



Self-determination and creation of Somaliland national identity: a sociological analysis of school textbooks

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Abstract

Somaliland is considered the northern region of the prior Somali Republic, formed from the British Protectorate and the Current Republic of Somaliland and which united with Southern Somalia on July 1, 1960. Following political misunderstandings and grievances, Somaliland declared its right to self-determination and remained a de facto state since 1991 following the collapse of the Somali military regime. Since then, Somaliland has achieved progress toward reconciliation, peacebuilding, state-building, and election democratization. However, creating a discrete Somaliland national identity remains a significant obstacle to overcome. For such an obstacle, nations utilize one of the official education goals—preparation of citizenship and training in a political ideology. Therefore, this paper analyzes how Somaliland uses its school textbooks on self-determination and creating a national identity separate from other Somalis with homogenous characteristics. The author employed content analysis based on factors that shape national identity in the school textbooks, and then sociological analysis, particularly Merton's Typology of Deviance, was used. The school textbooks with the contents of Somaliland's national identity were social science for standard five, form two geography and form four history. The article argues contradiction of national identity in school textbooks remains consequential. The clan lineage claim for the Somaliland national identity in school textbooks ignites paradoxes in creating Somaliland's national identity by allowing some clans beyond the Somaliland borders to claim the national identity, excluding other inhabitants, and putting ambiguity on other clans. The contradictions pave the way for consequences on citizens' general acceptance of national identity, which Somaliland should resolve.

Keywords: *Somaliland, Self-determination, Textbooks, National Identity, Somalia.*

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1. Introduction

With interests in the Red Sea, the British Colony founded Somaliland as the British Protectorate in the Horn of Africa during the late 1890s. Somaliland had its local administration in the late 1950s and took its independence from the British Colony on June 26, 1960. After gaining independence, it united with Somalia, which took its independence from the Italian Colony on July 1, 1960 and formed the Somali Republic. The union aimed to seek a greater Somalia—a nation-state where all Somalis unite and prosper. However, this goal was not achieved because three Somali regions—the Somali region in Ethiopia and Northern Frontier District in Kenya did not manage to gain independence.

In contrast, Djibouti gained independence in 1977 but opted to be a separate republic. The grievances and mistrust between the two sides had been relevant inside the Somali republic for 30 years. The mistrust and grievance were the back stone of the fierce civil war that shortened the life of the military government, which collapsed in 1991. The military regime tried to annihilate the armed opposition forces and allegedly committed atrocities against the rebel groups and clans.

Following the fall of the military regime in 1991, the traditional leaders of Somaliland gathered, discussed, and declared the self-determination of Somaliland as a separate state from Somalia on May 18, 1991. Thus, in the last three decades, Somaliland has taken various steps toward peace, reconciliation, state-building, and democratic elections. It formed one of the most peaceful environments in the Horn of Africa. However, Somaliland stands as an internationally unrecognized country. Nevertheless, Taiwan, which shares the same fate as Somaliland, is the only recognized state.

Education is a critical tool for achieving national interests. Political leaders have often used state education systems as a nation-building tool, using school curricula to shape citizens' national identity to be consistent with their long-term political goals (Chai, 2015). The existence of national identity is obtained through education (Mahdavi & Piltan, 2009). The social system of education is considered a unique sub-system that has adequate power on recognition, affection, and social behavior of the students; this important factor mainly takes place in the social atmosphere known as a school with the help of the process of becoming sociable (Mahdavi & Piltan, 2009). Indeed, one of the most effective tools in schools is the textbooks which facilitate the creation of relationships that contribute to the national identity creation process. Textbooks can change, shape, and affect the formation of identity (Köroğlu & Elban, 2020). The literature shows that most countries utilize school

textbooks as one way to shape the citizen's national identity ((Chai, 2015; Köroğlu & Elban, 2020; Lee, 2010; Vural & Özuyanık, 2008; Williams, 2014; Zhao, 2014).

Somaliland strives to prepare its citizenship, national identity, and political ideology in school textbooks. Consequently, self-determination and Somaliland's national identity are critical narratives of education in Somaliland. This paper intends to analyze the narratives in Somaliland school textbooks about its self-determination and creation of a unique national identity. Thus, textbooks identified with a such themes were social studies for grade five students, form two geography and form four history.

2. Methodology

The sample of this study was the textbooks that encompass contents related to the factors that are the basis of national identity. Factors that shape identity include ethnic origins, geographical location, language, nationalism, leading nationalist figures, and political organizations. The textbooks that fall under the criteria were social science for standard five, geography for form two, and history for form four secondary school.

The data was collected from textbooks through reading and comprehension using content analysis. According to Krippendorff (2018), content analysis is "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use." Thus, a predefined and interactive set of categories contributing to creating national identity were defined and later reviewed about contents within the textbooks. After reviewing the contents within textbooks, deeper conceptual content analysis was employed to analyze the contents of textbooks related to the creation of national identity.

Conceptual content analysis in the study employed follows several steps. First, the level of analysis was based on themes. Secondly, the number of decided themes to code was based on the predefined themes. Thirdly, concepts were distinguished based on their appearance frequencies in the codes. Consequently, analysis and interpretation of the results were drawn to prepare for further sociological analysis.

After the contents emerged, sociological analysis was employed using Robert Merton's typology of deviance. Merton's typology facilitates the explanation of Somaliland's cultural goal, which entails the creation of a discrete national identity and the institutional means to achieve which textbooks are a crucial part of it.

Merton's typology simplifies the classification of Somaliland's people on their national identity acceptance.

3. Somaliland and its self-determination: a brief introduction

Before the arrival of the colonials, Somalis were organized into different clans dispersed in the Somali lands. Colonials divided Somalis into five the British protectorate (currently Somaliland), Somalia (South Somalia), Djibouti, Ogaden (now the Somali Region in Ethiopia), and Northern Frontier District (NFD).




Figure 1: The Somali peninsula map in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland was announced as a British Protectorate (Bradbury, 2008; Farley, 2010; Spears, 2010). After decades under the British colony, the British Protectorate acquired its independence on June 26, 1960 (Bradbury, 2008; Farley, 2010; Jhazbhay, 2009; A. I. Samatar, 2002). After five days of its independence, Somaliland united with the Italian colonized Southern Somalia to form the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960, and sought the missing other three Somali regions to

create the greater Somali state (Bradbury, 2008; Farley, 2010; Jhazbhay, 2009; Lewis, 2003; A. I. Samatar, 2002).



Figure 2: The Somaliland map in the Horn of Africa

Obviously, the Somali culture especially the tribe, has played an essential role in Somali life—politically, economically, and socially. Somalis were organized into independent clans that stood up to protect their interests. To protect their interests, they developed rules and procedures to govern themselves and deal with other tribes (Bade & Hared, 2021). After a long period of colonialism, Somalis became an independent republic in 1960. Unfortunately, Somalis assumed their understanding of government from the herding culture they used to practice, which was based on families fighting each other and raiding camels. At this point, the clan competition between the Somalis commenced, and the importance of clans in Somali politics and clan governance became apparent.

British Somalilanders were exceptionally compelling for the union's consummation, though the Italian Somalilanders favored proceeding cautiously. Italian Somaliland's legislators favored the union's postponement to solve the undecided issues. However, British Somalilanders supposed the union's deferment might desire to be a weakness and thrust to speed up it. "I noted with alarm that the people of Somaliland had forced the union upon the South so precipitously that they alone had to pay the price by accepting a southern constitution, southern flag, the southern capital, and a southern Head of State – who also appointed a southern Prime Minister," noted Jama Mohamed Ghalib (as cited in Spears, 2010, p. 129). After taking the president, Italian Somalilanders also took heavyweight

ministries. British Somaliland took only 33 seats of the 123 National Assembly (SCPD (Somaliland Center for Peace and Development), 1999; Spears, 2010). This inequality in power-sharing ultimately triggered British Somaliland's grievance, feelings of loss, and disillusionment among Somalis (Bradbury, 2008).

Presumably, Somalilanders soon realized that they had made a mistake in uniting with Somalia without legal guidance (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007, p. 463; Pham, 2010, p. 140). It seemed increasingly clear that the leaders of Southern Somalia would dominate them in government power-sharing. Democratic principles guided the political arrangements and constitution after independence. According to literature, 1960 and 1969 was the golden age of democracy in Somalia's history (Bradbury, 2008; Elmi, 2010; Hansen & Bradbury, 2007; Ismail, 2010; A. I. Samatar, 2002). "After two administrations, power-sharing was democratically divided into the Southern or Somalia took a president, while the northern or Somaliland was left with a prime-ministership" (A. I. Samatar, 2008). This issue brings the appearance of equity between Somaliland and Somalia.

However, the actuality was different, and it created a stir among the people of Somaliland because of the government's marginalization and alienation with northerners. Besides, the democratic system was increasing, failing, and corruption became rampant. Divided tribal politics and rampant corruption permeated the government (SCPD., p. 15). Both the evils of political tribalism and widespread corruption perpetrated by tribal men who wanted to run for the 1967 elections have led to instability, disrepute for Somalis, undermined state-building, and hastened the assassination of the president, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. Both the evils of political tribalism and widespread corruption perpetrated by tribal men who wanted to run for the 1967 (Bradbury, 2008; Farley, 2010; Hansen & Bradbury, 2007) elections have led to instability, disrepute for Somalis, undermined state-building, and hastened president Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke's assassination on October 15 1969.

Tribal politics and widespread corruption have led to unrest in the country, with the military seizing power in a bloodless coup on October 21, 1969, much to the delight of the coup leaders (Elmi, 2010; Ismail, 2010; Kusow, 2004; Lewis, 2003; A. I. Samatar, 2008; Spears, 2010). The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) has issued a statement saying it has taken over control of the country from the parties. The SRC fought against tribalism, clan politics, nepotism, and ordinary people widely welcomed SRC's steps. The military government stated that tribalism is cancer in society. They made it clear that it was necessary to eradicate and move towards a modern state-building process. In foreign policy, the military regime opted the Soviet Union its close ally. The soviet union, as compensation, provided economic and military to Somalia estimated at \$50 million in 1972 (Khapoya & Agyeman-Duah, 1985). The military government was grateful for "huge work projects, modernization efforts, and attempts to unify the Somali administration's

two components" (Farley, 2010). The regimes' most significant triumph belongs to the education sector; it wrote the Somali language into Latin script (Ismail, 2010).

Nevertheless, the military regime remained repressive, tight, and brutal (Bade, 2020; Farley, 2010) due to the alienation of administration from most other clans. Bereketeab (2012) noted that "Pervasive political repression by the regime and the accompanying economic and security deterioration provoked widespread dissatisfaction and rebellion, thereby undermining the project of state-building" (Bereketeab, 2012). The most astonishing collective narrative is that the military government's breakdown commenced with the war's consequences against Ethiopia in 1977 (SCPD (Somaliland Center for Peace and Development), 1999). Somalia's loss of war with Ethiopia hastened the Somali state's fall (Mengisteab, 2011, p. 11; Walls & Kibble, 2010, p. 38). The first signal of breakage within the military government power system arrived following the failed coup lead by Abdillahi Yusuf, and his clan members tried to overthrow the military government after the Ethio-Somali catastrophe in 1978. The Majeerteen clan was the main plotters of the failed coup against the military government in 1978. Afterward, in retaliation, the regime committed atrocities in Mudug and Bari regions, Majerteen's key settlements. In reaction, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), a clan-based movement, was formed against the military regime (Bade, 2020; Farley, 2010; Møller, 2009).

Moreover, the military government's extreme atrocities and authoritarianism paved the way for the other clan-based movement in the 1980s. Somali National Movement (SNM), one of Somali's most significant rebels against the military regime was founded in 1981 (Bade, 2020; Mengisteab, 2011; Møller, 2009). The Somali civil-war became fierce during the 1980s. Bereketeab 2012, noted that "In a desperate measure to stay in power and suppress the rebellion, the regime's army bombed towns indiscriminately" (Bereketeab, 2012). Hargeisa, the capital city of current Somaliland, was of such a profoundly bombed town with destruction. The war's act not merely backed SNM's claim to depose the military regime but also to reconsider with the union and, more importantly, Somaliland's self-determination. "The immense suffering the Issaq clan were subjected to by the Siad Barre regime during the war, and the domination of the Somali state by southerners finally convinced the Issaqs to opt for secession, with the idea of independence coming later" (Bereketeab, 2012). The gigantic sorrow and impact of the military government's actions during the war, besides Southern's state domination, was the vital narrative that convinced SNM to choose for separation idea of independence in 1991. Finally, the result of fierce civil war led to the military regime's fall in 1991.

The country's rule went into militant's hands. The United Somali Congress (USC) took Mogadishu, the Somali capital, whereas the SNM controlled Hargeisa, the second biggest city, declared its independence from Somalian on May 18, 1991. Somaliland's secession was since Somaliland was a separate state created by the British colonialists and then united with southern Somalia; when they did not

understand each other, they had the right to self-determination. Two issues caused the acceleration of Somaliland's independence declaration. Those were forming a unilateral government in Mogadishu without consultation with the SNM and pressure within Somaliland's population (Bade, 2020; Bryden, 2004). Bereketeab mentions, "the first two years following the unilateral declaration of independence were fraught with conflict and war" (Bereketeab, 2012). The clans that were not supportive of SNM instead backed the military regime involved conflict with Issaq subjugated SNM. After taking over, SNM reconsidered to reconcile the opposing groups through negotiations intended abolition of hostility to avoid devastating vengeance acts. The Borama national reconciliation conference established Somaliland's bedrock of state formation. "The non-Issaq clans, albeit reluctantly, seemed to have accepted the idea of Somaliland statehood" (Bereketeab, 2012).

The leading figures of SNM proposed clan elders for mediation between disputing groups. Accordingly, the Somaliland clans Isaaq, Gadabursi, Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli), Issa, and other clans prepared and sent their representatives to Borama's conference on national elder's council (guurti), produced transition of power to the civilian government (Walls & Kibble, 2010, p. 40). The elder's council (guurti) elected former Somali prime minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, and Somaliland entered a democratic and civilian rule system, and SNM abandoned the power.

Thus, to build public confidence and develop the government, President Egal announced a multi-party system. Ambitious parties have been called upon to come up with an inclusive platform. They were also warned against clan and religious group affiliations. Succeeding Somaliland's referendum in 2001, Somaliland also implemented its constitution based on a parliament's bicameral system. The guurti (elders) were allocated for the upper house and elected assembly for the lower house. After president Egal's death, Somaliland elected Dahir Riyale Kahin as succeeding president in 2003. In 2005, Rayale successfully implemented parliamentary elections.

In utilizing the democratization and electoral process, Ahmed Mohamed Mahamoud "Silaanyo" won over Riyale's ruling part in June 2010. Again, in 2012, Somaliland successfully and peacefully conducted local government council elections. More importantly, in 2017, Somaliland went into the presidential election in which the current president, Muse Bihi Abdi, Somaliland's 5th president, came to power. Thus, free elections and the transfer of power in succession improved to the state-building in Somaliland.

Somaliland expected that its successful democratization process would increase a chance of attaining international recognition. Receiving some understanding and appreciation from some countries, including the United Kingdom, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda, no single country has recognized Somaliland today. Bryden argues that "for Somalilanders, the declaration of independence was not an

act of secession, but was, rather, the reclaiming of a sovereignty they voluntarily gave up" (Bryden, 2004). Factually, Somaliland remains secure and stable where power was peacefully transferred in every election (Bradbury, 2008; Pham, 2010). "This is attributed to the successful conflation of traditional clan structures and a modern representative polity, but also to 'avoiding revenge and achieving a successful reconciliation" (Bereketeab, 2012). These developments led Somaliland to arise as a political entity from a conflict-ridden context, complicated and highly destructive, putting Somaliland statehood negotiation's stage.

In this regard, clan structures contributed and played a constructive role in Somaliland's peacebuilding. Bereketeab said, "clan mechanisms and institutions of conflict resolution have been decisive in, at least, mitigating conflicts and managing disputes and thus in bringing relative peace and stability" (Bereketeab, 2012). Certainly, Somaliland experienced a fruitful way to state-building. However, the border dispute with Somalia's Federal Government Member, Puntland, may hinder Somaliland's international recognition mission. Additionally, Somaliland challenged an international pressure to join the Somali reconstitution process and participated at the London conference in 2012. Since 2012, Somaliland negotiated with Somalia over self-determination, but there are no fruitful outcomes from those negotiations.

4. Representation of National Identity in Somaliland Textbooks

4.1. Ethnic Origin of Somalis and the Somaliland People

According to literature (Behr, 2018; Eno & Kusow, 2014; Ingiriis, 2020; Kusow, 2004; A. I. Samatar, 2006), Somalia's leading sociological arguments refer to the Somali identity. However, Somaliland's grade five Social Studies textbook defines Somalis' ethnic origin and the origins of Somaliland people. According to Social Studies grade five student book, there are different accounts about Somalis' origin; however, some studies have recently studied Somali origin (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 4). Some Somali clans believe they are of Arab descent. To this day they practice, based on their origins, the sheikhs from the Arabian Peninsula who descended and multiplied in the Somali territories (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 4). These sheikhs include Sheikh Ishak, Sheikh Isse, Sheikh Samaron, Sheikh Darod and others. These Somali clans are descended from these sheikhs. They are no different from other Somali clans in terms of appearance, culture, religion and the language they speak, Somali (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 5).

There is a second narrative that the Somali people are ethnically descended from the Cushitic people living in the Horn of Africa. These ethnic groups include Ethiopians, such as Gabra, Afar, Eritrean, Saho and Rindiile. It is thought to have originated in southern Ethiopia and much of northern Kenya; they still live there. Somalis are said to have much in common with these ethnic groups (Somaliland

Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 6). However, many Somali clans prefer to believe in the Arabness narrative. In the mind of the Somali nomad of that time, Arabness was superior to his neighbourhood's African identity (Eno, 2008, p. 287). Those paradigms mentioned above conflict with each other and resume to be significant in identifying the Somali identity.

In defining Ethnic origin, Somaliland prefers the second narrative of Cushiticness. According to the Social Science grade five textbook, the people in Somaliland are ethnically Somali. They belong to the Cushitic sect of the Hamitic people. People in Eritrea, Djibouti, lowland Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia, and northern Kenya. They are believed to be from the same area, speaking Cushitic. Somalis are the largest Cushitic-speaking group. Others are the northwestern Horn of Africa such as Afar or Danakil, and Djibouti divided into Somali and Afar. It also includes people living in Ethiopia, such as Somalis, Oromo, Booran, Gelladi, and Randiile (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 2). All these people speak Cushitic, and most of them are nomads and have differences. Somalis are tall, thin-skinned, grey or brown, and their faces look like those of the Arabs.

In the narrative of Somalis' arrival of Africa dates to A.D. 9-10 widespread in Northwest, East and South of the Horn of Africa, reached Ethiopia and northern Kenya. In 9-10 C.D., there were regular arrivals from Arab countries to the Somali territories. Arabs from Arabian Peninsula arrived in Somalia, married local inhabitants and people born then and said to have descended from the Arabs who came to Somalia's shores in the A.D. 9-10 (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016b, p. 2). Ethnically it is challenging to classify Somaliland's people from other Somalis. However, Somalis are organized into clans with settlements. The clan-family system is a traditional and cultural identity associated with the long-standing divisions in Somali society. Thus, Somalilanders do not merely preserve their clan-family identity but also as a kind of national identity and Somaliland's citizenship claim. The clan affiliation in Somaliland is also entitled to a Somaliland passport, identity card, political rights, and employment. The Somaliland identity based on clan lineage faces many challenges; most Somaliland clans also live beyond Somaliland's borders in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. The clan affiliation in Somaliland may allow other countries to claim the Somaliland identity and may restrict others.

4.2. Somaliland's Geographical Location

Internationally unrecognized, Somaliland defines its geographical location in form two geography textbook. However, Somaliland is a part of the sub-Saharan countries of Africa and among the eleven countries, the Eastern Region of the continent of Africa. Only three of these share common boundaries with Somaliland. To the West is the smallest Republic of Djibouti, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia

to the South and the East is the Federal Republic of Somalia. On the north runs along the Red Sea's natural boundary in the Gulf of Aden, which extends more than 850 kilometres long (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 94). Moreover, the book says that the territory's centermost point is where the latitude and the longitude intersect at approximately $45^{\circ}52'E$ and $09^{\circ}45'N$ (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 95).

The geographical location of Somaliland does not deal with ethnic or something else but on colonial border lining. The absolute location of Somaliland has been made in the early colonial period by the conventional international agreements signed by the three European powers and the Abyssinian Kingdom of Ethiopia. This agreement aimed to demarcate the permanent international boundaries based on the Geographical Positioning System's International Grid System (GPS) (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 96).

Reasoning and justifying Somaliland's borders, textbooks cite three protocols and agreement demarcated one at various dates that created Somaliland's borders except for the northern boundary that is naturally created by Gulf of Aden's Red Sea coastline. The first of that three protocol is the Anglo-Italian Treaty or Protocol (May 1894). This protocol creates the Eastern border which divides the two territories of British Somaliland (now, Somaliland) and the Italian Somaliland, now Puntland in Somalia (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 96). This borderline runs straight down along the longitude of $49^{\circ}00'E$, from the Red Sea down to where it intersects latitude $09^{\circ}00'N$ and then the line is joined obliquely to the intersection point of longitude $48^{\circ}00'E$ and latitude $08^{\circ}00'N$. This protocol is not an official agreement between Somaliland and Somalia or other prior administrations. Nevertheless, it is a colonial agreement between the Italian Government and the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

The second is the Anglo-Ethiopian Protocol or treaty (July 1897). This borderline separates Somaliland from Ethiopia and runs straight along latitude $08^{\circ}00'N$, from the intersection of longitude $48^{\circ}00'N$ up to the next intersection of longitude $47^{\circ}00'E$ and latitude $08^{\circ}00'N$ (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 96). This border is the longest of the three Somaliland border. It used to be recognized as a missing land under the Ethiopian colony which once caused the Ethio-Somali war. However, after the declaration of Somaliland, it is respected as an international border. The third treaty is the Anglo-French protocol (Feb 1888). This was an agreement signed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the French Government for the demarcation borderline's demarcation that divides the Republic of Djibouti and the Republic of Somaliland till now (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2018, p. 97). This is an inclined straight line which connects from the southern coordination of nearly $42^{\circ}43'E$ and $10^{\circ}35'N$ up to the northern coordination of $10^{\circ}59'N$ and $42^{\circ}58'E$ at Lawyacado. These three borders in Somaliland show that foreign powers or let me

say colonizers agreed to recognize as an international border; it is also part of colonial borders that later became international borders today in Africa.

4.3. Somaliland's Language

The language remains one of the best instruments for creating a national identity. For instance, in modern Turkish nation-state, language along with secularism and history was the elements which Turkish leaders focused on building national identity (Aydingün & Aydingün, 2004). Aydingün and Aydingün (2004), noted: "in modern Turkey, it is contended that the language was the main instrument that defined the nation and national history since it did not contradict the significant modernization policies that were developed" (Aydingün & Aydingün, 2004). In the context of creating a national identity, the language aims to unite the nations in a country.

Conversely, Somaliland's case is unique and different. Since Somaliland is separating from Somalia, language cannot contribute to Somaliland's separation. Somalis are recognized as one of the most homogeneous communities globally; they share language, religion, and culture. Thus, the official language of Somaliland is Somali. The Somali language became a cross border language and spoken in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Like ethnicity and language, Somalis also share a religion; thus, Somaliland's religion is Islam, specifically the Sunni sect.

4.4. Somaliland Nationalism

Gellner (2008) defined nationalism as: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 2008). Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle (Gellner, 2008). Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment; A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind (Gellner, 2008). The nationalist ideology that founded Somaliland was grounded on the dissatisfactions and grievances of uniting with Somalia.

However, according to the Form Four history book, Somaliland nationalism was rooted far before the unity. The rise of Somaliland nationalism was affected by some factors in Somaliland. First was the change in international opinion towards colonization after the two World Wars. Second, the experience gained by Somaliland soldiers who participated in the two World Wars and their realization that Whiteman (colonizer) is not superior to the blacks. Third, the United Nations Organization's formation, whose primary aim was to preserve peace and security, emphasized the need for political independence and self-determination for all subjects, promoted Somaliland and other African societies' nationalism. Fourth, new colonies were freed in Africa and Asia; these included Ghana, India, and

Pakistan, whereby those independent countries inspired the rise of Somaliland nationalism. Fifth, the Islamic Religion, which stands for human freedom, equality, and peaceful co-existence, played a remarkable role in increasing Somaliland nationalism. Sixth, freedom of movement of pastoral life in Somali culture, as necessitated by seasonal trends, where people continuously look after pasture and water for their animals, accelerated the rise of Somaliland nationalism.

Finally, the transfer of Hawd and Reserved Area to Ethiopia by the British in 1954 was a big issue that raised the Somaliland people (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 3,4). However, other accounts show that those causes facilitated the rise of Somali nationalism as a whole but not merely Somaliland's nationalism (Abdullahi, 1992; Bade, 2020; Hoehne, 2014; null, n.d.; S. S. Samatar, 1979).

4.5. The Leading Personalities of Somaliland Nationalism

Although Somali nationalism aimed to unite all Somalis before and after the colonials, it failed to achieve its objective. The Somaliland case shows how Somalis are disappointed to unite and remain beyond several borders—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the currently unrecognized Somaliland. Nevertheless, Somaliland history textbooks mention the top personalities of Somaliland nationalism. "The rise of Somaliland nationalism has had leading personalities who devoted their life, energy and thought to speed up the movement of self-determination and full independence" (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 4). The most famous figure was Sayid Mohammed Abdille Hassan, who waged wars against the British administration in Somaliland in 1901-1920. Although the textbooks argue that Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan was a Somaliland nationalist, Sayid Mohammed Abdille Hassan is regarded as a religious leader. Hassan, the founder of Somali nationalism, fought for the Somali liberation against any colony, including the British, Italy, and even Ethiopia (Bade, 2020). Sayid Mohamed's war against the colonials had not occurred only in Somaliland territory but dispersed to Somalia and Ethiopia.

Another prominent person was Hajji Faarah Oomar. He was of the earliest nationalists to expose the new aspirations and promote the general social and political betterment of the people in the 1920s (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018, p. 3). He was a former employee of the British administration in Somaliland. After difficulties with the protectorate authorities, he was exiled to Aden in Yemen, where he participated in the formation of the Somali Islamic Association. Through articles in Aden newspapers and petitions addressed to the British government in London, Hajji Farah and his associates worked hard to bring Somali interests to the notice of people in Britain. They thus

helped prepare the ground for further developments (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2018, p. 3).

Sheikh Bashir Yusuf Hasan Fiqi (the 1940s) also played a crucial role in Somaliland nationalism. Sheikh Bashir was a national hero who, unlike Haji Farah, decided to base his struggle against the British rule with the armed opposition. He believed that demanding self-determination and attaining full independence on peaceful means is a waste of time (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 3). Sheikh Bashir was finally killed on the battlefield as a martyr with dignity. Ugaas Doodi Ugaas Rooble was another prominent nationalist who, in 1941, was exiled and imprisoned on an Island in Yemen (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 3). Ugaas Dodi was a robust nationalist figure who was against British domination in Somaliland. Following his release from the prison, Ugas Dodi was invited Haile Selassie of Ethiopia but rejected his invitation (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 4). Unlike Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, those other three figures were in Somaliland but did not fight like him.

4.6. Formation of Somaliland National Political Organizations

The national political organizations in Somaliland that textbooks mention dates from 1935 to 1958 under the British Somaliland Protectorate. This point positions one of the main arguments that Somaliland was a separate state from Somalia. Also, this narrative depicts the political identity of Somalilanders. The political identity of Somaliland is the most logical argument for creating Somaliland's identity instead of clan-based identity. The Form History book writes some political organizations before the union. In 1935, the Somali National Society (S.N.S.) was formed, which in 1941 changed its name to Somali National League (S.N.L.), in 1954, when the transfer of Hawd and Reserved Area to Ethiopia came into being, traditional and religious leaders together with traders, intellectuals and political personalities created the National United Front (N.U.F.). The formation of N.U.F. was accelerated by the transfer of the Hawd and Reserved area to Ethiopia. Eventually, four Somaliland elders were selected to leave for London, demanding the return of the transferred Somaliland territory. These delegates were Sultan Abdirahman Sultan Derie, Sultan Abdillahi Sultan Derie, Abdirahman Ali Mohamed (Dubbe Ali-Yare), and Michel Ali Hussein (Michel Mariano)

In 1958, a third political organization named United Somali Party (U.S.P.) was established. All the political parties shared the same aim of independence and unification with Somalia, to the foundation for Greater Somalia (Somaliland, Somaliland French Coast (Djibouti), Ethiopian Somali Territory, Somalia, and Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.)). These political parties differed only in their attitudes towards the speed with which these aims should be accomplished. However, the event of transferring Hawd and Reserved Area to Ethiopia in 1954

and the complete surrender of these vital grazing lands to Abyssinian control changed the whole course of political life and eventually to the Protectorate's advancement to full independence (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 4). Therefore, in February 1960, an election for the new Legislative Council was held, whereby S.N.L. gained twenty of the available thirty-three seats, the N.U.F. one, and the United Somali Party (U.S.P.) won twelve seats. This result marked the N.U.F.'s eclipse, which had previously been regarded generally by the administration as the future government party (Somaliland Ministry of Education and Higher Studies, 2016a, p. 5).

5. Consequences of Contradictory National Identity Representation in School Textbooks

Somaliland students were taught a syllabus developed for the Somaliland cause for nearly the last two decades. Still, much needs to be asked about their effectiveness in creating a cohesive national identity in Somaliland. In school textbooks, the contradictory representation of national identity does not leave Somaliland without consequences. Instead, it hinders the creation of an entirely accepted national identity in Somaliland. Despite the differences in Somaliland regions' acceptance of national identity, arguably, the identity crisis remains crucial after three decades of statehood.

It is questionable how the crisis in national identity triggers deviance in Somaliland. The famed American sociologist Robert K. Merton developed the social strain theory. According to the theory, "strain," which paves the way for understanding deviance, comes from the discrepancies between culturally defined goals and the institutionalized means available to achieve these goals. In the Somaliland case, the state intends to create a discrete national identity based on Somaliland statehood. This means that the state has a culturally defined goal—Somalilanders living in a specific territory. It also has institutionalized means of achieving Somaliland's national identity in which the school textbooks play a significant role. The battle occurs here, and deviances become available at this place.

Merton proposes a typology of deviance—a classification scheme to facilitate understanding deviance. Merton's typology of deviance is based upon two criteria: first, a person's motivation to achieve cultural goals and a person's belief to attain his goals. Additionally, the theory states that strain may be structural, which signifies the process at the societal level that filters down and affect how an individual perceives his or her needs. This type of strain can imply pressure on

citizens to become deviant and then criminal. Merton produced five types of deviance conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.




Figure 3: Merton's typology

In the case of creating Somaliland's national identity, deviances from the people are evident. Applying Merton's typology of deviance, the people of Somaliland formed the five typologies of deviance. Some regions of Somaliland, mainly inhabited by the Isaaq clans, are in the conformity type. They appreciated Somaliland's self-determination, identity, and institutional means by which the state moves on. The innovation type also comes from non-Isaaq clans, especially Awdal and some parts of the Sool region. They accept the goal of being a Somalilander, yet they argue there should be an adjustment to the institutional means of achieving the goal. The recent movement named *Tabliiqa Siyaasadda*,[†] led by Prof. Ahmed Ismail Samatar and the late Dr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, comes under the innovation category. They accept the goal, yet they question its means of implementation. Ritualist categories reject the goal—they do not accept the Somaliland identity; however, they accept the means of implementation.

Some include those who believe in Somaliness or the religious movements that believe in the Islamic ummah's broader identity. Retreatism can be found in some parts of the eastern regions of Somaliland—Sool and Sanaag. The people in these regions neither accept the identity nor its institutional means. By the way, people with retreatism type remain calm. The result of the parliamentary elections of

[†] *Tabliiqa Siyaasadda* was a public debate conducted in several places. The general question of the debate was "Is Somaliland owned by all Somalilanders?". *Tabliiqa Siyaasadda* intended to highlight the weaknesses of Somaliland government and ignite inclusionary system in which the grieving clans see the government as theirs.

Somaliland in 2021 can be seen that clans in East Sanaag did not participate effectively. The Warsangeli clans had no representative in the Somaliland parliament; this does not mean they lacked the votes. Instead, they did not accept the goal and institutional means of being a Somalilander. The final type of deviance is rebellion. The rebellion develops its own new goals and institutional means. Buuhoodle District and some parts of the Sool regions host rebels against the Somaliland state, self-determination, and its means of implementation. The point is that the rebellion is violent, and some militants fought against or prepared to fight against the Somaliland state.

6. Conclusion

Education contributes to developing countries' economies, state-building, democracy, and creating national identities. Thus, textbooks are suitable for spreading messages about achieving national goals. Somaliland utilizes textbooks to spread its self-determination and create a national identity separate from Somalia. The Somali Republic was/is accepted as one of the most homogenous states in the world. Hence, Somaliland challenges creating a distinct identity from Somalia in which it shares most elements that create an identity: language, religion, culture, and tradition.

Referring to Somaliland's textbooks, precisely Social Studies 5th grade, Geography Form Two and Form Four History, the Somaliland national identity has an ambiguity that would lead to an identity crisis. The political borders that shape Somaliland's national identity are based on treaties and protocols between the Colonial Powers—the British, Italian, and Abyssinians. The colonial treaties shaped Somaliland's borders with Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The colonial agreements similarly shaped most of Africa's borders.

On the other hand, Somaliland's national identity is based on cultural identity—in which clan is the main factor. The clan identity allows Somalilanders to claim a national identity, political ambitions, etc. However, the fact that most of Somaliland's clans also live outside its borders in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, the clan identity allows non-Somalilanders (in terms of geography and politics) to access Somaliland's national identity. Additionally, it excludes Somalilanders inside the borders and puts other citizens in doubt. The other paradoxes include the absence of the creation of shared history, which all Somalilanders cherish. These factors create an identity crisis and deviance against the state goal—creating a national identity. In conclusion, Somaliland's national identity may need revision and further explanations other than colonial treaties' political identities.

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