



ASSESSING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND COVID-19 IN THE PHILIPPINES

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ABSTRACT

The article attempts to examine the relations between the civilian authority and the military otherwise known as Civil-Military Relations (CMR) during response operations in battle against COVID-19. This gives an overview of the engagement between civilian actors and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) since the emergence of CMR in the Philippines and under President Rodrigo Duterte's present administration. It also aims to identify and analyze the relations of pandemic and other threats in the lens of CMR. It focuses on the following features: the emergence of CMR in the Philippines, the military's role, the demand for CMR in threats, and what does it entail in the contemporary and future, a future where pandemics and other risks are likely to raise. Local and international journals published in various research journals on-line were utilized to support the materiality of this paper. Specifically, this article highlights the future and importance of the balance of power concerning civil-military relations in a third-world country such as the Philippines given its history of autocratic rule. This paper concludes by offering recommendations in threats such as the COVID-19 that often result in the demand for civil-military relations.

Keywords: Armed Forces of the Philippines, COVID-19, balance of power, civil-military relations, pandemic

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines is a third-world country that struggles to fight the imminent threats of COVID-19, a global public health crisis. It underestimated the pandemic's severity which resulted in the imposition of a total lockdown of the entire country on a later date of March 16, 2020, to prevent the spread of the virus. The government conceived this not only as a health crisis but also as a threat to security-not a crisis that requires long-term health reforms. President Rodrigo R. Duterte appointed retired military veterans to fill its cabinet positions and address policy measures to be taken for the pandemic which is not new based on the prior administration's actions during a crisis or dilemma. This is why establishing effective civilian control over the military is a challenge to a democratized nation since the military has contributed an enormous political power in the past. Given the fact the Philippines has been threatened by several military rebellions since the post-Marcos dictatorship, the utilization of the military and retired military personnel to combat the spread of COVID-19 speaks volumes about the country's civil-military relations. Hence, the role played by the President of the Philippines, also the Commander-in-chief of the AFP is important to determine the principle of civilian supremacy over the military.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has often played a crucial progressive role in nation-building. The Philippine military itself has been routinely deployed for disaster response operations and emerging threats. In a sense, the AFP plays a significant role in the government's war against COVID-19 given its extensive experience in responding to natural disasters and pandemics. The AFP has the manpower capabilities that could spread the command and control network to supplement the civilian roles in a more quick response towards evolving threats like the pandemic. It also has sufficient capabilities particularly in terms of logistical capacity, to build roads, schools, health facilities, and other infrastructure (Arugay,2012). However, given the military's historic background in oppressive actions and abuse of authority, various civil rights activists and critics called the attention of the government in its way of addressing the pandemic crisis (Pleyers, 2020).

This paper attempts to probe the dynamics of power play in the Philippine government utilizing the military to solve situations such as pandemics which reflects the civil-military relations in its society. It discusses corollary points which are as follows: the emergence of civil-military relations in a democracy, the military's role in the pandemic response, demand for civil-military relations in a crisis, and developing the balance of power. Thus, this may serve as a foundation for possibilities of future related research studies in a scholar's chosen context.

DISCUSSION

The Emergence of Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

Civil-military relations (CMR) thoughts have always been dominated and rooted in Western political thought (Angstrom, 2013). It has always been a complex issue for different scholars for its wide definition, concepts, and scopes. However, in the Philippine context, the model of CMR differs from the definition instituted by Western scholars (Heiduk, 2011). This is because the civilian institutions are weak and further confronted simultaneously with pressing security threats, developing effective governance to eradicate corruption, achieving political legitimacy amidst the diverse community, and the military

taking up a wider role in its politics, economic and social forms (Collier, 1999) As discoursed by Bruneau (2015), to understand the contemporary Philippine CMR, one must focus on the political institutions developed over time to exercise democratic civilian control. CMR, in the Philippine context, refers to the interactions between military and civilian actors that result in policy decisions. As a democratized country, the issue in the Philippines is on how to maintain a military that sustains the protection of the state and subordinate the civilian authority (Chambers, 2012).

In the article by Rosén (2020), he introduced the ‘first and second generation civil-military relations’, where he argued that CMR is a discourse about the military and its relation to the state. According to him, these generations are bound between what the military should and should not do and attained only by tradition, norms, and principles. Respectively, the first generation is ‘visible’ relations in form of observable physical interfaces between civilians and the military. While the second generation is ‘non-visible’ this comprises exchanges of information on security and intention (Carment, 2007). In the Philippines, it does not necessarily display the ground between the military and civilians, but it makes a distinct separation of the military and civilians in forms of governance areas. These generations as mentioned by Rosén challenge society’s perception of the military’s role in its internal and external security. Thus, adding a complex position for the Philippine military to determine what it should do and what it should not. In the complex humanitarian emergencies, it implies that the military were given roles that they worked close to or even with civilians (Staniland, 2008). As a result of this, the distinction between the military and civilian became unclear due to the expansion of work areas that were based lone on normative claims. He suggested that once a “third-generation civil-military relations” is developed, military organizations will emerge the civil supremacy and creation of ‘partnership’ between the military and civilians (Rosén, 2020). The third generation does not create forms of visible or non-visible relations to military and civilians; instead, it extends the functions and capabilities of the military organization into all sorts of tasks necessary in aspects of civil governance.

According to Chambers (2012), CMR in the Philippines was shaped through three seminal eras. Primarily, CMR emerged during American Colonial rule (1898-1946). It is where political power, the evolvement of international relations, civilian supremacy principle, and colonialism lessons developed and impacted the Philippine CMR later on. Secondly is through the post-independence of the first Philippine Democracy. Following its decolonization, it finally developed a patron-client relationship or informal power arrangement between civilian politicians and the armed forces establishment, whereby the military institution sometimes interfered across civilian decision making. Finally, the designation of President Ferdinand Marcos increased the AFP political influence through an enhanced military budgeting, manpower, and close ties to the president.

CMR emerged through the country’s democratization period after the decline of power and the ousting of the former President Marcos dictatorship in 1986 and from then beyond (Calimbahin, 2019). Amidst political uncertainty afterward, the military’s significance in the Philippines was evident. Substantive changes in the legal framework, especially the constitution, support such engagement and shifts in procedure, doctrines, or policy within the executive branch of the government and the military. On the other hand, the armed forces managed to limit the extent of reform because of the insistent threat of coup d’etat (Collier, 1999). The AFP enjoyed substantial power over these shifts in policy areas where it was considered important under then-President Corazon Aquino administration amidst the considerable chaos of at least seven major military coup attempts. The norming of CMR

under the Ramos administration was towards a policy solution to the military's poor assets and performance deficits in the anti-insurgency war. It also reflects that the military's involvement in politics is a thing of the past (Chambers, 2012). Nevertheless, the step down from the presidency of President Estrada and rebellion against President Gloria Aquino through military intervention tipped the civil-military balance of power (Arugay, 2012). Through the military's withdrawal of support from its government, it allowed the military to expand, have a greater role in crafting and implementing counter-insurgency strategy (Arugay, 2011). However, the further expansion of the military under President Benigno Aquino III has ceased due to the abolishment and the return of the responsibility of civic action projects in conflict areas (Romero, 2011). The attempt of President Rodrigo Duterte to include the military in his war against drugs is a more subjective dimension on CMR. Moreover, President Duterte's order to utilize the military to reduce the spread of COVID-19 also speaks volumes of a different dimension for CMR in the Philippines which will further be discoursed in this paper. This gives us that through existing political influence on security and defense policy-making, the authoritarian prerogatives still prevail in the form of the military. On the other hand, civilian control over the military after the transition of democracy remains limited (Bruneau, 2015). Indeed, the military today appears to have experienced a resurgence of authority since the fall of Marcos' dictatorship (Chambers, 2012). Whilst the significance of the military as an institution was evident due to expanding its functions in forms of internal security, disaster response, and safeguarding, the military remains locally embedded with consequences to democratic civilian control. As a result, the Philippines' CMR is still in a prolonged crisis (Neff, 2014).

The Military's Role in the Pandemic Response

The Philippines is an emerging democracy where an elected civilian government exists together with an influential military (Chambers, 2012). The AFP on one standpoint has taken advantage of non-traditional security augmented by various scholars and policymakers which is not only concerned with the state's security and territorial integrity but more of finding ways to address threats such as climate change, gender-based violence, environmental degradation, pandemics, poverty, natural disasters, etc. (Caballero, 2008). This is based on the principle of "armed nation-building" where the military is asked to do far more than its role. The military is anticipated to carry out a broad set of peacemaking and state-building skills in addition to its core combat capacity (Cronin, 2008). The utilization of the military in the Philippines during the pandemic and other forms of threats is already a thing of the past (Chambers, 2012).

CMR tends to confront us with challenging questions about the military's role in a democratic society. Given that the expansion of the functions of the military organization into civil governance is historical, it gives us that there could be changes and a shift in the notion of the military more generally (Rosén, 2020). In the article by Roberts (2020), the historical record revealed a valuable discussion on how past rulers responded to different forms of a pandemic. History tells us that even up to this day most of our methods in combatting COVID-19 are positively ancient. Methods such as quarantining, travel bans, wearing masks, confinement, and social distancing are proof of such medieval measures that we still practice in preventing and eliminating new forms of threats (Heisbourg, 2020). Importantly, the foundation given by history provides aspects of pandemics such as forecasting or addressing future outbreaks, a guide to preventive measures, answers to scientific questions that include the value of medieval remedies against new threats, determination of key policy issues, and raise arguments on the variations of national or regional actions in handling new threats (Roberts, 2020).

Under President Duterte's administration, the presence of former generals in the government's pandemic response challenges the convention where doctors, health experts, and doctors should have the sole responsibility. But the reliance on the military even for civilian tasks has been a norm under his administration. He also used this in his war against illegal drugs and his shakedown of the opposition and critics. It is of a belief that the AFP, together with the Philippine National Police (PNP), was an instrument to implement the community quarantine protocol. However, although strict measures were implemented by law enforcement agencies the situation still worsened due to the increase in the number of COVID-19 cases. Despite the rise of COVID-19, the operational function of AFP increased and so did the warlike narrative discourse in terms of "defeating the invisible enemy," "lockdown," and "national security threat" (Lasco, 2020). Another challenge in the military's role on CMR is the appointment of three retired military officers to lead the nation's plan in battling the health crisis. To wit, Carlito Galvez Jr was appointed as the Chief Implementer of the Philippines in the declared national policy against COVID-19, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenza headed the National Task Force against COVID-19 and Interior Secretary Eduardo as the vice chairman for the reactivation of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID). It is good to note that these retired officers are not public health experts, instead, they rely on their military and crisis management backgrounds to reinforce efforts in COVID-19 protocols (Pearce et.al, 2020). This is solely based on the belief that the military and police follow the orders and commands without question. According to the dialogue of Leachon in a news article (Dizon, 2020), he stated that the military's role in a pandemic is utilized when the people's social behavior has become uncontrollable which results in irrepressible consequences. As a good example, in the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, the military was brought in to restore the order, assess the damage, and distribute relief goods to the people (Trajano, 2016). This exact approach remains ambiguous to this day, what was clear is that the AFP and the PNP will hold the mission to reinforce efforts of the health department to contain the spread of the virus. In general, this idealism might cause patterns of behavior that is detrimental in making sound decisions and policies. While all of these are part of the thought that the military can solve and supplement on the societal crisis, a focus on building civilian capacity and authority- in national and local government – should be well considered to help deal with the public health crisis and capitalize to relevant long-term solutions.

In the influential work of Finer (2002), he posed the question "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise." The relations between the military that enjoy a prodigious power and civilian government that relies on moral persuasion and weak authority and/or legitimacy, is apparent in Southeast Asia, where dictatorial and military interventionism have been noticeable features of historical development. The military played an essential role in achieving each nation's independence which likely gives it a special status because, at the top of each armed struggle, the military continued to maintain power in the political arena (Blair, 2013). When the military has been the critical factor in political development, the institution develops a sense of responsibility to further political development and a sense of entitlement to intervene in politics. However, the military's fewer opportunities for occupational undertakings leave the institution with the opportunity to further its intervention in the political arena (Beeson, 2008). The civilian government on the other hand lacked the sufficient capacity to face the challenges over time caused by post-democratization. Relying on the military to carry out some of the functions of the civilian authority raises consequences and creates an issue as a matter of public debate. Issues such as its divergence from its external defense role could strain its professionalism and weaken its competency in warfighting (De Castro, 2010). Moreover, its involvement in unconventional tasks could increase its political autonomy which could weaken

and impair the supremacy of democratic civilian control. This posits that despite constitutional and law reforms, the military have the distinction of weak mechanisms (Hernandez, 2008).

In developing countries, the armed forces its mission of external defense, law enforcement, and internal security, to unconventional roles ranging from disaster relief, economic management, and pandemic threats (Arugay, 2012). Hall (2016) sustained this thought through which she identified the range of tasks assigned to the military in the Philippines that expanded to international deployments for peacekeeping, stabilization operations, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response that are aligned to its development and security goals. She argued that civilian authorities utilize the military for these instances to coerce and establish the use of force in attaining external and internal security. Although primarily, the military's in developing countries are considered as security institution of the state alone. The military's involvement in development work is based on two factors. One is a significant role in political succession, and secondly is its increasing salience of concepts linking security and development. Hall (2011) extended this thought that contrary to notions of the military as a last resort in a democratic society, the local authorities defer the military's central role in disaster and assistance operations. Furthermore, the local authorities and the military engagements rise due to the military's extensive experience in responding to natural disasters and pandemics. The AFP has the manpower capabilities that could spread the command and control network to supplement the civilian roles in a more quick response towards evolving threats like the pandemic. It also has sufficient capabilities particularly in terms of logistical capacity, to build roads, schools, health facilities, and other infrastructure (Arugay,2012). Blair (2013) added that in a democratic country setting, the role of the military is more than "civilian control of the military." The civilian community supposes that the military's role is limited to deterring war threats of external and internal relations in the country and holds a higher standard of professionalism than the civilian government. As determined by Blair's article, he argued that the characteristics of the military in a Democracy are a manifestation of the legal framework and policies, the attainment of external and internal security mission, representative of the diverse local and national community, and political neutrality.

Furthermore, Feaver (2003) argued that a democratic CMR is achieved through monitoring mechanisms that are not intrusive of the military's autonomy; convergence of policy preferences by the civilian authorities and the military; and expectation of consequences for military evading. The military's role as an institution does not have to act to fill the gaps left by weak and inefficient responses by the civilian government. For example, the AFP was compelled to assume internal security functions to the shortcomings in police capacity and as a result, the expanding role of the military was caused by the failures of past administrations both national and local. This generates the desire of the military to reduce its role uncertainty and instead intervene in politics, maximize its power, resources, and autonomy (Arugay, 2012).

Demand for Civil-Military Relations in COVID-19 Response

The present pandemic raised vital questions of what makes a government of the people, the military institution, and a nation sustainable (Dodds et.al, 2020). The pandemic brought an existential threat to the government and the military units. It leads to the tension between tactical readiness and strategic caution. But the widespread testing for COVID-19 will be a key to the military's continuing ability to meet pandemic-related challenges (Fraiooli, 2020). Conflicts like natural disasters and pandemics often generated demand for civil-military relations (De Castro, 2010). Based on the findings of Dodds et.al, the pandemic also raised a challenge for a state's territory, political condition, and governance. Lasco (2020) added that it had far-reaching social

and economic impacts that are still unknown. As a challenge to a state's territory, the pandemic brought the importance of political systems which matter in developing sound policy decisions, division of power and responsibility. Secondly, the range and type of participants' involved, interpreting, and responding to pandemics is evidence of a political act. Lastly, a question of expertise towards political leaders, state actors, and defense organizations is a manifestation of governance.

CMR is a process that deals with fluidity and informality. The relations between civilians and the military cannot be measured by using interest group models and the large institutional networks contending or cooperating. This is best realized in the social environments of Third World countries (Bienen, 1981). According to Hernandez (2008), the factors that shape CMR other than a state's legal framework are: the role and mission played by the military in the political arena, the political legitimacy of the civilian government, the strength and weakness of the civilian oversight institution, socio-economic factors, and external factors. It is easy to realize that civilian whether elected or appointed by the public officials, lacks the knowledge in concern to a state's national security and defense mechanisms (Bruneau, 2015). Evaluating a nation's utilization of the military is best explained by civil-military relations. In a sense, CMR leads us when and how the civilian authority chooses to utilize its military (Bruneau, 2015). In the classic, *The Soldier and the State* by Huntington (1957), he described how civilians maintained their "objective control" over the military that were granted the primary responsibility to respond to violence, threats, and crisis.

Amartya Sen (2020) has pointed out that deficiencies and other natural disasters are not like a war which works when a leader has decided on his own and use its power without the need for opinion or consultation. Instead, he argued that there are two ways in dealing with a social calamity one is through participatory governance and alert public discussion on the other. Woo (2020) has also provided an overview of policy capacities that have contributed and displayed deficiencies towards response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Singapore, the presence of fiscal, analytical, operational, and political capacities was evident in a strong early response towards COVID-19. The good insight of policy capacities of what can be, and have been, established a good result in dealing with pandemics. However, the inability to precisely assess and address its risks still hinders the state from absolutely being free from the virus. Moreover, capacity deficiencies need further research to understand the origins and causal mechanisms of the ongoing COVID-19. The evolving threats or pandemics reveal new policy implications emerging daily. According to the research for COVID-19 policy response development shall be built up and drawn for future pandemics and crises that are formulated for a long-term period.

CMR is important in supporting different contexts of crisis. It is the changing nature of modern conflicts, natural hazards, and crises that makes the interaction between civil authority and the military germane. Both institutions seek to co-exist and cooperate while maintaining a clear distinction. COVID-19 posed a crisis towards public health and the economy, which in turn allows the citizens to learn about its government based on their political and policy actions. According to Roberts (2020), the long history of pandemic and other forms of catastrophes reminds us of the enduring complexity of disaster management, controversies that surround it, including the cause and responses to plagues. History tells us that pandemics suggest that we do not live in dangerous times. Instead, we tend to underestimate threats and pandemic because humankind survived them. In the present time, COVID-19 introduced a shift to a widened, globalized, and security threat or agenda (Tardy, 2020). COVID 19 in its eleven months, from early January to Mid-November, produced over 62.1 million cases. It killed millions of death and counting, millions out of work, suspension of travel to other countries, caused a state of

emergency, and caused every human under strict implementing controls. The crisis presented security policies that are needed as a consequence of an evolving threat that may also arise in the future. It has also shown the capacity of a government to adopt in response to this type of threat. Moreover, the pandemic caused an existential threat that called for the emergency response of national and global communities. The militaries all over the world were called to mobilize and immediately respond against the threats of the pandemic. According to Ankersen (2020), COVID-19 poses a national security risk where a state draws and co-exists with the military to address such risk. From a CMR perspective, some activities that are drawn to the military on domestic roles are perplexing. It seeks to determine the apt role of the military in a framework of an inclusive understanding of national security. While the military is capable to support operations during such threats, a limit to its power should also be well-considered.

According to Hall (2016), in a democratic CMR, civilian authorities assume a privileged position over the military. Civil authorities provide the policy goals while the latter provides the means for the attainment of such goals.

Developing the Balance of Power

In the previous discussions, we already recognized the emergence of the CMR in the Philippines, the military's role in the pandemic response, and the demand for CMR during such crises. We discussed that the AFP was given an increased law-enforcement responsibility under Duterte's regime due to the spread of COVID-19 which turned to be an important turning point in global culture. The challenge now is on how to maintain the balance of authority and what it entails in the contemporary and future of CMR.

Simon (2020) posits that the military may use the virus threat to accustom the public to the loss of civil liberties, hence the expansion of executive power (Simon, 2020). The COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines may also affect its democratic preferences. Amat and others (2020) furthered that the threat may be a stepping stone for any current administration in a democracy to centralize, attain power and expand control as citizens are more willing to trade-off civil liberties and ideological preference in exchange for security and effectiveness in the response. In the article, *Pandemics meet democracy. Experimental evidence from the COVID-19 crisis in Spain* stated that governments during these times make use of exceptional powers to enforce lockdowns, alter the pre-existing power balance, and nurtures fears of authoritarian turn. If the cause of the abuse of power lies outside the armed forces in the lack of accountability of governments, so too must the ultimate solutions lie beyond the military. But it may also be the case that the armed forces lack accountability to the government-either because the military itself dominates the state, or because the state is too weak or divided to control the military, or because the state renounces its responsibility to control the use of force. Fukuyama (2020) has given scenarios where the virus threat could lead to rising fascism and resilient democracy. He believed that the crisis will have a beneficial effect to expose the major consequences that are usually unforeseen, reveal authoritarian figures, and in contrary, competence and accountability will tend to be valued.

Lasco and Curato (2019) coined the concept of medical populism as a political style used in health-related emergencies. In the paper of Lasco (2020) he identified how President Duterte constructed and responded to the COVID-19 pandemic through the following features: simplifying the pandemic, dramatization of the crisis, forging of divisions, and invocation of knowledge claims. Foremost, the Duterte administration was quick to streamline and downplay the pandemic by stating that he wanted to slap the virus and that "Filipinos are not easily hit by

the illness...It's when you do not follow rules that trouble comes in and that's true for all human acts" (Lopez, 2020). The announcement of the state of public health emergency on March 9, 2020, declaration of enhanced community quarantine a week after, and call for emergency powers lead to the discernment of Duterte to utilize the police and military generals which referred to as 'optics of power' by Filipino sociologist David (2020). The usage of 'optics of power' as a response to the crisis by the imagery of war is an implication of its dramatization of the crisis. Moreover, his administration focused its narrative on criticizing his political opponents, leftist groups, and street protesters than accepting its lack of accountability and/or blaming China (Merez 2020). Lastly, he has informed the public through unscientific claims such that the virus is spread to the air even if the World Health Organization has not stated the origin of COVID-19 and therapeutic claims that a vaccine will be soon available in May (Aguilar, 2020). These things demonstrate what politics recognized as symbolic reassurance and re-establishing its power legitimacy and patterns of actions amidst the health crisis.

Due to the vague distinction between civil and the military lies the heart of abuses of power. The challenge to establish democratic civilian control over the military in new democracies is undoubtedly difficult (Bruneau, 2015). Civilian control as defined by Croissant (2010) is where civilians have the sole authority to determine their policies, its policies aspect, and decide on political issues. Moreover, only the civilian authority has the right to determine which of its policies will be implemented by the military. On contrary, civilian control is not simply all about good governance, nor the quality of policy structures, and neither the stability of the political regime (Chambers, 2011). This type of control provides that the civilians alone have the responsibility for political decision-making (Trinkunas, 2005). However, asserting civilian control is important in democratic transitions. Maintaining democratic control is not feasible without the effective civilian power to formulate, implement policies and control over the military. The military on contrary has no autonomous decision-making power with those policies that are of the scope of the civilian authority (Chambers, 2012). Hence, to further understand civil-military relations and systematically assess the balance of power in decision making between civilians and military, a state must recognize that seeking accountability in the government is important whether civilian or the military authority that must be accounted to the population at large (Collier, 1999). The ultimate goal is not to maximize civilian authority to legitimize its authority over the military but by mutually reinforcing common goals, redefining the legal frameworks, and reshaping each institution in accordance with appropriate jurisdictional function. Furthermore, Blair (2013) argued that the military's involvement could have a positive impact if good security governance is developed, effective civilian oversight of security institutions exists, and when it exerts efforts to constraint the executive power. The success in ambiguous conflicts requires a framework that balances the relationship between civilian and military authority (Cronin, 2008). Hernandez (2008) since democratization involves the redistribution of power, it must include the redistribution of power from the military to the civilian authority whose relative power vis-à-vis the AFP diminished during authoritarian rule. The process of democratization would therefore be impaired if the military's role in politics were not reduced, if not eliminated if the institutions that checked the military from going beyond its constitutional and legal mandate remained weak relative to the military and if the military were not restrained when it tried to grab political power.

CONCLUSION

As a third world country and a weak state, the instituted CMR Western thoughts are not aligned to the case of the Philippines. The Philippines still underlies a case where formal civilian control of the military appears to be a process of reluctant "muddling through" by civilian actors. CMR

continues to be instilled with clientelism, partisan-linkages, and submission of civilian authority to the military in decision-making. Philippine CMR is still in a prolonged crisis. As such, soldiers remain influential and civilian control is only tepidly institutionalized. A lot of work must be done to define the military's role along with the civilian government. Giving the responsibility to the armed forces is no longer a goal for this generation. It is time for the civilian government to be accountable to maintain democratic civil-military relations and for the military to subordinate the civil authority to help deal with the public health crisis and capitalize on relevant long-term solutions.

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