



HEIDEGGER AND THE IMPLICATION OF EVERYDAYNESS IN HUMAN EXISTENCE

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ABSTRACT

The author demonstrates how the concept of Dasein's Everydayness is articulated in Heidegger's early work *Being and Time*, contributes to understanding why self-responsibility and decision making are not obvious for man in our today's society. Heidegger's philosophical analysis of Dasein's Everydayness reveals to us why man tend to evade being the architect of his own life and get lost into "common opinion of the crowd" in the society. Thus, this paper focus on the analysis of the various aspects that define inauthentic human being and his life style.

Introduction

Heidegger's claim that *Dasein's* Being is tied to two modes of existence implies the tension that man experiences in his life. As a thrown being, my own, ordinary way of existing is already constituted irreducibly and pervasively by inauthenticity. Therefore, this paper is dedicated to the task of clarifying the "who" of *Dasein* in its everyday mode of being. Thus, we intend to recapitulate the entire structure of inauthentic being of *Dasein* which is implicitly reflected in a common world which connotes irresponsibility and refusal to commit oneself to choices in life.

Dasein and its Implication

One of the important aspects of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology in *Being and Time*, is the recovering of the original existential ways of conceiving of the phenomenon of human existence. In order to carry out this important aspect, he proposes *Dasein* as the right term. According to him, the primary objective of phenomenology of *Dasein* is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. It is through this interpretation that the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which *Dasein* itself possesses, are made known to *Dasein's* understanding of Being (Heidegger, 1962)

Dasein is a German word, which is translated in English as, Being-there. It is the formal indication of the entity that is ontologically distinguished from all other entities. (Schalow, 2010) *Dasein* becomes important because of its peculiar ontological structure

that differentiates it from other entities. By the fact that, in its very existence, the challenge and meaning of existing is an issue for it. (Schalow, 2010) In other words, *Dasein* has an understanding of Being and can raise the question of Being.

Another feature that distinguishes *Dasein* from other entities is the fact that, it is a being-in-the-world. *Dasein* finds itself in the world, but in a very different way than other entities are in it. It understands the world as a range of possibilities and it has always understood itself in terms of its possibilities. *Dasein* and the world are internally related. Heidegger says that the fact that the world is not created by *Dasein* and it is not merely a factual world that exists independently of us, we too are contributing to its creation, *Dasein's* relationship with it is significant. For him, we are neither locked up within ourselves nor do we have to step outside ourselves to meet the external world. *Dasein* as existence is always already standing out in a world. (Schalow, 2010)

Being in the world therefore, is a formal indication of *Dasein's* existence, since life is always life in a world. (Schalow, 2010) Thus, *Dasein* is an entity which is in each case I myself; it's Being is in each case mine. (Heidegger, 1962) Heidegger's description of human being as *Dasein* is an attempt to leave behind philosophical notions of the individual as subject, and more broadly, the subject-object duality of the individual and the world, that is, interior consciousness juxtaposed against an objective world outside of it. (Sherman, 2009) Thus, Heidegger states:

The essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence. Accordingly, those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. . . . So when we designate this entity with the term '*Dasein*', we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but it's Being. (Heidegger, 1962)

The phrase "*Dasein* exists" as frequently put in *Being and Time*, does not mean existence as an objective reality that applies to all entities in the world. If it could mean so, Heidegger would be saying nothing about the distinctively human way of being, but would be giving us a pure tautology. however, by the term 'exists,' Heidegger means something essential about human being as *Dasein*. Therefore, to 'exist' means the unique way in which man is: he is so that he understands himself in his being. To be in this way, that is, to exist, is according to Heidegger the 'essence' of man. (Magda, 2001) Thus, *Dasein* is a way of being human as opposed to the being of inanimate objects or non-human animals.

Dasein has no specific gender. It is neither man nor woman but it is a human being. Heidegger states that the who of *Dasein* is neuter (Heidegger, 1962) which designates the fact that *Dasein* is a gender neutral or a gender inclusive human being. Thus, the study does not hold a specific gender in reference to *Dasein*, however, all gender pronouns shall be used synonymously when we refer to *Dasein*. That is, we may refer to *Dasein* as he or she just for the sake of articulation and communication.

Everydayness of Dasein's Being

"Everydayness" is an ontological structure that characterizes *Dasein's* Being as 'Being-in-the-world.' The ontological explication of *Dasein's* self-understanding shows that the disclosure of the Being of equipment as involvement also reveals *Dasein's* own situatedness in the work-world.

The term "everydayness" (Heidegger, 1962) refers to the mode of being, the attitude toward reality, which typifies our 'normal' participation in the life-world.

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise, we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (Heidegger, 1962)

Consideration of daily life is bound to the routine and the habituation, the customary and the obligation of the society. We live unreflectively in the everyday life, easily and complacently conforming to those canons of behavior deemed suitable by popular consensus. We accept the validity and readability of habit, convention, folk wisdom. People and events seem self-evident, perfectly clear and absolutely unremarkable in their predictability. We lose the inclination to wonder, the power, as Bertrand Russell wrote, of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life. (Gareth, 1980) However, it is alongside and within this ordinary reality that those experiences which define human possibility become available to us. The life-world is the location in which we have our lives, the place in which we meet others and find ourselves through simple acts which modify the world.

The phrase, man by nature is a social being (Aristotle, 2012) is a common philosophical statement that is usually used to define the social relation of man in society. As individual being, we hold various positions in our society where we encounter one another, we talk about various social issues, be it politics, business, culture, science and technology, religious matters and all other aspects of the social sphere of our daily lives. As we encounter each other in our daily lives, we perceive and define others from different angles based on the common world experience, which is made up of fads, styles, behaviors, vernacular, and our cultural heritage, in which we automatically participate and take for granted.

These aspects of our everyday experience with others in the society capture our attention and concern. Most of the time, then, the self, which each of us is, is derived from the common understandings and possibilities which the others define for us. For example, others may define us based on the kind of music we listen to, the food we like, the clothes we buy in shops, the notions and ideas we hold about current issues, the common expressions we utilize, the activities and events in which we engage. In other words, for the most part *Dasein* unknowingly surrenders its unique individuality to these commonly defined styles of living, thinking, and communicating and defines itself by them. (Sherman, 2009)

At the heart of the analysis of this structure, we are concerned with the question, who is *Dasein* in its everydayness. Thus what we have primarily in mind in the expression 'everydayness' is a definite "how" of existence by which *Dasein* is constituted through and through 'for life'. (Heidegger, 1962)

According to Heidegger, 'everydayness' manifestly stands for that way of existing in which *Dasein* maintains itself 'every day' (Heidegger, 1962) that is, the common world of experience described above. Proximally, it signifies the way in which *Dasein* presents itself to the others in the public. By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me-those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself-those among whom one is too. (Heidegger, 1962) In this state, one is no longer himself but 'they-self'.

The 'they' or 'others' dissolves one's own *Dasein* completely into the kind of Being which disowns itself and gets lost in the world that no one is responsible for. In other words, *Dasein* is lost in the world where the "who" is not the "I self" instead, the "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the they. (Heidegger, 1962) Thus, everydayness portrays undifferentiated mode of being of human being in his daily life.

According to Heidegger, we are thrown into a world, which is full of possibilities and potentialities to discover and become what we have to be. The fact of being thrown into the world, does not mean the negative attitude of not cared being for, rather in some sense it means that we are always a product of time, place and culture within which we are born, live and die. However, within this facticity, lies freedom of choosing to embrace our thrown possibilities and transcend to our authentic being. But what happens in everydayness? We tend to evade this reality and get absorbed into the common world of experience where everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated, where our state of mind understands and interprets everything in terms of public interest. By publicness, everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed

off as something familiar and accessible to everyone. (Heidegger, 1962) Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. In this state of being, the 'they', which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday *Dasein*, is the 'nobody' to whom every *Dasein* has already surrendered itself in Being among-one-other. (Heidegger, 1962) Thus, in everydayness, *Dasein* exists inauthentically, the structure of which constitutes idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity and calculative thinking.

Everyday Discourse as Idle Talk

The subject matter of our current discussion is the public disclosure of every day's *Dasein* being together with the "they" as it is constituted by discourse and language. Discourse is a fundamental existential foundation of language which determines the two ways in which *Dasein* exists in the world; understanding and disposedness.

Discourse therefore, as an existential..., is the articulation of understandability: of existence and fellow-existence, of the significance-whole of world and of the being of beings within the world. (Magda, 2001) Speaking, hearing, listening and keeping silent, constitutes the ontological structure of discourse. The purpose of discourse is not just to exchange opinions or to speak for the sake of speaking. Rather, it stands in service of truth, that is, the unfolding of the self-revealing concealing of being. (Schalow, 2010)

When *Dasein* diverts this primary goal of discourse, it gets absorbed into what Heidegger refers to as *gerede*¹. *Gerede*, in *Being and Time*, has been translated as idle talk since it is the only translation that carries the close meaning of the term. Idle talk is the "possibility of understanding everything without previously making the matter that we talk about our own. (Schalow, 2010) This means that in idle talk, we do not find the underlying cause of what the talk is about, we are not concerned with knowing the intelligibility of things but the talk itself. Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it leaves undone. (Heidegger, 1962) Idle talk poses great obstacle in advancing human knowledge in the sense that:

What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. Idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along -a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness. And indeed this idle talk is not confined to vocal gossip, but even spreads to what we write, where it takes the form of 'scribbling'. In this latter case the gossip is not based so much upon hearsay. It feeds upon superficial reading. The average understanding of the reader will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip (Heidegger, 1962)

Idle talk poses two major problems to our existence in the world. First, idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back. (Heidegger, 1962) In idle talk, unknowingly we assume that we know everything and what we know is genuinely presented to us. Second, when *Dasein* maintains itself in idle talk, "it is-as Being-in the- world-cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships- of-Being towards the world, towards *Dasein-with*, and towards its very Being-in. Such a *Dasein* keeps floating unattached. (Heidegger, 1962) What happens to *Dasein* while in this state of being? *Dasein* has no genuine relationship to the things he encounters in his world, no ground for social relationship with others and it has lost its true self.

Idle talk, simply by omitting to discover things in themselves, is a falsification of speech in the genuine sense, whose whole function is to be discovering (Heidegger, 1962) the truth. Generally, in idle talk, one has no stand for his own idea, one takes no

¹ This German term has no exact English word of the same meaning but with many approximations, none of which hits the target clean in the center. Chatter, gossip, idle talk, groundless talk, bottomless talk, hearsay, all hover on the circumference.

responsibility, one covers up his freedom, one does not inquire, one ignores his own potentiality for being, one knows what he does not know, one rejoices in public of interpreting things. All these constitute the comfort zone of one's daily life. What *Dasein* does in idle talk ...turns away from its true self and becomes the "they-self". Out of this, it loses the meaning of discourse.

Discourse is not restricted to language, nor indeed to any system of signs or symbols. It is rather the entire domain of *Dasein*'s expressive and communicative possibilities in virtue of which things become interpretable for it, and by it, as such. Discourse is expression and communication in the broadest sense, including all our spontaneous and unsystematic means of conveying something about something to someone. (Wrathall, 2000)

Heidegger thus analyzes discourse according to its three constitutive moments: The about which of the discourse or what is talked about, what is said as such, communication and intimation. (Wrathall, 2000) Idle talk does not put these three moments into consideration, rather the outcome of the prevalence of idle talk in discourse is that the "they" frequently prescribe *Dasein*'s state of mind. In such a prescription, the "they" determines that *Dasein* should develop ungenuine relationships with beings, with other *Daseins*, to the world, and with Being. Uprooted from genuine relationships, *Dasein* refrains from and rejects thinking. It floats, unattached and uncommitted, alongside beings and the world, supposedly communicating with other *Daseins*, but in truth merely waddling with them in the sleepy bog of idle talk. (Gordon, 2001)

Dasein's 'I' and Others Relation

There is an internal tension within the structure of Being-with between *Dasein*'s Being-one's-Self and its Being-with-one-another. Overall, *Dasein* is essentially a Being-with; because its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of the others. Therefore, "knowing oneself" is grounded in Being-with, which is understood by *Dasein* primordially. Similarly, *Dasein*'s Being-I is already a Being-with. (Bambach, 1995) Whenever *Dasein* says, "I am" it also implies the understanding of the others. It reveals that *Dasein* and the others are all being-in-the-world with one another in the with-world. However, in the analytic of *Dasein*'s everydayness, Heidegger finds that it is precisely because there is always already an understanding of the others; *Dasein* does not come to an open understanding of itself. *Dasein*'s being-with is the condition that it fails to be itself.

The tension of *Dasein*'s being-one's-self and its being-with-one-another occurs in its everydayness. On the one hand, being "itself" *Dasein* has a constant care that one is different from the others. It addresses itself as an 'I', it always understands that this 'I' is not the others. On the other hand, *Dasein* in its everydayness clings to level off the distance between its own self and the others. There is a tendency of making *Dasein* an average one among the others. *Dasein*'s authentic distantiality belongs to being-with. However, it is hidden from the everydayness because every day Being-with-one another stands in subjection to others. The being of *Dasein* is taken away. In the *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger describes the phenomenon of distantiality as constant care. In its everydayness, *Dasein*'s being apart from the others is covered under the ontical obviousness of the "I". However, *Dasein* is not aware of it that this kind of Being with the Others is perhaps much more stubbornly and primordially there. (Bambach, 1995) In its own everyday involvement, it is not itself. Instead, it is always the indefinite others. The others are there as the structure of *Dasein*'s being-with which is not related to whether they are "actually" there. As taken away by the others, its everyday "who" is the "they" (das Man). It is not a particular one, but the anyone, the neuter. This "they", who is no one in 'particular' and "all", dictates the modes of Being of everyday *Dasein*.

UNDEFINED CURIOSITY

Philosophically speaking, the purpose of looking at things or seeing implies a tendency towards understanding what is seen. However, the basic state of sight, which belongs to everydayness, is concerned with the opposite of this fact. We designate it

with the term 'curiosity,' which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception. (Heidegger, 1962)

Translated from the German term *Neugier*, Heidegger defines curiosity as a tendency of seeing not in order to reach an understanding or to obtain knowledge of what is seen, but merely so as to see something. (Gordon, 2001) When one is curious, he develops a tendency of looking around merely for the sake of looking. One roams far and wide out into the world, not in order to understand things but simply to see how they look. (Magda, 2001) In other words, one has a 'greed for the new.' Thus, curiosity seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. (Heidegger, 1962)

Heidegger describes three major characteristics of curiosity. First, it does not tarry in the environment in which it expressed its concern, second, new items constantly distract it and third, it never dwells anywhere. (Gordon, 2001) The first characteristic denotes the impatience that one has when encountering things and does not give himself time to study any particular thing. The second characteristic implies that curiosity is restlessness in the sense that it is neither concerned with observing entities and marveling at them nor being amazed to the point of understanding them. A person who is curious is not interested in gaining any knowledge of things. Third, by never dwelling anywhere, Heidegger means that *Dasein's* curiosity is everywhere and nowhere, skipping from topic to topic, never attempting to find a ground for the paltry and novel knowledge that it obtains. Consequently, blended with idle talk, curiosity adds to the uprooting of *Dasein*. (Gordon, 2001)

Where Curiosity Meets Wonder

At this point, it is necessary to contrast Heidegger's curiosity with his views on wonder. In his writings, Heidegger often mentions Socrates' saying in Plato's dialogue, *Theaetetus*, that, wonder is the feeling of the philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. (Plato, 1961) While curiosity discovers nothing and offers no genuine knowledge, Heidegger quoting Aristotle argues that:

When I wonder, I often endeavor to discern what arouses my wonder with greater clarity. I may frequently strive to attain more knowledge and understanding of that which arouses my wonder. Wonder may lead to an examination of beings in the world, to a search for knowledge of the essence of a being, to the pursuit of wisdom, and, perhaps, even to addressing the question of the meaning of Being. (Gordon, 2001)

There is no such worthy knowledge or wisdom that characterizes curiosity, or accompanies it. The above three characteristics that describe curiosity prove this fact.

The world we are living today, the world of science and technology, is so tempting to the extent that people are no longer concerned with deepening self-knowledge, we rely so much on what has been said. What happens is the fact that we fear to be held responsible on what we tell others. Thus "much too often, when *Dasein* flees responsibility and commitment or genuine knowledge and understanding, it does so by engaging in idle talk or by bringing up matters that will arouse curiosity. (Gordon, 2001) Most of the time when our curiosity is aroused, especially by political matters, we tend to turn to social media or reading disguised books searching answers to various political issues, where in the process we open ourselves to indirect enticement which lead us to an illusion.

Assuming then that a person is the victim of an illusion, and that in order to communicate the truth to him the first task...is to remove the illusion, if I do not begin by deceiving him, I must begin with direct communication...but an illusion stands in the way.... What then does it mean 'to deceive'? It means that one does not begin directly

with the matter one wants to communicate, but begins by accepting the other man's illusion as good money. (Gollomb, 1995)

Therefore, as we have mentioned above, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction,' but not in the sense of 'observing entities and marveling at them,' as Heidegger remarks, and as distinguished from philosophical wonder, 'to be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest. (Tziovanis, 2015)

Many people are very curious about the love life of some major political figures; satisfying such curiosity, as many popular books and newspapers do, very rarely leads to worthy knowledge. What they do, as Heidegger puts it, lead to "restlessness" and "distraction" that has truly come into its own in the information age. Today's media pushes a tendency toward deracination', and when they provide a surfeit of information that news no longer engages us and does not have to engage us because as soon as we tire of one news story two others clamor for our attention. (Dreyfus, 2005) Thus, contemporary information and technology do not measure up to true knowledge rather their output arouses curiosity.

Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off or left undiscovered and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood or left unexplained, offer to everyday existence the guarantee for a supposed genuineness and vitality of living. (Magda, 2001) These two are described as uprooted, alienated forms of 'groundless floating' of *Dasein* Being.

Ambiguity in Public Understanding

By nature, entities are supposed to constitute a set of properties that exclude opposite or contrary properties. For instance, being white excludes being black, being tall excludes being short, being healthy excludes being sick, being close by excludes being far away, and so forth. For the case of human being, there arises situation where one cannot exclusively describe the reality in terms of one or the other of a pair of properties, like activity and passivity, or subjectivity and objectivity, but must be said to participate in both. (Michelman, 2008) In such conditions, ambiguity arises. In this case, ambiguity results from a lack of clarity or precision in linguistic expression and is considered a fault to be avoided.

Translated from the German term, *Zweideutigkeit*, ambiguity denotes that *Dasein* "encounters entities in the way that they are accessible to everyone and about which everyone can say something. (Schalow, 2010) It implies the impossibility of deciding when the being of entities is uncovered in a genuine manner and when it is described in the idle talk of the *Das man* (they-self) or the 'they'. The books, journals and newspaper we read, the news we watch and listen to, look as if they were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not so; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is.

Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves to what is accessible for use and enjoyment, it has already established itself in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and in the way *Dasein* projects itself and presents itself with possibilities. (Schalow, 2010) Thus, ambiguity in this sense:

Denotes the loss of authority in the way the world is presented to us and the fact that we no longer have to take responsibility for our views insofar as we constitute public opinion. These losses presuppose a mediated world, one that is reported, interpreted, and tendentiously presented rather than one that addresses us in its own right, and they presuppose the anonymity of modern mass society where my vote and my..... responses to a poll are taken at face value. (Dreyfus, 2005)

One can easily perceive that most politicians speak and act ambiguously. Their followers and many of their faithful listeners, however, flee from recognizing this easily discernable ambiguity. They choose to believe that the matter at hand is genuinely

spoken, hence merely needs to be genuinely grasped and genuinely understood. (Gordon, 2001)

The literal example that expresses ambiguity is presented in William Shakespeare's play *Julius Caesar*. Mark Antony presents a demagogic speech to the Romans, shortly after Brutus and his fellow conspirators murdered Caesar. The Romans refuse to perceive the ambiguity in Antony's speech, an ambiguity that members of the audience in the theater grasp immediately (act 3, scene 2). These Romans grasp Antony's speech as genuinely spoken and themselves as genuinely grasping and genuinely understanding what has happened. In truth, Shakespeare shows they grasp and understand nothing; their stupidity helps the wickedness of Antony and Octavius to triumph. (Gordon, 2001) Unfortunately, even today, it is still very common for many people to embrace ambiguity as genuinely spoken words.

The worst part of human life is that of fleeing responsibility and commitment or genuine knowledge and understanding, by engaging in idle talk or by bringing up matters that will arouse curiosity. In such responses, man resists all attempts to efface the ambiguity embedded in his existence. Leo Tolstoy in his novel, *Anna Karenina*, gives a good description of a person who refuses to accept ambiguity in his way of living. In the novel, this person has been referred to as Marshal Sviazhsky. Marshal displays his ambiguity through his great admiration to Levin, a major figure in the novel.

Sviazhsky was one of those people who always amazed Levin because their extremely logical, though never original ideas were kept in a watertight compartment and had no influence whatever on their extremely definite and stable lives, which went on quite independently and almost diametrically opposed to them. Sviazhsky was an extremely liberal person. He despised the nobility and considered the majority of noblemen to be secretly in favor of serfdom, though too cowardly to express their views openly. He considered Russia to be a doomed country, like Turkey, and the Russian government so bad that he did not think it worth his while to criticize its actions; yet he was a civil servant, a model marshal of the nobility, and when he traveled, he always wore a peaked cap with a red band and a cockade. (Tolstoy, 1961)

Tolstoy continues to describe in detail the contradictions and the ambiguity in Sviazhsky's discourse and everyday existence. Heidegger's terms help to define Sviazhsky's *Dasein*. He is uprooted, lives a life dictated by the "they," and is steeped in ambiguity. He, seemingly, does not recognize the ambiguity that is central to his being. Sviazhsky not recognizing the core of ambiguity in his existence accords with Heidegger's thinking that he already lives with ambiguity as supposedly natural to his language, discourse, and life.

Calculative Thinking

One of the great American philosophers and psychologists, Wayne Dyer, believes that who we are and who we shall be, all depends on our thinking. We are the product of our thoughts. This is commonly expressed in his saying, "as you think so you shall be." In *Being and Time*, Heidegger translates *noein* (Greek word that means thinking) not as thinking but as apprehending. In his book, *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger states two kinds of thinking; calculative and meditative thinking. While meditative thinking is mindful of Being, calculative thinking is not. In this chapter, we are concerned with calculative thinking that dominates *Dasein* in its everyday dealings with entities that lead it to be drifted apart from itself to *Das man*. Thus, for Heidegger:

Calculative thinking is the ground of modern science. Beginning with Rene Descartes, the beingness of entities was reduced to being as an object for a self-certain subject. The meaning of being becomes the representation of nature as an object to be used, manipulated, and exploited. As representations, entities become measurable. Since modern science is only concerned with measurement, it reduces the being of entities to quantity and thus makes their technological control possible. Entities are used up and reduced to a dull and indistinguishable uniformity. In this age

of science and technology, it appears to eliminate meaning and the dignity of humanity where the individuals have become nameless faces that only count as numbers. (Schalow, 2010)

The rapid industrial and technological development demands our research, planning and organization that operate on given conditions. We consider them with calculated intention of their serving specific purposes. Thus, we can count on definite results. This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates.... Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with the numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities than self-realization. Thus, it never stops, never recollects itself; it is not meditative thinking. (Heidegger, 1966)

The consequences of this kind of thinking lead to advancement of science and technology, which in turn tend to dehumanize the human person. In other words, the power concealed in modern technology determines the relation of man to that which exists. It rules the whole earth; it dictates what *Dasein* does and how it should be in order to cope with life in the world. (Heidegger, 1966)

Heidegger, just like any other existentialist, argues that the modern technology tends to turn man into tools or objects making him lose his value of being. Thus, in calculative thinking, *Dasein* does not recognize its freedom and does not care for its being; rather, it concerns itself with other entities in the world. Therefore, Heidegger is revolting against any historical events and any form of mass movement such as scientism, totalitarian and nihilism that tend to submerge the individual in a collective form denying him freedom to realize and concretize his potentiality for being.

What Heidegger is advocating for is the fact that calculative thinking should not be used as the only way of thinking; rather it should operate on the ground of meditative or conceptual thinking which first is concerned with the Being of *Dasein*, where existence becomes an issue to be investigated. In other words, Heidegger's conviction is the argument that, science and technology ought to be for the well-being of man and not vice versa. Therefore, what we are clarifying here is the dominance of calculative thinking in *Dasein's* everydayness structure of being, which has been accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking and as a result, it has drifted *Dasein* apart from its true way of being. It is out of this.....that Heidegger concludes that science does not think.

Conclusion

We conclude that inauthentic mode of being of *Dasein* in its everyday life, connotes the common world of human person where one evades his freedom on the account of fleeing responsibility and commitment opting to live along with the crowd, doing things because he sees others do them or because it is the custom of the place. This is what the four elements of everydayness: Idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity and calculative thinking have clearly revealed to us.

The four constitutive elements of everydayness that we have analyzed above have recapitulated the obstacles to self-realization and potentialities to self-actualization. Idle talk discloses to *Dasein* a being towards its world, towards others, and towards itself, a Being in which things are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way, that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from *Dasein's* understanding, but only

in order that Being-in the world should be suppressed in this uprooted everywhere and nowhere, calculative thinking turns *Dasein* concern to the world of science and technology instead of its existence. With this..., *Dasein* gets absorbed in the world of others and disowns its possibilities and potentialities of a unique individual.

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