred to as "access to water."

Each independent variable's effect size was determined using the formula below, which indicates the influence of the independent factors on the dependent variable:

$$\eta^2 = \frac{SS_{\text{between}}}{SS_{\text{between}} + SS_{\text{error}}} \quad (1)$$

where η^2 is the Partial Eta Squared (Partial Eta Squared being equal to Eta Squared in one-way Analysis of Variances (ANOVA)), SS_{between} are the sums of squares for the independent variable under study, SS_{error} is the sum of squares for the error in ANOVA [34].

For instance, the effect size in the case of land ownership (an independent variable) indicates how much of an impact having or not having property has on a local community member's decision to relocate. Using ANOVA, the effective size was determined. The partial eta squared value,

expressed in percentage, was computed using a univariate general linear model test. The obtained number shows the dependent variable's percentage of variation. The significance of the difference can be determined by measuring the effect size. It compares the strength associated between the dependent and independent variables.

3. Results

3.1. Statistical Results

The period spent in the war prior to migration varies throughout communities, according to the results. The people in Takum were the most resilient to conflict of any community. Before leaving their town, 33% of the Takum residents lived there for more than a year following the outbreak of hostilities. Low levels of conflict resilience were seen in Jalingo, USSA, and Yola, where 66%, 70%, and 60% of the population, respectively, migrated within one to seven days following a conflict. Three-quarters of the population of Mubi left before the fighting reached their neighborhood. The amount of time people spent in conflict prior to migration is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Time spent in conflict before migrating.

	≥1 Year	6 – 12 Months	1 –6 Months	1–4 Weeks	1–7 Days	Migrated Before Conflict Started
Jalingo	33%	12.35%	3.32%	32.33%	10%	4.5%
Mubi	6.87%	8.5%	2.32%	11.63%	34.89%	34.89%
Takum	2.44%	0%	9.75%	9.76%	68.3%	9.75%
Yola	4.54%	0.1%	4.54%	0%	72.72%	18.2%
USSA	7.86%	0.1%	4.62%	7.97%	63.16%	14.99%

With up to 86% of farmers in Takum and USSA, agriculture was the most commonly mentioned activity among the various communities' activities. This was followed by small businesses and laborers who were primarily manual laborers, such tailors and fisherman, as well as a small number of government employees, primarily teachers. The majority of respondents who said they did not have any activities were older adults. The distribution of activities in the region of origin is depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Distribution of activities in the area of origin (Source, 2022).

The analysis of the questionnaire results is described in the method section. The result included, among other values, the partial eta squared value, which represents the effect size in percentage, and the p value, which is defined as the probability of observing the given value of the test statistic, or more, under the null hypothesis [35]. An extract from Table 2 shows the results of the one-way ANOVA used to ascertain the connection between Jalingo land ownership and the amount of time spent in conflict.

Table 2. Output table from SPSS for one-way ANOVA in the case of land ownership as the independent variable.

Tests Between-Subjects Effects						
Dependent Variable Time spent						
Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2273747.98	1	2183746.968	4.409	0.043	0.092
Intercept	13888288.49	1	13988287.49	28.952	0.000	0.404
Land_ownership	2273747.98	1	2183746.968	4.409	0.043	0.092
Error	21798034.97	44	495409.886			
Total	44314823	46				
Corrected Total	23981781.93	45				

Note that the symbols df, F, and sig. stand for degree of freedom, ratio of two mean square values, and significance, respectively, and p value. R Squared is equal to 0.092 (modified to equal 0.070).

Statistical results in Jalingo show that gender, access to water, and previous migrations as independent variables had a low effect on the time spent in conflict. Meanwhile, land ownership,

previous water scarcity, and occupation showed a medium effect on the time spent in conflict. Finally, income showed a large effect on the time spent in conflict. The effect sizes for the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables for Jalingo and other Locations are shown in **Table 3**.

Table 3. The effect size between time of migration (dependent variable) and all independent variables in all Locations.

	Gender	Income	Land Ownership	Occupation	Access to Water	Previous Scarcity	Previous Migration
Jalingo	2.50%	15.00%	9.13%	6.50%	2.56%	8.90%	5.50%
Mubi	1.21%	2.40%	1.90%	1.95%	0.40%	2.70%	1.40%
Takum	3.50%	1.60%	1.30%	1.20%	0.00	0.10%	0.00%
Yola	0.65%	0.10%	17.50%	1.80%	0.00	0.20%	0.15%
USSA	2.10%	1.90%	5.00%	0.75%	0.00	32.00%	0.15%

Table 1 indicates that 35.67% of the population in Mubi migrated prior to the onset of conflict, while an equal proportion migrated within the first seven days following the onset of conflict. In Mubi, there is no test of relationship between the independent and dependent variables, indicating a statistically significant result. The effect size was typically less than 2.8%.

None of the tests in Takum produced results that were statistically significant. In every instance, the dependent variable's effect sizes relative to the independent factors were negligible. The majority of Takum respondents said they lacked access to surface water sources. Merely 5% of them were able to obtain surface water sources, specifically rivers. Water was obtained from shallow wells by all other responders.

In USSA, the amount of time people lived in conflict prior to migration was significantly influenced by their ownership of land. The impact percentage was high (18%). Except for land ownership, no other test produced a meaningful result. In every other test, the effect size was extremely small. USSA respondents stated that they do not have access to surface water sources. They mentioned using manually excavated shallow wells and built boreholes to obtain groundwater. Because of this, it can be seen that the impact size of access to water was not valued.

According to Yola's statistical findings, some respondents' time spent in conflict prior to migration was significantly impacted by their prior experience with water scarcity. The 32% effect size was

a pretty big number. For the same reason as in USSA, there was no effect size value for water access. As in Table 3, no significant results from any other tests were obtained, and the effect sizes were small. The main driving force behind migration, it was discovered, was the sense of insecurity created by Boko Haram's activities and the counterinsurgency by state military forces. However, the decision to migrate was made at different times: in Mubi, Takum, USSA, and Yola, it was made very early in the conflict, or before the communities were affected; in Jalingo, people stayed longer in the community despite the state of insecurity created by Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen, and banditry. Thus, the hypothesis is that the duration of conflict was influenced by factors other than the insecurity itself; Figure 2 illustrates the differences in these parameters between the groups.




Figure 2. Variation of factors that affected migration in the communities (the authors).

Occupation, land ownership, and prior resource scarcity all had medium to significant effects on the dependent variable in Jalingo, as Figure 2 demonstrates. Put another way, these variables influenced how much time residents spent in their villages throughout the unrest brought on by Boko Haram. All independent variables in Mubi and Takum, however, had no impact on the dependent variable. This indicates that for the majority of members of both communities, their involvement in the conflict was minimal (less than a week) or nonexistent. In USSA and Yola, land ownership and previous water scarcity, respectively, showed a high effect on the dependent variable. These, however, were insufficient to significantly postpone the migration period in either community. Because of this, a large number of individuals from USSA and Yola left their communities before Boko Haram's actions made them unsafe, and a large number more left within a week of the fighting, as Table 1 illustrates.

3.2. Results of Interviews

The IDPs' extra information was corroborated by the data reported on the statistical results above. Some respondents said that even in the face of Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen, and banditry, they were prepared to carry on with their activities and remain in their village. They gave "taxes" or bribes to Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram rebels to assure their safety. A 48-year-old Mubi man who was involved in conflict for six months said: "I negotiated with Boko Haram to give them half of my cows for tax enable me stay in the community and grow my cows but I ended up losing all the cows I have to the Boko Haram soldiers. This prompted me to leave in order to save my life". Many cattle rearers in the same age bracket shared similar experiences in the same community and most of them left after six months. One of them said; "I paid tax forcefully to Boko Haram. I later left when I discovered that nothing was left for me to pay tax with". It was however noticed that at the height of the crisis in the region, some people moved, others did not move. Those who stayed agreed to stay under the rule of Boko Haram. They were paying their taxes and did whatever was required by Boko Haram. They farmed for Boko Haram and supplied them with food. Those on the other hand who could not bear this rule of Boko Haram left. Some people were also forced to stay, as if they were enslaved and were used as a human shield. A few of them partnered with Boko Haram fighters. In order to remain in their community, several Takum respondents claimed to have paid "taxes" to Herdsmen. According to other USSA responses, they arrived at the camp because there was no food left for them.

4. Discussion

The study area's communities were dispersed across various proximities. Takum and the USSA were near one other, but Mubi, Yola, and Jalingo are located far to the north, some 200 kilometers apart. In contrast to Jalingo, where most tests were statistically significant and large effect sizes of most independent factors on the dependent variable were seen, the majority of tests in this study were not statistically significant, according to the results. One may assume that because of the proximity to resources, nearby communities would be more resilient to external disturbances such as conflict or insecurity. In this instance, the contrary was noted. It was discovered that seasonal movement has increased the dependency of those impacted by the pressure on community resources for their livelihoods. Moreover, it was contended that the region's farms and waterways presented opportunities for the local populace to profit from farming, cattle rearing, crafts, and a variety of auxiliary services. Tipping points in the stocks of ecosystem services are frequently the

consequence of changes in the ecological, socioeconomic, demographic, or political systems. This in turn limits access to such resources and income in most areas. It is noticed that poor populations that are highly dependent on those ecosystem services often prioritize their short-term needs over long-term sustainability. The earlier findings are in line with the study's findings, which show that people in the communities of USSA, Mubi, Takum, and Yola—all of which relied on local resources—migrated out of the area as soon as they felt threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency.

This study revealed that the importance of migration-related factors varied among the communities in our research area. Income in Takum and USSA had a significant impact on how long residents stayed in their communities after the conflict. Although 86% of the population in this community worked in agriculture, a sizable portion of them (43%) also ran small businesses. This implies that their means of subsistence did not just depend on agriculture, which itself requires access to water and rich soil. It was found that, conflict has different and deeper effects on livelihoods in areas that are affected by chronic economic marginalization, precisely because of their existing vulnerability. This implies that residents of Jalingo and Yola, who are economically stronger than those in USSA, Mubi, and Takum, were able to withstand the insecurity brought on by the Boko Haram insurgency and herdsmen for a longer period of time. The aforementioned supports the claim that resilience to conflict can be fostered by the economic strength generated by local business operations.

The present study's findings showed that conflict was more likely to arise in communities that relied more heavily on natural resources. They left earlier than those who, by engaging in alternate sources of income, had been more resilient to the shortage of resources. In Takum and the USSA, land ownership had a significant impact, while in Jalingo, it had a middling effect on the amount of time spent in conflict. It is claimed that in certain cases, during the violence in northeastern Nigeria, family members were unable to flee once the rebel group took control of the community and they were forced to stay behind to preserve their land and belongings.

One cannot overstate the importance of conflict or the resulting insecurity as a driving force behind migration. According to a migration specialist from the Federal Ministry of Labor in Abuja, Nigeria, "One of the push factors for migration is conflict." Would you stay in that atmosphere if your life was in danger and you were forced to give up your means of subsistence? Since you have to save your own life, I don't think so. Many of the survivors perished, and others were left without access to food, water, or other necessities. It became impossible to access due to the violence. Most

people migrated down South and those who could not move further at least moved to IDP camps within the same state". Experts in Nigeria also believed that migration may be a result of conflict and insecurity mainly. Interestingly, they also showed a common agreement on the role that environmental changes and the resulting effect on resources play on migration. According to data gathered at the IDP camps, migration is in fact a function of wellbeing; those who were financially more stable stayed in their communities longer and made every effort to avoid migrating, while those who were not as stable migrated as soon as hostilities broke out. The environmental conditions in the study area chosen by Sobczak-Szelc and Fekih [36] are comparable to those in the research area of the current study, where communities face major issues related to the quantity and quality of water and land. It was noticed that some local farmers, by engaging in parallel activities, gained resistance to resource scarcity, in line with what we saw in Takum and USSA. Migration cannot be seen as solely driven by environmental change, as the current study indicates. It is hypothesized that some environmental factors could cause migration.

5. Conclusions

This study sought to ascertain the impact of insecurity brought about by herdsmen, banditry, and Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. The impact is seen in the shortage of resources, such as water and the desertification of land. It has been observed that several circumstances can impact an individual's choice to relocate to a different area. These include the community's location, land ownership, the migrants' social standing, the community's accessibility to land and water, and wealth. It was discovered that the primary driver of migration was conflict. It was also discovered that the aforementioned elements had varying effects on people's decisions to migrate within different groups.

The purpose of this study was to ascertain the impact of the insecurity brought about by the banditry, herdsmen, and Boko Haram insurgencies in Northeast Nigeria. Scarcity of resources, such as water and land desertification, is affected. It has been observed that specific circumstances have the ability to impact an individual's decision to relocate from one area to another. The community's location, property ownership, the migrants' social standing, the community's accessibility to land and water, and riches are a few examples. Migration was determined to be mostly driven by conflict. It was also discovered that the aforementioned elements affected people's decisions to migrate differently depending on the community.

Insecurity in Taraba and Adamawa States is a result of various factors, including the Boko Haram insurgency and communal conflicts. The insecurity has had a significant impact on the economy and social fabric of the region, making it difficult for people to access basic services and live a normal life. In order to help the impacted population reconstruct their lives, the government must address the underlying causes of the insecurity. While looking for answers, a resolution to the conflict—which is the primary driver of migration in the area is inevitable. It is difficult to find a peaceful solution while dealing with terrorist organizations, nevertheless. This could help to explain why the government has been using force to try to resolve the conflict for more than a decade. Numerous studies indicate that a lack of economic prospects leads young people to join insurgencies. Therefore, it is advised that the government appropriately address the unfavorable socioeconomic and environmental conditions of the studied area. While this might not immediately put a stop to the fighting, it will at least lessen the ongoing poverty that encourages so many young people to join the insurgency. This might be accomplished by stepping up industrialization in the nation's northern regions.

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