Nuclear deterrence in Kashmir

The affections of nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in respect to the conflict in Kashmir
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1.0 Introduction

In 1998 both India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons by only a month apart. Stating their status as a nuclear power to the international community and showing each other their nuclear muscles. The relationship between India and Pakistan has had ups and downs throughout history and this is also evident in relation to the conflict in Kashmir. A conflict that grew out of the partition and that still has not been solved. Our hypothesis is therefore that nuclear weapons was a short term solution, however nuclear deterrence will not solve the conflict in the long term. The research question this paper seeks to answer is: How did the nuclear tests of 1998 change the political relationship between India and Pakistan in relation to the conflict in Kashmir?

The paper will first present our methodology and data collection, before describing the theories that have been used. After this comes a brief history of the conflict in Kashmir. India for so Pakistan's approach to becoming a nuclear weapon state is then further discussed. We continue by analyzing the relationship between the two states in relation to the conflict in Kashmir post 1998 before discussing the aspect of human security and how the conflict has been managed. We will then finish the paper by summing up our findings and making a conclusion based on our research question.

Case study is a method which analyzes the causal relations of two factors in a hypothesis. In this research we analyze the causal factors of India and Pakistan nuclear deterrence political relationship. The research will look at the Peace and Conflict Resolution discipline and apply the case of India and Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence Relationship in respect to Kashmir conflict since 1998 with a focus on conflict management. The nature of this thesis is qualitative method of research. The data we will use for this research is secondary. Secondary data is not collected by the researchers themselves, it is collected by other scholars for their objectives. Books, journals, magazines, newspapers, literature and other materials are the source of secondary data.

2.0 Theories
2.1 Deterrence theory

Deterrence according to the Oxford dictionary is “[t]he action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences”. Deterrence in international relations means one of the main strategic approaches to impact the decision making of engaged parties with respect to capabilities which one state has. It is also a trust to once strategic capability to avoid itself from the opponent attack in the context of aggressive policies. In other words, deterrence is a military or strategic tool to influence one state in its reciprocal activities (Kegley Jr. and Wittkopf 1998). A good example to these explanations was the Cuban missile crisis during the cold war era.

In this chapter the main focus will be on India’s Nuclear Deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan. India’s and Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is based on Credible Minimum Deterrence (Zahra 2000).

Escalation of war is depended on many internal and external factors which can determine further continuation with respect of causes and consequences. One of the major causes of war is through aggressive diplomacy in respect to other states as Carl Von Clausewitz (1776:24) argues that "[w]ar is the simple continuation of diplomacy by other means". To this extend nuclear deterrence can be defined according to Jeffery L. Johnson (1998:2) as “(...) a strategy of nations possessing significant nuclear arsenals for influencing the behavior of other nations, usually also possessing nuclear arsenals. More specifically it is a strategy of putting in place incentives for other nations not to engage in certain kinds of military actions, in particular not initiating a nuclear war”. Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from nuclear weapons attacks, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD).

2.2 Preponderance theory

In the history of international relations theory there is some value in the system of hegemonic stability. A study done by A.F.K Organski from the University of Michigan, concluded that balance of power politics was likely to generate instability and wars, whereas a preponderance of power in the international system was more likely to create peace (Gupta 2000). His argument regarding the conflict in Kashmir claims that
Pakistan’s wish to seize Kashmir by force have faded, although it continues to believe that a military balance with a stronger India might guarantee its existing territorial sovereignty.

2.3 Dependency theory

Dependency theory emerged during the 1960’s and 70’s, because of people starting to question the wealth distribution and development in the world (Ferraro 2008). Development theorists suggest that the international system is developed in such a manner that it prevents poor countries from developing, creating what they call underdevelopment. There are a lot of different thoughts around how the dominant countries do that, since the theory draws from world system theory, historical structural theory and neo-Marxist theory (Ferraro 2008). However, they agree that there is a hierarchy among states in the world order and that the most dominant states make it impossible for less powerful states to climb the ladder.

2.4 Balance of power

The balance of power in international relations is an old theory about how weaker states will attempt to achieve equilibrium with the stronger states. According to this, those states in power are driven by fear and ambition for their own position and thus seek to mobilize "counter-power" when leaders in other states appear to become stronger. States can increase its own capability by cooperation, in the form of alliances with other states, or by rearmament. There are disagreements regarding the idea of equilibrium, however, the analytic core of the classical balance of power theory is no predomiance (Chatterjee 1972).

2.5 Positive and negative peace

Peace studies make a distinction between what we call negative and positive peace. Negative peace is explained as an absence of direct violence and war. Positive peace is more complex and difficult to achieve, it is an absence of structural violence and injustice. In order to achieve positive peace one has to rule out the negative aspects in
the structure of a society. Johan Galtung introduced three terms to understand when talking about positive- and negative peace: direct-, structural- and cultural violence. Direct violence is visible and easy to spot while structural violence is more indirect. As explained by Barash and Webel (2009:7):

“When people starve to death, or even go hungry, a kind of violence is taking place. Similarly, when humans suffer from diseases that are preventable, denied decent education, affordable housing, opportunities to work, play, raise a family, and freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, a kind of violence is occurring.“

To put it in another way, if a child is murdered we are talking about direct violence, if a child dies of poverty it is structural violence and whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it, one call it cultural violence.

2.6 Conflict management
Conflict management is explained (Ramsbotham et al. 2011) as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conflict handling. Conflict resolution is more comprehensive and covers a more deep-rooted approach to a conflict. While conflict management is seen as a short term process where the main focus is to manage the conflict and prevent war, conflict resolution is more long term and addresses the deep-rooted issues of the conflict in order to work towards peacebuilding.

3.0 A historical context of the conflict in Kashmir
The conflict in Kashmir goes back to the partition of India and Pakistan and has still not been solved. The region of Kashmir was not directly ruled by the British, instead it was a princely state ruled by the Maharajas. The demography of the region was a minority Hindu and a majority Muslim population (Bose 2007). It was however influenced by the colonial power when it came to defense, foreign affairs and currency (Varshney 1992). When the British left India they encouraged Kashmir to take side with either India or Pakistan. The Maharajas decided to stay independent. At the same time a secular and
popular movement led by Sheikh Abdullah emerged and formed a party that was later to be called National Conference (Varshney 1992).

After the partition, Pakistani tribesmen with support from the Pakistani government attacked Kashmir (Varshney 1992). The Maharaja looked to India for help, but in order for them to get involved the Maharaja needed to accede to India (Bose 2004). The Maharaja then signed a treaty of accession with India (Bose 2004). India's prime minister at that time, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised to later hold a referendum about the future of Kashmir that he withdrew in 1956 (Varshney 1992). The Indian army, with support from the National Conference, managed to take back two thirds of the territory. After the ceasefire in 1949 Pakistan controlled one third of the territory, as is the situation today (Varshney 1992).

In the following years there were a lot of disputes about the referendum (Bose 2007). United Nations (UN) got involved to organize, but the states could not agree on the conditions and the referendum was never held. The conflict even became a part of the high politics during the cold war. The United States offered Pakistan a security alliance and the Soviet Union backed India (Varshney 1992). The UN Security Council’s member states therefore worked against each other and the dispute was in a deadlock. There were however some efforts made to find diplomatic solutions through mediation, but they were later turned down by India (Bose 2004). China's defeat over India in 1962 worsened India's position and a new war broke out between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in 1965 (Varshney 1992).

Pakistan figured that India was in a weak position and hoped to create an insurgency among Muslims living in Kashmir. There were no insurgency among the Kashmiris and India was thus able to fight back (Varshney 1992). In 1971 there was another proxy war between Pakistan and India mainly over East Pakistan, but it hurt Pakistan badly and also affected their relationship in Kashmir (Varshney 1992). Kashmiri nationalist were also weakened. India accused Pakistan of creating a proxy war, while Pakistan said that it is only morally supporting the Kashmiris (Bose 2004). At this time Abdullah was
leading the Kashmir government and he decided to make peace with India on the
grounds of gaining an autonomous status (Varshney 1992).

In 1972 an agreement referred to as the Simla Accord was signed between India and Pakistan. The agreement established the Line of Control (LoC) from the ceasefire line in 1971 (Varshney 1992). The agreement clarified that both sides needed to respect this line and avoid using threat or force in accordance with the line. In 1975 an agreement was signed between India and Abdullah (Varshney 1992). As planned in 1950, this gave Jammu and Kashmir more autonomy than any other state in India (Varshney 1992). Kashmir's relationship with India was from this point good and stable until the death of Abdullah in 1982 (Varshney 1992).

After the death of Sheikh Abdullah, his son took over power through elections. There was however some internal disputes among the parties and Islamic groups united to gain power (Varshney 1992). Previous elections included a lot of controversies (Bose 2007), and votes were also rigged in the 1987 election: "(...) reports indicate that several electoral candidates of the [Islamic group] were beaten up" (Varshney 1992:220). This led to riots and the emerging of two Kashmiri militant groups. Hizbul Mujahidden as Pakistan-Islamic friendly that wants to join Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) as a more secular group and fighting for an independent Kashmir (Varshney 1992).

India tried to stay on top of the situation by using armed forces to liberate Kashmir. Daily people were killed. The majority killed was Muslims, but also several Hindus were killed, by Indian forces and Islamic militants (Varshney 1992). The support for India had faded, and the fighting for independence became more popular again. India and Pakistan came even closer to a new war during an armed insurgency in Kashmir in 1990 (Bose 2007). This makes the 90's a very unstable period between Pakistan and India in relation to the conflict in Kashmir. This will be further discussed in the next section.
4.0 Analysis

4.1 A historical and theoretical analysis of India’s nuclear weapon program

India's nuclear program started before India's independence in 1947. One can trace India's civilian nuclear program back to an Indian physicist called Homi J. Bhabha with support of Tata Institute for Fundamental Research which opened in Bombay in 1945 (Ganguly 2000). After studying at Cambridge University in the 1930s Bhabha came back to India. He convinced India's principal industrial barons, the Tata Family, to contribute money to a center of nuclear physics. Post-independence, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru realized the importance of atomic energy research in order to build an industrial base and handle the problem of poverty. India wanted to keep the program indigenous as economic self-reliance was important after independence, however some assistance in reactor design were acquired from the UK and Canada (Ganguly 2000).

The debate regarding whether or not India “should acquire a nuclear weapon capability has been perennial ever since China tested its first atomic bomb in October 1964” (Thomas and Gupta 2000:2). Almost 10 years later, in May 1974, structural and proximate factors led to India testing its first nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert. In advance of the testing, there had been a change in Indian foreign policy from “adherence to moral principles” to a bigger focus on “imperative statecraft” (Ganguly 2000:46). The defense minister at the time, Jagjivan Ram claimed that there were few military implications caused by the test and it was described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (Ganguly 2000:47). Except France, the nuclear states clearly disrelished the test, and sanctions as less economic support and military assistance were set by the United States of America. India's political elite was surprised by the negative response of the international community, however it “(...) had a perverse and unintended consequence: it made the Indian program increasingly indigenous” (Ganguly 2000:48). In the aftermath of the first nuclear weapon test, there were great political disagreements regarding further development, however the next tests did not take place until 1998.
India's decision to go nuclear and test 5 devices at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert on 11th and 13th of May 1998 (Ganguly 2000), affected the balance of power in the South Asian region as well as in the international order. The reason for this can be explained by the previously mentioned deterrence theory, which is one of the main strategic approaches to impact the decision making of engaged parties with respect to capabilities which one state has. But first, one has to look at the reasons for India becoming a nuclear state. For instance Bhabha believed in deterrence theory and used it as an argument pro-nuclear. “With help of nuclear weapons (...) a State can acquire what we may call a position of absolute deterrence even against another having a many times greater destructive power under its control” (Ganguly 2000:41). Nonetheless, the idea of national security, deterrence- and the balance of power theory are all highly relevant in order to explain why India decided to become a nuclear weapon state.

Advocates for nuclear technology claimed that the nuclear weapons and energy would contribute to domestic strength and economic growth. In addition, there has been a conception stating that India gaining nuclear technology and further development of nuclear weapons would result in improvement and modernizing the country. Even Nehru, who publicly opposed nuclear weapons, “(...)saw nuclear power, in its peaceful capacity, as providing India the ability to leapfrog many technologies” (Cohen 2000:15). New technologies meant economic growth in the sense that it would open the possibility of developing industries. Nevertheless, The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), perceived nuclear as a symbol for something much more than just a military device. The Hindu nationalist party was convinced that India possessing nuclear power, marked great accomplishment for the Indian culture (Cohen 2000). Some of the secular nationalists also saw nuclear weapons as a tool to demonstrate Indian civilizational superiority (Cohen 2000).

Sumit Ganguly's article from 2000, “Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998”, presents three arguments explicating why India tested nuclear devices. One of them
includes the Indian government's strive for status and prestige in the international system, which can be interpreted by the balance of power theory. India accessing nuclear technology was an attempt to achieve equilibrium with the Pakistan-China alliance. The importance of equilibrium escalates in regards to the Kashmir conflict, as it is a power struggle between India and Pakistan. For the BJP, who were pro-nuclear weapon, the question of India's state security was much more relevant than the human security aspect of the people living in Kashmir. The aspects of state security and human security will be discussed later in the paper.

The second explanation builds on an understanding that the Indian bureaucratic-scientific and technological momentum reached a climax in the nuclear tests of 1998. Ganguly (2000) argues that this explanation is incomplete and misleading because even if leaders of India's Atomic Energy Commission had large influence on the nuclear decision, the political authority make final decisions independent of what scientific leaders can offer (Ganguly 2000). The third argument however, concerns the BJP’s wish for a strong and muscular Indian state. Once again one can draw lines to the balance of power theory and search for hegemony which will naturally create equilibrium, according to Partha Chatterjee (1972). Even though the mentioned classical balance theory itself is an indefinite, ambiguous description of how a system is supposed to function, the theory's analytic core is an idea of no predominance (Chatterjee 1972).

Supplementing the three main arguments, Sumit Ganguly (2000) presents political aspects that influenced the decision of India going nuclear. “Some Indian advocates of nuclearization have always seen nuclear weapons in terms of realpolitik. In a world based on self-help, nuclear weapons were both a mark of a nation's greatness and an instrument of power because of their deterrent effect” (Cohen 2000:19). Moreover, alternative explanations are security dilemma in regards to China and Pakistan's military capabilities and threatening behavior, India’s political choices reacting to Chinese and Pakistani threats and foreign assistance.
Over the years, Indians increasingly perceived nuclear weapons as a symbol of national power. “As we shall see, their ranks were swelled by the diplomacy surrounding the extension of the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the passage of the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty], which were effectively portrayed as treaties that would forever keep India as a second-rate state.” (Ganguly, 2000:20) The reason for this is India's approach to nuclear weapons as an attempt to dismiss the status of being inferior in regards to political- and military power in the international community.

According to the United Nation, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was meant to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and weapons. “[I]n November 1965, the UN political committee adopted a resolution detailing the guidelines for a treaty on nuclear nonproliferation” (Ganguly 2000:43). The NPT included specified, mutual responsibilities of nuclear- and non-nuclear powers. For instance, in return for signing an agreement stating that countries without nuclear weapons would not develop or obtain them, it provided non-nuclear states access to peaceful nuclear technology. In other words, “the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (Thomas 2004:2) Furthermore, the NPT was profiled as a first step against total nuclear disarmament. However, India did not support the agreement and India's refusal to sign the NPT is an act against dependence theory, because India will not let the most powerful nations, in this case the legal nuclear states, control their nuclear policy.

In regards to the CTBT, India were initially supporting the treaty, but had three objections to the negotiations. They wanted a “time bound plan for universal nuclear disarmament”, were against “entry into force” and “the treaty's allowance of computer simulations of nuclear tests and hydro-nuclear tests” (Ganguly 2000:54). For India, both the NPT and the CTBT are examples of dependence theory in international relations. Signing the treaties would mean that India accepted the initial balance of power as the
legal nuclear states are represented in the UN Security Council and therefore were willing to sign treaties on the nuclear state’s terms without challenging the world order.

4.2 A historical and theoretical analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program

“It is a question of hours not days for Pakistan to carry nuclear tests”

Abdul Qadeer Khan

According to neo realism territorial security is very important (Nizamani 2001), and it explains the crucial role of state centric approach to security studies. It also explains different understandings in respect of state’s political, economic and mainly their military relationships at the contemporary age of nuclear developing states. In realpolitik balance of power is a necessary tool for a state to survive in today’s anarchical society of states (Bull 1977). This elaborates the formation of increasing military buildups, alliances, arms race and in general maintaining the symbiotic relationship with respect to the concerned state or states in the international system. To this regards, according to Organski’s preponderance thesis in the international relations the Kashmir conflict would not be escalated if there would be larger military capabilities in the region by India (Zahra 2000). To keep this theoretical explanations in mind the question is, why did Pakistan decide to become a nuclear state and what were the consequences?

Farah Zahra (2000) argues that Pakistan’s nuclear program has a symbiotic relationship with India’s nuclear policy. This was an effort to balance the conventional military capabilities at different levels regarding to different periodic conflicts that happened with India in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Historical wars between India and Pakistan had huge impact on their security policies, and this can be explained by a thesis stating that “[w]ar made the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1975:42).
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1956 to join the Atomic Peace Program which had been launched by the United States of America president Eisenhower. The U.S. had given $350,000 grant for Pakistan’s research reactor and two years later the grant was implemented (Shahid 2016). This was the first approach to Pakistan’s establishment of a nuclear program after post-independence in 1947 from the British and the separation from India. The grant which had been approved by the U.S. was for scientific research purposes of nuclear technology and its civilian utilization. Expansion for research on reactors sparked to verse Pakistan’s nuclear program. The spread of nuclear technology was carried by Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission by the beginning of 1965 (Shahid 2016). In addition to the U.S., there were also Pakistani key characters in the development of the nuclear weapons program.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a pro-nuclear program leader of Pakistan. He served as president from 1971-1973 and during 1973-1977 he was Pakistan’s prime minister. Bhutto was also holding high level positions before this; in 1963 he became the foreign minister and later served as the minister of fuel, power and natural resources (Nizamani 2001). China had tested its nuclear weapons in 1964. This changed the regional balance of power with respect to China’s good political relationship with Pakistan and maintained a contested relationship to India after the war in 1962 (Albrigh 1998). Bhutto a nationalist leader, decided to appoint Munir Ahmed Khan in 1972 as chairman of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission. He asked him to make the bomb ready till 1976 (Shahid 2016), and Bhutto strongly stood on his argument, having a nuclear weapon Pakistan.

Two principle reasons boosted the Pakistan’s nuclear program, 1971 war with India and the 1974 India’s nuclear device test (Shahid 2016). Two characters in two different levels had played crucial role, one was the political leader named Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the other was a scientist known as Abdul Qadeer Khan (Nizamani 2001). Khan had brought the knowledge of gas centrifuge from URENCO, a uranium plant in Netherland, when he was there in 1975. Today he is known as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In a short period of time the Khan research laboratory and Atomic
Energy Commission of Pakistan reached to the weapon-grade uranium production in 1985 (Shahid 2016).

It will not be without relevance that the U.S. always tried to limit the spread of nuclear capability to Pakistan through treaties such as the NPT and later the CTPT. In the first stage a good example of this is Henry Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan in 1976 with the clear message that Pakistan would face horrible consequences if it chose to conduct its nuclear test. The other phase of pressure was about the 1986 Pressler amendment “which conditioned U.S. aid to Pakistan on a presidential certification that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons” (Zahra 2000:148). The other statement by prime minister Sharif says that “the United States had been discriminating against Pakistan on the basis of religion, arguing that the U.S. government had “ignored” India’s nuclear activities and sanctioned Pakistan’s because “we are an Islamic country” (Zahra 2000:148). This was the strong stand to gain Islamic countries support against any types of political attacks and embargoes (Zahra 2000).

Nuclear weapons also had an economic impact on Pakistan. The country was facing huge balance of payment crises. In 1998 Pakistan’s fragile economy was mainly dependent on funds from international institutions and the United States (Zahra 2000). Different reasons had been the fragile economic vital force, like involvement in wars with India (1965 and 1971). Also separation of East Pakistan in 1971 affected Pakistan to suffer from a huge economic backlash. In May 30th 1998 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon tests had become a reality after the Indian tests of 11th and 13th of May the same year. New phase of economic challenges was threatening Pakistan from the international institutions mainly World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank (Zahra 2000). Immediately sanctions had been implemented on Pakistan after the tests. Despite the fact that Pakistan became a nuclear state, the sanctions did not continue for a long period. Nearly one year later the U.S. decided to support nuclear Pakistan (Zahra 2000).

There were many arguments why the United State restarted its aids to Pakistan. In 1999 the U.S. approved a package that was about 1.69$ billion to support structural adjustment and trade liberalization efforts. Another aid package was given by the IMF,
at the same time the World Bank also had released 350$ millions (Zahra 2000). The reasons why the United States changed its aid policy in regard to Pakistan had been argued by many authors and military strategist like Farah Zahra (2000), Amit Gupta (2000) and Haider K. Nizamani (2001). They have different approaches to analyze why the U.S. helped Pakistan after it had achieved nuclear weapons, mainly focusing on three core important reasons:

“(1) In the face of severe economic difficulties, Pakistan might be tempted to sharing its sensitive nuclear technology and information with Islamic states or even rogue states like North Korea. (2) Pakistan was a moderate Islamic country; chaos in Pakistan could in fact affect neighboring Islamic states and the Middle East. (3) An economic breakdown in Pakistan could have a domino effect on India.” (Zahra 2000:150)

Economic backlash and understanding of aid policy help to analyze the conflict in Kashmir. Situation of difficult economic crisis and tensions in Kashmir may cause major conflict between two nuclear weapon states. Escalation of further major conflict in the region would cause larger nuclear weapon crisis with its massive destructions capacity. Despite the fact of nuclear weapon’s destruction capacity, it would be a right time to see the people’s perceptions in Pakistan, through conflict management lenses and escalation of violent conflict in larger scale. Future of such threats will result in massive damage of living species and huge environmental crises (Dably 1992).

Pakistan’s people have been traditionally supportive of having a nuclear weapon policy. There was massive public demand for having a Pakistan with nuclear weapons to create balance of power vis-à-vis India’s nuclear capacity (Zahra 2000). The Joan B. Kroc institute of the University of Notre Dame sponsored a survey regarding public opinion on nuclear weapon capacity. The survey’s result before India’s detonation said 61 percent of the elite in Pakistan wanted to have the same policy as India under Nehru’s administration “the option open”, where 32 percent favored building the nuclear weapon capability. In aftermath of India’s test, 73 percent in the public survey favored Pakistan’s weaponization. A Gallup Poll publication that was published the day before
Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons explained that 70 percent of the urban population agreed with the test. Moreover, just 30 percent favored restrain and 80 percent said that there was a high possibility of war between India and Pakistan.

With achievement of nuclear capability this brought India and Pakistan in the stage of gaining higher status in regional and global level according to preponderance theory. This is shown by the test of Agni 2 with the 2500 kilometers range in India and Ghauri 2/Hatf 6 with a 200-2300 kilometer range in Pakistan. Ben Sheppard (2000) argued that there will be more instability in South Asia in the era of nuclear weapons. Witnessing the enhancement of new advanced weapons in both the states can be analyzed by different international relations theories.

According to Neo-realist theory, territorial security becomes the key objective of nation states in international system based on the survival. Therefore every state pursues deterrence policies in different circumstances. In other understandings of realism, war means battle between or among the great power or powers and peace is the absence of this type of war. Security for realism is as “the protection of the homeland from military attack” (Nizamani 2001:5). In this context one now looks to the conflict in Kashmir which is based upon multi-dimensional and complex causes. New tensions after the 1998 tests would follow with breakout of military and strategic balance of power. Deterrence is a means to prevent attack from others by frightening them.

Although the conflict existed in Kashmir post 1998, there was not any major conventional war between India and Pakistan because of the nuclear deterrence (Thomas and Gupta 2000). On the other hand, Waltz argues that “Nuclear weapons makes deterrence transparent” (Nizamani 2001:5), because one “is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated” (Nizamani 2001:5). In his further explanations the use of force between two nuclear weapon states is only for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of conflict instead of winning the war. That is why this makes the nuclear deterrence more stable and transparent for the prevention of large scale conflict.
David Hagerty critically examined the dynamic of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and he concluded that “the presence of the nuclear factor has prevented interstate war between the two countries” (Nizamani 2001:6). On the other hand Kenneth Waltz favors the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, as well as the third world countries based on the historical evidence analysis. In such a space, small scale conflict like terrorism, insurgency and extremist group will replace the large scale conflict (Nizamani 2001). According to conflict management, since 1998 there has been no major interested wars between India and Pakistan, a reason for this is nuclear deterrence in the region. There have however been some tensions in relation to the conflict in Kashmir that will be further discussed in the next section.

### 4.3 India and Pakistan relation post 1998

It has already been argued that India and Pakistan’s relationship have been complicated up until the tests of nuclear weapons in 1998. Also the testing and what led to both countries obtain nuclear weapons shows that their focus on national security and importance of not giving in to the other country's demand have contributed to a still ongoing debate about the two-nation theory. In this section, the India-Pakistan relationship after 1998 will be analyzed in relation to Kashmir.

Since the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, India has had the upper hand. Gaining nuclear weapons gave Pakistan the leverage to balance the power vis-a-vis India, due to previously feeling weaker than India's conventional military capabilities and their unhappiness with the division of Kashmir (Kapur 2009). In 1999 Pakistan invaded the Line of Control, 28 years since the last time India and Pakistan fought a war against each other. The tension between the states was high since both of them now also had nuclear weapons.

Kapur (2009) argues that gaining nuclear weapons was an important factor for Pakistan invading the LoC. Additionally he also claims that nuclear weapons deterred India from an all-out conventional war and that it sends a message to the rest of the world about the seriousness of the conflict. At the same time he points out that India claimed it
abstained from crossing the line because of concern for the opinion of the international community (Kapur 2009). This shows India’s focus on power and obtaining a higher status in the world order, making both the balance of power and dependency theory relevant in this case.

Rajesh M. Basrur (2009:337) argues that "[n]uclear rivals invariably avoid not only nuclear conflict, but major conventional war as well." This means that Pakistan would have chosen to avoid invading the LoC in 1999 due to fear of an outbreak of a full conventional war. Later on Basrur continues to point out the difference between strategists and policy makers. Words like ‘second-strike capability’, ‘survivability’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘credibility’ (Basrur 2009:338) has a strategical meaning when it comes to building up arms in no-war situations, but will not count for decision makers once nuclear conflict breaks out. Strategic thinkers therefore ignore "that conventional war is not a reasonable option between nuclear-armed states" (Basrur 2009:338).

Different strategic approaches are relevant in regards to Pakistan’s position on the invasion in 1999. Important politicians in Pakistan, like former Pakistani leader Nawaz Sharif, fought hard to change the situation in Kashmir (Behurial 2009). His work mainly focused on achieving better diplomatic relationship with India and support from Washington DC. He was however very unpopular and opposed by other politicians. Ashok K. Behurial (2009) argues that disagreement among the highest ranks of politicians in Pakistan led to the Pakistani army creating their own policy on the Kashmir issue and launching the invasion, thereafter they blamed it on Sharif.

Army chief Pervez Musharraf took control over the country after the assassination of Nawaz Sharif (Behurial 2009). The new president engaged in talks with India for several reasons, some of them due to sanctions and pressure from the U.S.. After the terror attack on the U.S. September 11th, the U.S. put even more pressure on Pakistan to join them in the war against terror and they did (Behurial 2009). This again shows that Pakistan is dependent on support from the international community, mainly the U.S.. Nevertheless this did not work out as planned since the talks were unsuccessful and because of attacks on India in 2001 and 2002.
In December 2001 Pakistan-backed militants attacked the Indian parliament (Kapur 2009). The two groups carrying out the attack were later banned by president Musharraf, partly due to India’s demands on Pakistan reducing terror and militant attacks. India also launched operation Parakram, stationing 500 000 troops along the LoC and the international border (Kapur 2009). In May 2002 the tension became even higher as terrorists killed 32 people at an Indian army camp. The U.S. intervened and promised to end military infiltration all together. India accepted this and withdrew their forces (Kapur 2009).

The mentioned attacks are much like the one in 1999. According to Kapur (2009:396) nuclear weapons "helped facilitate the confrontation and played only a limited role in resolving it." He also states that one should not exaggerate the impact nuclear weapons have had on the dispute between India and Pakistan in relation to Kashmir. Gaining nuclear weapons might have boosted Pakistan’s confidence in the dispute, forcing India to response to the nuclear leveraged threat with another approach than before. Basrur (2009) points out that states have to engage in cold wars because they cannot afford to stay out of it. This again means that India and Pakistan have to continue their relations with nuclear threats in mind as long as they possess nuclear weapons.

Since 2003 until recently there have not been any large scale armed conflict between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. However, there have been several attacks on civilians and security forces in both sides by terrorist organizations, in addition to violent uprisings carried out mainly by the people of Kashmir. Nevertheless, violence in Kashmir has decreased and talks between India and Pakistan have taken place (Kapur 2009). Kapur does however argue that the changes have not been that huge and this is not merely a result of nuclear deterrence. There is more stability between Pakistan and India in regards to Kashmir because the focuses have shifted. Pakistan is dependent on the U.S. and therefore they are pressured to support the war on terror. India on the other hand, is focusing more on internal issues, like economic growth and preventing terrorist attacks in other regions (Kapur 2009). All of this illustrates that both states are concerned about their status in the world order and the balance of power. Even if
nuclear deterrence is not the only reason for change in their relationship, a more stable Kashmir indicates that violence is reduced and a full conventional war is avoided.

Even if the violence might have been reduced over the years, the conflict has not been solved. This is evident with the violent clashes along the LoC between India and Pakistan's security forces earlier this year (FN förbundet 2016). In fact, on September 29th 2016, India conducted its first military attack across the Line of Control (LoC) since 1972. There has been rising tension between Pakistan and India in regards to Kashmir and the international media reports “(...) bloody clashes across the “line of control”” (Safi 2016:1). The ongoing conflict puts the ceasefire from 2003 in an unstable situation and interpret that nuclear deterrence is no long term solution to achieve peace. Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, might use a new weapon as the conflict continues, namely the water in the rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. “Walking away from the major river sharing agreement will harm Pakistan tremendously as the three rivers provide water to 65% of Pakistan's land mass.” (Boone and Safi 2016:1).

4.4 Human security vs. state security

Human security is explained by Commission on Human Security (CHS) as below:

“Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (Commission on Human Security 2003:4)

In the case of Kashmir, human security is not much considered. Both India and Pakistan focus their security on the state level, with securing of borders and military (Bose 2005).
State security focus on threats directed against the state (Commission on Human Security 2003). Security forces from India and Pakistan direct their focus on protecting territory and keeping control over the parts of Kashmir they have claimed. Bose (2005) talks about the Kashmiris in the war zone, and states that almost all the 6-7 million people who live there have experienced at least some form of abuse or humiliation by the military and law enforcements. With poor living conditions, the citizens have built up resentment towards their occupying forces. This has led to many civilians taking up arms. Bose (2004:333) writes that “Pakistan and India has been dealing with the two halves of Kashmir under their respective control like colonial masters. Their efforts to create pro-India and pro-Pakistan Kashmiris have fractured the civil society of Kashmir.” This makes a divide between the Kashmiri people and pushing them to find a standpoint in the conflict. This has again made Kashmiris wanting different outcomes of the conflict. With a population of such diversity, it proves difficult to find a solution that works for everyone (Bose 2005).

Like previously mentioned, nuclear deterrence builds on the theory that deterrence puts an end to conventional warfare. However, in this case there are still relatively small-scale conflicts going on in Kashmir. In the aspect of human- and state security one could argue that the deterrence makes the situation no better than it would have been in the case of a conventional war. Another argument is that it may have even prolonged the conflict (Rajain 2005). To explain, neither parties have used all of their capacity for warfare. The protraction of conflict might be followed by nuclear war in the region. With this in mind, it is more understandable that an end to conflict through negotiations is difficult. At the same time, the alternative is no less desirable. In case of nuclear war breaking out, one guarantee is that both India and Pakistan will suffer great casualties and destruction.

The alternative to negotiations is the continuation of violence and war. Bose (2005) claims that a continuation of this violence and bloodshed will ultimately have to end with a solution through talks, so it is better to start the dialogue now to prevent further bloodshed. The main issue is that both countries are affected by their attitude towards each other. The conflict has been going on for so many years that the state has created
an image of the “other”. Examples are seen in the way newspapers write about the incidents, how schools educate children when it comes to history of the conflict and education in general. These things help prolonging the conflict and building an unhealthy attitude towards each other.

In order to change the conflict one has to work towards changing attitudes. When speaking of conflict management Galtung’s triangle proves relevant. He speaks of a link between attitude, behavior, contradiction and violence (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). He argues that to end direct violence one has to change conflict behavior. To end structural violence one has to remove structural contradictions, and injustices and cultural violence can be eliminated by changing people's attitude towards each other (Ramsbotham et al. 2011).

An argument is that nuclear deterrence has changed conflict behavior. Meaning a decrease in conventional warfare and direct violence. There might have been even more direct violence without the deterrence, however, the structural and cultural violence remains deep-rooted (Bose 2005). Galtung claims that to end structural violence, structural contradictions and injustices has to be removed. In the case of Kashmir the contradictions means the lack of willingness to make compromises. Koithara (2004:263) writes that “[b]oth compromise and creative solutions are needed to bridge the wide gaps existing today on positions and perceptions”. India and Pakistan needs to realize that ending the conflict in Kashmir cannot have the same outcomes that both states originally wanted (Koithara 2004).

Attitudes towards each other are becoming better with civilian and military Confidence building measures (CBMs). An example is the creation of a bus-link between India controlled Kashmir and Pakistan controlled Kashmir in 2005. The making of this bus-link made soldiers work together in repairing the road. The same soldiers who previously had fired bullets at each other were now exchanging pleasantries, greeting each other and cooperating towards a shared goal (Bose 2007). It is crucial to continue this to alter people’s perception and attitudes towards each other. Continuing with
opening possibilities for trade, travel, interaction through sports and cultural events is important in working towards peace.

“The increasing demand on both sides of the border for lifting the ban on India-Pakistan trade, the growing viewership of Pakistan television in India and Indian satellite television channels in Pakistan, the lengthening queue of people seeking visas outside the embassies of India and Pakistan and the starting of a bus service between Lahore and Delhi are indications of the fact that the peoples of India and Pakistan want and need peace” (Bose 2004:330).

Further, the absence of major war led to the states cooperation, co-existence and making CBMs; “CBMs are essentially designed to increase understanding by reducing suspicions” (Badrul 2010:43). CBMs can further be catalogued into provisions enabling information exchange, mutual access to observation or arrangements to handle incidents and crises (UN 1982). CBMs are an important factor in conflict management, especially in a conflict where stereotypes and fear dominate the relationship. The importance of building a relationship with understanding each other should not be underestimated.

There are several examples of CBMs created between India and Pakistan due to nuclearization in relation to the conflict in Kashmir. First of all the Lahore Agreement built up memorandum of understanding to gain “meaningful arms control measure” (Badrul 2010:46). A type of CBMs which helps two countries control arms race through cooperation. India’s nuclear weapon doctrine is based on credible minimum deterrence according to India’s Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 (Zahra 2000). Minimum deterrence means that “the possession of sufficient nuclear weapons inflict grievous harm on the enemy in retaliation and no more” (Zahra 2000:155). The Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, minimum credible deterrence, is the same as India in nature. The national security board of India which released a draft of India’s nuclear doctrine states there is “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons. In contrast to India, Pakistan decided to go against the “no-first-use” policy of nuclear weapons.
In addition to the mentioned agreements, there are officially seventeen more CBMs (Zahra 2000). These work at different levels and are created to ease cooperation between the two countries. In addition to the bus-links there has been established a direct hotline between India and Pakistan’s prime ministers. Moreover, there are “(...) a dedicated communication link (DCL) between Pakistani and Indian director general of military operations (DGMOs) to share information in case of an accidental war” (Farah 2000:158-159). India and Pakistan have reached an agreement on several “measures to create transparency” (Zahra 2000:159). Another CBM also focused on “(...) the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities, and Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons” (Zahra 2000:159).

The Pakistan foreign secretary Ahmed said in 1998 that Pakistan proposed CBMs “which will signify our commitment to the reduction of tension, nonuse of the force and peaceful settlement of disputes” (Zahra 2000:159). For further understanding of the concept, there are two types of CBMs. The first one is military CBMs which is used for better communication and trust building for the military purposes to reduce tension (Badrul 2010). The second one is non-military CBMs that explains collaboration in the science and technology, creation of dialogue on art and culture, commerce and trade, free movement of peoples in both side and building trust. CBMs will establish formal recognition by both states that military is not the solution to the Kashmir dispute, encouraging and initiating intra-Kashmir dialogue on both sides of the LoC for the conflict and involving the Kashmir people to bilateral dialogue between both sides (Badrul 2010).

Since independence, India wanted to integrate Jammu and Kashmir as a part of its union. On the other hand, Pakistan’s approach was mainly to determine independency for Jammu and Kashmir (Badrul 2010). According to conflict management theories, tensions will escalate to further conflict if root causes will not be addressed in the beginning. Nuclear deterrence pushed India and Pakistan to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Measure (NRRM). This will enhance data sharing and exchanging of information in regards to official agreements, treaties and provisions on nuclear
weapon. This will also guide parties to bilateral cooperation, trust building and prevent miscalculations (Badrul 2010).

All these measures will not have comprehensive implementation through strategic security analysis in contemporary situations until and unless people of Kashmir will be included in a peace process (Badrul 2010). The inclusion policy will be very comprehensive in the context of peace and conflict studies, to give people of Kashmir the chance to decide their own future. The tension between both states in relation to the conflict in Kashmir has a higher risk of violent escalation if the public is not included. This can be avoided by full political will in different layers by India and Pakistan. Conflict will be resolved in Kashmir through peaceful means and methods as a sustainable peace process (Badrul 2010).

5.0 Conclusion

Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program has a symbiotic relationship with India's nuclear program. India's decision to go nuclear was a result of external threats from China and Pakistan, and Pakistan answered by testing their own nuclear device within a month after India's test in 1998. However, there are important factors that separate their nuclear programs. For instance, Pakistan had a fragile economy with balance of payment crisis and received support from external actors in order to develop a peaceful nuclear program. India, on the other hand, wanted to keep their program indigenous as economic self-reliance was important after independence. Moreover, the U.S. decided to support nuclear weapon Pakistan, but India did not feel like they received the same support from outsiders. For instance, Indians interpreted the NPT and CTBT as treaties to keep India inferior in the international community. However, Pakistan was also against the NPT and the CTBT and both refused to sign the treaties. Another similarity is the public support of the nuclear programs within the countries. Surveys show the Indian and Pakistani population increasingly perceived nuclear weapons as a symbol of national power.
The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 changed their approach towards each other in regards to the conflict in Kashmir. By becoming a nuclear weapon state one cannot avoid a cold war and one have to take that aspect of their political relationship into consideration during emerging crises. It might have led both states to take higher risks in confrontations with each other in Kashmir, and stopped both from escalating the conflicts in 1999, 2001 and 2002. At the same time one must not exaggerate the impact nuclear weapons have had. Pakistan's economic dependency on the U.S. and the international community, and India trying to gain a higher rank in the world order led to targeting internal issues that contributed to a shift in their focus towards Kashmir. Changes in the Kashmiris public opinion and the fight for independence have therefore brought in a another aspect to the conflict. This shows clearly that the conflict have not been solved, but made even more complex.

Even though both states have a state-centric approach to the conflict in Kashmir the focus is slowly shifting from a state-security to a human security approach by establishing CBMs. An argument has been that deterrence has led to a decrease in direct violence. However, structural and cultural violence are still existing factors. To change this, and change the course of the conflict CBMs are crucial. Already there is a change in attitudes and structural contradictions. The Kashmiris are slowly becoming more visible in the conflict and showing that they have their own wishes and demands. This is necessary in order for peace to be a possibility. In relation to Pakistan and India on the human level, the deterrence might be better than a conventional war in the short term. Less focus on the state security, more on human security would help the peacebuilding process. At the same time, consideration to Kashmiri citizens and humanizing each other is important. Positive peace is not reachable unless all parties make compromises and changes their attitude towards each other. One can achieve this through civilian and military CBMs like education, interaction and hotlines.

This paper has tried to answer the question of how the nuclear tests of 1998 have changed the political relationship between India and Pakistan in relation to the conflict in Kashmir. The thesis was that gaining nuclear weapons was a short term solution and that nuclear deterrence will not solve the conflict in the long term. By looking at the
tensions in the aftermath of the 1998 tests and the shift in India's and Pakistan's political focus, it has been concluded that the relationship has changed, however this is not only due to nuclear weapons. Other factors like international dependence, world order ranking and internal issues also play an important part. In addition the paper discussed that nuclear deterrence might be as bad as conventional war and that it might have even prolonged the conflict. With both states now possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles that are more dangerous, contributes to creating an unstable region. All of this shows that the conflict have not been solved and that the Kashmiri’s fight towards independence is stuck between India and Pakistan's political nuclear disputes.

There is however more that can be added to this research. Our work has been limited in both resources and time. We were not able to do any interviews or field work and had to rely only on secondary data. Moreover, the data available is mostly from Indian authors. This can affect the content of the paper, even if we tried to stay as objective as possible. Our research also cover a big topic that require a lot of time, and therefore we have had to shorten down the focus of our paper so that it would fit into the course and the word count that we were given. This means for example that we have excluded the discussion about religion, independence movement and did not go into depth about insurgencies and terrorism in Kashmir. There is still more that can and should be done in this field. That fact that the conflict in Kashmir has not been solved yet, India and Pakistan being illegal nuclear weapons states and still have a complex political relationship shows that this is important to look further into.
6.0 Bibliography


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