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Frustration Aggression Theory and Local Refineries in Niger Delta: Implication to Host Communities' Economy.

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Abstract

This research is focused on the reasons why youths in Niger Delta are floating local refineries in Nigeria and how to find solutions to it. The study was anchored on frustration aggression theory and driven by in depth interview methodology. Respondents were selected from youths of four communities in Delta and Rivers states (Otor-Edo and Effurun-Otor in Delta state and Isiokpo and Bonny in Rivers state). The findings show that deprivation and hunger are some of the reasons why youths float local refineries in Niger Delta. The economic implications are loss of revenue to the three tiers of government and lack of sustainable peace and development in oil host communities. Hence, this paper recommended that Niger Delta Development Commission should build at least two refineries every year to create jobs for the youth and stop importation of petroleum products in Nigeria.

Key Words: Frustration aggression theory, local refineries, Niger Delta, Host communities.

Word count: 135

Introduction

Edafejirhaye (2021 P.6-7) asserts that some Niger Delta youths risked their lives by building illegal refineries for survival. They tap crude oil from pipelines to refine diesel, kerosene and premium motor spirit known as petrol to make a living. The Federal Government of Nigeria responded by sending army to destroy those illegal refineries. According to him, over 1000 illegal refineries were destroyed between 2014 and 2019 by the government who could not build a single refinery during the same period, but depended on imported refined petroleum products even though the government has the financial capability to build three refineries in a year. The NDDC master plan spelt out some major projects that will turn around the host communities and empower the youth in terms of job opportunities (NDDC 2006). Building of more refineries to stop importation of petroleum products into the country is one of the agenda of the government.

As a result of politicization of NDDC's activities over the years as Edafejirhaye (2021) observes, no refinery was built within the last 20 years.

This year alone as at February 18, 2022 Leadership Newspaper reported that no fewer than 184 illegal refining sites have been uncovered in Rivers state and about 150 sites completely destroyed (Punch Jan.15; 2022). What can we say is the major cause of this illegality in the oil rich region? Could it be frustration or natural aggression?

Miller and Dollard have the answer to the above queries in their stimulating and illuminating book "Frustration and aggression" which defines frustration as "that condition which exists when a goal response suffers interference." Frustrating events are those which block the individual's goal oriented behaviour, threaten his self esteem or deprive him of the opportunity to gratify his important motives and immediate goals. The Frustration-Aggression hypothesis proposed by Miller et al (1939) is a significant contribution in tracing the causes of aggression in Nigerian Niger Delta oil resource. This hypothesis states that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. The Nigerian state through her constitution claim ownership of all resources found in land and sea thereby rendering the original owners of the land of Niger Delta where oil is found in commercial quantity helpless, frustrated, dejected and poor in the midst of abundant resources that can equally transform the people's lives and land just like Abuja and Lagos cities. The government could not build more refineries or maintain the few existing ones to match the current demand but resort to importation of fuel. Meanwhile, the oil host communities have been calling on the federal government to build more refineries in the host communities to provide job for the people. That called fell on deaf ears. As a result of the neglect, the youth defiled law and order by floating personal refineries for survival.

In recognition of the significance of oil, Feyide (1986) rightly stated that:

Oil is raw material as well as a convenient and effective source of energy. In the form of energy it increases man's capacity to get work done. As a raw material it provides the feedback for the fasts expanding industry in the world-the petrochemical industry...All over the world lives of people are affected and the destinies of nations are probably determined by the results of oil industry operations. Oil keeps the factories of the industrialized countries working and provides the revenues which enable oil exporters to execute ambitious national and economic development plans. Those developing countries that have no oil are faced with a grim struggle for survival: if they lose they are relegated to the "fourth world" the march of progress would be retarded and life itself would become unbearable if the world was deprived of oil. That is why oil has become the concern of governments, a vital ingredient of their policies and a crucial factor in their political and diplomatic strategies (Feyide, 1986).

Nigeria, being a mono-economy nation largely depends on the oil sector for its economic survival. The Nigerian economy is dependent on the exploitation of crude oil and the nation's present and future is very much tied to the commodity (Okere, 2013). Indeed, oil and gas resources from Niger Delta region accounts for over 90% of Nigerian export and foreign exchange earnings, and over 70% of total Nigerian revenue (Ekuerhare, 2002). This informs Wilson (2012) to state that the increase or otherwise in crude oil production affects directly the revenue base and development programmes of Nigerian state. Oil has been the mainstay of Nigeria's economy. It is the country's major export, fetching millions of petrodollars to the country each day. Sadly, that same resource is being savagely stolen in bountiful quantities on daily basis through illegal bunkering and refining as Adeboboye, (2013) observes. This action has serious implication on both host communities' and Nigerian economy.

Statement of the problem

Since the year 2000 Nigerian government made promises of putting in place developmental infrastructures such as construction of network of roads across the delta, building more refineries in the oil host communities to create job for the youths, to address the suffering of the people of the oil bearing region and to stop importation of petroleum products into the country. For these purposes the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in the year 2001(NDDC 2006). After two decades, no single refinery was built and the government agency - Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) continues importation of petroleum products. Some of the questionable products imported by NNPC this February 2022 have started giving vehicles mechanical problems as reported by some national newspapers from Abuja, Lagos and Osun states. While Nigerians are enduring the situation, the products from the local refineries became supplements to the imported products as the government finds it difficult to maintain the existing refineries. In this same vein, as motorists are presently languishing in queue to buy fuel in some parts of the country the Governor of Rivers state - Wike, is busy destroying some local refineries with the promise to building modular refinery. About 150 sites of local refineries have been destroyed as at the end of February, 2022 (Leadership Feb. 18; 2022). From the above observations, the key elements of the statement of the problem are hereby highlighted:

Firstly, the inability of the government to maintain the existing refineries in the presence of abundant fund speaks volume about the government lack of focus.

Secondly, frustration pushed the youth to build refineries for survival when government through NDDC failed in her duties and promises to provide them the expected jobs.

Thirdly, twenty years was long enough for government to build 20 refineries in Nigeria if one refinery is built every year. It means Nigeria government lacks focus and is toiling with the citizens' welfare. Hence; a government that could not build a single refinery within 20 years does she has a moral justification to destroy the local refineries built by the people for survival?

Fourthly, if the way these youths get crude oil for refining is the illegal act; can all former and present political leaders who have barges in high sea for illegal bunkering should also answer

for their illegality before destroying these local refineries? Why must we kill flies and spare the big fishes? Is this not injustice? Remember, he who comes to equity must come with clean hands.

From the above analysis on this issue of illegal refineries this work using an in depth interview in attempt to find permanent solutions to the issue of illegal refineries in Nigeria.

Research Objectives

The main objective of this study is to unravel the factors that push the youth into illegal bunkering and refining. The specific objectives are:

- 1.To know the causes of illegal bunkering and refining in Nigeria.
- 2. To unravel the economic implications to the host communities visa-vis Nigeria's economy
- 3. To find permanent solutions to the issue of illegal refineries.

Research Questions

The research questions for the study are crafted from the research objectives thus:

- 1. What are the causes of illegal bunkering and refining?
- 2. What are the economic implications to the host communities and Nigeria economy?
- 3. How can the issue illegal refineries be addressed?

Methodology

The methodology used for this study is an in depth interview. Four respondents (youth leaders) were interviewed from four selected host communities where the activities of illegal refineries are so pervasive. They are Otor-Edo and Effuru-Otor in Ughelli- South local government of Delta state. The other communities are Isiokpo and Bonny in Rivers state.

In-depth interview as Boyce and Neale (2006) observe, is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interview with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, programme, or situation. For example, we might ask participants, staff, and others associated with a programme about their experiences and expectations related to the programme, the thoughts they have concerning programme operations, processes, and outcomes, and about any changes they perceive in themselves as a result of their involvement in such programme.

In-depth interviews are useful when detailed information about a person's thoughts and behaviors are needed. Interviews are often used to provide context to other data (such as outcome data), offering a more complete picture of what happened in the programme and why. For example, you may have measured an increase in youth visits to a clinic, and through in-depth interviews you find out that a youth noted that she went to the clinic because she saw a new sign outside of the clinic advertising youth hours. You might also interview a clinic staff member to find out their perspective on the clinic's "youth friendliness." In-depth interviews should be used in place of focus groups if the potential participants may not be included or comfortable talking openly in a group, or when a distinguish individual who opposed to group's opinions about the programme. Interviews are often used to refine questions for future surveys of a particular group (Boyce and Neale, 2006).

One of the advantages of in-depth interviews Edafejirhaye (2021) asserts is that it provides much more detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as surveys. They also may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to collect information - people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with you about their programme as opposed to filling out a survey

Literature Review

History of Illegal Bunkering and Refining in Nigeria

The history of illegal bunkering and refining could be traced to 1990s when various Niger Deltans who protest against oil companies' environmental degradation activities in the oil communities and total negligence of the oil bearing region in term of sustainable development by the federal government. The protest led to arrest and execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and others by Abacha military administration in 1995. After the death of Nigeria's Head of State, General Sani Abacha, in 1998 and the new political climate which it ushered in made it possible for Ijaw youths to become more vigorous in their demands. This point found expression in the hijacking of oil installations. And in December 11, 1998, Ijaw youths converged on Kaiama (an Ijaw town) where they made a landmark declaration, now known as the Kaiama Declaration. In the document, they requested for more local control of oil revenues and better environmental policies. The dynamism of Ijaw demands resonate in the Kaiama Declaration thus:

- 1. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belongs to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.
- 2. We cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of `the right to ownership and control of our `lives and resources, which were enacted without `our participation and `consent.
- These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum Decree etc.

3. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of `occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to "protect" its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijaw land should appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone (The Guardian 30th December 1998).

The declaration gave a December 30, 1998 ultimatum to both the government and the oil companies to respond positively to their demands. It added that if the deadline was not met, all MNOCs operating in Ijaw lands and territorial waters, and indeed in the larger Niger Delta, should leave (Niboro, 1997). Ijaw youths followed up on these demands with a protest march to government House in Yenagoa, the main purpose of which was to convey their grievances through the state governor, Lt. Colonel Paul Obi to the Federal Government. But security operatives opened fire on the protesters leaving some dead and many others injured in the pandemonium that followed. This marked the beginning of hostilities between Ijaw youths and the security forces (Ojakorotu, 2008).

Illegal bunkering and refining became a flourishing business as soon as democracy was put in place in 1999. Top military men, top politicians, frustrated youths, past and present presidents of Nigeria are involve in one way or the other. All past and present presidents have allocation of oil well from where they sell crude oil in the international market for personal gain. Only the one been taken secretly by hungry youth is regarded as illegal operation (Boris, 2015). Hence; when the Human Rights Watch asked Tom Ateke why he was involved in oil theft, he stated, '...I take that which belongs to me. It is not theft, the oil belongs to our people' (Okwelum, 2021)

It is under such conditions that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) states to Shell as follows:

It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our land or die in it...Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil' (Human Right Watch, 2005, Okwelum, 2021)

It is the same way MEND spoke to the Russian President as follows:

Greetings from ...MEND and welcome to Nigeria...The Abuja that you see is a child of rape and the President that you signed agreement with is an illegal Commander-in-`Chief...You already know that the region where the wealth with which the city (Abuja) has been built remains mired in poverty and lack. That the people who own the resources have no stake in it for which we have now waged a war to emancipate...It would have been nice to visit the region where you hope to develop gas and see the pathetic state the people live

in...the type of injustice that led the likes of Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba to stage a revolution'. It is under these circumstances that the multinationals are beginning to divest from the onshore to reinvest offshore (Okwelum, 2021 P.6).

To show that the conditions outlined above for the exercise of the right to oil thieft and local refineries is graduating to war in the delta, Ibaba and Okolo (2013) in their seminal work in "Resolving militia conflicts in the Niger Delta: The role and strategies of mediation" have not only outlined the four phases through which the crisis in delta have gone through, they have also summarised the five causes of the crisis which invariably have also led to the resource nuisance of oil theft and illegal refining in the delta to include: alienation and disempowerment, militarization of democracy, human rights violation, failure of corporate social responsibility, corruption and accountability, failures in governance to deliver dividends of democracy, and ethnic based political domination. Way back in the 1990s the struggle and the strategy was in the form of legal actions in courts of law by the delta communities against the multinational oil companies for compensation. When litigation proved of no advantage, the struggle graduated into peaceful demonstration and occupation of flow stations to access adequate compensation and social amenities and the response of the multinationals was the invitation of the state to provide military cover that largely culminated in the bombardment of whole communities leading to loss of lives and properties. With military invitation, the youths galvanized into militants and militias groups and transformed into militant occupations, shutting down and outright bombardments of flow stations leading to kidnapping of both foreign and national oil company workers. When the stage of militant occupation proved effective, the governments of the southern states joined the bandwagon with the agitation for resource control; which was led by James Ibori the then governor of Delta state. The result was increment of higher percentage (13%) in the derivation formula. Not yet satisfied, militancy entered into the phase of completely overwhelming the Nigerian petro-state into the amnesty deal. Now, the amnesty partially failed but the struggle has now graduated into oil theft and illegal refining, a development of a 'rogue economy' that may snowball into full scale war if public relations proactive strategies are not adopted by the state.

From the above historical analysis, the Nigerian state succeeded using constitution to exploit the natural resources of the people without adequate sustainable development programmes for oil host communities. Therefore; Niger Deltans are now using the natural law (oil as God's gift) to take what belong to them and government call it illegal. The oil wells political gladiators allocated to themselves for personal bunkering is it not illegal too?

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the frustration-aggression theory of Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer and Sears of 1939. The omnipresent environmental risks associated with the prevalent insecurity felt by the vulnerable populations of the Niger Deltans whose livelihoods are wholly dependent upon their interaction and relationships with their environments, is the reason, this paper is interrogating why the major beneficiaries of the environment; such as the MNOCs and the Nigerian government are degrading the environment of the host communities without sustainable

programme plan. This is because the Niger Delta security has habitually been structured and delineated by its relationship with their natural environment. Any unjustifiable interference with or obstructionism in this relationship is tantamount to security threat, breach and deprivation that triggers aggression and violent conflict. In this context, the doyen of the psychoanalytic theory, Sigmund Freud is of the view that man's actions are determined by instincts, and specifically the sexual instinct (Rahmati & Momtaz, 2013). Importantly, Rahmati and Momtaz explicate that Freud was clear that when the expression of these instincts is frustrated, this invariably triggers an aggressive drive. Interestingly, some psychologists in the persons of Dollard et al. (1939) took up the gauntlet and reformulated this promising hypothesis into a very popular theory known as the Frustration-Aggression Theory (FAT). This popular FAT postulates that an obstacle to goal attainment leads to frustration which may lead to aggression (Dollard et al., 1939; Ramirez, 2009). Consequently, the Frustration-Aggression Theory attributes conflict to the outcome of frustration triggered by obstructionism, betrayal, interference, negligence, failures, deprivation, discrepancy, or the gap between needs expectation and attainment in the Niger Delta. Faleti (2006) views this formulation as the "want-get-ratio". This discrepancy between man's value expectation and his value capabilities is what Gurr (1970) ascribes to Relative Deprivation in his work 'Why Men Rebel'. Breaking this formulation down, Ademola argues that "People tend to become aggressive when what they get falls below their expectation" (Ademola, 2006, p. 60). This is an explanation for why the Saro-Wiwa-led Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) objected to the unjustifiable interference by the MNOCs and the government in Ogoniland's cordial relationship with their natural environment. This interference ostensibly culminated in colossal environmental degradation (aggression) and the uncompensated appropriation of Ogoni land for oil drilling. Consequently, Junger (2007) contends that, ignored by government, MOSOP petitioned Shell and the other MNOCs directly. MOSOP wanted \$10 billion in accumulated royalties and environmental-damage compensation, and a greater say in future oil exploration. In the words of Okumagba, this special conflict analytical mechanism of the frustration-aggression theory is known as the 'theory of frustration displacement' (Okumagba, 2009) or 'transferred aggression' (Dollard et al., 1939). This theoretical mechanism argues that a weak victim usually transfers his aggression to soft targets related to or of significance to the aggressor. Explaining this mechanism vis-a-vis the Niger Delta conflict, the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2012) posited that increased security measures by the oil companies in the delta and military pressure by the Joint Task Force (JTF), a unit composed of the army, navy and police, encouraged opportunists from the delta to seek softer targets further west. In corroboration, Okumagba (2009) avers that "given the relative strength of the Nigerian state in the case of the Niger Delta-government face-of, it often results into "frustration displacement" (p. 324). As a consequence, therefore, the activities of militia groups are directed at government and other groups in the region who would ordinarily not be affected. This explains why the Niger Delta militants targeted the oil facilities not only for destruction, but also as veritable avenue to generate revenue for survival through locally made refineries. With these attacks on the oil facilities and floating of illegal refineries, the the Niger Delta youths and the militants were able to let the world know how they felt about their oppression just as Major Jasper Adaka Boro noted in 1966 (Okwelum 2021).

The transferred aggression or frustration displacement tactics of the militants therefore, reverberated on the foreign oil workers who became easy preys as soft targets for abduction, kidnapping and hostage takings. This tactics (though a terrorist strategy) paid off handsomely because it successfully made the international news media to become campaigners for the cause of the Niger Delta while concerned about their kidnapped citizens. But a critical examination of the modus operandi of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) as Ibaba (2011) and Okonta(2006) stated, MEND was not involved in hostage takings for ransom reason but rather as an implement to attract international attention especially from the nations of the kidnapped expatriate oil workers. Akahalu (2014) opined that what Kenule Saro-Wiwa died for trying to achieve a cause peacefully, the militants now got on a platter of gold. This is how the frustration-aggression thesis lent credence to Horowitz (1985)'s contention that a bloodless theory cannot be used to analyse a bloody phenomenon. In other words, Saro-Wiwa made the mistake of applying a bloodless theory to a bloody phenomenon and paid with his life. This is yet another reason for using this theory as the analytical mechanism for this research.

Thematic Analysis of Interview

After investigating the questions raised in the study from the objectives earlier stated, findings from field work revealed that there are reasons why illegal refineries are thriving in Niger Delta.

Reasons for Illegal Refineries

The majority of the respondents said that hunger, frustration, environmental degradation, lack of job opportunity and inadequate sustainable plans for host communities youths by state and federal government are the major causes why the youth in the region are floating illegal refineries.

Another reason is that host communities would like to control the oil resource and build more refineries to create jobs for their youths the way Yoruba and Hausa exploit the gold, granite and asphalt in their states. These findings corroborate the literature review and the theory on which this study was anchored.

Economic Implications of Local Refineries

The respondents opined that as long as the federal government is not willing to build more refineries as promised 20 years ago, the business of local refineries will continue to flourish in the region. That means a great loss of revenue to the federal government and loss of taxation for state and local government.

Solutions to Local Refineries

Respondents suggested the followings as solutions to local refineries:

- 1. Government through NDDC should build at least two refineries every year in volatile areas where illegal refineries are being floated.
- 2. Government should give grants to host communities to build standard refineries and stop the regime of petroleum products importation.

- 3. The 13% derivation fund for oil producing states should be used to build refineries to create job for the youth.
- 4. Illegal allocation of oil wells to former and present political leaders for illegal bunkering should be abolished before destruction of illegal refineries start.

Discussion of Findings

One of the findings from the interview shows that hunger, frustration, environmental degradation, lack of job opportunity and inadequate sustainable plans for host communities youths by state and federal government are the major causes why the youth in the region are floating illegal refineries. A hungry man is an angry man. It will not be out of place when the youths turn their frustration against the state by tapping into the common wealth and the available resource for survival. The government agency – NDDC that would have built more refineries in the host communities to create jobs for the people failed in her duty; out of frustration the people became more aggressive to build refineries for survival since the environment they depend on for farming and fishing has been polluted by oil exploration.

The other ethnic groups in Nigeria (the Yorubas, Fulani and Hausa) are exploiting their gold, granite without following due processes. Will it not be reasonable for the oil host communities to control the oil resource and build more refineries to create jobs for their youths the way Yoruba and Hausa exploit the gold, granite and bitmen in their states? Remember, what is good for the goose is also good for the gander.

Economic Implications of Illegal Refineries to Host Communities and Nigeria

The respondents opined that as long as the federal government is not willing to build more refineries as promised 20 years ago, the business of local refineries will continue to flourish in the region. That means a great loss of revenue to the federal government and loss of taxation for state and local government. And the issues of illegal destruction of local refineries in the oil region may not cease yet. These findings support the following researches:

Okwelum (2021) observes with concern that destruction of over 6,000 private local refineries in the delta as at 2013 on the basis that they are illegal on the ground that they cannot account for how they came by the crude that they refine apart from by way of the hacks on the pipelines is in the extreme. According to him, it is an invasion of the rights of the whole oil community and even of the individual. It endangers public liberty and private initiative and undermines the defense of claim of right provided for under section 23 of the Criminal Code of the Southern States of Nigeria and the presumption of innocence until the contrary is shown provided for under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The theory of military intervention in the socio-economic life of the whole people even when it is led in impunity, criminality and violence justifies the right of rebellion, redress and revolution

in the delta especially when it is only the fries (Niger Delta youths) that are being brought to book while the big fishes (political actors in illegal bunkering) are being left off the hook.

Military intervention in civil life is a mortal blow to the right to human security of the indigenous peoples of the delta and a denial of the right to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life and in many cases, it had led to the invasion and sack of many ethnic communities including Odi, Okpare-Olomu, Isiokpo, Bonny, Otor-Edo, Opia, Umechem, Odioma and Uwheru under several muddy excuses.

In these and several other militarization exercises in the delta, soft issues of the peoples' exercise of choice, access to opportunities, security from poverty, diseases, famine, illiteracy and unemployment were effectively suppressed by the state centric notion of security for the multinationals to plunder the wealth of the people was firmly entrenched according to Ojakorotu (2015) in Military and oil violence in Niger Delta.

The claim by the Petroleum Industry Bill, the 1978 Land Use Act, the 1969 Petroleum Act and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic that all lands in Nigeria and all mineral resources in the lands belong to a corrupt government which shares same at the expense of original owners, thereby; denying them the basic comfort of live is prone to engender crises, frustration aggression and illegal means to survival of the fittest.

The claim that all compensation for land would be based on the value of the crops on the land instead of the value of the land itself at the time of acquisition, and the political will that hands over such lands to foreign corporations for crude oil exploration without a consideration for the indigenous economic mode of production and reproduction of live creates fertile soil for rebellion and calls for shift in paradigm.

The government reactions by destroying local refineries, negates the research finding of Edafejirhaye (2021) in community participation and sustainable development in the Niger Delta that sustainable development and improved welfare of oil producing communities is to a large extent dependent on community participation (Edafejirhaye, 2021).

And as wrap up by Ugbomeh and Atubi (2010) in their research on 'The role of oil industry and the Nigerian State' in defining the future of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, some of the ways to stop the Niger Delta crisis are to stop systemic corruption of allocation of oil blocks to political gladiators and also switch over ownership and control of the oil wealth from the Nigerian state to the owners of the oil bearing lands.

From the observation of Igben (2016) the less a people benefit from a system, the less interest they have in the survival of the system. The oil producing communities should have freedom to exploit their own resources just as the Yorubas and Hausas are exploiting their gold and granite so that the Nigerian project can work systematically.

Conclusion and recommendations:

The government reactions by destroying local refineries, negates the idea of sustainable peace and development in oil communities in the Niger Delta. The reason is that sustainable peace,

development and improved welfare of oil producing communities is to a large extent dependent on communities' active participation in the oil industry. The oil companies and the Nigerian State should as matter of urgency re-define sustainable future of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, by fully incorporate the host communities in the oil business by build more refineries in host communities, stop systemic corruption by handing over ownership and control of the oil wealth from the Nigerian state to the original owners of the oil bearing lands so that host communities will pay tax to the federal government as it is done in other countries.

From the respondents suggestions this research offer the followings recommendations:

- 1. Government through NDDC should build at least two refineries every year in volatile areas where illegal refineries are being floated. This will create jobs opportunities for the youths
- 2. Government should give grants to host communities to build standard refineries and stop the regime of petroleum products importation in Nigeria.
- 3. The 13% derivation fund for oil producing states should be used to build refineries to create job for the youth.
- 4. Illegal allocation of oil wells to former and present political leaders for illegal bunkering should be abolished before destruction of illegal refineries start.

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