

federal programs may remain merely paper tigers, as a result federal programs could be frustrated (Kefale, 2008:94-97).

The Third, causes of conflicts are the unpractical principles and interpretation and limitation of the federal constitution that is:-

The absence of an application clause (that indicates whether they have direct or indirect application), interpretation clause (that clearly indicates the principles, methods, and steps to be used in the construction of human rights clauses), limitation clause (that regulates the manner in which limitations are imposed when necessary), and the ambiguity with regard to the role of courts to interpret constitutional human rights clauses—owing to the bifurcated division of the interpretive power between courts and the House of the Federation—have played a role in the diminished implementation of human rights and tension among political elites in Ethiopia (Regassa, 2010:89-90).

The fourth major causes of conflict in Ethiopia, as Mehari Taddele (2017) noted that, the improper administrative boundaries between regional states; lack of recognition and status of ethnic identities as nationalities; inefficient administrative status as in the case of local government in *Zones and Woredas*; unable to make referenda on identities; conflicts over natural resources, including water and land usage; questions related to Addis Ababa and its relations with the federal and regional state of *Oromia*.

In the same token, the causes of ethnic conflicts are mostly expressed in terms of competition for resources—natural endowments as well as budgetary resources coming to them in the form of fiscal transfer, i.e., subsidies and grants, opportunities—jobs as well as education, and power—at the local, sub-national, and national levels (Regassa, 2010:99). Local elites tend to contribute to the escalation of some kind of conflicts for the purpose of securing a better access to coveted resources, opportunities, and powers. The federal dispensation which was devised to respond to old conflicts which arose out of the quest for ethno-cultural justice did address, more or less, these conflicts. But it triggered a new sort of competition for resources, power and opportunities. Consequently, the threat of fragmentation of states has become a challenge and lack of trust among diverse groups in constant interaction has become another challenge (Ibid).

The fifth cause of ethnic conflict is a poor federal culture and lack of democracy. According to Merera Gudina, the causes of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are, contending nationalisms that have emerged and evolved over time in Ethiopia. He also deplors the incomplete transition to democracy as a result of which we continue to have political instability that is rooted in ethnicity (Gudina, 2004: 66). Likewise, Assefa Fiseha makes the observation that poor political culture and poor federal culture continue to serve as the hotbed for ethno-national contentions in Ethiopia as well as the democratic deficit, human rights deficit, and the one party dominance in Ethiopia as the cause of many an ethnic discord (Fisha, 2009:395-402).

In reality, the major causes of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia as discussed above are 'primordial memory, economic resources, territorial boundary and political power and institutional factors'. Additionally, in my observation, *the design of federalism as ideology, the nature of ethnic parties and media are another cause of conflict* in Ethiopia. Primarily, the architectures of ethnic federalism are TPLF elites that designed to meet the interests of Tigrayan peoples and their dominance. In doing so, the federal state is a de facto one-party state in which TPLF the leading unit in the ruling coalition of (EPRDF). Even if the constitution granted the right of self administration to each regional, state, each ethnic party is a mere satellite of one ethnic party that is Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front.

That is why the leaders of different political parties were arrested and pushed to leave their country via opposed the dominance of TPLF for the last two decades and it becomes a cause of conflict among ethnic parties. Similarly, today the hegemonic dominance of the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) in power and the demographic expansion of its ethnicity in the capital of Addis Ababa, in relation to other ethnicity that is aggravating ethnic conflict in the country. In doing so, since 2018, the root cause of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia was related to 'identity politics or symbolic politics' that is a threatened change in the prevailing ethnic hierarchy of dominance and subordination. Currently the political elites assumed fragility in ethnic group relations and social construction of identities, and highlighted top-down more than bottom-up mobilization. Thus, the elites are contending for power by manipulating social divisions and blowing them out of proportion, with threats, fear and hate discourse and propaganda, leads to antagonism and conflicts between and among ethnicity in Ethiopia. These problems are emanated from weakness and narrowed perception of Ethiopian ethnic parties, whether the members of EPRDF or other opposing parties. Because, in order to hide their weakness, they mobilize their ethnic identity over the other and one ethnic party makes a

network with the other, to defend another even in the constituent units of EPRDF. On the other hand, the heads of ethnic parties are elected based on, identity rather than a profession and capabilities. As a result, the current noticeable causes regarding to ethnic conflict in Ethiopia, has been escalating as the weakness and bale life of ethnic parties.

On the other hand, the media are the means of ethnically based political parties to take power. Thus, when TPLF loses its dominance in the early 2018; they are exploiting and provoking ethnic/national hatred through their media to other ethnic parties, especially to Oromo Democratic Party and Amhara Democratic Party and vice versa. As a result, the hate-prone politicians of these parties in control of their ethnic media production that provokes national intolerance and hatred in the population leading to violent ethnic conflict among these regions and generally in Ethiopia.

In general, the Ethiopian federal system is designed to prevent or handle some conflicts, but it failed to comprehensively respond to the quest for a better regime of minority rights protection. As a result, it does not prepare to solve for new conflicts initiated by the new minorities. It also does not prepare to respond to conflicts caused by the local elites' competition for new resources (state budget); opportunities (education, jobs, network, and other forms of social capital, etc.); ethnic, political parties (political power and positions at the local, sub-national, and federal levels).

All these problems show that, Ethiopian federalism is ill-articulated to solve conflicts rather than a panacea to other conflicts. In doing so, It can be said that, ethnic federalism has failed to solve ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. Because, these conflicts have led to the death of many innocent people, the destruction of property, and the dislocation of millions of people in the country.

3.1.2. Consequences of the Conflict

One of the objectives of Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement is to address the main causes of long-standing unrest and civil war in the country. However, the federal arrangement also spawned new localized conflicts that results to internal displacements; it limits the movement of capital and manpower required to take advantage of economic opportunities; and freedom of movement exhibit special causes, dynamics, and consequences and it creates entitlements that

can block development and leads to irrational use of energy and other resources in the Ethiopian federal system today (Cohen, 1995:168-75).

The first consequence of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia as we observe today, promotes instability through the entrenchment of ethnic difference rather than promotion of state unity as well as the demarcation of territories based on ethnic lines promotes ethnic identity as more important than state identity (Abate, 2004:58). For example, in any government offices and ethnic party membership, all the interactions and relations of citizens depend on their ethnic membership or ethnic classifications. This imposition of ethnic classification is resulting in a challenge of state unity and for about 85 diverse ethno-linguistic groups of Ethiopia. Especially, the southern peoples of Ethiopia consists of more than 50 ethnic groups, but today each ethnicity is competing each other and questing the right to be a regional state within their separate entities.

The second consequence is the Ethiopian constitution of ethnic federalism has decisively transformed politics, although, not always with the hoped-for consequences. It has not resolved the national question. Ethnic conflicts have not disappeared, but have been transferred from the national to the *regional*, district and *kebele* levels or it has been contained by the security forces (Asnake, 2009:41). Relations between ethnic groups have become increasingly competitive, as they oppose for control of administrative boundaries and government budgets in addition to land and natural resources (Aalen, 2002:17-32).

The third anticipated consequences are to reinforce undemocratic political mobilization and platforms based on ethnic or religious group protection, leading to discrimination based on “son of the soil” alienation and violence (Taddele, 2017:18). The implication of such behavior fortifies exclusive and un-democratic political practices and mob-group dynamics that ultimately stifle voices of reason and inhibit any possibility of reasonable and rational deliberations. These problems have led to politics of intolerance and zero-sum political games, politics of fear, the politics of resentment and the politics of hate in society as we show different parts of the country. Protests, violence, and local and armed conflicts are easily turned to target ethnicities and produce conflict-induced displacement in the country today (Ibid). These problems are the result of the weakness of the constituent members of the EPRDF ethnic parties’ and the implementation of the constitutional protection of minority rights and ethnic security.

The other major consequence of Ethiopian ethnic federalism is its tendency to restrict migration-induced demographic changes. The ethnic boundaries created by the federal constitution of Ethiopia have legitimized any resistance to spontaneous inter-ethnic migration (Asnake, 2009:41). Such resistance happened in different ethnic groups. For example, from Anywaa to the Nuer, and from Ari to the Mursi in terms of migration has led to confrontations and the death of hundreds of people. Such projects have limited the geographical spaces for movement of traditional communities. Thus, migration and mobility encounter more restrictions in an ethnically-based federal system than in a unitary system (Ibid). In the same token, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of Ethiopia estimates that as of July 2015, “there were over 413,400 Inter Displaced Persons in Ethiopia due to ethnic conflict, land grazing, and cross-border violence, most of them living in protracted displacement situations, with the Somali region being the most displacement-affected region” (Taddele, 2017: 9).

Similarly, in the month of January 2016, there were 30,183 persons internally displaced in the country due to conflict-induced displacement and Natural disaster-induced displacement (in Oromia regional state -19,080 IDPs, Somali regional state -9,498 IDPs, and South Nation Nationality Peoples regional state -1,605 IDPs). In total, more than 65 percent of the 30,183 inter displaced population is due to ethnic group’s competition over the survival of different socioeconomic and political aspects to confer particular benefits on individuals and groups as well as the willingness of people to fight over their homelands, economically, and strategically important territories (Taddele, 2017: 16).

Again, in late 2017, inter-communal conflict (based on administrative boundaries between regional states; the recognition and status of ethnic identities as nationalities; referenda on identities; conflicts over natural resources, including water and land usage; religious-based tensions and conflicts) intensified throughout Ethiopia, particularly along the border between Oromia and Somali displacing hundreds of thousands of people in the two regions and exacerbating humanitarian needs (USAID, 2019). Since April 2018, renewed inter-communal violence in Oromia and SNNP has resulted in the displacement of nearly one million people. Displacement along the Oromiya–SNNP regional border continued through September, straining local resources and exacerbating existing humanitarian needs in the regions (Ibid).

In late 2018, violence in Somali Region’s Dawa Zone, including in and around Moyale town, which spans the Ethiopia –Kenya border, displaced up to 150,000 people and destroyed civilian infrastructure, according to international media and relief actors. Similarly, inter-communal violence happened along the BenishangulGumuz–Oromiya regional border since September 2018. As of late December, insecurity displaced at least 57,000 people within BenishangulGumuz’sAsosa and Kamashi zones, and 198,000 people to Oromiya’s East Wollega and West Wollega zones(Ibid). In my practical observation in the areas, the reason for these problems are during the phases of political transition in 2018, the dissatisfied ethnic parties lead to the ethnification of politics and a spiral towards instability and the collapse of incipient democracies and the regime.

In September 2019, conflict spreads to BenishangulGumuz and Ethiopia’s capital city of Addis Ababa, resulting in civilian deaths and additional displacement. In so doing, EBC announced that, this problem results due to the reason of political reform took place in the country; the power of some political elites is declined. Thus, these elites are going to conflict to restore the preexisted power. As a result, humanitarian organizations should be responding to acute needs across the country. But inter-communal clashes and insecurity continue to displace populations and disrupt humanitarian efforts in various parts of Ethiopia(EBC,2019).

According to the UN, as of January,2019, due to the above conflict induced problems, it results in death and large number of internal displaced people; as a result Ethiopia stands first in the world with regards to the number of internally displaced people, there were approximately 2.9 million IDPs in Ethiopia-more than 2.4 million IDPs identified conflict as the primary cause of displacement (USAID, 2019).In doing so, Ethiopia is currently requesting \$ 492,5455,99 from international humanitarian’s organization to manage IDPs in the table below.

USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE ETHIOPIA RESPONSE IN FY 2018 AND FY 2019

IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	ACTIVITY	LOCATION	AMOUNT
USAID/OFDA			
CRS	Agriculture and Food Security	Oromiya, SNNP	\$1,999,962
GOAL	Nutrition, WASH	Somali	\$2,600,000
iMMAP	Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management	Countrywide	\$1,000,000
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Economic Recovery and Market Systems (ERMS), Humanitarian Coordination and Information	Countrywide	\$16,300,000

	Management, Logistics Support and Relief Commodities, Shelter and Settlements, WASH		
International Potato Center (IPC)	Agriculture and Food Security	Amhara, SNNP	\$1,499,743
International Rescue Committee	Nutrition, WASH	Countrywide	\$8,330,287
OCHA	Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management	Countrywide	\$16,250,000
Oxfam	Agriculture and Food Security, ERMS, WASH	Somali	\$3,000,000
Save the Children/U.S. (SC/US)	Nutrition, WASH	Afar, Somali	\$2,900,000
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Health, Nutrition, Protection, WASH	Countrywide	\$6,900,000
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)	Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management	Somali	\$300,000
UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS)	Logistics Support and Relief Commodities	Somali	\$750,000
U.S. Forest Service	Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management	Countrywide	\$200,000
Program Support	\$1,824,864		
TOTAL USAID/OFDA FUNDING			\$63,854,856

USAID/FFP2			
CRS/JEOP	244,640 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid	Amhara, Dire Dawa, Oromiya, SNNP, Tigray	\$143,148,636
CRS/Development, Food Security Activities	1,950 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid, Cash Transfers for Food	Dire Dawa, Oromiya	\$2,243,417
Food for the Hungry (FH)	2,400 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid	Amhara	\$1,954,152
IRC	870 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid	Countrywide	\$2,450,010
Relief Society of Tigray (REST)	6,130 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid, Cash Transfers for Food	Tigray	\$5,181,766
UNICEF	910 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid	Countrywide	\$4,362,994
WFP	176,147 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid and Local and Regional Food Procurement	Somali	\$121,865,549
	62,251 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid and Local and Regional Food	Countrywide	\$44,979,785

	Procurement for Refugees		
World Vision	3,900 MT of U.S. In-Kind Food Aid	Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP	\$3,384,462
TOTAL USAID/FFP FUNDING \$329,570,771			

State/PRM3			
Action Against Hunger (AAH)	Nutrition Assistance for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,000,000
Center for Victims of Torture (CVT)	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services for Refugees	Gambella, Tigray	\$2,500,000
Dan Church Aid (DCA)	Livelihoods, Nutrition, and Food Security for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,000,000
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Child Protection, Gender Based Violence (GBV) Prevention and Response, and Psychosocial Support for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,000,000
GOAL	Nutrition Assistance for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,000,000
IOM	Shelter and WASH for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,250,000
International Medical Corps	GBV Prevention and Response, Health, Mental Health and Psychosocial, Nutrition, and Reproductive Health Services for Refugees	Gambella, Somali	\$4,000,000
IRC	Multi-sectoral Assistance for Refugees	BenishangulGumuz, Somali, Tigray	\$3,250,000
Plan International	Child Protection, Education, and Psychosocial for Refugees	Gambella	\$1,500,000
SC/US	Child Protection and Education for Refugees	Gambella, Somali	\$2,000,000
UNHCR	Protection and Assistance for Refugees	Countrywide	\$80,070,072
UNHAS	Logistics Support and Relief Commodities	Countrywide	\$550,000
TOTAL STATE/PRM FUNDING			\$99,120,072
TOTAL USG HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FOR THE ETHIOPIA RESPONSE IN FY 2018 AND 2019			\$492,545,599

1. Year of funding indicates the date of commitment or obligation, not appropriation, of funds; USG funding represents publicly reported amounts as of February 5, 2019
2. Estimated value of food assistance and transportation costs at the time of procurement; subject to change.
3. State /PRM funding in Ethiopia includes assistance to Somali and South Sudanese refugees who are sheltering in Ethiopia, which is also included in the regional USG response totals for Somalia and South Sudan.

Finally, in my intimate observation, the whole federal arrangement organized along ethnic lines and the inclusion of the secession clause will result greater Ethiopia to crumble, because currently the Ethiopian federal system seems to be a con-federal system of government. The

reason is that, in different national and international issues, the regional governments act as an independent state and sovereign power without the common authorization of the central and regional governments because of lack of political legitimacy of the new regime. Even the central government has not a jurisdiction, power over most areas of the constituent units. It has no sovereign control over regional states in different issues. Thus, it seems the product of the temporary union of states which do not surrender their sovereignty.

Theoretically, a federal government acts as a balance of equilibrium between the forces of centralization and decentralization; or a compromise between unity and diversity; autonomy and sovereignty; the national and the regional governments (Smith, 1995: 5-6). In the case of Ethiopia today, these features are incorporated into the constitution, but in practice neither the federal government keeps the centrifugal as well as centripetal forces in equilibrium, nor the regional governments completely united and completely separated from the central government. As a result, this political antagonism may lead to quest the right to self-determination up to secession, which would be the logical culmination of the nation-building project in Ethiopia. All these consequences are emanating from the regional states and their leading parties are working independently without the common sense of the central government and the leading party of EPRDF. In doing so, the destination of future Ethiopia will be frustrating.

4. Conclusion and Recommendation

4.1 Conclusion

Federalism as a system of government is becoming a debatable issue for most scholars in the area. Some scholars assumed that, it is used as a panacea for ethnic problems of multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies while many of other scholars have been observing that it is a cause of conflict, especially for ethnic diversified society (Alemante 2003:56). However, whether it recognizes a self-administered over the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious matters of a constituted unity, in order to exploit the benefits of federalism by managing ethnic conflicts and tensions, the focus should not be on the federal design only, but depending on the context of political culture and the nature of ethnic based political parties (Brancati, 2009:12-34).

The considerable evidence suggests that, the current Ethiopian federalism system was born as a result of addressing the century-old national questions of the different ethnic based political

organizations and liberation movements. But the results were both a response to old conflicts and a cause of new conflicts. It seemed too replied to ethno-national conflicts. In fact, conflict is rising due to economic resources and boundary sharing between different ethnic groups. The major cause of conflicts in the current Ethiopian is, the politicization of ethnic identity by self-seeking political leaders causes political instability. Means ethnic, political parties who lose the power and legitimacy and their leaders are manipulating their ethnic identities at the expense of their weakness that escalating ethnic conflicts as it observes in today's Ethiopia.

The desire of the self-seeking political leaders is manifested through using their media and politicization of tribal identity, design of the federal states, fiscal federalism and ethnic party cause ethnic conflict and anomaly throughout in the country. That is why Ethiopia has become one of the conflicting areas as a result; it stands first in the world with regards to the number of internally displaced people. In doing so, if not the new government re-designed the federal structure like those of corporate pluralist western countries, Ethiopia may face the same fate as the USSR and Yugoslavia.

4.2. Recommendations

To resolve all the above problems, I recommend the following resolutions to the Ethiopian government and all ethnic, political parties for future Prospects of Ethiopia as a state. Primarily, in Ethiopian federal system, constitutional rethinking might be needed at some places such as in the areas governing the upper houses both at the federal and sub-national levels as well as their representatives should be electing based on ability to contribute for the overall goals of the future Ethiopia ; reviewing the structure of federalism into geographical federalism instead of ethnical based federalism; avoiding article 39 - secession clause of the constitution; changing the power constitutional interpretation given to the house of federation and balancing powers of self rule and shared rule between the federal and regional states.

Secondly, it is also important to make a more aggressive use of resources that are hitherto underutilized such as the state constitutions. It is also imperative that state constitutions are designed in such a way that they respond to specific local demands and needs. Such responsiveness to realities and diversifying institutional and procedural devices will indeed enrich the federal experiment thereby making the state laboratories of democracy. The federal government should be responsible for equal distribution of economic power among all regions based on justice and criteria.

The third remedy is the constituent parties of EPRDF and other ethnic, political parties should establish only national parties like Uganda and indoctrinate all the societies as Ethiopian identity more than ethnic identities. Further, the parties equipped with the necessary institutional, procedural, and manpower, infrastructure, can be part of the scheme to prevent, manage, and transform conflicts. The leading party and other opposition parties should nominate and empower their membership based on their capacity and profession rather than identity. To meet these challenges, it is imperative that the government develop a full-blown policy and strategy for conflict and also need to work on the refinement of the norms, institutions, and procedures pertaining to federalism and its experimentation.

The fourth resolution is a re demarcating the regional boundaries. Means the government should measure a multicultural federalism in the right direction to the extent that it attempts to integrate historically marginalized groups and establishes constituent units whose boundaries coincide with the territorial and geographical bases rather than ethnic identity. Such measures should be ensuring the survival of the Ethiopian state as well as minimizes localized ethnic conflicts.

Finally, the government should insure sufficient institutional mechanisms for guaranteeing shared functions to the constituent units and emphasis on self-rule should be complemented by at least a shared policy-making at the center, in the civil service, in the executive and the judiciary. The triangulation of check and balance system and accountability should be existing in the federal, regional states and among the leading parties, opposition parties and in government civil servants in general. The relevant institutions will have to work on the basis of the rule of law, more than on the basis of a common party ideology to the survival of federal system.

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