



**BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN  
MADAGALI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF ADAMAWA STATE,  
NIGERIA 2009-2015**

**BY**

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**BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF  
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**July, 2017.**

### APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this Research Project titled “Boko Haram Insurgency and Educational Development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria 2009 to 2015” has been read and approved to meet the requirements of the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria.

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the families and children, who suffered from the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria, and to all those who suffered from the scourge of insurgency in Rwanda, Liberia, Syria and any other part of the world.

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## DECLARATION

I Abubakar Ibrahim Bello with matriculation number FUK/HMSS/13/HDS/1057, hereby declare that all the submissions in the work, except the ones acknowledged in the references, are my original ideas.

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Sign

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Date

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*This topic 'Topic Boko Haram insurgency and educational development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria 2009 to 2015' is the study that seek to identify and historicizes the activities, nature and impact of Boko Haram insurgency on educational development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa state between 2009 and 2015. Accordingly, the study argues that Boko Haram insurgency destabilized educational development in the area through disruption of academic activities. This emerged due to their (Boko Haram) attacks on educational institutions and the subsequent damage done to the schools. The study again argues that the insecurity created in the area by activities of Boko Haram impacted negatively on economic and socio-political developments which in turn affected the education process. The study recommends the following suggestions: Government should make necessary arrangements to provide support to all survivors including teachers, students, and other staffs of the schools that have been affected by the violent activities in areas affected; government should also provide adequate security to prevent any subsequent targeted attacks on schools; all schools burnt or damaged as a result of attacks should be reconstructed and renovated and ensure that they are provided with adequate teaching staff and facilities in order for access to education be restored as quickly as possible, etc. Finally, the study sourced information from oral sources, written and internet materials. The interviews were conducted with those who were deemed capable of having relevant information on the subject matter, just as the written and internet sources consulted were those that are relevant with the subject under study. From these sources and analyses, the gaps which existed in the available literature on the subject matter were filled.*

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## **CHAPTER ONE:**

### **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

The importance of education to human beings can never be overemphasized. Education is the key to educational development of any given society. It develops human capabilities which in turn impact positively on development, hence the assertion “the quality of a nation’s education determines the level of its national development.”<sup>1</sup> It is the importance attached to education, as it impacts on development that governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals alike over the years have continued to invest in educational development.

Insurgency, violent conflicts or war, can have serious effects on educational development with extended implications on the general processes of development. Insurgency and terrorism are twin phenomena that have ravaged societies across the globe over the years. Nigeria generally is not an exception of the ugly phenomenon beginning from the 1980’s and Madagali Local Government Area in Adamawa State, Nigeria in particular has suffered from the activities of terrorist insurgents. This study therefore aims at examining the impact of insurgency on educational development in the Local Government Area between 2009 and 2015.

#### **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The issue of terrorist insurgency took prominence in Nigeria’s Northeast region since 2000 in which it impacted negatively on the socio-cultural, political and the economic lives of the people in the area. Madagali Local Government Area is located within the region. Subsequently, this study seeks to address the following research problems:

- i. Has there been any form of insurgency in Madagali LGA between 2009-2015?
- ii. What has been the nature of the insurgency?
- iii. What impacts had the insurgency on educational development in the area?

### **1.3 Aim and Objective of the Study**

All researches are meant to address an identified problem affecting the society. This study broadly aims at historicizing the issue of terrorist insurgency in Madagali area of Adamawa State between 2009 and 2015. Specifically, the study's objectives include the following:

- i. To determine the prevalence of insurgency in Madagali LGA.
- ii. To determine the nature of the insurgency.
- iii. To determine the impact of the insurgency on educational development in the area.

### **1.4 Scope and Delimitation of the Study**

This study determines the impacts of insurgency on educational development in Madagali LGA of Adamawa state 2009-2015. Thus the topic Boko Haram and Educational Development in Madagali LGA defines both the subject, time and space of the study. For reasons of clarity and broader understanding of the subject matter, mention is made of related issues outside the specifics of the subject, space and time of this study. Such mention throws light for a better understanding of the issues that are concerned with this study. Madagali or Madagli is a town and local government area in Adamawa State, Nigeria. The LGA was created in 1991 when Taraba State was created out of Gongola State. It is located between Longitude 13°24'57"E. and

latitude 10°44'46"N. it borders Michika to the north, Askira Uba to the west, Gwoza local government area to the south and the Republic of Cameroon to the east.<sup>2</sup> There are many ethnic groups but Marghi and Fulani are the dominant single group in terms of population. Madagali LGA consists of wards such as Hyambula, Gulak, etc. It consists of many villages including Bitiku Juli, Kirchinga, Gubla, Magar, Visic, Tur, etc.<sup>3</sup>

### **1.5 Limitations of the Study**

In the course of this study, certain challenges including financial constraints and inadequate time were met. Other challenges were the difficulty in accessing data, information and facts concerning the study. People were not willing to give out information. Also was the challenge of insecurity in the study area, which posed difficulty in accessing some of the areas of the study. These challenges were however overcome as follows: the limited available funds were prudently utilized such that extravagance was avoided; perseverance and friendly posture was also adopted to lure the oral informants give out information; the locals were also used as guides to avoid insecure routes in the area and by so doing even the remotest areas within the study area were covered.

### **1.6 Justification/Significance of the Study**

This study is significant in that it provides the specificity of terrorist insurgency as it affects educational development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria. It therefore fills the gap that is in existing literature on terrorism,

insurgency, and education. Again, the study serves as a source material for those carrying out research in related area. Its findings will go a long way in aiding policy formulation by relevant stakeholders in tackling insurgency and educational development.

## **1.7 Conceptual Clarifications, Theoretical Framework, and Review of Related Literature**

### **1.7.1 Conceptual Clarifications**

Boko Haram is a group that wishes to expel the political community of northern Nigeria which they believe has been seized by corrupt and false Muslims and to establish a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across all of Nigeria. Boko Haram (meaning ‘Western education is sinful’) has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity hitherto unknown in any part of Nigeria except the Niger Delta region. The group has probably only existed for about three years. It is based in the north-eastern states of Nigeria and has attacked both the police and military, churches and other places of worship, schools, international agencies, market squares and other highly-public targets. Newspaper estimates place the number of casualties in the wake of the Boko Haram campaign in the hundreds of thousands, with many others maimed or wounded. The group’s weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degrees of lethal capacity.

Education is the process of improving knowledge and developing as well as improving skills of individuals. It is the process which leads individuals to develop their cognitive, effective, and psychomotor potentials for utilization that can lead them and humanity to achieve improved living standards.<sup>4</sup> Education is also a discipline that is concerned with methods of teaching and learning in schools or

school-like environments as opposed to various non-formal and informal means of socialization (e.g., rural development projects and education through parent-child relationships). Education can be thought of as the transmission of the values and accumulated knowledge of a society. In this sense, it is equivalent to what social scientists term socialization or enculturation. Education is designed to guide children in learning a culture, moulding their behaviour in the ways of adulthood, and directing them toward their eventual role in society. In the most primitive cultures, there is often little formal learning; little of what one would ordinarily call school or classes or teachers. Instead, the entire environment and all activities are frequently viewed as school and classes, and many or all adults act as teachers. As societies grow more complex, however, the quantity of knowledge to be passed on from one generation to the next becomes more than any one person can know, and, hence, there must evolve more selective and efficient means of cultural transmission. The outcome is formal education, the school and the specialist called the teacher.<sup>5</sup>

The term insurgency has been used variously to describe movement that are revolutionary in nature such as civil wars, anti-colonial struggles and terrorist agitations. It is rebellion against government involving the use of arms. The menace is wanton destruction of lives and properties. Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power. It is used by those too weak to do otherwise. Insurgency is characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, and urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour. Insurgents may attempt to seize power and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or they may have more limited aims

such as separation, autonomy, or alteration of a particular policy. They avoid battle-spaces where they are weakest—often the conventional military sphere—and focus on those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and the political. Insurgents try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and hope that, over time, the power balance changes in their favour.<sup>6</sup>

Definitions of terrorism are usually complex and controversial, and, because of the inherent ferocity and violence of terrorism, the term in its popular usage has developed an intense stigma. It was first coined in the 1790s to refer to the terror used during the French Revolution by the revolutionaries against their opponents. The Jacobin party of Maximilien Robespierre carried out a Reign of Terror involving mass executions by the Guillotine. Although terrorism in this usage implies an act of violence by a state against its domestic enemies, since the 20th century the term has been applied most frequently to violence aimed, either directly or indirectly, at governments in an effort to influence policy or topple an existing regime. Terrorism is not legally defined in all jurisdictions; the statutes that do exist, however, generally share some common elements. Terrorism involves the use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear, not just within the direct victims but among a wide audience. The degree to which it relies on fear distinguishes terrorism from both conventional and guerrilla warfare. Although conventional military forces invariably engage in psychological warfare against the enemy, their principal means of victory is strength of arms. Similarly, guerrilla forces, which often rely on acts of terror and other forms of propaganda, aim at military victory and occasionally succeed (e.g., the Viet Cong in Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). Terrorism proper is thus the systematic use of violence to generate fear, and thereby to achieve political goals,



when direct military victory is not possible. This has led some social scientists to refer to guerrilla warfare as the “weapon of the weak” and terrorism as the “weapon of the weakest.” In order to attract and maintain the publicity necessary to generate widespread fear, terrorists must engage in increasingly dramatic, violent, and high-profile attacks. These have included hijackings, hostage takings, kidnappings, car bombings, and, frequently, suicide bombings. Although apparently random, the victims and locations of terrorist attacks often are carefully selected for their shock value. Schools, shopping centres, bus and train stations, and restaurants and nightclubs have been targeted both because they attract large crowds and because they are places with which members of the civilian population are familiar and in which they feel at ease. The goal of terrorism generally is to destroy the public's sense of security in the places most familiar to them. Major targets sometimes also include buildings or other locations that are important economic or political symbols, such as embassies or military installations. The hope of the terrorist is that the sense of terror these acts engender will induce the population to pressure political leaders toward a specific political end.<sup>7</sup> It is from the insurgency and terrorism that Boko Haram evolved in Nigeria.

### **1.7.2 Theoretical Framework**

Theories are useful sets of logically related concepts for examining the occurrence of any phenomena. Theories are also indispensable tools at the back of the researcher in shading more light on the possible relationship that exists between various variables that apparently appear to have no logical connection between them. Theories therefore provide spring board for the researcher's critical analysis of a phenomenon as well as for data collection.<sup>8</sup> In the attempt to understand the Boko Haram scourge in Nigeria

and Madagali local government area, the following theoretical formulations are examined.

**i. The Relational/Vengeance Theory**

Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, (religious) and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination.<sup>9</sup> The differences in value invariably creates the “We” and ‘Others’ dichotomy: “The fact that ‘others’ are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of values.”<sup>10</sup>

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram’s violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect’s penchant for blood-letting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in this context the “We” and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the “Others”, the Boko Haram members. On the other hand, is bond either by the common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” for Allah, or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining members of the Nigerian society as the “Others”. In the circumstance mutual antagonism exists and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, members been killed by government security forces- the “Others” attracts reprisals from it, the “We”.<sup>11</sup>

**ii. The Human Needs/Socio-Economic Perspective**

The socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria, essentially attempts to de-emphasise the interpretation of this being a particularly Muslim or northern crisis.<sup>12</sup> The perspective which blames social conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfil and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict.<sup>13</sup>

Unlike the relational/vengeance theory, the perspective goes beyond the trigger to focus on the underlying factor(s) that could have bred such groups. It has its largest proponents from the intelligentsia, and is particularly viewed by some foreign governments such the United States and Britain as explanations for the problem. Nigeria's socio-economic indexes seem to validate the assumption of human needs theory. The Human Development Index Trend, for instance, ranked Nigeria 156 out of 186 in 2011. The socio-economic factors being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the north. But perhaps its relevance in the interpretation of the Boko Haram problem is that while its proponents admit of endemic poverty and hopelessness generally in Nigeria, they note its severity in the north. Hence Professor Jean Herskovits of the *State University of New York*, made it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began, that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness, and that the government must address socio-economic deprivation, which is most severe in the north.<sup>14</sup>

Indeed the very high incident of poverty in Nigeria is generally seen as a northern phenomenon. A study by Professor Charles Soludo, shows the three northern regions

having an average poverty incidence of 70.1% compared to 34.9% of the south's three. Ten states in Nigeria with the highest incidence of poverty also are all northern states, whereas the ten states with the lowest incidence of poverty are all southern states.<sup>15</sup> Thus, "70% of the people living in the north live below \$1 per day, which is equivalent to N129 per day".<sup>16</sup> The high conflict potential of the developing areas could indeed be a function of frustration caused by economic deprivation.<sup>17</sup> Frustration-aggression tendencies often also manifest misplaced aggression. This trend has featured in the series of violence inflicted upon the ordinary citizens of Nigeria, most of who have no direct connection with political and economic elites whose mismanagement of the country's resources engender the unemployment, poverty and deprivation that breed frustration and foster violence. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr. have rightly noted, hostilities in such instances, are directed "toward someone or something not responsible for the original frustration".<sup>18</sup>

### **iii. The Political Feud Perspective**

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that while the extra-judicial killing of the leadership of the Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with the state, the severity that the violence has now assumed is the fallout of a fierce political battle in 2011. The outcry at that time resonated around forcing Jonathan to give up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north and had pitted some formidable political forces in the north against similar forces in most of the south – especially from Jonathan's minority ethnic Ijaw nationality of the south-south of Nigeria who saw in Jonathan's ambition an opportunity to placate the restive region over perceived decades of political and economic marginalization in the Nigerian federation. The post-2011

election violence in parts of the north, therefore, did not only symbolize a rejection of the polls result and/or Goodluck Jonathan/a Christian southerner's presidency, but was also a precursor to the current mayhem.<sup>19</sup>

Midlarsky defines an act of political violence "as an attempted or actual injury (ordinarily not sanctioned by law or custom) perpetrated on persons or property with the actual or intended consequences of effecting transformations either within structures of political authority or within economic and/or social system."<sup>20</sup> In the general context of the theory of northern loss of power, for the Nigerian political system, notorious for its prebendalism, patronage system, and cronism, the stakes for the control of political power can be quite high, and loss of central power could prompt a "highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals" or groups towards bringing the country "under a specific kind of fundamentalist strain," even if illegally.<sup>21</sup>

The political feud perspective has acquired more dimensions as it also reveals emergent dynamics in Nigeria's power relations. Jonathan's Ijaw ethnic group claims Boko Haram is a northern attempt to undermine the president's power. At the same time, there is an emergent school of thought that the specific focus of the terror campaign is the 2015 presidential election, an attempt to ensure that power returns to the north by 2015, especially amidst speculations that Jonathan may yet contest the presidency at that time. Senator Uche Chukwumerije, who has canvassed this view, links Jonathan's accession to power from the vice-president in 2007 to elected president in 2011, to the Niger Delta militancy spear-headed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, (MEND) from the late 1990s. Obasanjo's emergence as Nigeria's president in 1999 to him also owed to the militancy by the

Yoruba ethnic militia, the Oodua People's Congress, (OPC) as an aftermath of the 1993 presidential election annulment. Thus his suggestion to his ethnic Igbo nationality to mobilize its own militia, Movement for the Sovereign States of Biafra, (MASSOB), to “devise a means of constructive engagement with the youth” towards 2015.<sup>22</sup>.

A closer examination of the Boko Haram terror movement also reveals it clearly as a Kanuri revolt – it is “dominated by Kanuri boys, despite the recruitment of volunteers from areas outside Borno and Yobe States”.<sup>23</sup> Outside of its core old Borno versus Fulani context, a statement by Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa, the Chief Whip of the House of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the north-east caucus in the House, further underscores a general north-east angst. According to him, “We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is responsible for insecurity in North-East”.<sup>24</sup>

#### **iv. The Islamic Theocratic State Theory**

The Boko Haram sect has hardly masked its intention to bring down the Nigerian government, and ultimately Islamize Nigeria. Lengmang notes the allegation that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level Shari'a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system.<sup>25</sup> Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, “they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence.”<sup>26</sup> Lengmang attributes resentment to the Shari'a coexistence with secular federal system to the view by many a northerner that western education is incapable

of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region, and so shares the fallacy of western education being incompatible with Islam.<sup>27</sup>

However tangential its link with al Qaeda or its affiliates, the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria holds the vision of global political Islam, which is the overthrow of all worldly government (Kufur system) and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state. Perhaps its reported rejection of President Jonathan's invitation for dialogue and demand that he converts to Islam or hand over to a Muslim underlines this tendency.<sup>28</sup> Mehrdad Mozayyan has traced the rise of the radical Islam to three variables. One was the 1979 Iran Revolution that ushered a widespread rejectionist philosophy, changing the Muslims' view of themselves and their position in the world, as well as their approaches to daily life and politics. The second was the anti-western feelings in the Middle East traceable to the effect of European colonization. The third and most recent is the American presence in the Middle East with claims that it brought a corrupting influence.<sup>29</sup> In a related way, corrupt and ineffective local political leadership espousing Western ideologies and failing to improve people's well-being remain a major stimulus to political Islam. Eventually, the Islamists' gaining and holding power in Iran produced the wake-up call throughout the Muslim world and led to widespread Islamic resurgence.

#### **v. Conspiracy Theories**

The conspiracy theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram crisis can be marked into two broad categories: one focusing on machinations of internal actors, the other on external actors. Internal actors may include the disgruntled northern power elite who, having lost power, are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership, as well as the Jonathan administration itself, which may be sponsoring the

crisis in order to rally southern support behind his administration, and there is also the perception that Boko Haram may be a secret society controlled by some ‘invisible’ hands that seek to destroy the north ahead of 2015 so as to forestall or weaken its bid for the presidency at that time.<sup>30</sup> External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western states like the United States, or neighbouring African states envious of Nigeria’s progress and stability.

For the first hypothesis regarding internal actors, which we have treated in great detail under the political feud theory, our position is that its merit probably lies in the profound feeling of marginalization emanating from the north-east, either in terms of perceived denial of socio-economic infrastructure and/or the Kanuri sense of marginalization from central power. The second hypothesis also contends that part of the support mobilization strategy was to portray Islam in bad light by hitting Christian targets. This hypothesis perhaps draws from instances where attempts or actual attacks on Southern and Christian targets both in the north and south, which were blamed on Boko Haram, but were traced to Christian southerners.<sup>31</sup>

Although the United States continues to deny predicting Nigeria’s disintegration by 2015 – pointing out that a private agency, not the US government carried out the survey upon which the report is predicated – those who emphasize this aspect of the external conspiracy theory point to a 2008 war game conducted by the US army which was designed to test its response ability to probable state failure in Nigeria in relation to US energy needs. The oil-rich Middle East has historically been unstable, and resurgent Islam has compounded the problem. Nigeria’s far north is contiguous to the troubled Sahel and Maghreb regions, which also are contiguous to the some Middle East states in the grip of Islamism. The US interest in Nigeria’s oil does not



predispose it to be comfortable with such proximity to this potentially Islamist enclave.<sup>32</sup> At a one-day symposium on ‘international conspiracy: towards Nigeria’s disintegration,’ in Kaduna, North-West Nigeria, the Association of Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria (AMBON) noted that

There were reasons to believe that the peace and security of Nigeria were being threatened by the western world powers for their economic gains; that the western world threatens the peace of the country in order to protect their economic interest in Nigeria’s oil region.<sup>33</sup>

Sentiments such as these have led to reservations over state efforts to collaborate with foreign powers to combat the Boko Haram. According to Professor Tam David West, Nigeria’s former minister of petroleum,

When they come ostensibly for security, they have their own agenda to penetrate our system and subjugate the sovereignty of the country; not only that, they become a powerful force within the country to dictate the political direction.<sup>34</sup>

Allegations of conspiracy by envious neighbours to undermine Nigeria is highly speculative, especially when considered in light of the military cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries in the war against transnational terrorism, and their common interest in regional stability.<sup>35</sup>

### **After Examining**

These theories attempts at explaining the driving forces behind the Boko Haram phenomenon. The position of the study is that each of the perspectives offers some degree of insight into the problem, as well as the general patterns of political tension and social violence in Nigeria, which Boko Haram merely epitomizes. This study however, adopts The Human Needs/Socio-Economic Perspectives as the suitable theory that explains the causes of the Boko Haram phenomenon, due to the following

reasons: the prevalence of poverty makes it easier for extremist groups to mobilize disenchanted mobs in pursuit of their own political goals. In Northern Nigeria, and the North East in particular, where over 70 per cent of the population lives under the internationally-defined poverty line, it is easy to see how any demagogue or religious extremist can mobilize the poor and destitute as instruments for his own political goals. There is the added factor of youth unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging.<sup>36</sup>

### **1.7.2 Review of Related Literature**

The related literature has been reviewed under the following themes:

#### **i. Terrorism**

The work by Richards examines the concept of terrorism. It argued that, “terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive.”<sup>37</sup> There is a wide gap in Richards’s work, as the present study is not only concerned with the conceptualization of terrorism alone, but how Boko Haram terrorist group’s attacks affected education in Madagali LGA of Adamawa state.

The concept of terrorism has defied a universally acceptable definition. Scholars have preferred one definition over another which reflects the diversity of the concept. The need for an acceptable definition of terrorism will free the concept from some challenges. A universally acceptable definition will help in facilitating international cooperation against terrorism. The lack of a universally acceptable definition has made the concept face constant abuse by state and non-state actors who define the

concept to suit their political and strategic interests. Similarly, a consensus on the meaning of terrorism will help scholars and policy makers to come up with methods, approaches that will guide research in the field.<sup>38</sup> The work is useful to the development of this present study in that it provides useful information with regards to the meaning of the word terrorism. Such information has helped in building this study. Richard's work however does not situate the specificity of the present study in that it did not examine the impact of Boko Haram on educational development in Madagali local government area which this study intends to do.

In his work *why do we know so little about terrorism?*, Sanchez-Cuenca posits that terrorism is a term so ambiguous at both political and ontological levels. Politically, it is mostly used in derogatory terms and often to debase the enemy. Ontologically, terrorism connotes different entities; an act of violence, a group of people employing violence, and strategy in the conduct of violence. Terrorism enjoys this flexibility which is not applicable to other concepts such as war, riot and genocide. Furthermore, terrorism as an "ism" is an abstract concept that can be applied in several ways. The most conceptually dominant school defines terrorism as any violence against non combatants.<sup>39</sup> Sanchez's work is helpful in building this study in that it explains the ambiguous nature of the word terrorism. His works however does not situate the specificity of the present study.

Schmid in his seminar work *framework for conceptualising terrorism* situates terrorism within five climes. Terrorism as/and crime; politics; warfare; communication; religious fundamentalism. Terrorism as a crime is not only considered illegal but illegitimate. National and international laws strongly abhors terrorism and have made it a criminal act. Terrorism is not only criminal, but

politically motivated and used as an instrument of political strategy. Terrorism also involves the use of warfare, which has been evident since ancient times. The connotation of terrorism as communication involves the use of propaganda in attempts to seek relevance and publicity. Terrorism as religious fundamentalism involves the use of religion to perpetrate violence. History is replete with religiously motivated terrorist attacks.<sup>40</sup> The work by Schmid explains the variation of the meaning of the word terrorism which is useful to this study. Schmid's work does not address the subject matter of this study as this study intends to investigate the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on educational development in Madagali LGA of Adamawa state.

The objective of terrorism or terrorist is captured in the work of Lutz and Lutz. They assert that the objectives which terrorist are seeking are quite different ranging from a change in government policies, a change in the leadership of a government and or a change in the whole structure of government. Other can have quite more complex objective such as changing a state boundary, to seeking an autonomous region, alignment with another state or an independent state of their own. One most important feature of terrorism is that it is both a technique and a tactic used by different groups. Terrorism as a technique is used as a means to an end. The objective is what differentiates between those who are willing to resort to violence from those who are not.<sup>41</sup> Notwithstanding giving the objective of terrorist and terrorism, the work however does not fulfil the objectivity of the current study.

## **ii. Global Perspective of Terrorist Insurgency**

According to Gabriel et al, terrorism became a matter of global concern and discourse around the world since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers

of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States of America. And recently, other western nations are having their own share of the deadly experience. Islamic terrorism among the entire global terrorist group has become more networked and globalized.<sup>42</sup>

Again it has been argued by Awake that a few years ago, terrorism and terrorist activities were unheard of and seen to be confined to particular geographical spheres. It was seen as isolated phenomenon for nations such as Northern Ireland, the Basque region in Northern Spain and some areas of the Middle East. Terrorism however became a global issue with the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the destruction of the towers in New York. From this experience, terrorism has been growing and expanding almost on a daily basis the world over.<sup>43</sup>

The work by Gabriel discusses terrorism as connected with Islam it also throws light on the nature of Boko Haram. Similarly Awake's information is useful to this study in viewing terrorism as a global perspective. Both however failed to meet the specificity of this study both in terms of subject, space and time.

### **iii. Terrorist Insurgency as African Perspective**

Mohammed and Toni drew attention home, stating that African is not isolated and immune from terrorist threats and invasions. Its combinations of relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity, and sometimes discrimination, its poverty level, and in many places its "ungoverned space all lend Africa to a significant susceptibility of the growth of radical sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism."<sup>44</sup> The duo narrowed the scope to Africa, which is of course helpful to this study as the factors that led to terrorism given by them shade light on the emergence

of Boko Haram. The divergent point of this study is that it seeks to determine the impact of terrorism on education in Madagali LGA.

Israel Adoba O. maintain that,

African and her people have been made to face the terrible situation of terrorism here and there which has gone beyond any possible amelioration. This several complex of problems stem from religious encumbrances, conflicts of power struggle, corruptions, election rigging, economic quagmire and resources control among others, which have however been occasioned by the craze and desires for the enjoyment of the spoils of the state to maintain the statuesque.<sup>45</sup>

Israel's work acknowledges the presence of terrorism in Africa and also highlighted the causes of the terrorism in Africa. However, the present study extends further to Madagali LGA of Adamawa state, Nigeria.

Agba T.P. has argued that although terrorism and insurgency has always been in practice it emerged as a significant international problem beginning from the 1960s and grew to epidemic proportions in the 1970s.<sup>46</sup> That by 1968 close to two hundred (200) incidents of international terrorism took place across the globe, this rose up to close to seven (700) incidents in 1987 and again declined to three hundred and four (304) in 1997<sup>47</sup>, involving less than twenty African countries including Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique among others,<sup>48</sup>. The work by Agba gives historical facts and figures of terrorism in Africa from 1960s up to 1990s, which is useful in building this study. However, the present work deals with more recent events with particularism to Madagali local government in North East Nigeria.

Agba further argued that African sub-region got their independence through liberation wars which were characterized by terrorist and insurgency practices. Angola for

instance went through a civil war which lasted for thirteen years and which had devastating effect on the country. Since the 1980s, terrorist and insurgency activities become a major phenomenon of concern for Africa's development, some of which were expressed or practiced in the following conflict situations:-the conflict in the Republic of Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra-Leon, Sudan, Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire. Other sources of terrorist insurgency in Africa include the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara. These claimed millions of lives as well as caused humanitarian crisis. The terrorist and insurgency practices also tremendously destroyed existing social and economic infrastructure, including schools, health facilities, etc that serve as goods (tools) in enhancing human capabilities.<sup>49</sup> Here, Agba give some instances of state-sponsored terrorism in Africa and also some civil wars experienced in Africa where terror was characterized. The present study on the other hand, focused on religious extremism as opposed to state-sponsored terrorism as given by Agba. Notwithstanding, his work helped this study by giving the consequences of terrorism, on schools inclusive which is the focal point of this study.

Jalata pointed out that in recent times terrorism has been on the rise in Africa. In West Africa, for instance, terrorism has increased as a result of the activities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in the West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar-al-din, Boko Haram and other militant networks.<sup>50</sup> Al Qaeda has increased its presence in Africa with zero influence in 2005 to a three established franchise in 2013.<sup>51</sup> Jalata's work drew attention to West Africa and give instances of terrorists groups in the sub-region. The work of Cohen relates how the influence and presence of Al Qaeda increased in Africa. Both their works is helpful by giving information on the network of terrorist in West Africa and their growing influence, but fails to meet the specificity of my studies in terms of subject, time, and area.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

The study sourced information from oral, written and internet sources. For oral sources, the study identified relevant stakeholders who are deemed capable of providing relevant information on the subject matter. These include people of various backgrounds such as students, parents, educationists, policy makers etc. This was done by the conduct of face to face interviews, randomly through unstructured questions which propped further questions in order to get the fine details of the issues being investigated. Relevant written and internet materials were also consulted for information in order to build this study. Information retrieved was examined and analyzed from a critical standpoint. Where a source of information casted doubt, such source was corroborated with another source.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter highlights the essential features of the study. These include the introduction which is the bed-lie of the study, the statement of research problem as well as the aims and objective of the study. Other important features of the study which include the review of related literature is also done. It essentially fills the gaps that are in existing literature on the subject matter. It argues that literature reviewed failed to situate the specificity of the subject matter of the current study in that they failed to examine the impact of insurgency on educational development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State between 2009 and 2015.



## End Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> Federal Government of Nigeria, National Policy on Education, (2013)
- <sup>2</sup> Wikipedia, s.v. , “*Madagali*”, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Accessed on 11<sup>th</sup> December, 2016 from <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madagali>).
- <sup>3</sup> Isaac Adeniran, *Brief History of Madagali*, <http://www.naijasky.com/madagali/707/brief-history-of-madagali/6316/> (Accessed 25<sup>th</sup> January, 2017).
- <sup>4</sup> Fatunwa AB, *New Perspectives in African Education*, (London: Macmillan Educational Limited, 1980), 74.
- <sup>5</sup> Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. "education.". Encyclopædia Britannica Student and Home Edition. (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013).
- <sup>6</sup> Otegwu Isaac Odu, The Nigerain State and the Rise of Radical Islam: Interrogating the Boko Haram Insurgency, (VUNA Journal of History and International Relations, 2014), Vol.2 No.1.
- <sup>7</sup> Encyclopædia Britannica s.v. "terrorism.", Britannica Student and Home Edition. (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013).
- <sup>8</sup> Shadrack Gaya Best, *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Steadies in West Africa*. (Ibadan Spectrum books limited 2012), 35-37
- <sup>9</sup> Faleti, A.S. “Theories of Social Conflict,” in Best, G. S (ed). *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2006).
- <sup>10</sup> (Ibid).
- <sup>11</sup> Simeon, Op.cit.
- <sup>12</sup> Kukah, H. M. (Reprint Edition). *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, Limited, 1993).
- <sup>13</sup> Faleti, A.S. “Theories of Social Conflict,” in Best, G. S (ed). *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa*. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2006).
- <sup>14</sup> Norwitz, H.J. (ed), *Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World*. (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).
- <sup>15</sup> Lukman, S.M. (n.d.) The North and the Poverty Phenomenon. <http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS6707.htm>
- <sup>16</sup> (Ibid).
- <sup>17</sup> Dougherty E.J and Pfaltzgrate Jr, L.R. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, second edition. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1990).
- <sup>18</sup> (Ibid).
- <sup>19</sup> At a public function shortly before he was removed as National Security Adviser, General Andrew Azazi in reference to the acrimony over Jonathan’s decision to go against his party’s zoning policy that could have prevented him from contesting the 2011 presidential election, referred to Boko Haram was a creation of some disgruntled members of the President Jonathan ruling party, who angered by his emergence, appropriated the group to destabilize his government. Many believe Azazi owed his sack to that statement.
- <sup>20</sup> Midlarsky, I.M. *On war, Political Violence in the International System*. (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

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- <sup>21</sup>Joseph, A. R. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic*. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 1991).
- <sup>22</sup>Vanguard, Lagos, Thursday September 29, 2011
- <sup>23</sup>Tribune, Ibadan, Wednesday, June 27, 2012
- <sup>24</sup>Sunday Trust, Abuja, Sunday February 12, 2012
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- <sup>32</sup>Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, *Contending Theories on Nigeria's Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency*,  
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- <sup>34</sup>The Nation, Lagos, Sunday January 29, 2012
- <sup>35</sup>Simeon, Op.cit.
- <sup>36</sup>O Mailafia 'Conflict and insurgency in Nigeria' PM News 26 September 2012
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- <sup>39</sup>Sanchez-Cuenca, I., Why do we know so little about terrorism? *International Interactions*, (2014). 40(4).
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## **CHAPTER TWO: TERRORISM IN NIGERIA FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Nigeria, usually referred to as the most populated country in Africa, is experiencing a situation characterized by various forms of domestic cum internationally aided violence and chaos resulting in enormous loss of lives and properties in dangerously progressive stages particularly in her Northern Region. Due to the precarious nature of the violence, it has resulted in untimely and non-dignifying deaths of citizens; destruction of properties worth billions of Naira; displacement of thousands of people and creation of fear and insecurity within the country.<sup>1</sup>

Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in its second edition (2000-2013), ranked Nigeria the 4th most terrorized country in the world. The GTI provides a comprehensive summary of patterns and global trends in terrorism based on total lives lost, injuries and property damage.<sup>2</sup>

Certainly, before the current insurgency (i.e. Boko Haram), Nigeria had witnessed several forms of terrorism which is a systematic use of violence to destroy, kidnap and intimidate the innocent in order to draw national attention to their demands with the Nigerian government. These past terrorist activities are politically motivated, even though some may have other strong motives such as socio-economic and regional marginalization issues. It is against this backdrop that this chapter attempts to bare from a historical perspective terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

## 2.2 Niger Delta Militancy

In the Southern part of Nigeria are militants who have carried deadly attacks that often paralyze oil and gas facilities from time to time. These groups have often carried out attacks on military personnel, oil workers and engage in hostage-taking, kidnapping, bombing and assassinations.<sup>3</sup>

Niger Delta militancy dates as far back as 1966 when Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, a former police officer from the region led a rebellion against the Nigerian state. He formed an organization in which he trained youths in the use of firearms and explosives. The group engaged the police in February 1966 and raided the armoury. The 1966 rebellion was later on followed by a declaration of independence of the Niger Delta region from Nigeria. However, the 1966 rebellion lasted for only twelve days after it was crushed by Nigerian forces. In the 1990s a human and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa continued with the struggle for improved living conditions of the Niger Delta people and an end to the environmental damage caused by oil activities. His group MOSOP carried out protests that drew local and international attention. The group carried out a riot in 1994 in which irate youths killed four pro-government supporters. The group's leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others were sentenced to death, and executed by the military regime of General Sani Abacha.<sup>4</sup>

The Government repression slowed down the momentum of the agitators. The movement resurfaced in 1998 following the Kaiama declaration by Ijaw youths who vowed not to follow non-violent means any longer. The Kaiama declaration set the stage for the contemporary militancy in the Niger Delta.<sup>5</sup> The Niger Delta militancy started in the late 1990s as a protest over environmental degradation. The movement soon metamorphosed into an insurgency that seeks for increased share of revenue and compensation for environmental destruction. Owing to government neglect of their

grievances, the group resorted to terrorist tactics such as bombing of oil pipelines and kidnapping of oil workers.

Groups such as Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) were interested in a better standard of living of Niger Deltans because 43 percent of 32 million people living in the Niger Delta live in poverty and 75% regard themselves as poor.<sup>6</sup> MEND is the most vocal of all the other militant groups in the region in carrying out attacks against the Nigerian state and multinational corporations.<sup>7</sup> The group has destroyed oil installations and claimed responsibility for attacks that have killed Nigeria's security agencies and civilian contractors. Similarly, the group has claimed responsibility for most of the hostage taking in the area.<sup>8</sup>

Creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2000, The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established by President Olusegun Obasanjo with the sole mandate of developing the petroleum-rich Niger-Delta region of southern Nigeria. Since its inauguration, the NDDC has focused on the development of social and physical infrastructures, ecological/environmental remediation and human development. The NDDC was created largely as a response to the demands of the population of the Niger Delta, a populous area inhabited by a diversity of minority ethnic groups. During the 1990s these ethnic groups, most notably the Ijaw and the Ogoni established organisations to confront the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies such as Shell. The minorities of the Niger Delta have continued to agitate and articulate demands for greater autonomy and control of the area's petroleum resources.<sup>9</sup>

The ethnic unrest and conflicts of the late 1990s (such as those between the Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri), coupled with a peak in the availability of small arms and other

weapons, led increasingly to the militarization of the Delta. By this time, local and state officials had offered financial support to those paramilitary groups they believed would attempt to enforce their own political agenda. Conflagrations have been concentrated primarily in Delta and Rivers States.<sup>10</sup>

Prior to 2003, the epicentre of regional violence was Warri.<sup>11</sup> However, after the violent convergence of the largest military groups in the region, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom (both of which are primarily made up of Ijaws), conflict became focused on Port Harcourt and outlying towns. The two groups dwarf a plethora of smaller militias supposedly numbering more than one hundred. The Nigerian government classifies these groups as "cults", many of which began as local university fraternities. The groups have adopted names largely based on Western culture, some of which include Icelanders, Greenlanders, KKK, and Vultures. All of the groups are constituted mostly by disaffected young men from Warri, Port Harcourt, and their sub-urban areas. Although the smaller groups are autonomous from within, they have formed alliances with and are largely controlled from above by either Asari and his NDPVF or Tom's NDV who provided military support and instruction.

The NDPVF which was founded by Asari, a former president of the Ijaw Youth Council, in 2003 after he "retreated into the bush" to form the group with the explicit goal of acquiring control of regional petroleum resources. The NDPVF attempted to control such resources primarily through oil "bunkering", a process in which an oil pipeline is tapped and the oil extracted onto a barge. Oil corporations and the Nigerian state point out that bunkering is illegal; militants justify bunkering, saying they are being exploited and have not received adequate profits from the profitable

but ecologically destructive oil industry. Bunkered oil can be sold for profit, usually to destinations in West Africa, but also abroad. Bunkering is a fairly common practice in the Delta but in this case the militia groups are the primary perpetrators.<sup>12</sup>

The intense confrontation between the NDPVF and NDV seems to have been brought about by Asari's political falling out with the NDPVF's financial supporter Peter Odili, governor of Rivers State following the April 2003 local and state elections. After Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from the NDPVF and began to support Tom's NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.

Subsequent violence occurred chiefly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, with the two groups fighting for control of bunkering routes. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down and resulting in widespread property destruction.

The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and "self-determination." Consequently the state government felt the escalated the campaign against him by bringing in police, army, and navy forces that began occupation of the Port Harcourt in June 2004.

The government forces collaborated with the NDV during the summer, and were seen protecting NDV militiamen from attacks by the NDPVF. The state forces failed to protect the civilian population from the violence and actually increased the destruction of citizens' livelihood. The Nigerian state forces were widely reported to have used the conflict as an excuse to raid homes, claiming that innocent civilians



were cahoots with the NDPVF. Government soldiers and police obtained and destroyed civilian property by force. The NDPVF also accused the military of conducting air bombing campaigns against several villages, effectively reducing them to rubble, because it was believed to be housing NDPVF soldiers. The military denies this, claiming they engaged in aerial warfare only once in a genuine effort to wipe out an NDPVF stronghold.

Innocent civilians were also killed by NDPVF forces firing indiscriminately in order to engage their opponents. At the end of August 2004 there were several particularly brutal battles over the Port Harcourt waterfront; some residential slums were completely destroyed after the NDPVF deliberately burning down buildings. By September 2004, the situation was rapidly approaching a violent climax which caught the attention of the international community.<sup>13</sup>

After launching a mission to wipe out NDPVF, approved by President Olusegun Obasanjo in early September, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari declared “all-out war” with the Nigerian state as well as the oil corporations and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on wells and pipelines. This quickly caused a major crisis the following day on September 26, as Shell evacuated 235 non-essential personnel from two oil fields, cutting oil production by 30,000 barrels per day (4,800 m<sup>3</sup>/d).

This negative consequence is a result of thousands of oil spills, human rights violations, environmental destruction, and corruption. Over the past half century, Nigeria has become a plutocracy. The political power is concentrated solely in the hands of the socioeconomic elite. Shell’s strong presence has played a major role in the absence of democracy in Nigeria. According to the documentary "Poison Fire," one and a half million tons of oil has been discharged into the Delta's farms, forests,

and rivers since oil drilling began in 1956. This is equivalent to 50 Exxon Valdez disasters. Hundreds of kilometres of rain forest have been destroyed due to the oil spills. When petroleum is discharged into the soil, the soil becomes acidic which disrupts the photosynthesis process and kills the trees because their roots are not able to attain oxygen. Moreover, the fish population has also been negatively affected by oil drilling. The region is home to over 250 different fish species, 20 of these species are found nowhere else in the world.<sup>14</sup> (World Wildlife Fund, 2006) If oil spills continue at this rate entire species will become extinct and the entire Nigerian fishing industry will be abolished.

Starting in October 2012 Nigeria experienced a large spike in piracy off its coast. By early 2013 Nigeria became the 2nd most pirated nation in Africa next to Somalia. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta is thought to be behind most of the attacks. Since October 2012 MEND has hijacked 12 ships, kidnapped 33 sailors, and killed 4 oil workers. Since this started the United States has sent soldiers to train Nigerian soldiers in maritime tactics against pirates. Since this 33 pirates have been captured. Although the Nigerian Navy now has learned new tactics against pirate's attacks still occur on an almost regular basis.<sup>15</sup>

### **2.2.1 Government Response to Niger Delta Militancy**

In August 2008, the Nigerian government launched a massive military crackdown on militants. They patrolled waters and hunted for militants, searched all civilian boats for weapons, and raided numerous militant hideouts.<sup>16</sup>

On May 15, 2009, a military operation undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) began against MEND militants operating in the Niger Delta region.<sup>17</sup> It came in response to the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers and foreign sailors in the Delta

region.<sup>18</sup> Thousands of Nigerians have fled their villages and hundreds of people may be dead because of the offensive.<sup>19</sup>

On June 26, 2009, the Nigerian Government announced that it would grant Amnesty and an unconditional pardon to Militants in the Niger Delta which would last for 60 days beginning on 6 August 2009 and ending 4 October 2009. Former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua signed the amnesty after consultation with the National Council of State. During the 60 day period armed youths are required to surrender their weapons to the Government in return for training and rehabilitation by the government.<sup>20</sup> During the 60 day period militants led their groups to surrender weapons which includes; Rocket-propelled grenades, guns, explosives, ammunition and even gunboats have all been surrendered to the government.<sup>21</sup>

Though the programme has been extended through this year, the new government of Muhammadu Buhari sees it as a potentially enabling corruption and so feels that cannot be continued indefinitely.<sup>22</sup> The amnesty office has worked to reintegrate the fighters into society, primarily by placing and sponsoring them in vocational and higher education courses in Nigeria and abroad.<sup>23</sup>

The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) program proved to be a success, with violence and kidnappings decreasing sharply. Petroleum production and exports have increased from about 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in mid-2009 to between 2.2 and 2.4 million bpd since 2011.<sup>24</sup> However, the program is costly and chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution that which fueled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. With Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's defeat in the March 2015 elections, the amnesty program seems likely to end in December 2015 and with patronage to former militant leaders terminated, local discontent is deepening.<sup>25</sup>

### 2.3 Maitatsine

In 1980, Muhammadu Marwa was a slightly built man in his late fifties. He came from Marwa, in Cameroun. His nickname Maitatsine developed because he would say, in halting Hausa "Wanda bata yarda ba Allah ta Tchine", "May Allah curse the one who disagrees with his version" thus, Mai Tachine, later rendered more accurately as Maitatsine.<sup>26</sup> He had had a long history as a dissident preacher in Kano, and had been imprisoned and deported in 1962, but later returned. His followers had been involved in a clash at the mosque in Kano's Sabongari in 1972, and there had been an increasing number of clashes and arrests in 1979 and 1980.<sup>27</sup>

He lived in an area of Kano called Yan Awaki. Many of his followers lived with him—two thousand according to one estimate. He supported them from donations from prosperous sympathisers and by the alms they solicited, which, according to one of his wives, brought in 200 Naira a day.<sup>28</sup> His enclave increasingly seemed an *imperium in imperio*. Local residents complained, and there were some clashes. Later, the government of Kano State, (then ruled by the People's Redemption Party, under Governor Abubakar Rimi) and the Nigerian Security Organisation were blamed for not taking action sooner. Presumably Rimi hoped, by being conciliatory, to avoid violence—on one occasion he actually invited Maitatsine's envoys to lunch, much to the disapproval of the Anigolu commission.<sup>29</sup> There seems, too, to have been a breakdown of communication between the various organs of government—both the Kano State Governor and the Secretary to the state government first learned of the existence of a State Security Commission during the Anigolu commission's sittings.<sup>30</sup> A police report of October 1980 stated, "Religious fanatics numbering about 2,000 occupied Yan Awaki Quarters in Kano City...when any member is

arrested and charged to Court, they will not attend...They constitute their area into a private republic not accessible to other people."

### **2.3.1 Ideology of Maitatsine**

The learned and influential Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, who was Grand Khadi of the Northern Region in the First Republic, described Maitatsine as one of "a trail of one-track minded Malams versed only in the recitation of the Quran by heart, and not fully comprehending what it contained."<sup>31</sup>

There were reports that after his death, copies of the Quran in his house had the name of the Prophet replaced by his own.<sup>32</sup> In 1982, in Borno, "They preached that Maitatsine was their true prophet...They then called on all their followers to desist from mentioning the name of Prophet Mohammed whom they referred to as an Arab."

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The other basic strand in his teaching was his complete rejection of affluence, western materialism and western technology. Maitatsine was in this tradition, "preaching that anyone wearing a watch, or riding a bicycle, or driving a car, or sending his child to the normal State schools was an infidel."<sup>34</sup> It was said that some of his followers would walk great distances rather than travel by bus or car.<sup>35</sup> His followers called non sect members infidels (Kafirai), and "were told not to believe generally in earthly possessions of luxuries" and to regard rich Muslims "with extreme abhorrence and contempt."<sup>36</sup>

As 1980 progressed, Maitatsine seems to have been increasingly convinced of the inevitability of a violent confrontation. The increasing number of incidents between his followers and the police gave him a sense of encirclement and threat. He seems,

too, to have been emotionally affected by the death of his beloved eldest son, Tijani.<sup>37</sup> To the Aniagolu commission, he was a monster of iniquity, his sole redeeming feature being that he paid his taxes punctiliously.<sup>38</sup>

The streets of Kano in North-Western Nigeria were often tempestuous in early and mid 1980, owing to the activities of one Mohammed Marwa, an heterodox religious crusader. A fiery preacher, Maitatsine who controlled a great followership in Kano, Maiduguri and other communities across northern Nigeria would rain curses on the government and all its policies, as he would urge his followers to unseat all organs of government in the country. Initially, he was ignored by both the Federal and Kano State governments but when the seething rage and many other open atrocities being perpetrated by Maitatsine and his disciples were becoming a clear case of insurgency, the military then waded in.<sup>39</sup>

Maitatsine died a violent death in Kano, Nigeria, in 1980. His teachings were deeply heterodox, he claimed to be a Prophet. In December 1980, his followers in Kano revolted; the city was convulsed by what was virtually civil war, and 4177 died, among them Maitatsine himself. In October, 1982 a new rising broke out at Bulumkutu, 15 kilometres from Maiduguri, far to the east. 3,350 were killed. Fighting also broke out in Rigasa village, near Kaduna, which spread into the city. In March, 1984 there was an outbreak of violence in Yola, the capital of Gongola State, which left between 500 and 1,000 dead. In April, 1985, there was yet another rising in Gombe, in Bauchi State, when over a hundred were killed. His followers are usually called "Maitatsine"; the movement is also known as Kalo Kato.<sup>40</sup>

### **2.3.2 Government Response to Maitatsine Uprising**

The Nigerian state's response to the Maitatsine insurgency was one of a violent reaction. While it is clear that the crisis was a result of the poor socio-economic situation in the country, little efforts were devoted to an entrenchment of good governance which was lacking or fundamental reforms.<sup>41</sup> Even though a commission of inquiry i.e. the Kano Disturbances Tribunal of Inquiry headed by Justice Anthony Aniagolu was set up to identify the causes of the violence and proffer recommendations, the report of this panel as argued by Bala Usman (1987) contained more ambiguities than answers thereby bringing the state's sincerity and commitment to peaceful means of conflict resolution to question.<sup>42</sup> The poor management of the Maitatsine crisis by the Nigerian state can be said to partly explain its recurrence in other parts of the North later in 1985.<sup>43</sup>

### **2.4 The Boko Haram**

Boko Haram, which colloquially means "western education is sin" calls itself "Jama'atu Ahlussuna Lidda'awati Waljihad". The group is an extremist Islamic sect poised to create an Islamic state in Nigeria based on Sharia Law. The group came into being in the mid-1990s around Maiduguri in the North-Eastern state of Borno under one Abubakar Lawan.<sup>44</sup> The sect lacked any coherent identity until it came under the leadership of a charismatic Islamic cleric known as Muhammad Yusuf. In 2003, Yusuf led the sect in a movement, which espoused a conservative theology that opposed the Nigerian secular state referring to it as corrupt and un-Islamic.<sup>45</sup>

The sect later spread from the city of Maiduguri in Borno state into other states like Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Niger. In the course of time, the group attracted more

followers by addressing their basic physical needs such as food, shelter and other forms of welfare handouts, which the people were not able to receive from the state. Nigerian unemployed youths and war refugees across the border from Chad, Mali, Sudan, Libya, etc formed the bulk of the group's membership.<sup>46</sup>

The group had remained relatively docile and un-noticed by the larger Nigerian population and the international community until July, 2009, when it clashed with the security forces resulting in the death of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf. The deputy leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, assumed the mantle of leadership of the group and organized deadly attacks on the civilian population, government establishments, military and police installations, schools, churches and mosques, offices, including United Nations Headquarters in Abuja. These operations expanded Boko Haram's theatre of activities from the North-Eastern states to other parts of the North such as Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa and Abuja.<sup>47</sup>

The Boko Haram sect dreamt of a new society devoid of corruption and whose sole purpose was to remain close to Allah (God). According to the group, the main stream of Nigerian society had been polluted by western values, which in their opinion, was a deviation from the principles of Sharia.<sup>48</sup> In pursuance of their vision of creating an Islamic state of Nigeria, the group claimed to draw on the teachings of Taymiyyah, a 13<sup>th</sup> Century Islamic cleric, which advocated that: "In the face of leadership by Muslims who did not behave in a benevolent way and used their leadership to oppress, it was accepted to Allah for individuals to withdraw from corrupt system and fight it with violence".<sup>49</sup> The purpose of the group was therefore, to withdraw from the Nigerian society, which in their view had become corrupt beyond redemption.



Boko Haram has been described as a movement of grassroots anger among North Eastern masses at the continued deprivation and extreme poverty in the region. The vision of the sect bordered on creating a state anchored on sharia law, which would replace the secular state of Nigeria. In the states of Boko Haram stronghold, the sect provided state-like functions such as welfare services, job training and placement in mini-industries including moral police, similar to the Hisbah religious Police in Kano.<sup>50</sup>

Boko Haram could not have in the actual sense rejected out of hand western education as implied in its literal interpretation; since it enjoyed a wide range of products of western education such as mobile phone, cameras, vehicles, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, communication gadgets, among others. However, Boko Haram has serious grudges against Northern elites created by the British colonial policy of indirect rule whom, according to the sect have had their heads turned from Allah by easy money and corrupting western values.<sup>51</sup> The group believed that the western educated Northern elites were spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminal self-enrichment rather than dedicating themselves to the Muslim Ummah (community).

Several factors could be adduced as being responsible for the emergence and spread of the Boko Haram sect in Northern Nigeria and include the following:

**i. Rejection of Western Education and Values**

The Ideology and philosophy of the movement can best be understood through giving an explanation of the two key words *Boko* and *Haram*. According to Danjibo (2009) and Adesoji (2010), the word *Boko*. is an equivocal term which means either book, western or foreign, while the word *Haram* is an Arabic derivative meaning forbidden,

sinful or ungodly.<sup>52</sup> Literally put together, book *haram* means book is sinful. But in its deeper meanings, it connotes “forbid everything Western” and western Education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden.<sup>53</sup> The inference from the foreign explanations is that the movement characteristically opposes and outrightly rejects western education, western values and culture as well as modern science.

## ii. Poverty, Unemployment, and Ignorance

Poverty, unemployment, and ignorance contribute significantly to the spread of the sect’s activities in Northern Nigeria. Most Nigerians agreed that the current insurgency in the North is worsened by the high level of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy prevalent in Northern Nigeria. This reality is corroborated by Marxist proposition on religious influence on man.<sup>54</sup>

Accordingly, when a young man is poor, illiterate and unemployed he becomes a clean slate for any kind of brainwashing which is more potent when it comes from religion aided by culture. This is so because this category of people lacks the intellectual power to question logically or critique what they are told. Also, the activity component of the brainwashing given to them provides a quasi-equivalent of employment, and thus they fell engaged in acting out what they have been brainwashed on.<sup>55</sup> To buttress the above standpoint, according to Danjibo, majority of the followers of late Malam Muhammed Yusuf were largely illiterate youths who engaged in petty trading or had dropped out of school. This standpoint also accounts for why the movement has large and committed followers among the *Almajiris* (Quran trainees) who depend on their Malam (teacher) for knowledge, inspiration and their daily survival. The low intelligent quotient of the recruits also manifested in why

they believed in suicide bombings and automatic access to *Aljanna* (heaven where 72 virgins will be ready to welcome them).<sup>56</sup>

According to Sani, the collapse of public education is one of the causes of Boko Haram insurgency. Normal schools that should have provided meaningful education to our children have collapsed and as such people, who cannot find good place to learn, will go and learn from bad places.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, in the North in particular, low school enrolment rates have been experienced especially at the primary school level. This is blamed on the long standing effect of Islamic education as most parents are reluctant or yet to embrace western education. To such parents, western education is tied to the Bible and it is an indirect way of changing their religion.<sup>58</sup>

DHS Education Data Survey (2011) showed a gloomy picture of education particularly in the North West and North Eastern part of the country. According to the report, 12 percent of children in Borno are not in primary school, while in Zamfara state, the percentage of out of school children is 68 percent. The two states have the highest number of out of school children. The report further revealed that the rate of children who have never been to school is also alarming. It states that 72 percent of children in Borno state have never been to school, with 4 percent in the Federal Capital Territory. Out of every 120 children in school, the report revealed that Zamfara state has an average 28 children in school, Borno state has 29, Sokoto state 34, Yobe 42, while Plateau state has the highest number of children in school with 113 out of every 120.<sup>59</sup> Boko Haram has every cause to inflict havoc on the Nigerian community as there are ready recruits to beef up her military strength.

### **iii. Bad Governance and Corruption**

In Nigeria, government at all levels from the federal, states, and local governments have not fared well in the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, health, education, employment and security despite the enormous oil revenues accruing into their coffers. Many people provide all the services that otherwise would have been provided by the government including security. Monies are allocated to the various tiers of government for the development of their areas but it is diverted by those in position of authority into private pockets.<sup>60</sup> Gwom opined that kidnapping and terrorism are signs and consequences that formal authority is ineffectual and checks and balances in governance are not working. Despite stupendous wealth in the country, majority of the youth lack or have low or access to (quality) education and employment.<sup>61</sup> This is made worst by the inexplicable wealth displayed by those whose rise to fame could only be traceable to few moments of lawlessness or defiance of order rather than to hard work. Most of the youth learn from those they see as models even if they are not doing the right thing. Terrorism will continue to prosper due to wide spread injustice, oppression, marginalisation and extreme poverty among the people.<sup>62</sup>

#### **2.4.1 The Nature/Structure of Boko Haram**

##### **Membership**

Boko Haram draws its members mainly from disillusioned youths, unemployed graduates and former Almajiri, mostly in Northern Nigeria. It also draws members from neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Sudan.<sup>63</sup> The sect also has some well educated, wealthy and influential people as members. For instance, Alhaji Buje Fai, an ex-commissioner in Borno State, Kadiru Atiku, a former

university lecturer and Bunu Walil, a Borno based contractor are known to be members of the sect.<sup>64</sup>

### **Funding**

Boko Haram has been sustaining its activities through several means, among them are the following.

#### **i. Membership dues donations**

The payment of membership dues was the basic source of funding for the sect before Mohammed Yusuf was killed; members had to pay a daily levy of 100 Naira to their leader. The activities of the sect have become secretive after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, making it difficult to know whether the payment of membership dues has been discontinued.<sup>65</sup>

#### **ii. External assistance**

Looking at the emerging trend of Boko Haram in Nigeria, it will be discovered they enjoyed external financial support. For instance, late Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun were tried for terrorism –related offences. Mohammed Damagun was arraigned in a federal high court in Abuja on three count charges, namely belonging to Nigerian Taliban, receiving a total of US \$300,000 from Al Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism and aiding terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five count charges, among which includes receiving monies from Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruiting terrorists who would attack residence of foreigners, especially Americans living in Nigeria. It has also been discovered that the Mohammed Abubakar Shekau had met Al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 and was able to obtain from Al Qaeda whatever financial and technical support the movement needed.<sup>66</sup>

### **iii. Bank Robbery**

Boko Haram also finances its activities through bank robberies. Arrested member of the sect have confirmed that they raise money through raiding banks or supporting robbery gangs to raid money. For example Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, alias Kabiru Sokoto, the suspected mastermind of the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla who was arrested by security operatives confirmed that BH raised money for its operations through bank robbery. The loot is usually shared among five groups: the less privileged, widows of those that died in the jihad, Zakat, those that brought in the money and to the leadership for use in propagating the jihad.<sup>67</sup>

In 2011, Sheriff Shetima, a member of a robbery gang arrested by security operatives confessed that his gang was responsible for some robbery operation in Borno State to raise funds for the BH, including an October 2011 raid on First Bank Nigeria Plc, Damola branch where they killed a policeman and stole 21 million Naira. Unsurprisingly, over 30 of the 100 bank attacks in 2011 were attributed to the BH funding.<sup>68</sup>

### **iv. Donations from Politicians**

They also receive donation from politicians, government officials and other individual or organizations within Nigeria.<sup>69</sup> In January 2011, security operatives arrested Alhaji Bunu Walki and 91 other persons; he was a contractor and indigene of Borno State. He was alleged to be the main financier of the Islamic sect and there are several other cases of senators and strong politicians behind the sponsorship of Boko Haram.<sup>70</sup>

## **2.5 Conclusion**

The chapter has given the background of terrorism in Nigeria from historical perspective. To this end, the chapter look at the militancy in the Niger Delta area, and

the response government to the activities of the militants. The Maitastine Uprising in the 1980s is also analysed. The chapter further analysed the overview of the origin and development of Boko Haram insurgency, ideologies and factors that led to the emergence of the group, as well as the examining the membership and source of funds of the Boko Haram group. The chapter closed with comparative analysis between Maitatsine uprising and Boko Haram insurgency.

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## End Notes

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## **CHAPTER THREE:**

### **BOKO HARAM TERRORIST INSURGENCY IN MADAGALI LGA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

There is no doubt terrorism has a debilitating effect on both human and material resources of a country. Terrorist attacks most of the times result in a countless number of death, injuries, psychological stress and loss of means of livelihood. The damage done to infrastructural facilities as a result of terrorist attacks leave far reaching consequences on the national economy, considering the resources needed to rebuild them. As stated by Gombe State Governor, Ibrahim Hassan Dankwambo “it will take the North-east 20 years to rehabilitate its economy after the five-year terror unleashed on it by the Boko Haram”. The governor pointed out that generations yet to be born may have to struggle to be able to overcome the devastation that the Boko Haram has done to the people of the north eastern states.<sup>1</sup> This chapter examines operations of Boko Haram insurgency in Madagali, the nature of the insurgency, and ultimately the impacts of the insurgency on educational development in Madagali LGA.

#### **3.2 Boko Haram Insurgency in Madagali LGA**

Heavily armed insurgents belonging to the Nigerian Islamist sect, Boko Haram, in the early hours of 23<sup>rd</sup> August, 2014, invaded the secretariat of the Madagali Local Government Area in Adamawa State. The insurgents dislodged Nigerian soldiers who were guarding the facility and surrounding areas.<sup>2</sup>

A security source told Sahara Reporters that hundreds of the militants arrived at the local government headquarters led by armoured vehicles they had earlier seized from Nigerian troops in Gwoza, Borno State. The source added that the Islamist fighters

were also armed with shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-aircraft mortar guns mounted on pickup vans. They reportedly had it easy overwhelming Nigerian soldiers in the area who retreated quickly in the face of the militants' heavy gunfire.<sup>3</sup> The militants promptly hoisted their flag and seized the administrative headquarters of Madagali local government area.<sup>4</sup>

However, the recent attack on the border villages of Adamawa, according to local sources, was the most lethal in recent times, resulting in many casualties as the insurgents captured many villages in one fell swoop as security operatives in the areas allegedly took to their heels.<sup>5</sup>

James Abawu Watharda, while confirming the attack in a phone chat, said the insurgents struck the local government in large numbers, wielding sophisticated weapons including rocket-propelled launchers, improvised explosive devices and petrol bombs, and started shooting at innocent people and setting property items ablaze before overpowering security operatives and vigilante groups and immediately hoisted their flags.<sup>6</sup>

“Yes, some Boko Haram terrorists invaded most of our villages, shooting sporadically and in the process killing many innocent people and destroying a lot of houses before hoisting their flags in different locations. We are worried with the spate of killings and destruction by terrorists without the intervention of the security operatives,” he said.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, the James added that the terrorists were becoming impregnable as they had a field day killing people and destroying property. They seem uncontrollable even as the security personnel avoided any confrontation with them, he stated. “For now people are fleeing for their lives and no one can tell the exact casualty, because of the pandemonium that ensued,” he said.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, information has it that the Boko Haram terrorists who attacked the town of Madagali, where they hoisted their flags after sacking the residents have suffered heavy casualty when a Nigerian Air force Alpha-jet fighter plane dropped several bombs at them, according to a security official.<sup>9</sup>

Shortly after the troops withdrew, the air force plane arrived Madagali where it dropped several bombs that destroyed four of the armoured tanks in custody of the Boko Haram, and killed several members of the insurgents at a spot between Madagali and Gulak towns.<sup>10</sup>

An official of the Nigerian police mobile force, who managed to escape the attack, told LEADERSHIP Sunday that only two of the six armoured tanks that the Boko Haram gunmen brought to Madagali were able to make it into Madagali, because the air force jet couldn't drop bombs on it while within the crowded civilian settlement.<sup>11</sup>

Though many residents of Madagali town had to flee from the town during the attack, the over 4,000 displaced Gwoza refugees that are camping at a primary school in Madagali were not affected.<sup>12</sup>

### **3.3 Nature of Boko Haram Insurgency in Madagali LGA**

The study discovered the nature/tactics of the attacks carried out by Boko Haram in Madagali LGA. Among the nature of attacks carried out by Boko Haram in Madagali LGA are; ambush and raiding using riffles of different kinds, suicide bombing, using explosive devices, and guerrilla warfare tactics. Boko Haram insurgents employed the use of hazardous and deadly weaponry in their attacks on schools. This include the use of force and assaults, violently breaking in, killing staff and students, kidnapping, destroying and burning facilities, and looting properties of victims in schools

attacked. More devastating is the use of firearms, explosives and bombs on civilian population who are supposed to be spared and protected in any conflict situation that has turned violent or situations of war. In a globalized society today, mobile phones and internet have become easy sources of communication and learning, as well as business transaction. The insurgency put the entire state and particularly the study area badly affected out of the world by destroying all communication facilities. The attacks have forced the halting and relocation of all banking services and other business activities. The Boko Haram attacked and destroyed students, staff, and facilities massively.

### **3.4 The impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Educational Development in Madagali**

The impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on educational development in Madagali LGA as follows:

**Drop in School Enrolment and Low School Attendance:** According to the report of the Amnesty International (2013), from 2012, many parents had withdrawn their children from schools and even sent them away from the insurgency zone, especially that the attacks were at most times targeted at schools and students.<sup>13</sup> Schools in the north recorded the lowest number in recent years of students and pupils who applied and were admitted into different schools in the country.<sup>14</sup> Worried by the situation of closure of school in the north east as a results attacks by Boko Haram insurgents, Margee Ensign, President of American University of Nigeria in Yola Adamawa state observed “Education is the foundation of a society, without it, development is very difficult. I don’t think many in the international community understand the dimension

of the problems here in the north east".<sup>15</sup> According to Augustine Medugu, Headmaster of Gulak Model Central Primary School Madagali,

Before the insurgency attack in Magadali LGA, this model school was a filled up school with a number of children up to 1000. Per class we have three (3) streams i.e. stream A, B, and C from primary classes 1 to 6. Then we have nursery 1 and 2, and we also have play class i.e. kindergarten all been taken place in this school. But after the attacks however, the population has drastically reduced.<sup>16</sup>

**Killing of Teachers and other school staffs:** As a result of attacks on schools, many teachers were killed, some injured, while many others who escaped such attacks were displaced and relocated from the violent areas.<sup>17</sup> In the north eastern region of Nigeria, many teachers were forced to leave their communities because of the increasing threats from Boko Haram.<sup>18</sup> In Gulak central Primary school, the teaching staff before the insurgency was 20 teachers, but after the insurgency in was reduced to only 8 teachers.<sup>19</sup> Continued assassination of teachers and issuing of death threats will inevitably affect teachers' concentration and frame of mind for teaching. Insurgency has compromised the ability of the teachers to perform their job well and has affected morale.<sup>20</sup> In Madagali LGA available fact reveals that a computer teacher was killed in Government Day Secondary School (GDSS) Rugudum.<sup>21</sup> Augustine Medugu stated that,

To date we have never heard a name of a student that lost a live but I lost two of my security men. One on duty, he was leaving the school after working hours. His grave is at the school gate. Then the other security man was coming to take over the duty from the first victim, and at the road he was killed. So, the two of the security men were killed during the insurgency.<sup>22</sup>

The situation of continued attacks on schools and teachers can also deter students from training to take up teaching jobs. In the same vein, attacks where teachers were killed in broad daylight, in some cases in full view of the pupils, also students killed in full view of the colleagues are likely to expose the children and other teachers to

shock, distress, and severe psychological trauma.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, this affected negatively the performance of the students in their studies and examinations. For instance, in 2014, Adamawa state scored the poorest results in West African Examination Council (WAEC) Senior School Certificate Examination (SSCE), and second to the poorest in 2015 WAEC SSCE.<sup>24</sup>

**School Infrastructure Damages:** The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on school infrastructure is unquantifiable, Egwumba stated that the destruction of and damage of infrastructure and facilities grossly reduces the availability of an access to education of many children. Schools are burnt down; it is not only classrooms that are lost but also all teaching materials, equipments, laboratories (where the insurgent looted chemicals and acids which they use in making explosives), libraries etc leaving students with nowhere to receive learning.<sup>25</sup> Muraina et al submitted that more than 800 schools building are affected in the north leading to some students having lessons under trees and canopies and in some places schools were closed down.<sup>26</sup> Access to quality education at all levels requires that sufficient and proper facilities and services are all in place and that students can have access to adequate books and materials.<sup>27</sup> In Madagali, the number of primary schools that were affected by the insurgency is 33,<sup>28</sup> while that of secondary schools are 6, namely Government Day Secondary (GDSS) School Gulak, GDSS Madagali, GDSS Sukur Settlement, GDSS Shuwa, GDSS Rugudum, and GDSS Waga. Some of the schools are partially destroyed while some are completely destroyed.

**Obstruction of School Management and Repair of Damaged Schools:** Boko Haram insurgency has an adverse effect on school management in Nigeria. This is because repairs to damage from attack on schools and normal maintenance and



investment in education in general may be put on hold. Labourers dare not risk repairing or reconstructing a school that has already been targeted out of fear of money being wasted if attacks are repeated.<sup>29</sup> Muraina explains that attacks on schools have dire consequences for sustainable and educational development in the regions of attack in particular and Nigeria in general.<sup>30</sup> In the regions where the bombing are pervasive and the property destroyed potentially and in real terms, drag their economic and educational future back by several steps.<sup>31</sup> Apart from the fact that most of the teaching and administrative staff have escaped the area during and after the insurgency period, those that stay behind have lamented that lack of access to banking services in Madagali is a source of financial difficulty to them because they have to spent not less than ₦10,000 on transport for them to withdraw their salary at Yola.

The insurgency also negatively affected schools calendar and created a vacuum in the teaching staff; in that some subjects were left without teachers. Rilwan Abubakar, a student at Government Day Secondary School (GDSS) Kirthinga, lamented the situation while recalling the ordeal of the attack.

It was a normal Saturday morning, when we were about to set out for the day that we suddenly started to hear gunshots from the direction of Gulak town, a sign that Boko Haram insurgents are descending on our peaceful town. Without hesitation, we started to pack our valuables to escape the town. It was a terrible experience; we trekked for a long distance to save our dear lives. We later heard the sad news that our many of our relatives who were not able to escape have been killed by the insurgents. We took refuge at our relatives who are residing at Yola. We stayed there for almost a year. This means that I'm out of school almost one session. I was in SS2 when the insurgents attack, by now I should have graduate but is now that I'm sitting for Senior School Certificate Examinations (SSCE). The insurgents also killed one of my school mates Iya Liman during their attack. Also because many teachers flee the area during the attack, we now have many subjects without teachers to teach them, this include Mathematics and English Language.<sup>32</sup>

**Recruitment of School Children into the Boko Haram Insurgency:** As Boko Haram continues attacks in Nigeria, recruit has engaged in building an insurgency that expands to include children, a practice finding increasing favour among the latest round of uprising in Africa. Thousands of children are said to be serving as soldiers in armed conflicts around the world. They were recruited after having been abducted at the school, in the street or at home. There are others who enlist themselves into the militancy voluntarily usually because they have seen it as alternative.<sup>33</sup> Strohlic stated that these children are engaged to fight on frontlines, participate in suicide missions and act as spies, messengers or look outs. Girls may be forced into sexual slavery. Nigeria abducted Chibok School girls are typical example of such inhumane acts. The northern region of Nigeria, where the attacks are concentrated, is a home of majority of Nigeria's 11 million out-of-school children. There Boko Haram found young, uneducated fighters, easy to recruit from the ranks of vulnerable street kids and almajiris, poor boys who are sent to beg by their Malams (teachers).<sup>34</sup> Children in Nigeria being recruited as child soldiers by Boko Haram are denied access to education and killed or injured in indiscriminate attacks carried out in most affected areas in Nigeria.<sup>35</sup> There is no record that school children in Madagali are being killed or recruited by the Boko Haram insurgency as confirmed by Augustine Medugu.<sup>36</sup> However, the probability remained high.

**Drop in the Investment on Educational Development:** The insurgence has led more Nigerians into poverty. Subair, relying on National Bureau of Statistics estimates using the relative, absolute and dollar-per-day poverty measures, notes that poverty may have further risen slightly to about 71.5 per cent, 61.9 per cent and 62.8 per cent respectively in 2011.<sup>37</sup> As a result, many able hands were rendered jobless on account of migration and this definitely feedback to the challenges imposed by insecurity. In

an attempt to address insecurity, the governments increased its spending on security, while resources were diverted from socio-economic development programmes (education inclusive) that could transform the nation, and this provide conduit pipe for fraud and misappropriation of fund in the name of security coverage. Hence, poverty is among the greatest consequences of insurgency that hinders investment on educational development in Madagali LGA.

**Effect on Agriculture:** Food security was defined at the World Food Summit of 1996 as “when all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preference for an active and healthy life”.<sup>38</sup> This definition combines stability, accessibility and availability. Within this study, food security is conceptualize to include opportunity to cultivate food items, accessibility of food to the people at any given time and affordability, to purchase food needed for ones well-being. Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), opine that food security can be achieved by ensuring adequate food supply in terms of quantity, quality and variety of food; optimize stability inflow of supplies and secure sustainable access to availability by those who need them (Food Security Policy Brief, 2006).<sup>39</sup> But circumstances such as natural disaster, conflict and terrorist activities may hinder the achievement of sustainable access and availability of food in any environment.

“The effects of conflict on the agricultural sector are largely due to the risk of being attacked by insurgents,” according to a Brookings report published in 2014. The researchers wrote that, the industry is under a few different strains. First, is the simple problem of human mobility. “People across all value chains feared movement outside protected areas because of attacks by insurgents,” they wrote, explaining that farm workers feared attacks while grazing animals, processors lost workers when families

left the conflict zone, and traders began limiting their movements. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector became a target for militants in need of supplies. Their data shows that cash, food and equipment were more likely to get stolen. Lastly, the danger has made other things like transportation more risky and therefore more expensive, again putting pressure on the economic output.<sup>40</sup>

As a result of the insurgency, social, economic and political life has been virtually paralysed in the Madagali. In the recent past and particularly since the beginning of 2014, the insurgents have ransacked whole villages and destroyed farms lands, food crops and rural infrastructure. Many rural areas in the epicentre of the conflict have been rendered unsafe for human habitation, pushing hundreds of thousands of farmers out of the land. Food availability or abundance makes a nation partly secured, especially when issues of social security are being discussed. But the lives and livelihoods of people come under threat when that privilege is absent. During the insurgency period, and even after that, farmers in Madagali were no longer able to farm for security reasons especially for fear of attacks by the dreaded Boko Haram sect insurgents who unleashed untold havoc in the area.

This insurgent activity has in turn affected agricultural activities and food production which is the main economic stay of the people of the area. This has consequently raised prices of foods that are majorly cultivated in the area like maize, sorghum as well as production of fish. Madagali has also been known for mass rearing of cattle, which made meat available to other part of the nation but today, the story is not the same. The rise in the prices of foods has also negatively affected educational development in Madagali in that many parents found it difficult to feed their children much less sponsor their education.

Apart from causing the rise in the prices of food stuffs, Boko Haram insurgents also stole food stuffs and rustled cattle from the residents of Madagali. Abba Hassan, a resident of Gulak was a victim of Boko Haram insurgency and has lost so much to the attack on Gulak his grain, livestock and properties were carted away. Abba in an interview states that

The insurgents invaded my son's house and carted away with all the properties in the house including agricultural products, luckily my children escaped to Yola. I was also lucky that none of my children was abducted by the insurgents but all my properties including 15 cows and 80 bags of maize were taken away by the insurgents.

According to Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), since January 2014, Borno and Yobe have been facing critical acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3) and Adamawa state equally facing stressed acute food insecurity (IPC phase 2).<sup>41</sup> It further showed how the conflict had strained the 31,316 internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Madagali,<sup>42</sup> who have reverted to negative and unsustainable coping strategies. Meal consumption has reportedly decreased from three meals to one per day and many IDPs have abandoned their farms and agricultural activities due to the insecurity with many farms in the state. IDP host families have reportedly exhausted their food stocks and have resorted to eating grain reserved as seedlings for the next planting season.<sup>43</sup> This is evident that the people of Madagali are impoverished as the result of the activities of Boko Haram terrorist insurgency which consequently affects educational development, because as agriculture is the main occupation of the people of the area, what can stop them from farming can definitely affect their income which the insurgency did. As the result of this many parents can no longer be able to sponsor the education of their children.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

This chapter attempted to give answers to the statement of the problems of this study. Under it, the study discovers the followings as the impact of the insurgency on educational development in the area, drop in school enrolment and low school attendance, killing of teachers and other school staffs, school infrastructure damages, obstruction of school management and repair of damaged schools, recruitment of school children into the Boko Haram insurgency, drop in the investment on educational development, and last but not the least its effect on agriculture which is the main economic stay of the people of the area which in turn affected the education. Having done that, we can say that the study achieved its aims and objectives of historicizing the issue of terrorist insurgency in Madagali area of Adamawa State between 2009 and 2015 and its impact on educational development.



## End Notes

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- <sup>19</sup> Augustine Medugu, Op. cit.
- <sup>20</sup> Ugwumba, Op. cit.
- <sup>21</sup> Latbone D. Denham. Oral Interview with the researcher, Abubakar Ibrahim Bello, on 25<sup>th</sup> November, 2016, Latbone is the director planning, research and services in Adamawa State Post Primary School Management Board.
- <sup>22</sup> Augustine Medugu, Op. cit.
- <sup>23</sup> Ugwumba, Op. cit.
- <sup>24</sup> Latbone D. Denham, Op. Cit.
- <sup>25</sup> Ugwumba Op. cit.
- <sup>26</sup> Muraina et al, Op. cit.
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- <sup>28</sup> Zainab Saleh Michika, Oral Interview with the researcher, Abubakar Ibrahim Bello, on 25<sup>th</sup> November, 2016, Zainab is the Principal Education Officer, Quality Assurance Department, Adamawa State Universal Basic Education Board.
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## CHAPTER FOUR:

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 4.1 Summary

From the foregoing discussion, it could be deduced that, the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency that was witnessed in Madagali Local Government Area, has a varying consequences on political, social and economic life of the community. Therefore, this study examined the impact of the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency on educational development in the area between 2009 and 2015. The first chapter discussed the general introduction on topic of study and give some theories that explained the Boko Haram insurgency, and also reviewed some literatures on terrorism, and global and African perspective of terrorism.

Chapter two has given the background of terrorism in Nigeria from historical perspective. To this end, the chapter look at the militancy in the Niger Delta area, and the response government to the activities of the militants. The Maitastine Uprising in the 1980s is also analysed. The chapter further analysed the overview of the origin and development of Boko Haram insurgency, ideologies and factors that led to the emergence of the group, as well as the examining the membership and source of funds of the Boko Haram group.

Chapter three attempted to give answers to the statement of the problems of this study. Under it, the study discovers the followings as the impact of the insurgency on educational development in the area, drop in school enrolment and low school attendance, killing of teachers and other school staffs, school infrastructure damages, obstruction of school management and repair of damaged schools, recruitment of

school children into the Boko Haram insurgency, drop in the investment on educational development, and last but not the least its effect on agriculture which is the main economic stay of the people of the area which in turn affected the education. Having done that, we can say that the study achieved its aims and objectives of historicizing the issue of terrorist insurgency in Madagali area of Adamawa State between 2009 and 2015 and its impact on educational development.

#### **4.2 Conclusion**

The impacts of the Boko Haram attack on educational development are enormous and unquantifiable. Many students and academic and non-academic staff were killed, as well as structures and facilities were destroyed as a result of insurgent's activities. There were mass movement and relocation and disappearance of students as a result of displacement. Also the schools programmes and calendar were disrupted in Madagali LGA as it was the worst hit local government in Adamawa state by the insurgency. This is a drawback on educational development of the Madagali LGA, Adamawa state and the entire northern Nigeria that is battling to narrow a century of educational gap between the north and the south in history.

With finding and development as a result of the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram insurgents, it is obvious that the insurgency have had devastating impacts on the people, environment, infrastructures, and socio-economic development of the north east region and Nigeria as a whole. Education suffered severest devastation, with attacks on schools resulting in loss of staff, students, destruction of facilities among other things. The research therefore recommends the followings:-

Government should make necessary arrangements to provide support to all survivors including teachers, students, and other staffs of the schools that have been affected by

the violent activities in areas affected. This should include resettlement and rehabilitation of all those who are displaced by the insurgency, provision of emotional and psychological needs of the learners as well as provision life-skills to adolescent girls.

Government should also provide adequate security to prevent any subsequent targeted attacks on schools. The joint effort of the military and the vigilante which saw to the near defeat of the Boko Haram insurgents should be restructured and maintained to provide community policing for schools and their respective domains.

All schools burnt or damaged as a result of attacks should be reconstructed and renovated and ensure that they are provided with adequate teaching staff and facilities in order for access to education be restored as quickly as possible.

Federal government should take effective and lawful measures to prevent any unlawful killings, particularly those of staff and students as well as attacks on schools by Boko Haram insurgents, and any other armed groups in northern Nigeria.

Education authorities should put in place modalities for schools inspection and monitoring of academic activities to ensure that standards are being maintained. Government should also be determined to make provision for effective funding of education. The Federal Government should endeavour to ear mark 26% of the total budget for educational development as recommended in the United Nations Organisation.

The international communities and organizations should put pressure on the Nigerian authorities to conduct an independent investigation and prosecution of suspected perpetrators of human rights abuses including the abuse of the right of education.

Government should regulate and sanction religious fundamentalism and extremism of leaders and their adherents in Nigeria. The relationship on the partnership of some religious sects with their international allies should be checked to avoid or curb trans-border terrorism.

Because of the very wide gap between the rich and the poor in our society, the poor were more than prepared to rise against the society at the slightest opportunity. After all, they did not have much to lose. This regrettable social situation in our society ought to be remedied immediately else it will continue to provide the required recruitment potential for disenchanted like Boko Haram to rebel against the society. The Nigerian state should desist from addressing the symptom instead of the cause. Consistent deployment of security personnel is only a first aid measure. The long term solution is good governance with a robust institutional framework that ensures a prudent and effective management of resources to better the lot of its citizenry.

Boko Haram and all other armed groups should cease all unlawful killings, targeted attacks on schools facilities, teachers, students, and other human right abuses against civilians in the interest of educational and national development.

Government and educational authorities should encourage and support active engagement of learners and child-centred teaching.

There also the need to involve parents and community coalitions in planning, decision making and action to ensure improved quality of education and sustainability. Enrolment drive campaign should also be intensified.

Solving food and agricultural problem in Nigeria can only be achieved, if the right structural framework is laid. In other words, if the Nigerian government is able to

harness its resources properly by driving critical improvements in areas of irrigation systems, better agricultural institutions and agricultural extension services, as well maintaining consistency in its policies, and curtailing security issues, like the insurgency and cattle rustling in the north.

Lastly, the study recommends that the government must put up sincere measures to address the high rate of poverty and unemployment particularly by modernizing agriculture and provide incentives for industrialization such as in Malaysia, India and China. Poverty and unemployment make crime very attractive and irresistible to our teeming youth as an idle hand is the cheapest instrument in the hand of the devil. The study is conscious of the fact that the ideology of the sect is more important to them than the issue of worldly gains but equitable distribution of wealth by ensuring that people are gainfully employed may reduce the tendency of getting more youth recruited into the sect.

**A: PRIMARY SOURCES**

**I. Published Materials**

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Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria's Rivers State (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Federal Government of Nigeria, National Policy on Education, (2013)

**II. Interviews**

<b>Personality</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Place/Date</b>
Augustine Medugu,	Augustine is the headmaster of Gulak Model Central Primary School.	Gulak/ 15 <sup>th</sup> December, 2016,
Latbone D. Denham	Latbone is the director planning, research and services	Yola/ 25 <sup>th</sup> November, 2016

	in Adamawa State Post Primary School Management Board.	
Rilwan Abubakar	Rilwan is a secondary school student that was affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. He stayed out of school for almost a year.	Phone Conversation between researcher at Kashere, Gombe, and respondent at Kirthinga, Madagali LGA/16 <sup>th</sup> June, 2017.
Zainab Saleh Michika	Zainab is the Principal Education Officer, Quality Assurance Department, Adamawa State Universal Basic Education Board	Yola/ 25 <sup>th</sup> November, 2016

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## APPENDIX A

### MAP OF NIGERIA INDICATING ADAMAWA; MAP OF ADAMAWA INDICATING MADAGALI; AND MAP OF MADAGALI

