



**UNDERSTANDING GENDER AS BEING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDITH BUTLER'S CONCEPT OF PERFORMATIVITY AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF *DASEIN***

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**Abstract**

Judith Butler's concept of performativity asserted that the individual sense of self is not made by someone else but is originally constituted by the individual human being. However, some scholars such as Jay Prosser and Lise Nelson consider such notion as problematic, arguing that it is impossible to be in oneself without recognizing other constituted realities.

To overcome the problems confronting Butler's concept of performativity, the researcher proposed that it must be integrated with Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted identity, and (c) authenticity. Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* argues that man has the capacity to understand his own sense of self in his different existential encounter of the world, towards other beings and also by surpassing his own facticity or limitation.

The integration of the concepts of Butler and Heidegger leads also to a conceptual shift of understanding gender from performativity towards gender as *Being* containing the following elements: (a) Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity, (b) Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what he likes to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity, and (c) Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key to possibilities.

Improving on Butler's concept of performativity, this research concludes that gender identity is constituted not only based on one's subjective desire but on other aspects as well, such as lived experienced with other beings and one's being situated in the world.

Keywords: Gender as Being, Performativity, Phenomenology, Dasein

**INTRODUCTION**

Gendered identity is one of the contemporary issues in determining the individual sense of self. It is commonly perceived from heterosexual, man-woman binary lenses (Mikkola, 2008). In addition, it is the aspect of personhood closest to one's sense of identity as it mainly through gender that people express themselves to others. However, this sense of identity was condemned socially, politically, biologically, psychologically, institutionally, and even in the religious realm because it is against in the prescribed nature of a man and a woman.

Because of this contradicting argument, Judith Butler (1999) contributed significantly to this radical gender perspective. She argued that gender, sex, and sexuality have no stable identity. However, more than this, Butler (1999) proposed the concept of identity as an imitation of an ideal self that nobody inhabits. In other words, gender for Butler is not an imposing and compelling identity but a product of one's original act or desire. Indeed, this is the primary basis of Butler to come up with the idea that gender is performativity.

However, there are problems with Butler's theory that requires further exploration. At first, Butler's perspectives did not recognized and rejected other factors, such as the already established or given identities, as an essential aspect in determining one's original sense of self. For Butler, the constituted identities are socially and linguistically created. The individual person also is just simply following those acts (Felluga, 2002). Through this Butler's contention, other scholars such like Jay Prosser, and Lise Nelson argued that performativity has any grounds to have a stabilized identity. They argued also that these stabilized or constituted identities contributed in establishing one's original sense of self such like in the case of the transgendered people who want to have a vagina in order to be fitted in the social norms.

As researcher's point of view, Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* can be considered as a way to explore further Butler's concept of performativity by comparing and by integrating both concepts. Similar to Butler's concept of performativity, Heidegger argued that

one has no fixed essential entities. One can find his own essential structure for being responsible in searching for his possibility of becoming (Heidegger, 1956). However, in distinction, for Heidegger, personhood can be realized through the individual encounter of the world, with the other beings and by overcoming one's limitation.

Moreover, the primary intention of the research's discourse is not only to identify its conceptual correlation but to explore also the loopholes of Butler's concept of performativity through using the lenses of Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted identity, and (c) authenticity. Through the given concepts, it may provide a conceptual shift of understanding of gender as performativity towards gender as Being in to three domains: (a) Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity, (b) Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity, and (c) Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key in any possibilities. Moreover, through these domains, these elucidate that the different lived experiences of the individual human being, one's limitation, and already given identities contributed and considered as the fundamental aspect in forming and realizing one's original sense of self.

## METHODOLOGY

The study used a pure philosophical research method, particularly the critical analysis to explore how Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* is related to Butler's concept of performativity. In the body part of the research manuscript, the researcher exposed Butler's performativity and the weaknesses of her concept. After exposing Butler's concept, Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* was presented. This made possible through intensive library works, reading, analyzing, synthesizing, organizing and encoding the relevant information related to this study. Lastly, after presenting all the relevant information, the researcher analyzed the conceptual convergences and divergences of Butler's performativity and Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein*. Then the last part uses a justification suggested with information that would give some sort of enlightenment to understand gender as Being.

This research focused on Butler's concept of performativity and Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein*. It focused also on comprehending the conceptual convergences and divergences of Butler's performativity and Heidegger's phenomenology of in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted Identity, and (c) authenticity in order to provide new understanding of gender as performativity towards gender as Being into three domains: (a) Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity, (b) Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity, and (c) Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key in any possibilities. Only those relevant information were included to support the argument of the study.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

### A. Judith Butler's Gender Performativity

The first part of the research discussion contains Judith Butler's concept of gender performativity and its weaknesses. Specifically the details of the following variables in answer to study's objectives are being highlighted: (a) The distinction among sex, gender role, and gender identity (b) Butler's notion of sex and gender as socially constructed, (c) Butler's notion of gender performativity; (d) The problem of gender performativity.

#### *The distinction among sex, gender role, and gender identity*

Human beings grew up with the idealism that there are only two-assigned sexes at birth. These biological sexes referred to male and female. These are also the usual labels given at birth. It was based on one's medical factors including the hormones, the chromosomes, and the genitals (Ton, 2018). In the psychological factor, the assigned sex can be determined based from their sex chromosomes. If the baby's chromosome is XX, the assigned sex is female while if the baby's chromosome is XY, the assigned sex is male (Gender and Gender Identity, 2019).

Nevertheless, their assigned sex determines one's social role wherein one must act according to the set of expectation, standards, and characteristics about how a man and woman are supposed to act. Moreover, there are some human beings even nowadays want to live oppositely in their assigned sex. There are some people who want to live based on how they feel inside and how they express those feelings. There are some who feel and like to live a masculine female or feminine male.

According to Psychologist Robert Stoller, one can refer to sex in terms of his/her biological, anatomical, and chromosomal factors. On the other hand, gender role is a set of behaviors and society's expectation on how one must act according to his/her assigned sex. It

describes also how much feminine and masculine behavior displays (Mikkola, 2017). Lastly, gender identity is something following one's preferred identity either to live a male or a female.

### ***Butler's notion of sex and gender as socially constructed***

The distinction between sexed and gendered identity is used to have separate terminologies between a sexed body and gendered behavior (Ton, 2018). It means that there are no ways to have a similarity between sex and gender. On the other hand, biological sex does not determine one's gender identity. Sex and gender, therefore, are different in context.

In contrast, Butler (1999) argued that sex and gender are socially constructed and both are the same ideology. For Butler, social reality continually creates elusive identities through language, gesture, and all manners of symbolic social signs or speech acts. It means that one's preferred identity was created through linguistic construction and one was just simply following or participating in those acts. Through performing those conventions of reality or embodying those fictions in one's actions, human beings make those artificial conventions appear to be natural and necessary. By enacting those conventions, human beings make it real to some extent (Felluga, 2002).

As Butler (1993) said in her book *Body's That Matter*, "there is no reference in our understanding of bodily sexuality. Sexed and gendered identities are artificially imposed and become cultural norms that govern the materialization of the body." It means that our most personal acts continually scripted by hegemonic social conventions and ideologies (Felluga, 2002). It views also that every individual's behavior or personhood is performatively constituted by the social or heterosexual norms.

Indeed for Butler (1990), gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses or disguises as an interior self, and whether the "self" conceived as a sexed or not. As Mikkola (2017) quoted Rubin saying gender is caused by social interventions in which people are told not to behave in a certain way because it does not match to their preferred gender. Since sex and gender are socially constructed, it means that both have no stable or fixed identity. The succeeding discussion presents Butler's concept of performativity and how it intervenes in the ideology that gendered and sexed identities are socially or heterosexually constructed.

### ***Butler's Notion of Performativity***

In the preceding discussion, Butler questioned the normative beliefs that certain gender behaviors seemed to be an objective natural thing wherein an individual just simply follows and performs them by means of symbolic order. Symbolic order is the system of signs and conventions that determines our perception of what we see as reality (Felluga, 2002). Through this, Butler raised the philosophical query that to what extent one's acts will determine by one's place, language, and convention.

Butler (1999) suggested that sex and gender are performative. According to Xie (2014), gender performativity is an unformed concept that could compete with well-established concepts of anatomical sex and gender identity. On the other hand, Butler's concept is a revolutionized theory which argued that gender has no prescribe identity but it is something people do or act. Her concept of performativity argued that human beings cannot assume a stable identity. Subjectivity, instead, is a process which neither origin nor end but it is something people do rather than are (Salih, 2002). Besides, the act of performing gender constitutes who really people are. There is no gender identity behind the very expression of the identity and that identity is performatively constituted that is said to be the result (Butler, 1999).

In other words, gender being performative excludes the social construction of gender idealism. For Butler gendered identity is a compelling illusion and has no stable identity because it does not stay over time and varies with race, class, or region (Butler, 1999). For example, other countries do not prohibit marrying with similar sex while other countries prohibit same sex marriage. According to Butler (1988) "I will understand constituting acts not only as constituting the identity of the actor, but as constituting that identity as compelling illusion, an object of belief."

The latter statement tells us that there is no abiding gender identity but it is the end result of one's act (Duigan, 2019). Gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might said to pre-exist the deed (Butler, 1999). It means that there is no "we" nor "I" who determined of what gender to be. The one who does one's original identity is oneself or there is no doer behind the deed. As Sarah Salih (2002) aptly described it,

In Butler's scheme of things, if you decided to ignore the expectations and the constraints imposed by your peers, colleagues, etc. by 'putting on a gender',

which for some reason would upset those who have authority over you or whose approval you require, you could not simply reinvent your metaphorical gender

wardrobe or acquire an entirely new one (and even if you could do that, you would obviously be limited by what was available in the shops). Rather, you would have to alter the clothes you have in order to signal that you are not wearing them in a conventional way – by ripping them or sewing sequins on them or wearing them back to front or upside down. In other words, your choice of gender is curtailed, as is your choice of subversion-which might make it seem as though what you are doing is not ‘choosing’ or ‘subverting’ your gender at all.

As Butler (1993) said, “One is not simply a body, but, in some very key sense, one does one’s body differently from one’s contemporaries and from one’s embodied predecessors and successors as well.” In other words, one cannot make another person with the same identity as others. However, one can make himself as the real version of his own self. Thus, governing one’s perception of reality, one can make his subjectivity any less constructed (Felluga, 2002).

For Butler (1990), gender is becoming a corporeal style, or an act, as it is wherein no relation to the essential truths about the body. In addition, becoming gendered involves impersonating that nobody actually inhabits. It means that the original doer of one’s identity is oneself. It is not already decided but it emerges only within the actual expression and there is no ground for stable identity (Ton, 2019). Indeed, J.L Austin’s and Jacques Derrida’s idealism has something to do with the power of performative that comes from one’s capacity to be repeatable in different context (Krolokke, 2006). Being what you are is similar to Butler’s metaphor of wardrobe. It suggested that one has the capacity to be in one’s conventional way.

### ***The Problem of Gender Performativity***

Butler’s concept of performativity argued that gender identity is a sequence of act or a set of acts and through these acts form one’s identity (Ton, 2019). That is why, for Butler, gender is not a stable identity but it is something we do rather than what we are (Salih, 2002). In other words, subjectivity is not constitutionally, culturally, and biologically determined. Rather, it is the effect or the product of one’s action.

There are other who criticized Butler’s contention because she insisted that there is no ground for the stability of identity. One’s action or language really constitutes one’s original identity. Jay Prosser is one of those who criticized Butler’s concept of performativity. Prosser (1988) took the issue as Butler’s view of identity and body. He used an analogy to explain how it is possible for a transsexual person to feel mismatch between their body and image they have in their own body (Betcher, 2014). Transgender people for Butler are example of constituted identity wherein these people want to have surgery to fit the norm that all women have vagina and all men have penis (Ton, 2019).

To attack Butler’s argument, Prosser used the neurological inability to track parts of one’s body, called bodily agnosia. Agnosia is the loss of the ability to recognize familiar objects or stimuli usually as a result of brain damage (National Aphasia Association, 2019). He applied this psychological factor to transgender people who feel like they do not have breasts, or should have penis. Prosser’s point of view is that transgender people who want to undergo surgery in order to match their mind and body into their preferred identity (Ton, 2019). Prosser cited as reference for intellectual discourse, Butler’s description of Venus who assigned male at birth (Butler, 2011):

Venus has expressed her desire to become a whole woman, to find a man and have a house in suburbs with a washing machine. Butler described Venus as an example that confirms the notion that gender is performance. She saw Venus as a person who is performing drag and denaturalizing gender. This description raises the question: does Butler view Venus as a person who is trying to change gender norms? Venus expresses a life of woman, which could indicate that she is transgender and would be fulfilling a traditional female gender role (Ton, 2019).

Prosser argued that Venus was cited by Butler to serve as an example of constituting identity, without considering her as a subject (Halberstam, 2000). This criticism of Prosser is a way to clarify that Butler misinterprets the transgendered people. Butler does not clearly identify that transsexuals and transgender are one and not a form of performativity. Besides, they underwent surgery in order to fit in the social norms.

Similarly, sociologists Williams and Harrison (1998) argued that performativity has the doer behind the deed. At first, they agreed on the idea that it is helpful to deconstruct the idea of the ontological status of gender. However, they found out that Butler’s theory built a new ontological foundation in gender conceptualization wherein the subject assumes an identity without any references. Lise Nelson (1999) argued also that Butler’s concept of performativity ontologically assumes an abstracted subject and has no any space on the individual knowledge of the conscious identity.

This also manifested that the theory of performativity does not consider other factors. These factors include the space within which the performance occurs. The other involved and how

they might see or what they interpret they witness (Lloyd, 1999). It means that Butler does not give any space for constituted identity in her concept of performativity. Moreover, Chris Brichell (2005) criticized Butler's prose of writing. He pointed out that Butler is not clear about the concept of the subject. It was said that in her writings, sometimes the subject only exist tentatively. Sometimes they possess a real existence and other times are socially active.

In summary, they claimed that Butler was wrong in saying that there is no doer behind the action of the individual person. They argued that Butler's subjectivity ontologically assumes an abstracted identity and has no ground for the non-performative in the self-formation. In the researcher's viewpoint, the criticisms manifested that there is any ground for non-performativity in Butler's concept of performativity. And that Butler shows inconsistency in her philosophical perspective that she failed to discuss. These views make Butler's performativity more problematic and it needs some sort of clarifications.

In her book *Gender Trouble*, she said that if "I were to rewrite this book under present circumstances, I would include a discussion of transgender and intersexuality. The way that ideal dimorphism works in both sort of discourses. The different relations to surgical intervention that these related concerns sustain." This suggests that Butler's performativity is open to any criticisms and some sort of improvement (Salih, 2002). Since Butler's concept of performativity shows inconsistency, Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* may somehow offer something for further understanding of what is gender all about. Heidegger's concept is discussed in the succeeding chapter.

## **B. Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology of *Dasein***

Since Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* contains vast perspectives, this would focused only to some relevant information. The following are the concepts for discussion: (a) Being-in-the-world, (b) Being-with-others, (c) *Dasein's* Temporality and its Tripartite Ontological Structure, and (d) Authentic and Inauthentic existences.

It has been presented in the literature section that Heidegger focused on the existential question of what is the Being of being or *dasein*. He used this concept as frontal attack on the traditional metaphysics wherein all entities identified objectively. As stated, *dasein* is an entity and it does not occur among other entities. Nevertheless, its entities can manifest through *dasein's* existence (Heidegger, 1962).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger insisted that the essence of *dasein* lies in its existence. He said also that, "In each case *dasein's* possibility, but not just a property as something present-at-hand. In addition, because *dasein* is in case essentially its own possibility, it can in its very Being somehow understands (Heidegger, 1962). It means that *dasein* essentially owns his Being and can characterize through his existence. To understand Heidegger's concept in the broader sense, he provided four (4) different ontological structures of *dasein* as mentioned earlier.

### ***Dasein as Being-in-the-world***

In Heidegger's analysis of *dasein*, he found out that the fundamental character of *dasein* is a condition of already Being-in-the-world (Wollin & Naess, 2019). For him, being-in-the-world is the most basic and constitutive state of *dasein*. He said also that it is inconceivable to think of a man in isolation from the world and neither is the world meaningful without the *dasein* (Heidegger, 1962). To understand it fully, Heidegger divided Being-in-the-world into three components: (a) being-in, (b) the world, and (c) the self.

**Being-in**, this first component indicates the existential relationship of *dasein* in this world. For Heidegger, *dasein* is acquainted into two relationships, which are the relationship with other things or *Bersogen* and the relationship with other men or *Solicitude* (Iwuagu, 2017). These relationships reveal that man situated into different existential relations. As Blackham (1965) said, *dasein* is to be something relationship is not something spatial but means to dwell, to sojourn, or to stay in something. It means that man is acquainted with something or staying close to "Being familiar with."

Ontologically, **the world**, according to Heidegger (1962) is not a way of characterizing those entities which *dasein* essentially is not, it is rather a characteristics of *dasein* itself. It means that the world is the place where man realizes his existence. The world is everything that forms the human environment and provide setting in which human life has to be lived. Each *dasein* has its own world which is articulated in terms of practical concern. Man is situated in different things and circumstances which are essentials to understand his "beingness." It is Heidegger's belief that the world is solely a matter of human concern/care. Man exists in the world and it his existence as such that constitute the world as having any real significance (Iwuagu, 2017).

**The self**, refers to the last component of being-in-the-world and identified by Heidegger as *dasein*. The essential characteristic of *dasein* is not substantial. It has no fundamental properties or qualities. In addition, it is not stable or permanent subject and never be completed being (Iwuagu, 2017).

As Heidegger (1962) said *dasein* owns his possibility, one can never speak of *dasein* as something completed something stable or fixed. *Dasein* is never quite but it is constantly realizing its own possibilities. *Dasein* is always on the way, always forming and fashioning himself through his existential choices. It means that *dasein* can constitute himself as he goes along engaging in his various existential projects. The contention manifested that man can determine his existential qualities through forging his nature by means of existential choices which he makes.

### ***Being-with-others***

The instrumental world is a common world where we encounter not only things, but also other people who are seen as *co-dasein*. Man can relate in other existents in terms of personal concern or solicitude (Iwuagu, 2017). Heidegger (1962) insists that there can never be an isolated *dasein*. Man always deals with *co-dasein*. *Dasein* as he discovers the world, discovers also other *dasein* that co-exists with him. Hence being-in-the-world implies sharing of this world with other *daseins* and entering into a mutual relationship with them. Each human being in the Heideggerian world solely work out his authenticity in solicitude (Iwuagu, 2017). It means that man is living in other existent beings and through them he can find or discover also his essential qualities.

### ***Dasein's Temporality and its Tripartite Ontological Structure***

The content of this sub-heading is to explain how *dasein* as being-in-the-world will live authentically and show its limitations as existent being. The discussion here centers on *dasein's* tripartite ontological structures: (a) existentiality (self), (b) facticity (thrownness), and (c) fallness (forfeiture).

**Existentiality (self)**, this terminology pertains to *dasein* which has the potentiality of becoming in various possibilities. Man has the essential ability to go beyond the factual situation toward his ulterior possibilities. Kocklemans (1965) observed that *dasein* existentially is defined by its power to be. In this sense, it is always ahead of what it actually is and cannot even realize itself without previously anticipating this power to be. Maurice Greene (1957) asserted that man is possibility. He has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of possibilities. *Dasein* is always reaching out beyond itself. For Heidegger, man is constantly surpassing himself in order to realize himself fully. Heidegger looked upon man's life from his birth as a collection of possibilities that man actualizes as he pilots his affair in everyday life (Iwuagu, 2017). It means that through man's existence, he can realize and surpass himself fully.

**Facticity (thrownness)**, this terminology refers to the limiting factor of existence. It is an inward existential awareness of one's own being as a fact to be accepted. It means that man is always already in a world wherein there are some essential characteristics that are beyond one's control. Without having to choose it, man finds himself in existence. In addition, he discovered that there are some circumstances beyond his control in the midst of the world. At the very moment, one does not choose one's history, one's culture, and one's language. One is born into situation without being consulted (Okere, 1983). It signifies one's particular qualities of existence that cannot exchange with the other person. In addition, there are some existential qualities can't be chosen by individuals before one exists in this world such as color, race, and so on. However, man's quest for his possibilities is not yet disclosed but revealing that his other qualities are open project that can transcend into what he is not yet in order to better his conditions (Iwuagu, 2017).

**Fallness (forfeiture)**, this terminology refers to man's tendency to disown his own self in the world. This man's disownment is referred by Heidegger as *das-Man*, or inauthentic manner of living wherein man fall captive to his relationship in other things and men, then lose his own self. It means that as man understands the world, the world becomes himself. As Heidegger (1962) said, *dasein* has in the first instance fallen from itself as an inauthentic potentiality for being itself, and has fallen into the world. In this state of fallness where man loses his own self, he gives up his responsibilities and becomes absorbed in the way others do things without any reflection (Iwuagu, 2017). Fallness, then, designates the loss of oneself to the impersonal social forces in collective existence. Moreover, in this kind of disownment, one's unique self is sacrifice to the persistent and pressing "they" and thus the "self" become uncaring and nameless *das-Man*.

### ***Authentic and Inauthentic Existence***

For Heidegger, there are two basic ways on how *dasein* can exist in this world, then these are: (a) authentic and (b) inauthentic. These will determine how *dasein* forms his possibilities either to exist authentically or inauthentically.

**Inauthentic Existence/ *Das Man***, Heidegger primarily determines this as the *das-Man*. It signifies that man's existence is a monotonous "everydayness" and "banality" characterized. It means that *dasein* behave habitually in much the same way as everybody else, resulting in certain regularities and uniformities in social behavior in both individual and the group (Kellner, 1973). *Dasein* is completely fascinated by his world. It becomes also impersonal and disowns himself (Heidegger, 1962). It signifies that inauthentic living "taken over" one's selfhood in one's everyday being-with-others. Man losses his power to be and losses his sight of numerous possibilities to which he is open and thus remain to realize his authentic self (Iwuagu, 2017). In

addition, living on inauthentic life means that *dasein* failed to stand by oneself and forgets to go beyond from his finitude.

Lastly, **Authentic Existence**, entails a kind of shift in attention and engagement. It reclaims oneself from the way one falls into one's daily ways of being. It inevitably moves *dasein* between his day-by-day enmeshment with the "they self" and seizing upon the glimpse of his truer, and unique possibilities of existence (Sherman, 2009). Authentic existence, on the other hand, brings back or retrieves one's self from one's lostness in the "they self."

For Heidegger, one of the ways to retrieve our authentic self is to follow one's conscience (Iwuagu, 2017). Conscience does not mean anything like a moral imperative to do the right thing according to the external law. It refers to the clear and focused listening to and heeding of one's unique capabilities and potentials (Sherman, 2009). The call of conscience cuts man off from listening to the nameless "they self" and appeals man's self to extricate himself from the disowned existence (Iwuagu, 2017). Through this, man can project himself into the potentiality of being, and realizes that he can be able to live in authentic existence by being determined to follow his desire for his Being.

### **C. The Conceptual Convergences and Divergences of Judith Butler's Performativity and Heidegger's Phenomenology of *Dasein***

This section contains the conceptual convergences and divergences of both concept of Judith Butler and Martin Heidegger. The researcher comes up with the three correlative notions to discuss in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted Identity, and (c) authenticity which are used to explicate further which would eventually aid in understanding gender as Being.

#### ***Subjectivity***

For Butler and Heidegger, the selfhood is not imposed socially, culturally, or politically. It does not also pre-determined by someone or somebody else. In other words, for them subjectivity comes from "within" and it is not something historically, culturally, and is neither constitutionally enforced.

In relation to the above statement, Butler conforms to the notion that subjectivity must not acknowledge the existence of the objective knowledge. In her concept of performativity, she argues that subjectivity which is constituted by historical structures of power deprives one's original oneness and substantiality. As she said further, gender or subjectivity is not passively scripted on the body, and determined neither by nature, nor by language, nor by symbols, nor by history (Butler, 1988). It means that subjectivity for Butler must not constitute by the social, political, or cultural norms.

Distinct to the preceding idea, Heidegger's concept means that subjectivity does not only come from one's desire to be oneself. It can manifest also through our daily relationship with other things or *Bersogen* and other men or *Solicitude*. For Heidegger, man is a being-with-other who shares some essential qualities to discover their ultimate meaning of life. Heidegger (1963) said, being-in-the-world implies sharing of this world with other *dasein* and entering into mutual relationship with them. It means that man cannot be isolated from other men or things because they recognize and help each other in order to achieve one's ultimate meaning of one's self.

#### ***Stable/Constituted Identity***

Butler and Heidegger argue that there is no such fixed identity. One's identity has no properties, and is never completed. For them, there is no other author aside from oneself. It means that both philosophers rejected the constituted or stable ideas of human entities. They believe that the individual person has the innate capacity to determine their own selfhood dependent on what one thinks to be without any constrain

Butler concept of performativity does not totally recognize the stability of identity because it is illusionary, symbolic and compelling. It does stay at the same time because it varies from one's culture, class, or region (Butler, 1999). In addition, Butler's idea of social reality continually creates elusive identities through language, gestures, and all manners of symbolic signs.

In distinction, Heidegger's concept assumes that there are some identities that are something stable. These identities are beyond one's control. For Heidegger, these entities are referred to as *facticity*. Heidegger's facticity argues that one was born into a situation without being consulted (Okere, 1983). It means that there are some essential qualities that are not chosen by the individual before one exists such like color, race, biological sex, biological parents, and so on. For Heidegger, these limiting factors of existence must be accepted heartily.

#### ***Authenticity***

Butler and Heidegger challenged the pre-determined or constituted identities in order to retrieve one's original self. As what is mentioned in the preceding discussion, both philosophers believe that the individual person is the one who construct one's authenticity and strives of what one to be. In other words, every human being has the capacity to become the truer sense of self

because one has the capacity to determine oneself without any having any social, political, and cultural constrain.

For Butler, authenticity can be attained depending on what one wants to originally impose in oneself. As Butler emphasized in her concept, one sense of identity is something we do rather than are. There is no doer behind one's identity but one's action or language makes one's identity. In other words, one's desire to oneself defines one's genuine identity. One can think of one's original version of oneself without any constrains.

However, for Heidegger, authentic self is not only can attain by means of oneself. It can attain also through one's daily experiences and realizing one's essential qualities in one's relationship with the *das-Man*. If man falls captive with the *das-Man* or "*they self*", he is no longer with his original self and become totally absorbed to the impersonal social forces in collective existence. Indeed, Heidegger believes that one can attain authentic self through surpassing one's limitation, listening to one's desire, and realizing that one has the capacity to project one's own potentiality of *Being* by being-in-the-world, and by being-with-others.

#### **D. Understanding Gender as Being**

This section contains discussion to further understanding of gender as Being based on the conceptual convergences and divergences of Butler's performativity and Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted identity, and (c) authenticity. To understand gender as Being, the discussion focused on three domains: (a) Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity, (b) Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity, and (c) Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key in any possibilities.

##### ***The notion of Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity***

It had once argued that all things that have life are existent beings. This argument implies that all kinds of humanity, including gendered people are existent beings. As being-in-the-world, they are all beings who can subjectively determine one's perfection of the self. In the previous discussion of this paper, Butler claimed that subjectivity originally comes from oneself.

However, what does it mean to be a subjective being when one is situated in different conditions? Is Butler right in saying that gender or subjectivity is performative? In Heidegger's perspectives, Butler's concept is accused of marginalizing the dualistic view of subjectivity and objectivity. It means that there is no way for objective knowledge to intervene in the subjective idealism of the self. Heidegger does not tolerate this kind of thinking for man is a *dasein* who is being-thrown-in-the-world and being-with-others.

In fact, to be subjectively pure, it does not imply that all the information about oneself comes from one's mind. It does not mean also that the ideas about the individual self does not constitute any experiential references from other men and other things. For Heidegger, one cannot deny the existence of *Solicitude* and *Bersogen*. Before one exists in this world, other people and other things already exist with having some posteriori knowledge of some realities. It means that the others existence fundamentally contributed a lot in determining one's subjectivity.

Without other's existence one cannot realize one's subjectivity or capacity of Being. In this world, one must necessarily use other beings in order to understand one's essential qualities. There are other beings that must be considered as a means in shaping or forming one's subjective view of self. For example, one cannot call himself as a Christian or an Islam, a feminist gay or a muscular lesbian without the influences of other existence. In other sense, one cannot learn their own language or to reason out without the existence of other beings.

Gersava (2014) quoted Abraham Maslow that the structure is helpful for growth. It is fundamental and necessary for human growth, development, evolution and process. This contention shows that subjectivity is not only a matter of pure determinant of one's self but it is also a matter on how one realizes oneself through one's personal encounter of the other things and other men. Moreover, it manifested that other beings can be considered as fundamental aspects in understanding the essential characteristics of each individual.

##### ***The notion of Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what one to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity***

The ambition of Butler's performativity is to establish an idea that there must have been no fixed or stable identity. She argued that the stabilized identities were imposed artificially and forced the person to follow the already constituted qualities (Butler, 1993). Butler's proposition implied that one must not to follow any other norms because it is a form of degrading one's original or personal identity.

In researcher's point of view, to challenge the status quo is not tantamount to destroying the already established law. In fact, anyone can challenge the constituted identity if one feels disconformity. One can live according to their own personal will to oneself but it cannot totally



change or abolish the law. Ephraim Das Janseen (2017) said, if common sense of *das Man* is shown to be contingent regarding biological and gender possibilities for Authentic Being can open itself. For them, a kind of breakdown wherein they cannot succeed because their particular ways in Being-in-the-world do not match the social expectation of *das Man*. One can only move the system as if it were sought authentically challenging the ordinary fallen assumption made by the “they-self.” Moreover, if these changes will be institutionally recognized, this does not mean gender or subjectivity remain static. There is a good deed of change going on in the realm of the individual identity that is brought by those who transgress *das Man* institutions.

In searching the different possibilities of Being, one cannot be deprived of one’s existential choices. Any possibilities of Being either subjective or objective must be recognized by the law and other human beings. *Das Man* can be understood as a power that enforces the status quo but not in any conscious sense and certainly not as a substantive (Jaseen, 2017). It means that even though there are some norms that enforce one’s subjectivity, one cannot deprive the individual person to live in the best way what one like to become in any possibilities. The norms cannot deprive the individual person to live according to one’s will. The individual person is challenging the already given norms to continue one’s quest in order to achieve the fulfillment of oneself. Moreover, if there are any changes brought in a certain society, there are two things that will happen. Either the status quo will adjust to give justice among individual person or the individual person needs to adjust in order to live as one community.

***The notion of Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key in any possibilities***

It was already presented that Butler proposed an identity which is originally constituted by an individual person. It means that one’s authentic identity is done by the individual depending on one’s deeds. There must be no other author aside from the subject itself. This Butler’s argument criticized by other scholars like Jay Proser and Lise Nelson, if there is any ground that performativity to have stabilized identity.

The researcher analysis that Butler’s concept of performativity denies others authentic realities and one’s facticity. In Heidegger’s concept, there are some *dasein*’s realities that are beyond one’s control. Man was being-thrown-in-this-world with some already pre-determined existence like the texture of the skin or who will become one’s biological parents. It means that there are some factors that the individual sense of self is constituted. These realities are also caused by *das Man*.

Even though man has some qualities that are already established, it does not mean that one cannot be what one like to become. It is existentially true that one cannot be able to deny one’s facticity or other realities. However, in spite of the already given and existing realities, one’s quest of any authentic possibilities continues and remains undisclosed. It implies that in spite of one’s facticity, one still has the capacity to live according to one’s will or possibilities through overcoming one’s limitations.

Before an individual person was born in this world and began realizing oneself, there are some already existential truths or facticity about the Being of beings. Even these already pre-determined realities cannot be defined by symbols or languages. For Heidegger, *das Man* represents some universal truths of human Being. These are actually founded in the *das Man* which institutes, perpetuate, and enforce other realities of human identities (Jaseen, 2017).

It means that the authentic truth about selfhood is not subjectively confined. Man can surpass one’s limitation in order to live as what one desires in oneself. Besides, the individual person can use the already existing and given realities as a fundamental way to determine the individual sense of self. Indeed, to be in oneself are undergoes with the constant overcoming and realizing one’s limitation which Butler unable to recognize.

## PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The philosophical problem of this research study arises in Judith Butler’s concept of performativity. Butler’s perspective teaches every individual person on how to originally identify oneself. She argued that to be in oneself is based on how one person defines himself/herself. It means that the individual person is the one who really constitutes his/her own self. Besides, it signifies also that the sense of the individual self is not being done by someone or somebody else. That’s why for Butler, to be in oneself must be performative.

Nevertheless, Butler’s idealism is not totally accepted by other scholars such as Jay Proser and Lise Nelson. They questioned Butler’s concept of performativity because it denies other realities as part of forming one’s sense of self. Butler insisted that the stabilized identity deprives one’s original characteristic because it is illusionary, imposing, and compelling. Thereby, the question is that, is Butler right in saying that to be in oneself is to be performative?

Butler becomes extreme and one-sided with her view that to be what one like to become must be performative. She did not recognize other realities as part of developing and achieving one's sense of self. For Butler, other realities must not be recognized because it degrades the individual human being to live as best as what one to become. Besides, she consistently insisted that the individual person is the original source of self.

To explore Butler's concept of performativity, the researcher proposes that it must be integrated in Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein*. Heidegger's principle, in fact, is the best way to argue Butler's principle that to be what one likes to become is performative. The primary purpose of providing the conceptual convergences and divergences of both concept of Butler and Heidegger is to reveal Butler's inconsistencies that she had committed.

Primarily, Heidegger's philosophy argued that man can find his own possibility of being by being-in-the-world and by being-with-others. Man himself, according to Heidegger is, world forming, world disclosing, understands his own being with others and understand them in their being. There are some already given realities, such as fallness and facticity which can be used by the individual human being as a fundamental source of identifying oneself. Similar to Butler, Heidegger argued also that man's sense of identity is not fixed but he never denies the already given and *das-Man's* realities as part of achieving and overcoming one's sense of self.

Besides, the constituted realities already existed before one is born in this world. However, these realities can be challenged by the individual person but he cannot totally reform or annihilate those realities. Changes in the social norms still depend on the will of the people because every individual human being is situated already in the world that has been an already established reality before he came into this world. In addition, the law cannot totally deprive the individual person to live as best as what one likes to become.

In fact, Heidegger argued that every human being has the right and capacity to overcome those already given realities as part of one's essential development. In the reality, human beings at first were being pre-determined by the *das-Man's* realities. Moreover at the end, one can use those realities to come up with the realization of what it means to become a human being. This is what the individual person is experiencing right now wherein one uses his/her own lived experience to fulfill and to achieve one's desire to oneself. The question is, is it necessary not to recognize the already given identities or the constituted realities in order to be in oneself?

In the Heideggarian perspectives, the constituted realities, although it is pre-determined the sense of identity of every individual human being significantly helps the individual human person to achieve his own sense of self. Before one undergoes with knowing, realizing, and achieving oneself, the individual being was first being captivated in some already given identities such as what Heidegger referred as facticity and fallness. Heidegger's principles suggested that instead of losing the individual sense of self, the individual human being needs to overcome those already established realities in order to achieve one's desire to oneself.

Indeed, Heidegger's argument shows that the human being has the capacity to be in oneself in the midst of the already constituted realities. In the real situation, one can challenge the law, or the norms without denying those realities except if the will of the people or the law want to change some realities in the society. Just like what happening here in the Philippines, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender or LGBT community wants to establish their own public comfort room but it denied by the law. Nevertheless, unlike with the other countries, like in the U.S.A, having public comfort room for the LGBT community is not prohibited. The given example manifested that the individual human being can challenge the law and can still live as best as what one like to become in spite of the norms and culture of the society.

The argument shows that Butler has misconception about the significance of the already given realities. It shows also that Butler does not appreciate the contribution of the constituted realities in the human development of one's sense of self. Besides, she is consistently one-sided with her view that the one who does one's identity is really the individual self or what she referred as performativity. Her view is weaker than the Heideggarian principles which elucidates that the *das-Man's* or constituted realities are considered as a fundamental aspect in forming and shaping one's sense of self. The Heideggarian principle leads to a new conception that to be in oneself is not only performativity done but it is open in any possibilities of becoming in the every individual human being.

In fact, it is impossible for the human beings to be oneself without recognizing those already established realities. Nevertheless, the individual person, indeed, can still stimulate his/her own interest in oneself in the midst of the given realities. Every human being, as always emphasized in Heideggarian perspectives, has the capacity to choose what one likes to become through realizing oneself in one's different experience in this world, with other men, by challenging the already

given norms, and overcoming one's limitations. It means that every human being can use his/her own different experiences and limitations as a way to realize and to establish one's desire to oneself. Indeed, to be in oneself is not only dependent on what one wants to become in oneself but every lived experience of human beings in this world is part of the process of becoming.

### Summary and Conclusion

It was argued by Butler that to be in oneself must not socially, culturally, politically, religiously, and constitutionally to determine what one is. For Butler, to be natural in oneself must be based on how one person defines oneself. Besides, the individual person is the one who really constituted his/her own self. This is what Butler argued that one's identity is performative. However, other scholars such like Jay Proser and Lise Nelson criticized Butler that her concept of performativity has inconsistency and have any ground for non-performative identity. In the end, Butler did not mind the criticisms but she suggested that her concept is open to any criticisms and some sort of improvement.

To provide a conceptual shift of understanding gender as performativity towards as Being, the researcher integrated Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein*. Heidegger's concept provides a comprehensive understanding of what is the Being of being or *dasein* which is already presented at previous chapter of the research study. By integrating Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* to Butler's concept of performativity, the researcher understand gender as Being in three domains: (a) Gender as Being is constituted by subjectivity and objectivity, (b) Gender as Being means that one has the capacity to live as best as what one wants to become in the midst of the stabilized/constituted identity, and (c) Gender as Being means that one has limitations and its limits is the key in any possibilities. In addition, understanding gender as Being is made possible through comprehending the conceptual convergences and divergences of Butler's concept of performativity and Heidegger's phenomenology of *dasein* in terms of: (a) subjectivity, (b) stable/constituted identity, and (c) authenticity.

In the light of the research findings of this study, the researcher concludes that the notion of gender as Being is to recognize other realities, one's limitation, already establish norms, and lived experiences of human beings as a fundamental factor to recognize and to form one's desire to oneself. Every lived experienced and imposed entities of every individual human being play an important role in forming and realizing the essential qualities of what one wants to become.

In identifying oneself, one cannot deny the other realities, one's facticity, and already established norms because those are considered as an important element in order for the individual person to establish one's entity. It means that one cannot totally understand his/her own desire in oneself without recognizing those aspects which undermined by Butler in her concept of performativity and which is necessary also for growth and development of oneself.

In this world, what kind of person you are, whether a man, woman, gay, lesbian or bisexual, every individual person is being-in-this-world and acquainted with other beings who is longing for one's fulfillment of the self in spite of other realities, one's limitations, and already established norms. Everyone can seek his/her own desire in oneself regardless of different situation. One can use his/her own limitation and the constituted identities as a way to realize and to come up with one's personal desire of becoming.

It means that upon realizing and achieving oneself, one's being can be based through one's daily experience from other things and men. It can be achieved also through surpassing one's limitation and by challenging the already given norms. Indeed, everything of what one is experiencing in this world and with other beings are necessary or considered as the fundamental aspect in the active process of determining or establishing oneself.

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