

of the critical question of amnesty and retribution be worked out in a participatory manner. Trends emerging from the findings are that the Zimbabwe security sector is interweaved with the ruling party the ZANU-PF and any efforts to peacebuilding should be focused on interwoven “fabric”. As such the symbiotic relationship between the security sector and ZANU-PF government is compromising the delivery of good governance. The findings are that with the dominance of the “fabric” in the political field ever since year 2000 period under research the country has never known positive peace from a government failing to meet the qualities of well-functioning government. Whichever interpretation of recent developments proves to be correct; the militarization of Zimbabwean politics is a major cause for concern. Although the creeping influence of the military within both the party and the state is not a new phenomenon, the period since the 2017 President Munangagwa’s rise appears to have seen the intensification of this process. In addition to increasing the risk of the kind of violent repression witnessed in January 2019, the greater control of military leaders over civilian processes has important implications for positive peace prevalence in the country. The military’s influence extends throughout the country’s political and economic institutions, and it is nominally responsible for running the security sector.

Considerable political, practical, conceptual and strategic work still needs to be done to find positive peace in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe government would not, at present, qualify as a good governance or a well-functioning government in most political scientists’ calculations given the turmoil of conflicts that have been experienced in the country that entangle the security sector. It has been found out through the research that the security sector has been politicised and found its way into the state institutions such that it dances to the whims of ZANU-PF. As such it is not surprising that none in ZANU-PF has ever come in the open to castigate or acknowledge the militarisation of institutions such as Zimbabwe, Electoral Commission (ZEC), Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), Grain Marketing Board (GMB) etc. One of the key findings of the Motlanthe Commission which was set up after the 2018 elections was that six civilians had been shot and killed by members of the military or police. These were serious human rights violations, but not a single soldier or police officer has been held accountable to his or her actions. None of the commanders has been held to account.

Recommendations

That positive and sustainable peace and not negative peace is desired in Zimbabwe is indisputable, what is contestable and indeed a challenge is the issue of commitment in those, it is their responsibility to bring this about. As a prerequisite for 'positive peace', efforts must

be made especially by those in authority to create conditions necessary for cultivating a 'culture of peace' to thrive at both macro and micro levels in our society especially as we move towards yet another potentially conflict - prone harmonised election in year 2023. Below are recommendations from this study which might help in curtailing challenges with the security sector and how it can contribute to positive peace building in the country?

- The security sector should carry their duties as prescribed and acknowledged in the country's constitution.
- The armed forces should be fully conversant with the democratic features of the system which they serve and they should also interact with any of the elected civil authorities around a range of issues critical to their national mandate.
- There is need for restoring judicial independence, there is need to create an independent and impartial judicial commission to investigate infringements of judicial independence and provide public recommendations for judicial reform and examination in particular reforms that prevent the distribution of unlawful payments or gifts to judges. Enforce the principle of equality under law. Convene an independent body to examine past practices of the Office of the Prosecutor to devise measures to ensure that the office operates in a non-partisan fashion. Revise or abrogate section 121 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, which permits prosecutorial appeals of bail rulings, to limit the possibility of abuse.
- The high levels of uncertainty for citizens in the country results in them have serious challenges in amicable engagement with security sector institutions. Programming that focuses on reducing this uncertainty provides entry points for broader security sector transformation initiatives and helps the public to see tangible results in a short period of time.
- The conduct of security policy and the management of security matters should be handled in a consultative and transparent manner, and should encourage a high level of parliamentary and public participation without endangering the lives of personnel and without prejudicing the ability of the security forces to conduct legal and legitimate operations.
- It is essential to deconstruct all erroneous political conceptualizations of security sector reform, to discard the faulty rationalizations and deceitful expositions of security sector reform which are so myopic as to limit the idea to mere balancing of political power or to settling political scores.
- National security should be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social, and cultural rights of the country's people; and the activities of the

security sector should be subordinate to and supportive of these efforts. A culture of accountability and democratic process needs to be created to replace a police culture of impunity and violence then positive peace can be realised.

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