

**TOM REGAN'S ASSERTIONS ON ANIMALS MORALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
ON THE USE OF ANIMALS**

*Author Details: Pascal Mbatha Mwina.*

*Author is currently pursuing PhD degree program in philosophy at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Kenya. E-mail: [pascalmbatha2832@gmail.com](mailto:pascalmbatha2832@gmail.com)*

*Co-Authors: Doctor Simon Njuguna Waitherero, Lecturer and Chair of examinations and timetabling at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Kenya. E-mail: [simnjug@gmail.com](mailto:simnjug@gmail.com)*

*Doctor Josephine Nyambedha Apiyo, Lecturer at The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Kenya. E-mail: [ajosnyambedha@yahoo.com](mailto:ajosnyambedha@yahoo.com)*

**KeyWords**

Animals, Community, Humans, Inherent, Morality, pleasure, Regan, Use.

**ABSTRACT**

The aim of this work is to first highlight those philosophical theories which informed Regan's idea of moral concern to animals as well as his arrival to the assertions that, animals are part of moral community. We also target to show that in strict sense, animals are not part of 'moral standing; but we only show moral concern to them on the basis that they are of instrumental value(s) to us.

**Introduction**

Familiarizing ourselves to the philosophical background of Regan; is so fundamental because it gives us the foundation on how Regan arrived at declaring animals as part of moral community and how he denounces use of animals by humans. In achieving the aim; it will be necessary to look at those philosophical works which closely influenced him. We will look at: Regan's family background and academic background, the influence of theory of utilitarian, the theory of Categorical imperative and the theory of sentience. All these theories influenced Regan in making the way to the theory of inherent value being a moral theory on which he lays his foundation and declaration of abolishing humans, use of animals.

### **Regan's Family Background**

The biography of Regan indicates that, he was born in 1938 in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania in United States of America and died in February, 2017. Regan is a contemporary moral philosopher and pioneer of animal rights. Armed with a doctorate in philosophy and passion for protecting animals, he helped form animal rights and animal liberation movements of the 1960s. (Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>) Further it is said that, he provided moral explanations in support of the right to animals to be treated with respect. The philosophical tenet by him is, animals are like humans, have lives that matter to them, animals like humans have desires, sense-perceptions, beliefs, motives and memory. Therefore, they deserve the same right to live as human beings do. Regan for more than forty years has actively fought against breeding animals for food, animal experimentation and commercial hunting. ("Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>) The motive, of animal rights movement is to shutter down the various uses of animals by human beings.

### **Regan's Profession**

Regan was a distinguished writer and so devoted in academic career. It is indicated in his biography that, he taught at North Carolina State University and at Raleigh until he was Emeritus professor of philosophy. Many awards were given to him, for excellence in undergraduate and graduate teaching, was named University Alumni Distinguished professor. Regan published hundreds of professional papers and more than twenty books. (Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>) It is evidence that he was a committed person in academic works and scholarly activities. It is written that, he won major international awards for film writing and direction; and presented hundreds of lectures throughout United States and abroad. In 2000, he received the William Quarles Holliday Medal, the highest honor NC State University can bestow on one of its faculty. Regan is widely regarded as pioneering spokesperson for the philosophy of animal rights. (Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>)

The contributions he made in imparting and transmitting knowledge cannot go unnoticed. In fact it is asserted that, in 2016, he was inducted into Animal Rights Hall of Fame. (Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>) Regan authored more than ten books and co-authored others in defense of animals as ends. There is no doubt Regan is the leading protagonist of the animal rights abolitionist project in philosophy. The abolitionists decry the use and exploitation of nonhuman animals. (Omotosho, 2018) The reason as to why Regan is termed as 'abolitionist' is because he denounces use of animals by humans. Using animals in his

view is simply exploiting them. Abolitionist in its aspirations, it seeks not to reform how animals are treated, making what we do to them more humane, but to abolish, to end completely commercial animal agriculture, total abolition of fur industry and use of animals in science. (Regan, 2003) We may say that, it is evident that Regan is devoted to stop human beings from using animals for our benefits.

### **How Regan Ended Up Being Animals Defender**

Regan, beside the influential philosophical theories stated earlier, the way he grew up had also much positive influence on his passion for animals' welfare. During his child hood he could move across the streets where he could see some animals. The animals I knew were mostly animals of the streets. Mainly cats and dogs but there were horses, too. In those days vendors and junkmen rode four-wheeled wagons through the city, pulled by stoop-shouldered, weary creatures who were occasionally aroused from their dolorous fatigue by the high pitched clang of trolley's bell or the crack of the driver's whip. (Regan, A Bird in the Cage on <https://animalsvalue.org/>.html) Already at a tender age Regan had developed sympathy towards animals, he could recognize how they suffered in the hands of some people.

Another great incident which influenced him took place in 1972, when their pet dog named Gleco was killed by a running car. Faced with this incalculable loss, Nancy and I lapsed into a period of intense, shared grief, for days we cried at the mere mention or memory of Gleco. (Regan, A Bird in the Cage on <https://animalsvalue.org/>.html) Such experiences gave him a deep conviction that there is a need for moral truth which needs a positive change of our mentality and our behavior on how we interact with other animals.

The empathy Regan had to animals may be revealed by the saying that, what Gleco's death forced upon me was the realization that my emotional attachment to a particular dog was a contingent feature of the world. I understood my feelings for this particular dog, Gleco, had included other dogs. (Regan, A Bird in the Cage on <https://animalsvalue.org/>.html) Extending our moral concern and care towards animals is something which is underlined by such an experience by Regan. As indicated by the statement that, wherever in the world there is life that feels, a being whose welfare can be affected by what we do or fail to do, there love and compassion, justice and protection must find a home. (Regan, A Bird in the Cage on <https://animalsvalue.org/>.html) We cannot therefore deny that, non-human animals ought to be

recognized as deserving our due concern. It is our duty to ensure our way of life does not violate their well-being.

Regan was also influenced by the work of Mahatma Gandhi, who challenged him, how he could be against unnecessary violence which was taking place in Vietnam where many lives were lost. In the same line of thought, how then could one support the same type of violence where the involved sufferers were animals? Just as we cannot support war where the targeted are human beings, we should not also support war where the embattled are animals.

### **Philosophical Works that Influenced Regan**

Regan was influenced by a number of ethical theories towards his idea that animals belong to moral community and have inbuilt value so we ought not to use them. The theory of utility by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the theory of means and end by Immanuel Kant and the theory of Sentience by Peter Singer Provoked Regan towards toward establishing the theory of inherent value. Those philosophers, who argue for humans as the only ones having moral standing among animals, base their arguments on ability to rationalize, consciousness, speech ability and autonomy.

It is worth noting that, the concept of moral standing has become central to environmental and protectionist ethics, but specific requirements for this heightened, moral status remain unclear. In Regan's theory subject of a life (inherent value theory), have a moral standing. Singer's theory reserves this privilege for sentient beings. (Kemmerer, 2006) In other words, Regan uses theory of inherent value (subject of a life) to base the argument for animals, moral standing while Singer uses ability to experience pleasure or pain to argue for the same. Kant, Mill and Bentham, uses different theories namely, categorical imperative and utility theories respectively to argue for humans as the only moral beings having moral status. The two remain influential to Regan, for he uses them to tighten the argument for extending moral status to nonhuman animals.

Utilitarian and sentience theories focus on the ability to feel and suffer, as the morally relevant criterion by which moral standing ought to be established. Other creatures react to pain in ways similar to human beings. They share neurological and mental faculties associated with pain in human beings. (Kemmerer, 2006) As we try to locate moral consideration to nonhuman animals, the problem we shall be addressing is, whether abolishing use of animals can be a confirmation

and affirmation of their moral status. Regan thinks, by abolishing use of animals, he shall have featured and affirmed that, animals have moral status and moral rights.

### **The Theory of Utility**

We begin by saying that, the three stated theories are just but a few of the many theories which try to liberate on where morality is to be founded on. When we talk of morality utilitarianism and Kant's theory of means and ends, limits itself to human beings alone. Though, it has great influence to Regan's theory of inherent value.

John Stuart Mill, argues that, from the dawn of philosophy the question concerning the *summum bonum*, or what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought. It has occupied the most gifted intellects and divided them into schools. (Mill, 2009) Trying to lay a foundation on the test of right and wrong has not been an easy task. The theory by Mill argues that, pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. All desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and prevention of pain. (Mill, 2009) Good acts are those which promote pleasure and bad ones are those which produce pain. The theory argues for pleasure maximization. Animals experiences pleasure too but there pleasure is sentimental, hence are lower in value than those which are intellectual. Humans experience both intellectual and sensual pleasures.

Mill states that, pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments are much higher value than pleasures that are mere sensations. It must be admitted however, that utilitarianism places the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures. (Mill, 2009) The theory recognizes that animals have interests in seeking for what gives them pleasure and tries to avoid pain.

When determining what is right from what is wrong, the theory claims that we ought to look at the outcome of the action. The theory is also described as the, moral theory that which is right or wrong depends on consequences; the right act or policy is that which will result in the most pleasure or happiness of all affected. In assessing consequences; we must be impartial and give equal consideration to everyone's happiness or pleasure. (Francione and Gamer, 2010) In utilitarian sense, that may be affected by consequences of an action is not limited to humans

alone. What this means is that, consequences of our actions affects other entities, particularly animals from Regan's perception.

We should have a moral concern to those who are affected by the outcome of the actions we do. Therefore, the theory of utility holds that, "the consequences for every affected by the outcomes of alternative choices have direct moral significance. It is the principle of utility that determines moral right, wrong and obligation: what we morally ought to do is act so as to bring about best total consequences for everyone affected by the outcome. (Regan, 1983) The scope on those affected by an outcome is something which for Regan sounds to be human centered.

The theory of utility in Regan's understanding is not strong enough to stand on its own without the support of having a theory based on intrinsic value. Thus, Regan argues that:

Those who favor consequentialist theory must provide a companion theory of intrinsic value. This is because they hold that moral right, wrong and obligation depends on the best consequences; what makes some consequences better than others ultimately depends on what consequences are intrinsically valuable (good) or dis-valuable (evil). (Regan, 1983)

The theory of utility to some extent favors especially what he calls, "preferential" utilitarian which argues for equality of 'everyone's preference'. The preference utilitarian becomes so influential to Regan because of its claim that, similar preferences must be counted as having similar weight or importance. We owe it to animals themselves to take their preferences into account and to count their preference fairly. (Regan, 1983) We should in this sense of 'preference utilitarianism' take to consideration all preference, whether of human or of nonhuman animals.

Consequently, it is written that, analogous partialities must be allotted the same weight, the same importance, whether of the preferences are those of humans or other animals. Our duty to count their equal interests equally; we ought to do the act that brings about the best overall balance between totaled preference frustration for everyone affected by the outcome. (Regan, 1983) Though there is different utilitarianism, the one that favors animals' moral concern is the, 'preference' one. Preference utilitarianism suitably influences Singer as well as Regan, its argument acknowledges that:

Nonhuman animals can experience pain or pleasure or have preferences that can be satisfied or frustrated. The scope of the 'everyone' in the utilitarian's injunction to bring about, the best total consequences for everyone affected by the outcome; in short, should not be understood as limited only to human beings; but should be read to include all those who can experience pleasure and pain; all those who can have preferences that may be satisfied or frustrated. (Regan, 1983)

Utilitarian theory considers pleasure as the only intrinsically valuable and pain only as what is intrinsically dis-valuable; this is hedonistic utilitarianism.

The consequentialist theory is also known as, "teleological theory". In a Narrative review it is stated that, teleological ethics is also known as consequentialist ethics. Teleological come from the Greek term, *telos*, which means 'end'. Consequentialist ethics is the theory of morality that draws moral obligations or duties from what desirable or good as an end to be attained. (Narrative Review of Ethics Theories: Teleological and Deontological on [www.iosrjournals.org](http://www.iosrjournals.org)) Actions that results to good end are right, what is good here is what meets the moral theory conditions. A morally right act ought to produce a good end. Therefore, teleological perspective holds that an act is morally right if it produces a greater level of good over evil than any alternative act and it is morally wrong if it does the opposite. (A Narrative Review of Ethics Theories: Teleological and Deontological on [www.iosrjournals.org](http://www.iosrjournals.org)) Therefore, the theory of utility argues for maximization of pleasures or happiness and minimization of pain. Though, nonhuman animals seek after things that bring pleasure and contentment, their pleasure are of lower quality compared to those of humans. Humans have a higher quality of pleasure, since they can experience intellectual pleasures.

The theory of utility entitles humans with responsibility of considering the consequences of their actions. Joshua Gert also shows the underpinning of utilitarian theory, when he writes that, "utilitarian it is certainly true that if all one knows about an action is that, it will increase the risk of hurting someone, then the presumption is that one should not do it; it is a prima facie immoral. (Gert, 2004) It is therefore, so obvious that, all actions which may result to hurting human beings are immoral, because it causes more pain.

Utilitarianism is firmly founded on the creed that, foundation of moral, utility or the greatest happiness principle holds that, actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce reverse of happiness. The word right here means moral right. (Crisp, 1997) Happiness produced here is not limited to the individual but to all who are affected by the outcome. Though, we may have incidents where they may exist simultaneously, the action will be regarded as morally right, if only happiness degree is higher than that of unhappiness. Pain in utilitarian sense, is simply a privation, yes a privation of happiness or pleasure.

Humans ought to seek after, higher pleasures or happiness unlike with nonhuman animals. May be that is why Mill states that, “few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy. (Mill, 2009) Human pleasure and animal pleasure are therefore not equal. Animals pleasure is only limited to sensible things, hence renders them sentimental pleasures.

Humans though they too experience the same with animals, they have a higher quality of pleasure marked by their intelligence. Intelligible pleasures are therefore, higher than sensible pleasures hence, it is said that, it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. (Mill, 2009) Mental pleasures are of higher importance than bodily pleasures. Pleasure in Mill’s sense may be either inferior or superior. Only human beings are able to achieve the superior pleasures or happiness. Mill has conviction that, neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. (Mill, 2009) Pain and happiness cannot originate from the same source.

We can summarize the moral theory of utility in the saying that, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments. (Mill, 2009) Humans as well as nonhuman human animals try to avoid pain as sentient beings. They are inclined to what brings pleasure to them. The ability to avoid pain may be a way of caring for one’s life. Pain is always something to be avoided where necessary. Regan was so much influenced by Preference utilitarianism, which argues for taking into consideration, those preferences which have similar importance.



Therefore, our preference or interests counts not only, but also those of other animals. Hence, it is true that, similar interests are to be assigned equal weight, the same importance, whether the preferences are those of humans or other animals. Our duty to count their equal interests equally is a direct duty we have to animal beings. (Regan, 2003) The theory of utility has anthropocentric orientation, since it aims at judging human actions, by referring to the theory. The theory plays a great role towards the theory of inherent value developed by Regan. Utilitarian theory underlines that, we ought to do the act that brings about the best overall balance totaled preference satisfactions and totaled preference frustrations for everyone affected by the outcome. (Rena, 2003) Regan evaluates the theory of utility and sees it as having its strength and limitation.

### **The Strength of Utilitarianism**

There is strong side with the theory of utility, which is underlined by the saying that:

What counts morally is whatever does have interests. Rationally competent members of various minority groups have interests; these individuals have moral standing according to utilitarian. Children who lack a sense of justice have interests, hence have moral standing too. Everyone's interests' count and equal interests must be counted equally, no matter whose interests they are. (Regan, 2003)

The use of 'everyone' does not exclude nonhuman animals from moral consideration. The morality of our action(s) has to be evaluated by using the theory of utility, in utilitarianism sense. Good moral acts promote happiness for all those affected by an outcome of an action. We always seek to satisfy our preference that is our interests.

A universe in which you satisfy your desires for water, food and warmth is, other things being equal, morally better than a universe in which these desires are frustrated. The same is true in the case of an animal with similar desires. (Regan, 2003) A good environment is that which we may have desires being fulfilled. Human interests as well as animals interests counts equally, but human happiness is not equal to animal happiness. Our rational faculty plots us much higher than nonhuman animals.

### **The Weakness of Utility Theory**

Regan considers the theory of preference utilitarianism as unsatisfying moral theory. Regan writes that:

It is flawed both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, it is flawed because it requires that we count the satisfaction of the worst of preferences in reaching a fully informed judgment of moral right or wrong. Substantively, it is flawed because, after the necessary calculations have been completed, the worst sorts of acts can be justified. (Regan, 2003)

We cannot justify an act as morally right or wrong by looking at how much the one doing the act enjoys doing it. These become a weakness of the theory that is why Regan thinks we are not to evaluate the violation of human dignity by first asking how much the violators enjoy violating it; that is part of what it means to judge the preferences evil. (Regan, 2003) How does utilitarianism reflect in our treatment of animals?

Regan considers utilitarianism as not strong enough to defend animals from human exploitation. Therefore, he argues that:

Utilitarianism treats individuals as means to ends and not as ends in themselves. The theory of equal consideration of interest, takes interests as primary concern and not individuals with the interests. Regan thinks this is a mistake, the reason the interests matter is because the individual matter. Interests are attached to individuals and this has moral importance. Animals have the same moral status as human beings that are grounded on rights not on utilitarian principles. (Regan , *Ethical Theories* on <https://www.moral.org>)

Deontological ethics for Regan, aim at taking to consideration the value of treating other animals as ends in themselves. According to Regan inherent value is something which all animals possess equal by the fact that they are subject of a life. Being subject of a life entails having some characteristics which includes beliefs and desires, perception, memory and sense of the future; feelings of pleasure and pain, preference and welfare interests and the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals. (Regan, 1983) Nonhuman animals are for this sense captured by having a number of characteristics like, ability of experiencing emotions, hence, their life matters. Regan states that, we ought to treat beings with inherent value with the respect they are due as a matter of justice. It is impermissible to treat beings with inherent value merely as means to our ends. We have both negative and positive duties towards beings with inherent value. (Regan, *Ethical Theories* on <https://www.moral.org>)

## **Treatment of Animals from Utilitarian Point of View**

The theory of utility influenced animal advocates like Singer and Regan. The implication by the theory on our relationship with nonhuman animals is that, utilitarianism's implications concerning how we should treat other animals, as is true of everything else, depends on the overall consequences, counting equal interests equally. (Regan, 2003) The theory of utility though to some extent considers animal's interests; Regan does not think it is unworthy to grant animals, moral status. Regan asserts that, it is a mistake to claim that animals have an indirect moral status or unequal moral status. It is a mistake to ground unequal moral status on utilitarian grounds. (*Animals and Ethics Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://www.goodle.com>) The theory of utility is not therefore, sufficient to be a fountain of moral theory which takes to consideration animals interests.

The utilitarian principle therefore, influences Regan to some extent, but he is devoted to anchor animals on moral theory which fully renders animals as having moral status, something which utilitarian fails to. Therefore, he firmly introduces:

The concept of inherent value, any being that is a subject of a life is a being that has inherent value. A being that has inherent value is being towards which we must respect; in order to show respect to such a being we cannot use it merely as means to our ends. Instead, each such being must be treated as an end in itself. (Regan, 20003)

Animals in Regan indulgent ought to be treated as beings having inherent value. Animals are therefore, not to be considered as having instrumental value. Regan disqualifies utilitarian theory, on the basis that, it does not consider nonhuman animals as worth of moral consideration. The theory considers animals as having instrumental value, because it does not deny use.

Kant deontological ethics had also influence to Regan's inherent value theory. Though, Regan will not subscribe to it, it wakes his thoughts on arguing for inherent value for nonhuman animals. Concerning the ethics of Kant it is written that, Kant's ethics, notoriously, assigns fundamental value to rational beings. Nonhuman animals are not autonomous in relevant sense, and they are not moral agents, so they have no fundamental worth. Nonhuman seem clearly to be outside the scope of moral obligation. (Korsgaard, 2018) (The categorical imperative, which is also referred to as a universal moral law, majorly termed human beings as the only worth of intrinsic value.

We see that, Kant's universal laws were born from the notion that humans have intrinsic worth or dignity, by the virtue of their unique rationality. Every rational being exists as an end in itself and not merely as means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. (Kant, 1991) Human beings ought to treat each other not as having instrumental value but rather as possessing intrinsic value. Actions are judged not according to whether it promotes happiness or not, but on the basis of the consequences of the actions.

Kant's deontological ethics address how we ought to relate with our fellow humans and not how we ought to relate with nonhuman animals. Thus, he writes that:

Deontological ethics does not extend to nonhuman animals. The moral law refers specifically to humans. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings; only relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. (Matthew, 2005 on [www.ecomall.com](http://www.ecomall.com))

Regan claims that the argument on intrinsic value by Kant can encompass nonhuman animals. Hence Regan says that, while Regan agreed that animals are not rational in the same way as humans, he argues that they still have dignity because they are subject of a life with preferences, feelings and expectations. All animals are somebody, someone with life of their own. (Matthew, 2005 on [www.ecomall.com](http://www.ecomall.com)) Regan refutes the idea of Kant's neglecting nonhuman animals as possessing inherent value. Therefore, he writes that, my response to this challenge of inherent value involves abandoning the Kantian idea that persons are the unique bearers of inherent value and replacing it with an idea for which we have no commonly used word or expression. (Regan, 2006) Nonhuman animals in the view of Regan possess inherent value as subject of a life. Regan disagree with the idea that only human beings ought to be treated as end in themselves, and not as means. We are subjects to animals, and therefore arguing for their abolishment is a great deviation from the order of nature.

Kant is known to have framed the principle addressed in his deontological ethics. The principle is what is known as 'categorical imperative'. The word deontology derives from the Greek words *deon* meaning duty and *logos* meaning study. The theory assesses our choices of what we ought

to do. (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>) Kant's ethics uses rule to determine what is right from what is wrong. Kant argues that:

An end is an object of free choice, the representation of which determines an action. Every action therefore, has its end; and no one can have an end without himself making the object of his choice into an end. Act that determines an end is practical principle that prescribes the end itself not the means; it is categorical imperative of pure practical reason and therefore, an imperative which connects a concept of duty with an end in general. (Kant, 1991)

We may say that, every action regarding means and end proceed out of one's free will, meaning that they are voluntary actions. According to Kant, existence of free actions presupposes existence of free end.

Regarding the argument on means and end, he further says that, among ends there must be some that are also duties, for where there are no such ends, then all ends would hold for practical reason only as means to other ends; and since there can be no action without an end a categorical imperative would be impossible. (Kant, 1991) Human beings act for a purpose, the aim of acting targets to an end. Kant argues that, we all act for realm of ends. Whole of all end in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself; that is a situation in which each person is treated as intrinsically valuable, not as mere means to the ends set by each person. (Kant, 1785) Such a principle by Kant greatly promotes human dignity and ensures neither a servant nor a master can mistreat each other for selfish gain.

When we treat others as means, we simply use them as instruments and we disregard our respect to them as well as undermining their dignity. Though, Kant influences Regan's deontological ethics, which he argues for inherent value of nonhuman animals, Kant restricts intrinsic value to rational beings only. Regan picks from Kant and extends the same to animals. Since animals have inbuilt value and are subject of a life, in Regan understanding we ought not to use them as our property. Hence, we ought not to treat animals as bearers of instrumental value but rather as bearers of inherent value.

The reason as to why Kant calls his theory of ethics a 'categorical imperative is because, of his view that, it is categorical because, we recognize that its demands are unconditional but an

imperative because we recognize this law as something we ought to follow, thus as a constraint, that is, not something we always want to follow. (Guyer, 2016) We can say that, human beings ought to treat each another as beings having intrinsic value. Thus, humans are ends in themselves and it is our duty to act in a way that we treat one another as ends. The moral principle stands out shining because it ensures a fair treatment among human beings, though this principle from time to time we may find ourselves violating it in one way or the other. The principle of means and end, in Kantian sense only apply to human beings because they are the only moral beings. In other terms, non-human animals are outside the realm of intrinsic value, meaning that other animals can be treated as means to an end.

Some philosophers refer to Kant's categorical imperative as, a formula of humanity, because it says that, act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as means. Humanity is a practical abbreviation of what he is talking about. (Marks, 2009) It is clear that deontological ethics in Kantian sense is only applicable to human beings. Human beings moral worth should not therefore be reduced because doing so is treating them as means. In fact, we should not deliberately impose our will on others. Deontological ethics by Kant become a starting point for Regan's argument for inherent value to other animals.

Just as pointed earlier, for Kant he considers humans as having intrinsic value in themselves and guarantees them of being treated as means. Regan picks up such a foundation though not within Kantian application to humanity alone and argues that:

My response to this challenge involves abandoning the Kantian idea that persons are the unique bearers of inherent value and replacing it with an idea for which we have no commonly used word. In place of Kant's view that persons are unique in being inherently valuable, the rights view recognizes the inherent value of all subject of a life. All those who have this status that is to say, all those who as subjects of a life have an experiential welfare possess inherent value. (Regan, 2003)

Inherent value therefore, for Regan is not limited to human beings alone. In addition he writes that, the idea of being a subject of a life is central to answering the question, who is inherently valuable? Who is never to be treated as having instrumental value only? (Regan, 2003) Whether

a being has life or not in Regan's conviction should be the question we should ask ourselves as far as inherent value affiliation is concerned.

Thinking that we are the only intrinsically valuable beings is a sign of being anthropocentric. Supporting the argument we rely on the statement that;

As for suggestion that being a subject of a life illuminates only which human beings have value: such a suggestion is symptomatic of the prejudice of speciesism. If what we are being asked to believe is that humans who are subject to a life are inherently valuable because they are human beings; whereas other animals are subject of a life lack value of this kind because they are not human beings; then what we are being asked to believe, more than suggesting this prejudice, actually embodies it. (Regan, 2003)

Considering ourselves as human beings as endowed with in-built value while disregarding other non-human animals Regan's sees it as unfair.

The understanding of Regan is that:

Just as it is speciesist to count human interests as being morally significant and to deny this same status in the case of the similar interests of non-human, because the former are human interests, the latter not, so it is speciesist to affirm inherent value in the case of human subjects of a life and deny this in the case of non-human subjects of a life, because the former are humans, the latter not. (Regan, 2003)

The above analogy shows that Regan thinks even in the case of intrinsic value the same problem of prejudice has featured. May be that is why he asks, what, then, shall we say of the animals who concern us: cows, pigs, coyotes, mink, robins and crows? Are they like us in being subjects of a life? Animals like us, they bring their lives the mystery of a unified psychological presence, and like us they are somebodies not some-things.(Regan, 2003) Our argument concerning inherent value, rights and duties in our relationship with non-human in Regan's view should be built not on how we are different from them but on a common factor of similarities. We may argue that Regan uses the term inherent value, to label Kant's conception of intrinsic value; he tends to considers it as pervasive.

We may say that Kant informs Regan's theory of inherent value on the basis that, Kant's moral theory is seen as an attempt to extract all of morality, both being a moral agent and being a moral object, from a particular concept of rationality. (Rollin, 2006) It is worth noting that Kant limits the scope of intrinsic value to humans as moral beings. Regan only uses the notion of Kant's categorical imperative to universalize it in order to include nonhuman animals. Generally Regan does not agree that only humans are to be treated as means, as moral beings having inherent value.

### **Are Animals Means or an End from Kantian Perspective?**

When we evaluate whether animals are rendered as worth of being treated as having inherent value from Kantian point of view is that, "only rational beings are ends in themselves; that is beings that are not to be used as means (tools or instruments) to achieve some immediate or long term goal. (Rollin, 2006) Animals may therefore, be observed as having instrumental value. Using animals or their products is not therefore immoral. Abolishing use of animals as Regan tends to do from Kantian perspective is wrong. We may as well say that that, nonhuman animals are not captured under the realm of moral concern. As it is written that, it follows clearly for Kant that since only human beings are rational beings, only humans fall within the scope of moral concern. As far as animals are concerned, they have only instrumental value; that is, any worth they may have stems from their usefulness to humans.

Peter Singer in the contemporary period falls under animal advocates. Singer, comprehensively having being influenced so much by utilitarianism argued for equal respect between humans and animals. According to Julian H. Franklin writings, it is evident that, Singer is the leading exponent of utilitarianism as it applies to respect for animals. (Franklin, 2005) Regan argues for equal consideration of interests. Human beings interests as well as animals interests counts equally in his understanding. Thus, he says that:

Singer believes in the fundamental principle of equality, on which the equality of all human beings rests is the principle of equal consideration of interests. Only a basic moral principle of this kind can allow us to defend a form of equality that embraces all human beings. I shall now contend that while this principle does provide an adequate basis for human equality, it provides a basis that cannot be limited to humans. (Singer, 1994)

Nonhuman animals as well as humans count equally in Singer's sense, if we are to base morality on interest consideration. Animals have interests in avoiding pain and attaining what brings



contentment to them. Singer asserts that, in other words I suggest that, having accepted the principle of equality as a sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own species, we are committed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own species, the nonhuman animals. (Singer, 1994) Nonhuman animals fall within the scope of moral concern that is the reason as to why, Singer does argue for equal consideration of interests. We are to relate with animals in a way which shows we are not loftier than them.

Utilitarianism argues for taking into consideration the outcome of an action by taking concerns how it affects 'everyone'. Singer cites that we also ought to take to consideration ability to experience pleasure or pain that is 'sentience'. The argument by Singer is that, if a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted equally with the like suffering. (Singer, 1994) Nonhuman animals have the ability to experience pleasure or pain and in Singer's opinion they are morally justified to be taken into consideration.

All beings that have no ability to suffer, or experience pleasure have no ground for being taken into moral consideration. Thus, Singer writes that, this is why the limit of sentience (using the term as convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer, experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. (Singer, 1994) Some philosophers do not consider animals as endowed with such a capacity (sentience), Descartes as we showed earlier is a good example. Julian, asserts that, once we admit that all sentient beings can suffer pain and feel pleasure, they too must be included in the reckoning. If animals no less than humans feel sensations, their pains and pleasures no less than ours must count. That surely was the opinion of the founder of utilitarianism. (Franklin, 2005) Though, utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham does not deny use of animals but, that of Singers does take the argument a notch higher.

Singer took up the issue, systematically pursuing more extensive possibilities; he began a whole new chapter in the movement for animal equality by radicalizing Mill and Bentham. After exposing the horrors of factory farming and the callous waste of animals lives in biomedical testing and experimentation. (Franklin, 2005) Is it morally wrong to use animals in ways that are beneficial to humans? This is what Singer thinks, that the consumption of animals' flesh under present circumstances is morally wrong. Wrong is also biomedical experimentation at least as it

is now practiced. (Singer, 2002) It is evident that Singer considers using animals' flesh, subjects them to pain and deny animals, pleasure as well as use of nonhuman animals in the field of science.

Notably some philosophers like Mark Rowlands, describes Singer as, the founding father of the contemporary animal liberation movement. The increased public awareness of what exactly transpires in our treatment of nonhuman animals. Singer defends the moral claims of nonhuman animals. (Rowland, 2009) Claim for moral consideration for nonhuman from Singer's conception stems from an equal consideration. Having been so much influence by utilitarianism, he considers the concept of equal consideration as worth to render animals our moral concern. Pleasure is good whether experienced by human beings or by nonhuman animals, and pain is evil in the same sense.

Singer is convinced that, a true defender of animals should deny use of animals in different ways. Animals are part of moral community and whatever we do to them is considered by animal advocates as worth of moral concern. We can therefore, do right and wrong to animals, but can we argue like Singer and Regan, that using animals in ways benefiting to humanity as wrong? Singer argues that:

Since as I have said, none of these practices caters for anything more than our pleasure of taste, our practice of rearing and killing other animals in order to eat them; is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most important interests of other beings. In order to satisfy trivial interests of our own, we must stop this practice and each of us has a moral obligation to cease supporting this practice. (Singer, 2002)

Human beings are considered as having a duty to quite supporting killing animals for their flesh. Our preference to eat animals flesh or use them in medical research leads to animals suffering. The dependency of human beings on animals is so wide. Animal industry has greatly become a source of economic value in many parts of the worlds. Different people have relied on animal industries to earn a living. Mark shows how animal industries richly depend on animals when he writes that, the animal industry is big business. It is uncertain exactly how many people are involved in it, both directly or indirectly; but certainly the number must run into the tens, and probably hundreds, of thousands. (Rowlands, 2009) The use of figures here clearly highlights

that, so many human beings dependent on animals in different ways, for different benefits. Banning use of animals does not take to consideration how many people will be affected in various ways. It does not confirm or even affirm that animals belong to moral domain.

Those who argue for animals as part of moral domain or endowed with intrinsic value deny using animals as property. Mark continues to show how the chain of depending on animals is so dynamic. The remark he makes is that:

There are those who actually raise and sell the animals. Then, there are the feed producers and retailers; cage manufacturers and designers; producers of growth stimulants and other chemicals; those who butcher, package and ship the produce. Then there are extension personnel and veterinaries whose lives revolve around the success or failure of the animal industry. (Rowlands, 2009)

It is quite palpable that taking the direction of Regan, may subject human beings to suffering. Animal sector have employed so many persons. We dependent on animals for different enriching activities; hence objecting their use will be to disregard human beings possess intrinsic value and deserving dignified treatment.

Mark also says that, moreover also to consider are all the members of the families who are the dependants of these employees or employers. The interests these people have in raising animals intensively gone well beyond pleasures of taste and are far from trivial. (Rowlands, 2009) Regan though regards the efforts made by Singer in arguing for equal consideration of interest, the theory of equality build on sentience is utilitarian oriented. Regan wishes to put in place a theory which is non-anthropocentrically framed.

Regan represents a forceful and, in some ways compelling account of why nonhuman animals should be regarded as making direct moral concern claims upon us. The reason according to Regan, is that nonhuman animals possess moral rights and presents an elegant and systematic theoretical underpinning for this claim. (Rowlands, 2009) Since animals possess moral rights, they belong to moral standing. The reason as to why Regan argues for moral stand for nonhuman animals is seeing in what Mark articulates that:

I think it is fair to regard Regan's case as proceeding from within the framework of natural rights approaches to morality. This is for three reasons. Firstly, Regan argues that many kinds of nonhuman animals possess moral rights in virtue of

their nature; in virtue of the fact that they are as he puts it, subject of a life. Secondly, his argument appeals quite centrally to the concept of inherent value, viewed as an objective moral property which attaches to certain things and which does so irrespective of whether those things happen to be value or not. (Rowlands, 2009)

Inherent value and subject of a life are the beams on which Regan builds the argument of nonhuman animals as worth of moral concern and basing on them, he declares it as wrong to use animals, either as food, as a commercial commodity or in medical research. Therefore, it is so unmistakable that, Regan views at least nonhuman animals as possessors of moral rights which are objective in the sense that they do not depend on whether they are recognized rights. (Rowlands, 2009) Regan shows the argument on subject of life as so non-anthropocentric and considers inclusivity of nonhuman animals.

### **Regan on Nonhuman Animals Moral Rights**

The argument for nonhuman animals, moral rights, is built on two main concepts of Regan, 'subject of a life and inherent value'. Regan having influence by the various theories explained earlier on, he felt that they are not sufficient to defend animals from what he terms as human, 'exploitation'. Consequently, he comes up with a theory of inherent value which he uses to abolish use of animals. The assertion by him is that:

Individual are subject of a life they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory and sense of the future; including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them. Logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. (Regan, 1983)

In case a being has life, it basically has inherent value. As Regan writes that, being alive is a sufficient condition of an individual's having inherent value. Those who satisfy subject of a life criterion have inherent and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles. (Regan, 1983) Animals in this sense are not to be treated as having instrumental value which regards us treating them as tools.

Regan tends to argue that, we are not loftier than non-human, all human beings are subject of a life just like non-human animals are and therefore he states that, 'in terms of our inherent value we are equal with non-human animals. (Regan, 1983) In Regan's sense we may say that, he inclines to conceive being subject of a life as necessitating having intrinsic value. Such conception is not the case because we have incidents where a being is not subject to life but is rendered intrinsic value.

Ecosystems possess intrinsic value because thing is right when it tend to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. Intrinsic value is familiar and basic; it is reflected by what each of us feels virtually and intuitively in regard to ourselves and others. (Vucetich, Bruskotter and Nelson, 2015) An entity may have intrinsic value existing together with instrumental value or even instrumental value may be on its own. An example to illustrate this is as follows, a hammer may possess instrumental value for pounding nails and a child might possess instrumental value for doing chores and also possess intrinsic value. A child is intrinsically valuable even if he or she could do nothing. Thus, the two kinds of values are not mutually exclusive. Vucetich, Bruskotter and Nelson, 2015) (Meaning that, occurrence of one does not necessitate presence of the other or even absence of the others.

The two values are not equal or even the same. Instrumental value basically lies within the usefulness of an object to a subject. Instrumental value is described to be replaceable; meaning that, one object usefulness, can be replaced by another. May be that is the reason as to why it is said that, instrumental value lies solely within the function of the object. In contrast, intrinsic value is associated with the object itself not its function. An intrinsically valuable object cannot be substituted by another. (Vucetich, Bruskotter and Nelson, 2015) When something is said to have intrinsic value it means that, it ought to be valued not on the basis of its usefulness but on basis of 'what it is'; may be that is why Regan argues that non-human animals have inherent value. Possessing intrinsic value is a pointer to treating that particular entity with due respect because of what it is. Regan as a 'zoo-centric,' sights animals as posers of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic worth is something which Regan uses to draws his argument on non-human animals, equal treatment to humans. Regan says that:

You and I do have values as individuals; what we call inherent value. To say that we have such value is to say we are something more than, something different

from, mere receptacles. The genius and the retarded child, the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Theresa and the most unscrupulous used car salesman- all have inherent value. All possess it equally and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things. As if they exist as resources for others. (Bradely, 2006)

We undoubtedly see that, Regan has in mind that all human beings ought to be treated equally. Humans should not treat each other in any way which may reduce one to the level of a property. Regan has in mind, that treating human beings as resources will be to reduce them to means. He holds to the idea that, non-humans animals have inherent value. When something has inherent value, we ought to respect it, we have duties towards it. We should treat it as an end in itself, not merely as means. Inherent value is sort of value that is possessed by a concrete living being. (Bradely, 2006) Ben for these reason, tend to limit intrinsic value to living beings.

We should also conceive that, it exists in varying degree depending on the nature of the being. Human beings have therefore higher intrinsic value than non-human beings. Just as there exist hierarchy in order of beings, there ought also to existence hierarchy in the order of intrinsic value, just following from the order of beings. Human beings consequently, must possess more valuable intrinsic value than non-human animals and plants. Thus, arguing for equal intrinsic value is impossible.

In our discourse concerning value, it is worth to note that, in all aspects, whether intrinsic or instrumental value, human beings seem to be guaranteed to be the valuer. Only human beings have the capacity to assign value to things, such a value arises from the relation of the particular thing to us. Therefore, our relationship with animate and non-animate is basically instrumental value. Thus, in relation to non-human animals we may say that, we regard their instrumental value and not intrinsic value. Nonhumans can only have instrumental value. The only things which do in fact have value are humans and their states, such that a world without humans would have no value whatsoever (O'Neill, 1992) Human beings become very important in conveying value to things around him. Without human beings, we may not talk of something.

In case we are to draw a line between human value and nonhuman animals value, how can we go about it? Where can we draw the line? It cannot be true to say that, nonhumans since are subject of a life and are bearers of intrinsic value they ought to be treated equally to human beings.

Neither can we say that we ought not to use them since they have inherent value and are subject of a life nor abolish their uses by arguing for moral status. Though, Regan does so, what he does is simply a violation of the order put by nature on human and nonhuman relationship. Deviating from such a reality attracts creating a disharmony between humans and animals, relationship hence, threatening humans' wellbeing and dignity.

### **Drawing a Line between Human and Nonhuman Animals Intrinsic Value**

The argument here does not refute that, ontologically every being has a value, because every being ontologically is good. Every being, by the very fact that it is a being, has some goodness about it and is good for something.(Fagothey, 1959) The 'goodness about' here points to intrinsic value while "good for" is a pointer to instrumental value. We use the term to 'draw a line' to denote that intrinsic value of human beings and those of nonhuman animals should not be considered to be equal as Regan seems to do. Taking into consideration that nature does not place human beings and other animals at the same level; such a difference has to stand all through even in our relationship with other animals.

Nonhumans cannot be co-equal to human beings, simply because human beings are self- guided, self-conscious and rational. How we are different from animals is also manifested in their mode of living. Man has constant quest for the good. Humans can distinguish a good life from a bad, a right way of living from a wrong, a doing of what he ought as opposes to what he ought not to. (Fagothey, 1959) Nonhuman animals have no such a capacity to differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong. Whatever is good to animals is only good in the sense of instrumental value.

We may say that, there must be in place what we may call "hierarchy of values". Though like humans animals act for an end, which is the good, they do not have the capacity to know the value of that good. Only human beings have the capacity to know the value of something. The intrinsic value of a being is so metaphysical that, we may not easily grasp it; it is something to be contemplated on. It appears to be so theoretical in its properties unlike with instrumental value. Though, Regan defends animals as having inherent value, it is something which is so abstract and tend to escape human senses, that is why it is easier for us to clink on the instrumental value which emerges out of relating with other animals. Instrumental value is so vivid in not only animals but also in other entities. Living and non-living things have their instrumental value know to us.

Arguing for animals to be treated as beings with inherent value (end) and not as a means (instrument) sounds so damned (God's forsaken) even by humans. In fact such a squabble by Regan cannot stand; it forgets the fact that man-animals relationship is so rich in instrumental value. Using animals in one way or another does not violate the hierarchy of values. Abolishing animals' use by human beings is what greatly violates the order of value.

Whenever we use 'means' we should be aware within Regan's context it stands for instrument, while 'end' stands for inherent value. Are animals intended for their own sake or for the sake of human beings? When something is considered for its own sake it becomes an end, why Regan uses the term intrinsic value is because, just like an end, it stands in relation to the thing itself. When something is said to exist for the sake of something else, it is simply rendered to be, 'means', in Regan's it is taken to mean instrumental. It worth noting, though a 'means' always may be taken to presuppose an 'end', intrinsic value does not presuppose instrumental value, one may occur the other may not.

According to Austin, "a means signifies that, it lies in a mean or middle position between the agent and the end, and its use brings the agent to the end.(Fgothey, 1959) Though Regan, argues for treating animals as having inherent value, thus as an end, he should keep in mind that, we still can treat them as intermediate end. An example to illustrate this is; let us say there is a condition that for one to get a motorbike one must own a cow, one has a piece of land and sells it to acquire a cow, the cow becomes an end in relation to the land, while the end which is the cow becomes a means to be bestowed the motorbike, which (is the end). Basing the argument on our analogy we can argue that, whether animals are guaranteed as having intrinsic value and been part of moral community, their use as means (instrumental value) is inescapable. Human beings relationship with other entities stands not on rules put in place by man himself but by nature. Regan should therefore consider his policy on abolishing use of animals as disaster-prone.

Can it be possible to treat animals as purely ends? Or in other words, can we only treat animals as having inherent value only? Allowing animals to be owned by those who would raise them for food, as a source of various by products, as objects to be entered into competitions, or even as pets; we show that we are willing to treat animals as mere means to human ends. (Francione, 1995) Using animals in the different stated ways, is treating them as having instrumental worth.



Singer and Regan are considered to be against such uses of animals. Regan and Singer have presented and developed sophisticated and persuasive arguments in favor of increased moral consideration for animals. According to them, prevailing social attitudes towards animals are characterized by speciesism, which uses a morally irrelevant criterion to determine membership in the moral community. (Francione, 1995) Human beings deny moral concern to nonhuman animals because of what Regan terms as 'speciesism' that is favoring beings of one's species kind. The suggestion that being a subject of a life illuminates only human beings have inherent value: such suggestion is symptomatic of the prejudice of speciesism. (Regan, 2003) As far as nonhuman animals, advocates are concerned; Regan seeks not to reform our use of animals but to completely stop use of animals. Regan, purporting that by using animals we disregard them as subject of a life endowed with inherent value stand to be something impossible. Human beings will always remain to depend on plants, animals and other inanimate beings.

### **General Evaluation for Regan's Idea for Warranting Moral Concern to Animals**

Since nonhuman animals for Regan have life and are endowed with inherent value they have moral rights. We have duty not to use them as means to an end. There is an argument that:

There is natural hierarchy of living. The different levels are determined by the abilities present in the beings due to their nature. While plants, animals and human beings are capable of taking in nutrition and growing, only human beings are capable of conscious experience. Plants are inferior to animals and human beings, have the function of serving the needs of animals and human beings. Likewise, human beings are superior to animals. It follows, therefore, that the function of animals is to serve the needs of human beings. (*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://iep.utm.edu/anim-ethics>)

The very fact that there exists hierarchy which dictates human relationship with animals and plants, such an order should not be overturned. Though, this does not mean that we should treat them as we wish. If a being cannot direct its own actions then others must do so; these sorts of beings are merely instruments. Instruments exist for the sake of the people that use them, not for their own sake. Since animals cannot direct their own actions they are merely instruments and exist for the sake of human beings. (Aquinas, on <https://www.cc.e.org/ccle/Aquinas/summa.html>) Animals, whether they are subject of a life and bear inherent value, it does not nullify the fact that, they exist for the good of humanity. Using animals either as food or for other gains is not wrong, as long as we do so responsibly. Therefore, "if one being is higher than other on the food chain, then it is natural for that being to use the other in the furtherance of its interests. Since this

sort of behavior is natural, it does not require any further moral justification. (*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://iep.utm.edu/anim-ethics>) It may therefore, go without saying that, denying humans the use of animals goes against such natural justification, whether on moral basis or on inherent value or on subject of a life basis.

### **Are Animals Moral Agents or Moral Patients**

There is no doubt that many arguments raised deny animals as worth of being part of moral community. Animal advocates argue for animals as part of moral community basing arguments on either ability to experience pain or on being subject of a life, Singer and Regan respectively base their assertion for animals, moral concern. The assertion of Mark is that:

Animals can be moral subjects in the sense that they can be motivated to act by moral reasons. These moral reasons take the form of morally laden emotions that have moral content. An emotion has moral content in the sense that, if it is not misguided, it guarantees the truth of a moral proposition. When animals are discussed in the context of morality, the discussion almost always coalesces on the issue of whether animals should be thought of as moral patient. One is a moral patient if and only if one is a legitimate object of moral concern. That is, roughly, one is an entity that has interests that should be taken into consideration when decisions are made concerning it or otherwise impact on it. (Rowlands, 2013)

Regan argues for equal consideration of nonhuman animals as part of moral community on the basis of inherent value which he thinks gives a basis for respecting animals. The theory of inherent value applies to our dealings with moral agents and moral patients and applies equally. Since for reasons offered, moral agents and patients must be viewed as possessing equal inherent value. (Regan, 1983) Within this line of thought, it is evident that, Regan terms animals as moral patients while human beings are moral agents but having equal inbuilt value.

Those who argue for animal ethics as possessing, moral status, like Singer and Regan, they underline specific entitlement to nonhuman animals. The moral arguments they develop prohibition of using animals on the basis of their theories. Singer who is a utilitarian argues for moral status of nonhuman on basis of the ability to feel pleasure or pain. Singer establishes moral entitlement for nonhuman animals by arguing for pain and pleasure interests. If animals are bearers of moral status it necessitates that there are actions which we ought to or not to do to animals. Regan too put across the argument of abolishing use of animals on the basis that are subject of a life and have inherent value hence deserve to be treated not as having instrumental

value but rather inherent value. The moral theory he uses to demand for moral status for animals disqualifies use of animals in ways that disregard them as part of moral community.

### **Conclusion**

The chapter has achieved successfully its aim of first showing the background of Regan and the various philosophical theories which in one way or another influenced Regan's theory of subject of a life and inherent value of nonhuman animals. The moral theory stand in defense for animals as worth of moral concern and as endowed with intrinsic value. There is nothing virtually wrong with defending a humane handling of nonhuman animals, but Regan sidelines this when he disregards animals as worth of human use and dismisses the use of animals in all the various aspects which are beneficial to human beings. Animals as well as plants do not exist for their own sake but for the sake of supporting human kind as has he exists. A banana tree is not good for its banana-ness but because of the value it has to human beings, that is, it bears fruits which are useful to human beings. A banana plant can be food for herbivorous animals. Other animals on the other hand exist to support humans' wellbeing, through their various instrumental values which they possess but not for their own sake.

### **REFERENCES**

- Bradely Ben. "Two Concept of Intrinsic Value", *Ethical and Moral Practice* Vol. 9, No. 2 (2006): 111-130.
- Crisp Roger. *Mill on Utilitarianism*. New York: Routledge Publishers, 1997.
- Fathothey Austin. *Right and Reason Ethics in Theory and Practice* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Washington: Mosby Company, 1959.
- Francione Gary. *Animals, Property and the Law*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.
- Francione L. Gary and Garner Robert. *The Animal Rights Debate Abolition or Regulation?* New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Franklin H. Julian. *Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Guyer Paul. *Kant* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis group, 2016.
- I. Omotosho. "On Tom Regan's Defence of Animal of Animal Rights", *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2018): 56-61.
- Kant Immanuel. *The Metaphysics of Morals* translated by Mary Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1785.

Kemmerer Lisa *In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals*. Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006.

Korsgaard M. Christine. *The Place of Animals in Kantian Ethics*. Washington: Oxford University press, 2018.

Mill Stuart John. *Utilitarianism*. Washington: The Floating Press, 2009.

O'Neill John. "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value", *The Intrinsic Value of Nature* Vol. 75, No. 2 (1992): 119-137.

Regan Tom. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Washington: University of California Press, 1983.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Animal Rights Human Wrongs an Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. Washington: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

Rollin E. Bernard. *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. New York: Prometheus Books, 2006.

Rowlands Mark. *Animal Rights Moral Theory and Practice* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Florida: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2009.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Animals And Moral Motivation: A Response to Clement", *Journal of Animal Ethics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2013): 15-24

Singer Peter. *Animals Liberation*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Practical Ethics* New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.

Vucetich A. John, Bruskotter T. Jeremy and Nelson Paul Michael. "Society for Conservation Marks Joel. *Ought Implies Kant a reply to the Consequentialist Critique*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

*Animals and Ethics Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://www.goodle.com>

Aquinas, on <https://www.cc:e.org/cce/Aquinas/summa.html>

A Narrative Review of Ethics Theories: Teleological and Deontological on [www.iosrjournals.org](http://www.iosrjournals.org)

*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://iep.utm.edu/anim-ethics>

Matthew K. A, Interview with Tom Regan the sataya magazine, 2005 on [www.ecomall.com](http://www.ecomall.com)

Regan's, Autobiography on <https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1649103/bio>

Regan, *Ethical Theories* on <https://www.moral.org>

Regan , *Ethical Theories* on <https://www.moral.org>

Regan, A Bird in the Cage on <https://animals.value.org//.html>

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>